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 In a sense, this entire project reckons with what it means to acknowledge, with 
what it means to recognize or appreciate—belatedly—those formative figures and 
guiding forces that continue to animate and (re)mark. The inherent difficulties in locating 
or identifying a place to begin such an endeavor will become more apparent in due 
course. For now, an attempt at retracing the trail and its lineaments must suffice. 
 Seeds of the ideas that eventually found their way into this dissertation began to 
take shape over a decade ago during my time at Boston University School of Theology. A 
travel seminar to Cuba and countless impromptu meetups at The Dugout helped me 
nurture those seeds long before they were strong enough to take root. I am forever 
grateful to my colleagues and dear friends throughout that time—I now know just how 
rare such a cohort is. My thanks as well to my longtime friend Bonnie Porter for her love 
and support during the initial stages of my graduate studies.  
 I initially moved to Boston sight unseen due to two towering figures at Oklahoma 
City University’s Wimberly School of Religion. Dr. Mark Davies helped me develop a 
clear sense of critical consciousness and his famous ‘time to kick it up a notch’ speech—
a tradition for all first-year students at the time—haunts me to this day. The late Dr. John 
Starkey recognized the writer and thinker in me before I could, extending an unmatched 
sense of intellectual rigor and generosity. I had no business being in his Paul Ricoeur 
seminar my last semester at OCU, but it quite literally threw me on a trajectory that led to 
this project. We discussed my dissertation ideas many times over the years and it saddens 
me that he will never take his green pen to a completed version.  
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 This project would not have been possible without the support of BU’s Graduate 
Program in Religion. I would especially like to thank those who have helped me navigate 
my studies at various stages and advocated on my behalf: Dr. Adam Seligman, Karen 
Nardella, Drs. David Eckel Jonathan Klawans, Ryan Sullivan, Drs. Jennifer Knust and 
Ray Hart, Wendy Czik, and Dr. Michael Zank. To the close colleagues who have been 
with me since the beginning, Troy DuJardin, Ben Austin, and Paul Matthews, your 
honesty, friendship, and solidarity have made all the difference.  
 Special thanks are also due to faculty in the larger BU community who extended 
pedagogical opportunities that have ultimately helped me hone both my writing and my 
interdisciplinary interests. They include Maria Gapotchenko in the Core Curriculum 
along with Tom Underwood and Chris Walsh in the Writing Program. I am also deeply 
grateful for my first-year students in the Writing Program whose insight and enthusiasm 
shed new light on much of the material that made its way into this project.  
 Fragments and early drafts of the last chapter were given in presentation form 
before the Religion, Film, and Visual Culture working group at the American Academy 
of Religion annual meeting in 2012. My sincere thanks to those who participated in that 
forum. I am especially grateful for feedback from faculty and students at a Religion and 
Literature seminar sponsored by the Graduate Program in Religion at BU in 2016. In 
hindsight, that event marked a turning point in my thought and research.  
 A dissertation is only as good as those who had a hand in its development. To that 
end, I am exceedingly fortunate to have worked with such a wonderful and gracious 
group of scholars. My thanks to Joshua Pederson and Gail Hamner for agreeing to serve 
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as committee members and for providing feedback on my work. I am grateful as well to 
my second reader, Anthony Petro, for his insight, advice, and support throughout my 
studies. Special thanks to Bryan Stone for his encouragement and energy since my early 
days as a master’s student, and for agreeing to serve as my committee chair. I struggle to 
fully express how profoundly indebted I am to my advisor, first reader, and closest 
intellectual mentor, Shelly Rambo, who has witnessed, since the beginning, my own 
travails and those of this project. Her generous style of thinking, her willingness to make 
and recognize space for ideas to unfold, and, especially, her appreciation and attention to 
the craft of writing truly inspire me and have often carried me throughout this process.  
 I extend additional thanks to friends and housemates Emily Morgan and Taylor 
Brean for their patience during the countless times I have ensconced myself to attend to 
this process. Thanks as well to Jeremy Durling, whose late-night ruminations continue to 
nourish me and whose work has impacted my own more than he may know.  
 To my closest and oldest friend, Debbie Brubaker, whose presence haunts nearly 
every page: Saudade.  
 To my partner and companion, Lindsey, who everyday embodies an other-worldly 
level of creativity and solicitude: the hourglass is still flipping and I cherish each fleeting 
moment. This project is ultimately motivated by a desire to approach all moments with 
the degree of receptivity and care I see you so effortlessly exhibit each day.  
 Finally, my deepest and most expansive thanks are reserved for my family, 
especially my parents, Ricky and Donna, who have supported me without question 
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throughout this endeavor. Their guidance and example contributed the ideas that take 
shape below and will with others, no doubt. 
This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of my maternal grandparents who 
passed while I was working on this project but whose animating spirits mark and re-mark 
me still.  
x 
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ABSTRACT 
Modern understandings of nostalgia sharply distinguish it from memory and often 
construe its relationship to the past as reactionary, fanciful, or retrograde. This 
dissertation reconsiders that valuation by engaging the formative sources that contribute 
to philosophical understandings of nostalgia and provide resources for thinking it 
otherwise. It reexamines time and memory in continental philosophy and U.S. cinema to 
argue that nostalgia does important work often overlooked in present conceptions, work 
that repositions relations with the past to generative, animating effect. The project 
analyzes the temporal issues nostalgia elicits, highlights its affective contours, and 
repositions its power to mediate and rework memory. It maintains that the role nostalgia 
plays in human experience is more propulsive than regressive, making it more attuned to 
time’s tensions and demands than previously thought. 
Chapter one narrates the history of nostalgia, beginning with the work of 
Johannes Hofer. Origins in medical nosology establish a diagnostic frame of reference 
that grounds nostalgia’s reception as pathology while also revealing its persistent 
instabilities. Martin Heidegger and, especially, Jacques Derrida bring the temporal 
vectors of those instabilities into sharper focus. Chapter two shows how Heidegger’s 
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work provides a useful understanding of time and moods, but ultimately remains tethered 
to a nostalgia for presence (nostos). Chapter three brings Derrida’s thinking on time and 
the trace into conversation with psychoanalysis to isolate a more capacious approach, one 
that indulges nostalgic desire but also frustrates it (algos).  
 The remaining chapters turn to film and develop an understanding of the moving 
image based on its ability to capture passing time, the eminent object of modern nostalgic 
experience. Chapter four engages critical literature on the uses of nostalgia in film and 
reconsiders George Lucas’s American Graffiti (1973), a pivotal work often reproached by 
critics and scholars. Chapter five advances a close reading of Terrence Malick’s The Tree 
of Life (2011) and his estranged relationship with philosophy. That relationship informs 
his work and often takes nostalgic recollection as an orienting concern. The film in 
question situates nostalgia as a propulsive screen affect that facilitates the work of 
mourning in the wake of loss and discontinuity. The dissertation concludes by sketching 
out horizons for future research and turning to insights contained in Augustine’s 





 What does nostalgia do and what is it for? How does it move us and to what end? 
This project probes these questions in an effort to think through how we inhabit nostalgia 
and how it comes to affect us. At stake in this thinking through is a broader, more 
capacious understanding of how nostalgia vivifies our experience and motivates our 
engagement with the world in ways previously overlooked. To that end, the close 
readings of films, texts, and figures contained in this project delineate the more 
generative features of nostalgia by examining how it interacts with our perceptions of 
time and memory. They identify instances of nostalgic expression illustrative of those 
features and highlight how a nostalgia aware of itself turns us more fully and openly 
toward the world. Each reading shows that by transporting us to our pasts and providing 
some opportunity for reflective reworking, nostalgia returns us more vigilantly to our 
present, forging a deeper attunement to future horizons and how we might intervene 
within them. It is in this sense that nostalgia propels. What I call propulsive or animating 
nostalgia throughout this work increases our openness to the world and enhances our 
capacities for movement and receptivity within it. Propulsive nostalgia furnishes us with 
a means to more readily attend to our experience, to how we negotiate our desires and 
manage our attachments. It prompts us to notice and address how we move about in the 
world with greater care and attention. This is the lighthouse signal, so to speak, the 
guiding through-line that steers this dissertation and unites its efforts.  
 In positioning nostalgia in this way and accentuating its temporal dimensions, this 
project draws inspiration from Saint Augustine. Augustine famously provides us with one 
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of the very first descriptions of temporality in the first-person, one that considers how 
time both shapes and exceeds our experience. He is less concerned with outlining a 
theory of what time is and more interested in what time does to us when we interact with 
it. He offers a phenomenology of time, in other words, a meditation on what time feels 
like, how we respond to it, and how it conditions the things we notice or ignore, 
especially when refracted through motivating feelings like nostalgia. For him, time is 
distentio animi, a distention of the soul that constantly, unceasingly, pulls us in opposite 
directions. The soul in this context is life’s primary source of movement, energy, and 
propulsion—the seat of all animation and kinetic activity. It incites locomotion, impelling 
us to maneuver and enabling our response to the maneuvers of others. For the 
Neoplatonists who influenced Augustine, time spreads life out and stretches the soul in 
variance. Augustine himself goes a step further and suggests that this stretching or 
distending tends to unsettle us, often leaving us feeling caught in-between, entangled 
amid the unfurling temporal processes that form us. We anchor ourselves in the (moving) 
present with divided attention, stretched out in opposite directions: backward toward the 
past in memory and forward toward the future in expectation. For Augustine, this means 
the experience of time is nothing if not disjunctive and often presents as a series of 
scattered fragments. That disjunction means the past can and often does return to us 
through the tautness of the tension and the stretchiness of the in-between. This project 
shows how nostalgia often takes hold when that in-between-ness is most noticeable, and 
the tension most acutely felt.  
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 Augustine’s image of time as distention emerges in response to a key question 
that underlies the Confessions, his most influential work. “Quid est ergo tempus?” So 
writes the bishop of Hippo in Book XI. “What, then, is time?” He continues, 
encapsulating with great elegance and lucidity, how time may seem obvious to us at first, 
but ultimately recedes when we attempt to fix it as an object of analysis. As our lives 
unfold, the flux and flow of time continue in the background and become more or less 
noticeable depending on the circumstances. We have some intuitive awareness of this, 
but Augustine’s point is that when we focus our attention on that awareness—or when 
experiences like nostalgia do that for us—we are beset with redundancies, contradiction, 
and confusion. “What, then, is time,” he asks. “Provided that no one asks me, I know. If I 
want to explain it to an inquirer, I do not know.”  
 Borne of much distress and consternation, this line is one of the most famous 
epigrams in the history of philosophy. Phenomenologists since at least Immanuel Kant 
quote it, reproduce it, and repeat it. Edmund Husserl opens his 1905 lectures on time-
consciousness by extracting and citing the line, going on to suggest that no thinker since 
Augustine has managed to surpass his insight. Husserl’s student, Martin Heidegger, 
lectured extensively on the problem of time in 1930, concluding his talks with an 
extended meditation on Augustine. Paul Ricoeur is constantly ruminating on Augustine’s 
conundrum in his sprawling, three volume work on time and narrative. In the concluding 
sections of that work, he suggests that Augustine’s question reveals an aporia that 
remains deeply hidden even though—and especially when—it affects us most intimately. 
Time cultivates life and change but conceals itself when we attempt to grasp it or 
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demarcate a given moment. This leads Ricoeur to conclude that there has never been a 
philosophy of time completely free of aporia and that this explains why we often turn to 
metaphors and the language of myth when discussing time. He goes on to suggest that 
what Augustine ultimately offers us through notions like distentio animi is a means of 
approaching or mobilizing the paradox. So, rather than solving the aporia, the question 
becomes one of how to inhabit it and turn around in it, how to keep its tension open and 
taut—how to make it work, in other words. 
 This project begins in a similar position. It attempts to make Augustine’s aporia 
work by taking up nostalgia as a useful analytic site for exploring how the tensions of 
time and memory contribute to what we notice in the world and how we engage that 
noticing. I return to Augustine at the conclusion of this study, both his framing of that 
aporia and his own motivations for construing distentio animi as a response to it. The 
chapters below show how nostalgia leavens that aporia by heightening our experience of 
the world and turning us more openly to its exigence.  
 Nostalgia always comes after, and the form of desire it engenders often follows 
instances of loss or discontinuity not easily workable. Such experiences of feeling call for 
a better feel for experience, and a more supple approach to the aporia Augustine so 
beautifully outlines. This project contends that nostalgia can provide both. Emerging as 
an intimate response to Augustine’s aporia, nostalgia attempts to solve it, gains strength 
and momentum when it cannot, and, by virtue of that failure, puts the aporia itself to 
animating work. That work summons our most generative capabilities and propels us 
more fully and attentively to the world.  
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 This dissertation’s fundamental starting point—that nostalgia offers us a facility 
with experience unnoticed in familiar conceptions—imposes certain limits. A lack of 
counterexamples that bolster those familiar conceptions will, hopefully, have the overall 
effect of decentering them enough for an alternative to come into view. That absence 
does not amount to a lack of engagement with the conceptions themselves, however. 
Such examples are no doubt widely available and have been well documented, to be sure. 
This project is interested in approaching a view beyond. It positions nostalgia as a useful, 
motivating occasion for critical reflection and it does so by taking up a problem (time and 
memory) first identified by a religious figure (Augustine). As such, its significance is 
twofold. First, its most immediate yield is to dislodge nostalgia from familiar, 
constrictive valuations and chart a different path guided by key examples in philosophy, 
film, and religion. Second, and more broadly, this project makes contributions to modes 
of humanistic inquiry that draw on questions and concepts taken from religious discourse 
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Chapter 1: Nostalgia’s Live Burial 
 
Nostalgia is a ‘poisoned itch’…its real cause buried, perhaps invisibly, within us.1 
- Nadia Atia and Jeremy Davies 
 
Nostalgia…evokes the past only in order to bury it alive.2 
-Christopher Lasch 
 
In the year 1733, General Praxin led a Russian army to the banks of the Rhine. At this remote 
distance from their native country, five or six soldiers became unfit for duty every day from nostalgia. The 
General issued an order to bury alive all who were affected with it.3 
-Benjamin Rush 
 
Nostalgia’s Vivisepulture, Then and Now 
In November 1984 an essay titled “The Politics of Nostalgia” appeared in 
Harper’s magazine. Its author, the American historian Christopher Lasch, provides a 
highly critical overview of recent literature on nostalgia. A 1960s Neo-Marxist turned 
family values champion, Lasch summarily dismisses the figure of the nostalgic as “an 
incurable sentimentalist…cling[ing] to an idealized past…that exists only in his head.”4 
Putting an even finer point on it elsewhere, he suggests that the hallmark of “the nostalgic 
attitude” includes a wholesale “disparagement of the present.” This attitude results in a 
noxious “abdication of memory” that calcifies images of a past that “stand outside time, 
frozen in unchanging perfection.”5 Lasch targets populist appeals to nostalgia that 
bolstered progressive politics at the time, but the core of his argument supports a familiar 
 
1 Nadia Atia and Jeremy Davies, “Nostalgia and the Shapes of History: Editorial,” Memory Studies 3, no. 3 
(July 1, 2010), 181. 
2 Christopher Lasch, “The Politics of Nostalgia,” Harper’s 269, no. 1614 (1984), 70. 
3 Benjamin Rush, Medical Inquiries and Observations Upon the Diseases of the Mind (Philadelphia, PA: 
Grigg and Elliot, 1835), 111. 
4 Lasch, “The Politics of Nostalgia,” 65. 
5 Christopher Lasch, The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics (New York, NY: W. W. Norton 




conflation of nostalgia with regression or reversion.6 This position takes nostalgic 
experience and the form of desire it engenders to be shortsighted, all too often resulting in 
individual romanticism or collective fantasy. The Harper’s piece rehearses these moves 
and builds, finally, to a memorable if not revealing claim. “Nostalgia,” Lasch writes, 
“evokes the past only in order to bury it alive.”7 That evocative turn of phrase expresses 
more than he realized, conjuring both nostalgia’s fraught history and its continued 
dismissal as an aspect of human experience that occludes genuine acts of memory and 
serious reckoning with the past.  
This project takes fundamental issue with such statements and the underlying 
assumptions they depend upon, seeking instead to highlight generative characteristics of 
nostalgic experience otherwise buried or occluded. Nostalgia, I argue, need not prohibit 
legitimate access to the past, nor impede meaningful engagement with it. It can, on the 
contrary, encourage such engagement in incredibly compelling ways by virtue of what I 
call its more animating and propulsive features. Those features are often overlooked in 
critical assessments (like Lasch’s) that do not attend to the often slow and unhurried work 
they perform upon nostalgic subjects. That work, I maintain, contributes to incremental 
increases in our capacities to move and be moved by the experiences indexed within us. 
To that end, the propulsive, animating features of nostalgic experience this project 
unfolds circulate in what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick calls “the middle ranges of agency.” 
 
6 His interlocutors here include paragons of various forms of populist nostalgia like Richard Hofstadter, 
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Jim Hougan, and Richard Louv, among others. For Lasch, each figure mobilizes 
nostalgia to bolster ideological retrievals of the past that elide genuine historicity and authentic memory. I 
discuss additional sources that perpetuate Lasch’s conflation below. 




They generate tiny, often unspectacular exchanges or shifts in disposition that “offer 
space for effectual creativity and change,”8 or, to put it in a register I develop throughout 
this dissertation, they open up unturned possibilities for increased movement in time. In 
other words, they shape and inform how we move about in the world in response to the 
experiences of loss and discontinuity to which nostalgia so often attends.  
For Sedgwick, these middle ranges of agency deal in “small differentials” that 
often lodge themselves between the fixed, zero-sum dyad of self and structure, a 
dichotomy that “dramatiz[es] only the extremes of compulsion and voluntarity.”9 These 
differentials result in fragile, accumulative achievements that require discovery over and 
over again. Because they are so small and muted, those differentials can only show up for 
us if they are recognized as such. This may seem obvious, but a major preliminary 
concern of this study is to show how nostalgia’s history and transmission contribute to 
valuations that cannot recognize those differentials and instead position the feeling as 
erroneous, deviant, or retrograde. I contest this normative sentiment in an effort to both 
dislodge nostalgia from its longstanding pathological associations and highlight its 
capacity to intervene in temporal awareness and rework memory, ultimately interrogating 
what expect the experience of time to do for us. To the extent that nostalgia follows loss 
and discontinuity, my argument is that its propulsive, animating features function as a 
generative strategy for responding to those conditions in their often-protracted wake. That 
strategy, both necessary and ongoing, serves to reorient subjects in time and impel 
 
8 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Michèle Aina Barale, and Jonathan Goldberg, Touching Feeling: Affect, 





movement, offering a means of incorporating experiences that may indeed be terminal 
but need not be debilitating or immobilizing. 
 The argument develops in conversation with key textual and filmic sources in 20th 
century continental thought and American cinema, sources that help bring nostalgia’s 
neglected features into clearer view. Those features must be carefully unfolded in order to 
become fully intelligible. The close textual readings of Lasch, Johannes Hofer, Martin 
Heidegger, and Jacques Derrida contained below initiate that work and the analyses of 
films by directors George Lucas and Terrence Malick bring it to fruition. Together they 
comprise a sustained effort to make nostalgic experience more legible, to make the forms 
of movement and desire it engenders “readable in new ways,” to borrow from Barbara 
Johnson.10  
This chapter lays the groundwork for that effort by tracing nostalgia’s history, 
development, and transmission as a form of pathologized desire. I take up the image of 
live burial referenced by Lasch above as an effective tool with which to probe nostalgia’s 
history and a useful shorthand for conceptions that continue to construe it as a problem to 
be fixed or a disease to be cured rather than a resource for movement in time. At issue in 
this history is the manner in which nostalgia is thought to constitute an errant type of 
desire that ultimately impels spurious forms of movement subject to diagnosis, suspicion, 
and even punishment in some cases. Valuations of this kind form what I call gestures of 
vivisepulture (live burial) that contribute to nostalgia’s impoverished position and 
 
10 Barbara Johnson, The Feminist Difference: Literature, Psychoanalysis, Race, and Gender (Cambridge, 




occlude its broader range of expression in instances that often yield animating, propulsive 
effects. Lasch best exhibits these gestures but they enjoy additional moments of 
exceeding historical resonance. I map them onto two different valences that lie at 
nostalgia’s etymological roots—nostos (homecoming) and algos (pain)—and further 
anchor both sets of coordinates to two phases in nostalgia’s development. The first phase 
involves nostalgia’s initial emergence as a medical disease rooted in homesickness 
(nostos). The second coalesces around key transformations that takes place in nostalgia’s 
confrontation with burgeoning modernity. Those transformations deal with a great many 
things but the most germane to nostalgia is the shift in perceptions of time and 
temporality that ultimately recast the feeling as the form of wistful melancholy we know 
it as today (algos).  
This mapping demonstrates how, prior to the Enlightenment, the practice of live 
burial and variations upon it acted as a means of eliminating nostalgia along with the 
errant desires and spurious forms of movement it engenders. It is only later, under the 
new temporal conditions of modernity, when it is removed from its initial context, that 
nostalgia is buried alive once more through subjective interiorization, where the 
experience is transposed within the inner life of the individual and the outworking of 
memory. As Nadia Atia and Jeremy Davies put it, after modernity nostalgia becomes a 
type of “poisoned itch,” its “real cause…buried, perhaps invisibly, within us.”11  That 
interiorization, to be clear, brings the temporal dimensions of nostalgic experience into 
sharper focus but it does not fundamentally alter the conditions that generate the 
 




experience. Nostalgia emerges in response to loss, discontinuity, and restlessness. The 
form, texture, and character of that response drives nostalgia’s development across time, 
an evolution best exemplified in a shift in focus from localized space to passing time. 
Lasch’s assumption that nostalgia forestalls serious acts of memory, for example, take 
time and temporization as a major point of departure even if he does not center them in 
his discussion. He makes certain temporal assumptions and argues that what he calls 
authentic memory rightly comports with those assumptions. Nostalgia, on the other hand, 
does not—and because it doesn’t, it remains pathological. This position owes a great debt 
to nostalgia’s origins and history, but before exploring that development more fully we 
first need to establish some additional context that explains why Lasch acts as such a 
representative figure of what we might call nostalgiphobia.  
In the early 80s Lasch was experiencing a brief yet illuminating rise to national 
prominence. His 1979 book The Culture of Narcissism was a bestseller and had just won 
the National Book Award. Richard Locke of The New York Times called the work “a 
sardonic and often condescending survey of 20th century social theories about the 
family.”12  In its review of the book Time magazine likened Lasch to a sort of modern-day 
biblical prophet. His work was praised for its “formidable intellectual grasp and the kind 
of moral conviction rarely found in contemporary value-neutral history and sociology.”13 
Later that same year President Carter invited Lasch to join a group of public intellectuals 
to discuss the state of the American psyche following the tumultuous 60s, Vietnam, and 
 
12 Richard Locke, “The Literary View: In the Cage Literary View,” New York Times Book Review, Mar. 26, 
1978, 3. 




the Watergate scandal. The result of those conversations was Carter’s infamous “malaise 
speech” where he scolded the American public for their lack of confidence in 
governmental institutions. The speech backfired and was seen in hindsight as a failure 
and a grave tactical mistake.14 The next year, of course, Carter lost his reelection bid in a 
massive landslide that ushered in the Reagan Revolution.  
1979 was also the year that nostalgia theory or what we might call nostalgia 
studies began to emerge. Fred Davis’ seminal Yearning for Yesterday: A Sociology of 
Nostalgia was published on New Year’s Day, marking the beginning of what would 
eventually become a widespread proliferation of scholarship concerned with nostalgia, a 
development Lasch found to be excessive and wrongheaded. Davis suggested that the so-
called “nostalgia boom” of the 1970s was essentially a large-scale response to the decade 
prior, citing the same list of cultural shifts and political events that led President Carter to 
his “crisis of confidence” address. Major nationwide periodicals at the time approached 
nostalgia with a heightened degree of fascinated skepticism. “How much more nostalgia 
can America take?” asked Time in 1971, going on to suggest that nostalgia is merely 
“utopia in reverse,” selecting only what is agreeable in the past and distorting it into 
sanguine myth or fantasy.15 Earlier that same year LIFE published a special half-issue 
devoted to the nostalgia craze. “Everybody’s just wild about nostalgia,” its cover read. 
The issue featured pieces on the recent revival of Vincent Youman’s 1925 musical “No, 
No, Nanette,” the resurgence of Art Deco and the fashion trends of the 30s and 40s, and a 
 
14 For more on the speech, its background, context, and legacy as well as Lasch’s influence upon it see 
Kevin Mattson, “What the Heck Are You Up To, Mr. President?”: Jimmy Carter, America’s ‘Malaise,’ and 
the Speech That Should Have Changed the Country (New York, NY: Bloomsbury USA, 2009). 




retrospective post-mortem on the lavish movie palaces that flourished between World 
War I and the Great Depression. These exposés drew attention to new vectors of 
nostalgia while at the same time suggesting, in a manner that anticipates Lasch, that “the 
sentimental craze for the past” impedes any serious exercise of memory and instead 
paints an inaccurate picture.16 Provoked by future uncertainty and a general sense of 
restlessness, Americans were fascinated by the pastness of the past and began looking 
back to the quaint equanimity of time gone by with rose-tinted, sepia-toned glasses. In 
this context, nostalgia constituted a response to disjointed time, a reaction to socio-
political upheaval, and a protest against discontinuity. 
This brings us back to the 1984 Harper’s piece, specifically the vivid and 
evocative phrase Lasch’s uses to distill his argument: “nostalgia evokes the past only in 
order to bury it alive.” The implication here is that nostalgia delivers a facile version of 
the past, conjuring it for the purposes of self-gratification while ignoring its complexities. 
But the rancor and historical resonance run much deeper. The image evoked is that of 
vivisepulture—live burial—and it acts as more than mere rhetorical flourish. It conjures 
historical precedence that sheds further light on nostalgia’s origins and how those origins 
contribute to its fraught position in critical thought. A full 250 years before Lasch penned 
his critique, a Russian General named Praxin faced a massive outbreak that jeopardized 
his troops’ health. One after another soldiers fell victim to a strange new ‘wasting’ 
disease that wreaked havoc on his company’s health and morale. Forced from their 
homelands to serve on the Rhine during the War of Polish Succession, these troops 
 




exhibited intense symptoms of fatigue, appetite loss, and decreased motivation. 
Laypeople understood this ailment as a particularly severe case of homesickness, but 
medical professionals at the time offered a more technical diagnosis: nostalgia. Historical 
reports indicate that in order to treat this nostalgia epidemic, “the General issued an order 
to bury alive all who were affected with it.”17 Dislocated and forced into new conditions 
of imposed mobility, these nostalgics were subject to the same advancements in 
industrialization and urbanization as Lasch’s pastoral figures who lament “the eradication 
of unspoiled nature by the irresistible forces of progressive change.”18 New military 
mandates pertaining to flexibility, transportation, and increased maneuverability helped 
propel this change as soldiers were asked to leave the dwellings of their youth and make 
their homes abroad as productive and capable enlistees. These innovations had profound 
and long-lasting effects that contributed to nostalgia outbreaks like those reported in 
Praxin’s company.  
Doctors at the time observed that these nostalgics longed to return home. What 
does this mean, to re-turn? At its most simple, the desire to return or go back means these 
nostalgics want to move. They long to re-turn by moving away from their current location 
and moving back home. The form of desire involved here is not one of stasis or 
stagnation. Nostalgia does not seize all movement. It is not as if these soldiers cannot 
move at all; they cannot move, or, better, are prohibited to move, in the direction of their 
desire, a desire deemed unruly if not completely impossible. Praxin’s nostalgics long to 
 
17 Rush, Medical Inquiries and Observations Upon the Diseases of the Mind, 111. Italics mine. See also 
Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia (New York, N.Y.: Basic Books, 2002), 5. 




reverse their current form of movement and perform a return that orients them back 
toward the familiar—they yearn for homecoming. In question is an unsanctioned form of 
desire that excites their capacities for movement, not the capacities themselves; nostalgia 
is not tantamount to sheer paralysis. In this context, the experience comprises a revolt 
against the control and manipulation of movement by new social forces of deracination 
and estrangement.  
By interring his nostalgia-ridden soldiers alive within an enclosed space, Praxin 
performs an especially cruel act that further solidifies his victims’ increasing alienation: 
subjecting them to the slow, suffocating deterioration of their own capacities for 
movement and, finally, their own asphyxiation. Their insubordinate capacities for 
movement are too unruly and non-compliant, they must therefore be neutralized—slowly. 
All this because the soldiers’ desired form of movement refuses easy instrumentalization 
and is thus is taken to be inoperative and useless. Nostalgia thus incites movement and 
engenders propulsion but in this instance those possibilities are rendered problematic, 
unproductive, and errant. The desire nostalgia generates both impels movement and poses 
a movement problem, hence the need for immediate cessation and a compelling show of 
force through live burial. These measures were “inflicted in two or three instances…in 
consequence of which the disease instantly disappeared from the army.” Praxin’s order 
was successful and amenable to larger military concerns on two fronts: effective fear 
tactics deterred future cases and worthless, deficient soldiers were sent to living tombs as 




This little-known historical event casts Lasch’s accusation in new light. 
“Nostalgia evokes the past only in order to bury it alive.” The Russian General’s situation 
so long ago imbues this line with an eerie, apparitional ambience. The turn of phrase 
encapsulates the tumultuous history of a feeling that has gone from victim to perpetrator 
vis-a-vis live burial within the span of only 250 years. Praxin’s entombed victims haunt 
Lasch’s text in this regard, or, at the very least, his rhetoric re-animates their remains 
through the image of vivisepulture—live burial—and its concealed associations with 
nostalgia. The polarity is reversed, of course. Praxin buried nostalgics alive; Lasch says 
that nostalgics bury the past alive. Praxin delivered his orders at the dawn of the 
eighteenth century; Lasch pens his critique at the close of the twentieth. Both figures 
stand on either side of modernity and while modernity does change nostalgia’s 
valences—the way it inspires and inflects movement, as we shall see—the critical 
response remains the same: erasure and antagonism. Praxin executed nostalgics because 
of their unacceptable attachments, inefficient yearning, and unproductive, errant forms of 
desire. For Lasch, two centuries later, nostalgic desire still reads as errant, relegated to the 
sphere of noxious fantasy alone, burying the past alive by evoking it through fallacious, 
deceptive means. By connecting nostalgia and live burial in his piece, Lasch unwittingly 
conjures a long history in which the pathologized nostalgic, a figure of the obsolete and 
outmoded past, functions as an entombed reminder of all that has been lost—or buried—
due not only to the passage of time, but the values of progress and modernization through 




their appeal to live burial, take nostalgia and the forms of movement it facilitates to be 
fundamentally problematic and thus cause for suspicion, if not outright abolition.  
My contention throughout this project is that those assumptions and the gestures 
of vivisepulture they enable make it exceedingly difficult to see how nostalgia might 
facilitate more propulsive and animating forms of movement. The Praxin-Lasch 
apparatus cannot fully recognize those forms and therefore deems them errant or spurious 
because it depends on an additional, more foundational assumption that associates 
nostalgia with pathology. That association stems from nostalgia’s conceptual genesis in 
medical nosology, a discourse that establishes a clear diagnostic frame of reference. That 
frame first emerges in the late seventeenth century through the work of Johannes Hofer. 
Hofer is the first to coin the word nostalgia, positioning it as an “affliction of the 
imagination” (imaginations laesae) induced by internal “animal spirits” (spiritus 
animales) that generate errant desires and spurious forms of movement. In essence, he 
thought nostalgics suffered from a type of monomania due to increased, nearly obsessive 
contemplation of impressed memory traces containing images of a lost home. This 
conception situates nostalgia as a type of pathology and its diagnostic residue persists 
well beyond Hofer as Lasch’s assessment indicates. The remainder of this chapter unfurls 
that diagnostic frame using the image of vivisepulture as a guiding thread. It also 
sketches some methodological concerns with additional help from affect theory and more 
recent assessments of nostalgia. It concludes by returning to Hofer to identify moments in 
his text suggestive of different possibilities that run counter to familiar valuations. That 





Map of the Project 
The chapters ahead offer some conceptual and cinematic texture to the more 
propulsive and animating features of nostalgic experience this project aims to thematize. 
Chapters two and three offer interventions in continental philosophy, affect theory, and 
psychoanalysis in order to lay the conceptual groundwork necessary to see how those 
features surface in cinema. The second chapter begins by characterizing philosophy’s 
longstanding suspicion of feeling and emotionality, noting that while philosophy 
famously begins in feeling (wonder) it almost immediately works to excise movements 
feeling in favor of movements toward reason and rationality. I show how the feelings that 
lie at philosophy’s roots closely orbit nostalgia and express a desire to access or recover 
forgotten origins or lost beginnings. Those nostalgic feelings form what Martin 
Heidegger first called philosophy’s Grundstimmung, its most basic mood or fundamental 
disposition. 
The bulk of the chapter works to further unfold Heidegger’s thought to the extent 
that it offers some preliminary insights into considering how temporality interacts with 
motivating feelings like nostalgia. I argue that Heidegger’s work on time and moods, an 
admittedly minor moment in his work, begins to set us along the path toward 
understanding how nostalgic desire intervenes in time. He connects these insights to one 
of nostalgia’s antecedents, homesickness, through compelling phenomenological 
examples like anxiety and, especially, the uncanny or the unhomely which he examines 




to the poetics of Friedrich Hölderlin. Antigone brings us even closer to historical 
nostalgic experience given her fate of live burial. But, as useful as Heidegger is in this 
regard, these examples reveal the deep limitations of his thought. His romance with 
Ancient Greek beginnings, authenticity, and primordiality reveal his own surreptitious 
nostalgia for presence—he remains a thinker of nostos (homecoming) alone. 
Chapter three brings the temporal dimensions of nostalgia into sharper focus 
through sustained engagement with the work of Jacques Derrida, a figure who extends 
and radicalizes Heideggerian insights. At first blush, Derrida seems to be one of the least 
amenable thinkers to a reevaluation of nostalgia. Yet, while he vehemently rejects various 
forms of nostalgia for presence, he does offer the resources necessary to decouple 
nostalgia from a dynamic of regression and sentimentality. Once decoupled, a clearer 
understanding of nostalgia’s intrinsic bittersweetness comes into view, one where 
nostalgia emerges as a consequence of the insoluble interval between presence and 
absence. I begin by introducing and situating Derrida’s work through a reading of one of 
his final seminars, a text representative of his thought as a whole that takes nostalgia as a 
minor theme. I claim that Derrida ironizes and frustrates nostalgic desire without denying 
the experience to which it responds.  
I argue that these insights are part and parcel of his larger deconstructive project, 
a project that engages in what Derrida calls re-marking. I show how this gesture stands 
commensurate with the experience of nostalgia, an experience that forges an intimate 
correspondence with past experiences by spotlighting them and allowing them to be re-




différance, the trace, and afterwardness—that often occupy the majority of Derrida’s 
work. That body of work, I argue, takes time and temporality as its major leitmotif, and 
develops piecemeal in conversation with interlocutors like Heidegger and Sigmund 
Freud. I examine how Derrida positions himself with and against Heidegger and take 
special care to underscore the manner in which that conversation is often interrupted by 
psychoanalytic insights that hold the key to understanding the idiomatic conceptions of 
time and memory that unfold throughout Derrida’s final seminars. Unlike Heidegger, 
those insights, and the broader phenomenology of time to which they connect position 
Derrida as a thinker of algos (grief, ache). 
The next two chapters turn to film in full force. Chapter four places the foregoing 
insights in conversation with film theory to explore what Alessia Ricciardi calls the 
“inherently nostalgic function of film.”19 It begins by discussing the birth of cinema in 
1895 which serves to illustrate the medium’s capacity to offer up images commensurate 
with the transient nature of human experience: images of past and passing time. That 
transience, I claim, is often the space in which nostalgia emerges to mobilize memory and 
re-mark upon time’s passage. I show how film makes productive temporal use of the 
long-standing philosophical tension between referent and representation, between the real 
and its (moving) image. I argue that this matrix between time, movement, and 
representation supplies a crucial link between cinema and nostalgia. Cinema not only 
offers time and experience back up to us for reflection—belatedly, as in nostalgic 
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experience—it also traverses the initial problematic of nostalgia first identified by Hofer, 
i.e., the lacunae between movement and the image. 
In order to unpack those connections, I turn to the influential category of the 
“nostalgia film” first introduced by Fredric Jameson in his reading of George Lucas’s 
American Graffiti (1973). Drawing on critiques from Linda Hutcheon and Catherine 
Constable, I show how that category relies on the pathological connotations of nostalgia 
discussed below and work to expand its parameters to include more active understandings 
of spectatorship and intertextual practices like pastiche, allusion, and the deconstructive 
re-mark. This requires engagement with key antecedents in philosophy and film theory 
who offer versions of realism that inform received valuations of filmic nostalgia. I first 
examine André Bazin’s argument for cinematic realism and connect his insights to 
Plato’s allegory of the cave, a foundational scene of ontological realism that also 
functions as a primitive analogue for the movie-going experience. The chapter concludes 
by engaging the work of Vera Dika and Frances Smith on “nostalgia film” to leverage a 
reassessment of American Graffiti that highlights the productive, propulsive 
understanding of nostalgia that forms the overall basis of this project.  
The final chapter synthesizes the preceding insights by turning to the work of the 
American director Terrence Malick, specifically his 2011 Palme d’Or winner The Tree of 
Life. I begin by observing Malick’s close filiation with philosophy and note how his early 
interest in Heidegger continues to enliven and inform his work. Extending insights first 
offered by Stanley Cavell, I show how Malick’s films perform a re-mark upon 




absence.”20 Beginning with Badlands (1973) and Days of Heaven (1978), I argue that 
Malick’s cinematic oeuvre offers a sustained and compelling meditation on the accretion 
of memory and the temporized nature of the human condition. In The Tree of Life, these 
themes achieve new significance through affectively charged images that depict and elicit 
nostalgia. Malick creates and assembles these images in a manner that both 
acknowledges and complicates straightforward notions of successive movement and 
linear temporality, mobilizing what Russian filmmaker Andrei Tarkovsky has called 
cinema’s unique power to sculpt time.21  
I unfold this idea throughout the chapter by engaging in a close reading of the 
film that draws attention to how Malick constructs the past and uses those constructions 
to facilitate propulsive movement in the film’s main protagonist, a character previously 
stricken by immobility and grief. That transformation works, in part, because nostalgia 
functions as a screen affect in the film, a notion that resonates with the development of 
screen theory in film studies as well as the psychoanalytic and deconstructive insights 
regarding temporality, belatedness, and retroactivity explored in chapter three. As a 
screen affect, nostalgia mobilizes, reworks, and re-marks earlier feelings of bereavement 
in the wake of a profound loss. The film both screens nostalgia, evoking it in viewers 
through transference, while at the same time offering nostalgia up as a screen, a 
surrogate that facilitates the work of mourning in its main protagonist, allowing him to 
move forward by turning back. Like Derrida’s reflections in his final seminar, the film 
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accomplishes this without positioning nostalgia as a form of redemption or recompense 
and, especially, without providing any sense of temporal closure or narrative finality. In 
cinema, Malick offers an exceptionally arresting portrayal of re-marked nostalgic desire 
that gestures toward an increased receptivity toward temporal experience and all the 
vicissitudes it entails.  
 
Nostalgia’s Diagnostic Frame of Reference: The Invention of a Dis-eased Feeling 
One of the reasons why this project maintains a vested interested in nostalgia is 
because it serves a microcosm for the opacity of affective life, demonstrating the 
difficulties inherent in any effort to render experiences of feeling immediately 
transparent. “Feelings are always the feelings of feelings,” Adrian Johnston observes.22 
They arise as responsive reactions to stimuli not always easily identified. They come to 
us late and our understanding even later. If we feel happy or sad, to what do we attribute 
these feelings? How do they come to us and move us in the ways they do? At times, these 
feelings bury or conceal their trail as quickly as they emerge. They often arise through 
connections and associations that make it hard to retrace their provenance or isolate a 
referent. Time rushes ahead and comprehension lags behind. Both constitute the intricate, 
unfurling tapestry of accreting experience and enable us to better understand how we 
 
22 Adrian Johnston and Catherine Malabou, Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and 
Neuroscience (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013), 85. Silvan Tomkins, who pioneered the 
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easily by factors over which he has little control, with difficulty by factors over which he can control, and 
to endure for periods of time which he controls only with great difficulty, if at all. They are in these 
respects somewhat alien to the individual.” See Silvan S. Tomkins Tomkins, Affect Imagery 




come to find ourselves feeling this way or that. I further develop this thematic over the 
course of the next several chapters, but for now it will suffice to note that nostalgia takes 
this belated structure of emotional life and formalizes it. If the apprehension of feeling 
emerges through deferral and delay, at least one degree removed as Johnston suggests, 
then nostalgia is feeling par excellence. It emerges in response to loss and as it unfolds it 
generates layers of protracted recognition, engendering a powerful form of desire that 
seeks to retread or objectify time and its passage. Here we have an emotion that serves to 
not only highlight but actively accentuate the profound difficulty of going back, 
returning, or repeating. Nostalgia is a feeling whose entire purpose seems to be to retrace 
the track of feeling itself by taking as its object a phenomenon that does not sit still and 
cannot be localized: temporized experience. Enamored by the pipe dream of ‘going back’ 
to revisit some previous experience, nostalgia remains at war with itself, subsisting in 
jittery restlessness and unsettled transience. It longs for rest and repose but thrives in 
conditions of unfulfillment. Infatuated by the distance or interval between origin and 
effect, it pines for a type of union that only makes sense under the conditions of lack and 
absence that so forcefully impel it. Emerging in the aftermath of loss, dislocation, or 
discontinuity, it seeks remediation through return and repetition, expecting some form of 
cathartic release only to gain further momentum when that release is deferred again and 
again. Propelled by a type of frustrated, restive desire, nostalgia often accompanies the 
experience of mourning tinged with pleasure, of memory refracted through the prisms of 




nostalgia’s enduring persistence remains as interminable as its demands, reverberating 
beyond the (living) grave.  
It wasn’t always this way. Nostalgia has a long, fraught history marked by 
swerves and detours. This history is punctuated by a sharp shift in focus that coincides 
with the dawn of modernity, a shift that created the conditions for more common 
understandings of the feeling popular today. It initially emerged not as the inner form of 
longing we often take it to be, but as a medical disease with distressing symptoms and 
even more disturbing treatment plans. ‘Nostalgia isn’t what it used to be,’ or so the adage 
goes, expressing both its main lament and its susceptibility to what Krystine Batcho calls 
“semantic drift.”23 Now defined as a constellation of wistful feelings and desirous 
sensations associated with longing for things past, nostalgia was first called into existence 
in 1688 by the Swiss medical student Johannes Hofer.24 Drawing on Helvetian case 
studies, Hofer wanted to isolate a certain type of experience emerging “from the grief for 
the lost charm of the Native land”25 [ex dolore amissae dulcedinis Patriae desumptum]. 
This experience, he admits in his Basel dissertation, has a prehistory prior to its naming, 
what the Germans called das Heimweh and Helvetian mercenaries serving abroad in Gaul 
la Maladie du Pays. Like Praxin’s nostalgics less than 50 years later, these soldiers 
reacted to their new conditions of transience and forced mobility by expressing a 
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1688. (Book Review),” Bulletin of the Institute of the History of Medicine; Baltimore, Md. 2 (January 1, 
1934): 376–391. At present, Anspach’s is the only complete English translation of Hofer’s work. I have 
relied heavily on her work here and have only modified it in certain exceptional cases. 




profound desire to go back home, to return to their place of origin. They suffered from 
particularly acute cases of what we now call homesickness and their ailments often 
produced severe even lethal effects. Hofer felt that this phenomenon, both “uncommon 
and ever-present,”26 deserved a new name in official discourse. When searching for this 
new name he reached beyond the familiar German and French expressions. Instead, the 
former theology student returned to an ancient tradition of mourning and homecoming 
that can be traced back to Homer and the Psalms.27 He suggests that the new name for this 
feeling of melancholic sadness or desiring—nostalgia—is Greek in origin, but even those 
origins are feigned and created ex post facto. The word nostalgia is only quasi-Greek, or, 
as the late critic Svetlana Boym observes, “nostalgically Greek.”28 It did not exist as a 
category and had no extant linguistic use prior to Hofer’s coinage. The veracity of that 
coinage depends on a certain nostalgia for origins, what Jacob Taubes calls “the 
apotheosis of the early,” the perceived pedigree of ancient antiquity.29 The word itself is 
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thus borne of the same predicament it seeks to name, retroactively constructing a path to 
provenance in hopes of achieving some clarity and understanding.  
Nevertheless, by his own account, Hofer created this neologism “composed of 
two sounds,” Nostos (to return home, or reach an arrival place) and Algos (pain, or that 
which causes pain, grief, sorrow, or distress): the pain associated with returning, of 
arriving at a place associated with familiarity or homeliness. By generating this new 
name Hofer achieved something extraordinary. He created a novel disease, to be sure, but 
he also performed an act of translation. He transposed a previously noble emotional 
experience into a diagnostic tool subject to all the values and conventions attendant to its 
medical context.30 This resulted in a new type of pathology characterized by errant desires 
strong enough to result in grave illness. Acts of translation such as these are not neutral 
and often carry with them additional acts of implicit interpretive evaluation. Both the new 
name and the new context establish a diagnostic frame through which nostalgia continues 
to be received and transmitted, the same frame assumed by Praxin and Lasch in their 
gestures of vivisepulture. Hofer applies the word ‘nostalgia,’ a novel term at the time, to 
describe what he took to be a problematic pathology, a phenomenon we now associate 
with sheer feeling and often dismiss on the basis of excessive sentimentality as Lasch’s 
essay indicates.  
What does it mean to call an emotion into existence, to express desirous 
experience in language, to name a feeling or render a sensation in speech? “Can desire 
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survive its naming?”31 What is lost in this naming? And how, precisely, is such an 
experience felt or expressed prior to its naming? Tracing the genealogy of certain feelings 
or affects inevitably faces such seemingly intractable dilemmas, what Jean Starobinski 
has identified as “the interplay of emotions and language” in his influential cultural 
history of nostalgia.32 Emotions are only accessible for analytical examination and close 
reading to the degree that they find adequate, commensurate expression. Yet, they are not 
reducible to such expressions—this is the rub phenomenologists since Kant and Husserl 
warned us about. The names we confer—joy, anger, sadness, nostalgia—do not, cannot, 
contain the entirety of the experiences to which they refer. They all too easily elide the 
specificity of texture, the granularity of degree, the particularity of gradation. They are 
not the thing itself. At best, they serve as placeholders or signposts, always running the 
risk of burying their own origins alive. “It is not the emotion itself which comes before 
us,” Starobinski writes, “only that part which has passed into a given form of 
expression.”33 Identifying and naming an experience like nostalgia is, at best, an act of 
translation and, at worst, a crime of vivisepulture. In either case, examining such 
experiences is always already an engagement with the artifice of their construction, the 
drama of their transmission, the theatrics of their circulation.34  
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The artifice, drama, and theatrics begin with Hofer, who saw fit to invent not only 
a novel word but an entire disease by placing two familiar Greek terms side by side: 
nostos and algos. Together, these two old words name what Hofer took to be a new 
experience. He thus believed it possible “from the force of the expression Nostalgia, to 
trace the sorrowful sensibility arising from the burning desire for the return to one’s 
native land”35 [vt adeò ex vi vocis Nostalgia designare possit tristem animum ex reditûs in 
patriam ardenti desiderio oriundum]. A more literal translation of the first clause might 
read: “from the power of the voice, Nostalgia….” Thus nostalgia, according to Hofer, is a 
means of giving voice to the fiery, burning desire for a type of Odyssean homecoming, a 
movement of return to an origin that might offer some means of restitution, remediation, 
or repose. Incidents of actual live burial, like Praxin’s, would not emerge as a response to 
nostalgia for decades, but Hofer’s dissertation already establishes themes that pave the 
way. His short, remarkable text looks to render something intelligible. That intelligibility 
is local and specific to the discourse of diagnostic medicine in which Hofer is situated, a 
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discourse with its own strictures, conventions, and protocols. It stands to reason, then, 
that this intelligibility might also ignore or render unintelligible those aspects of nostalgic 
experience that do not immediately cohere with its epistemological standards. The 
possibility of misrecognition lies at nostalgia’s origins alongside the horizon of 
intelligibility. After Hofer that mis-recognition morphs into mechanisms of 
vivisepulture—figurative in Lasch and material in Praxin—that further obscure the 
alternative ways of knowing, desiring, and moving nostalgia contains. 
None of this is necessarily Hofer’s fault, yet his text does establish a diagnostic 
frame of reference through which nostalgia continues to be understood. It initiates 
nostalgia’s contested transmission by taking up an experience, previously unmarked by 
precise linguistic determination, and introducing or transposing it into something foreign: 
the lexicon of medical taxonomy and pathological classification. This moment marks the 
beginning of nostalgia’s formal vivisepulture, its live burial in thought and practice. Its 
nosological construction as a disease in Hofer’s work solidifies its position as a problem 
and sets a clear trajectory for its history as an analytical, diagnostic concept. This gesture 
is further serviced by Praxin and perpetuated by Lasch and others, a gesture rooted in 
misrecognition and the need to excise the unintelligible either through measures of 
outright retribution or more expulsionary discursive tactics like vivisepulture.  
Praxin and Lasch are not the only or even the most prominent figures to engage in 
acts of live burial or take up its metaphoric profusion. The fear of live burial and its use 
as an especially dreadful form of punishment resonate throughout thought and literature. 




insights into nostalgia’s own animating functions, and how those functions can be 
leveraged to generative effect. Antigone is probably the most recognizable figure in this 
regard, a heroine who responds to her sentence with clear-eyed defiance and a key 
example for thinkers like Heidegger (I will have more to say about this in the next 
chapter). Vivisepulture also frequently emerges in the work of Edgar Allen Poe as means 
of exploring the distinction between life and death through resuscitation and reanimation. 
For a long time, it was rumored that the scholastic philosopher John Duns Scotus was 
accidentally buried alive. Servants reportedly found his corpse outside the sarcophagus 
with bloody, lacerated hands, indicating a possible escape attempt.36  
These and other textual uses of live burial serve to soften the boundary between 
life and death, making it more porous and malleable. They do so by refiguring the 
dynamics of movement that adhere between life and death. Aristotle, for example, 
thematizes life under the rubric of the soul or psyche, the operative Greek word being 
anima from which we draw the English terms animation (possessing life, movement, or 
 
36 Francis Bacon is probably the most famous writer to have reported this, highlighting the themes of 
movement and reanimation. In his 1623 Historia vitae et mortis he writes: “There have been many 
instances of men who have been left for dead, laid out, and carried forth to burial; nay, of some who have 
been actually buried; that have yet come to life again. In the case of those who have been buried, this has 
been ascertained, on opening the grave, from the wounded and bruised state of the head, by reason of the 
body striving and tossing in the coffin. The most recent and memorable instance thereof was the subtle 
schoolman Duns Scotus, who having been buried in the absence of his servant (who appears to have known 
the symptoms of these fits), was by him afterwards disinterred and found in this state.” Cf. Francis Bacon, 
The History of Life and Death (http://www.sirbacon.org/historylifedeath htm) accessed August 7, 2020. 
Nearly 250 years later Rev. Alban Butler dismisses this telling as a mere fable in his The Lives of the 
Fathers, Martyrs, and Other Principal Saints. “The fable of his being buried alive is clearly confuted by 
Luke Wadding, the learned Irish Franciscan, who published his works, with notes, in twelve tomes, printed 
at Lyons in 1636. Natalis Alexander, a most impartial inquirer into this dispute, and others, have also 
demonstrated that story to have been a most groundless fiction.” Cf. his 
The Lives of the Saints, Volume VI, 1866. 




spirit) and animus (hostility or ill sentiment; also, motivation to move or do something).37 
Anima constitutes the vital spirit or life force of a being or entity and acts as a 
fundamental principle of movement—to live is to move, to be animated or impelled. 
Death, by contrast, is the cessation of movement. Freud is a particularly useful reference 
point in this regard. First in Beyond the Pleasure Principle and later in The Ego and the 
Id, he characterizes his notion of Todestrieb as a force that “lead[s] organic life back into 
the inanimate state” by restoring the earlier stage from which life emerged.38 The core 
binary at play here is between life as motion or movement and death as terminus or stasis. 
Live burial introduces a productive ambiguity between this set of oppositions. It 
preemptively forestalls the potential for movement (ending life) but in doing so also 
raises the question of finality: does the burial actually end life and stop animating 
movement? Is the victim really dead? These questions of closure eventually give way to a 
strange mixture of fear and fascination, the possibility, for example, that the corpse will 
return or re-animate to haunt in the future as Poe’s stories and the apocryphal legend of 
Duns Scotus indicate.39 Live burial leaves open the possibility that the ‘dead’ will be 
brought back with a vengeance, their anima re-kindled and free to perform spurious 
forms of movement that incite, among other things, fear, anxiety, and confusion. Like 
 
37 See, for example, his De Anima and Physics. 
38 Sigmund Freud and Peter Gay, The Ego and the Id in The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 19, ed. James Strachey (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1990), 40. 
39 This is one of the reasons why live burial is so often associated with the experience of the uncanny, i.e., 
the apprehension of something strange in the familiar, the unhomely that lies at the heart of the homely. In 
his book-length study of the topic, the first of its kind, Nicholas Royle draws a clear connection between 
the uncanny, live burial, and the sort of nostalgia this project explores: “At some level the feeling of the 
uncanny may be bound up with the most extreme nostalgia or homesickness, in other words a compulsion 
to return….” See Nicholas Royle, The Uncanny (New York, N.Y.: Manchester University Press, 2003), 2. I 




nostalgia, it raises a question of the possibility of animating—or reanimating—
movement. 
What sort of re-kindled anima does nostalgia raise and what sort of (re)animating 
movements does it induce, given its adjacency to live burial? This homology between 
nostalgia and vivisepulture serves to underscore one of the animating concerns of this 
entire project. The inadvertent connection Lasch makes in his Harper’s piece opens up 
space within which to consider how the forms of movement and desire nostalgia 
engenders may intervene within established assumptions pertaining to time and memory 
and how we comport ourselves to them. Like the practices of live burial to which it is 
subject, nostalgia introduces a productive, (re)animating ambiguity between two 
structuring values according to its own register: presence (life, movement) and absence 
(death, stasis). It recognizes distance and laments loss while at the same time setting in 
motion a powerful, propulsive desire to fill in gaps that cannot be immediately closed. 
Still, it subsists, offering a means of approach that weakens the boundaries between past 
and present, there and here, absence and presence. It is in this sense that nostalgia, like 
live burial, connotes a certain experience of haunting; something returns to re-animate, 
re-awaken, or re-mark, as I will put it in chapter three. By intervening in temporal 
awareness and reworking memory this spectral experience—nostalgia—creates the 
conditions for forms of movement that remain spurious and erroneous under the 
diagnostic frame of reference. 
Spurious or erroneous movement is essentially how Hofer describes both the 




vibration of animal spirits [spiritus animales] through those fibers of the middle brain in 
which impressed traces of the Fatherland [home] still cling.”40 Drawing on innovative 
insights at the time from Descartes and Thomas Willis, Hofer took these animal spirits to 
be something of an essential substrate that governs sense perception and physical 
reactions in response to received stimuli. In Descartes, whose framework Hofer 
essentially adopts wholesale in his dissertation, the animal spirits are produced by the 
brain and distributed throughout the body. This, he thinks, is what accounts for 
movement, specifically automatic or habitual movements like reflexes. These animal 
spirits function as “messengers of sorts”41 both organizing sensory communication and 
impelling movement. But, crucially, they are also capable of reactivating impressed 
images in memory and constructing new images in the imagination. Like the moving 
images discussed later in this study, these images re-present something presently absent, 
like the idea of home or any other object of nostalgia, and their representations serve to 
induce motion. The animal spirits move about within the body and as a result they move 
us, much in the same manner as ordinary feelings. But for Hofer, the images that cause 
nostalgia pose a problem because they facilitate spurious and erroneous movement in the 
form of return—they want to go backward instead of forward.  
Those afflicted, like the soon-to-be-entombed soldiers in Praxin’s company, long 
to ‘go back.’ They want to re-turn by re-orienting themselves toward the familiar and 
moving toward it. The images of home that motivate them were created in the past and 
 
40 Anspach and Hofer, “Medical Dissertation,” ¶7, 384. 




exert a force that depends on absence. Those images left indelible traces or impressions 
that are, according to Hofer, reactivated by the repeated and recurring vibration of quiet 
forces—the animal spirits—that govern movement and stimulate both memory and the 
imagination. As Thomas Dodman puts it in his translation, sensory stimuli trigger these 
vibrations “soliciting the imaginative faculties to converge on mental images impressed 
in memory and excite in the soul [anima] a recurring and exclusive idea of returning to 
the homeland.”42 In a sense, then, these animating forces called animal spirits serve to re-
animate past impressions embedded in memory—traces, buried alive perhaps, which 
generate a desire for movement and return. Nostalgia thus poses a movement problem by 
inspiring forms of movement deemed erroneous and regressive, a movement against 
movement, so to speak, a reaction to new demands of increased mobility. 
Against this backdrop it becomes clear that when General Praxin first sentenced 
nostalgics to death by live burial in 1733 he accomplished two things. First, he services 
nostalgia’s Hoferian status as pathology by implementing measures to both punish 
current nostalgics and discipline would-be victims in the future. Nostalgia engenders an 
unacceptable and unwieldy form of desire and must therefore be rooted out because it 
encourages spurious forms of movement—the return home—that do not accord with 
newfound military standards based on efficiency and portability. Nostalgics yearn for 
recursive movement and should thus not be allowed to move at all. Instead, they are 
subject to vivisepulture, interred in living tombs. Second, Praxin offers a material 
metaphor for the way the nostalgia morphs in confrontation with modernity. In the late 
 




nineteenth century, as new conceptions of time and temporality were just beginning to 
take shape, nostalgia disappeared from medical diagnostics altogether. Instead, it came to 
be associated with Romanticism as a trope for generalized longing and melancholic 
desire. This change—which Batcho attributes to semantic drift—facilitated a shift in 
focus away from space and place in favor of time and temporization. Corollary to this 
broader temporal shift is nostalgia’s subjective interiorization. No longer do nostalgics 
desire to return to some lost home; instead, they long for the past, for lost time and lost 
potential. Nostalgia is still a response to loss and a strategy for mourning, but under these 
conditions it is buried alive once again, this time within the mental life of the subject. 
Each instance of vivisepulture—Praxin’s literal gesture and modernity’s figurative one—
necessitate further unpacking. I will look at each in turn.  
 
Nostos: Nostalgia, Homesickness, and Place 
Praxin may have been the first to order the live burial of nostalgics, but he was 
not the only military official concerned with the new disease. The burgeoning malady 
posed a serious problem for many foreign armies stationed abroad. In Hofer’s time and 
up through the 18th and 19th century concerns revolved around optimal military 
performance.43 Armies needed to move about quickly and efficiently, and in this respect 
nostalgics made exceptionally poor soldiers. Hofer himself makes note of this newfound 
interest, observing cases of nostalgia “frequent with the centurions of the forces in 
 
43 As Batcho puts it, “much of the early interest in nostalgia was motivated by the concern for optimal 





Helvetian Gaul”44 who longed to counter their directives by initiating the move to return 
home. As imposed military mobility increased, so did the number of nostalgia outbreaks. 
By the time of the Napoleonic wars, nostalgia was second only to typhus and scurvy as 
the primary disease affecting military performance.45 Responses on the part of military 
officers like Praxin revolved around mitigating existing cases and managing troop 
morale. In some instances, they took deliberate disciplinary measures to prevent further 
nostalgia outbreaks. Soldiers who were forced to leave their homeland for tours of duty 
often fell victim to acute cases of homesickness and were subject to various forms of 
“moral therapy” or “moral assistance” similar to Hofer’s initial treatment plan of 
returning home. Afflicted troops were either granted furlough or, in some cases, merely 
promised the possibility of future return. When such ploys did not work more drastic 
measures were taken. Praxin’s practice of burying diagnosed nostalgics alive is perhaps 
the most extreme instance, but other draconian methods proliferated. When addressing 
outbreaks during the French Revolution, for instance, the physician Jourdan Le Cointe 
cites Praxin’s measures with approval, suggesting that nostalgia is best overcome by 
“inciting pain or terror,” going on to offer a remedy that involved applying a red-iron to 
the abdominal region.46 In order to properly treat nostalgia, it seemed, one must either 
assuage the longing through vague platitudes or by appealing to equally strong feelings of 
fear as a means of repressing or burying the desire. 
 
44 Anspach and Hofer, “Medical Dissertation,” ¶4, 382. 
45 Michèle Battesti, “Nostalgia in the Army (17th-19th Centuries),” in War Neurology, ed. Tatu L. 
Bogousslavsky (Basel: Karger Publishers, 2016), 135. 




In the U.S., the situation was a bit different. During the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries when European war doctors were scrambling to forestall nostalgia 
outbreaks and epidemics of homesickness, American officials boasted about their troops’ 
apparent immunity to the disease.47 Everything changed in the mid-nineteenth century 
with the American Civil War. Just as nostalgia was beginning to evolve in Europe—
inaugurating the shift in focus from space to time—American soldiers began to succumb 
to the illness en masse. Over 2,500 confirmed cases of nostalgia were reported during the 
first two years of the Civil War from Union armies alone.48 The symptoms, etiology, and 
proposed treatment plan were similar to those reported earlier in Europe. Affected 
soldiers were said to be despondent, melancholic and depressed, emotionally detached, 
sad, and generally sullen or crestfallen, completely consumed by the desire to return 
home. In a paper given before the Medical Society of the Army of Potomac in 1864, 
Union Assistant Surgeon Theodore Calhoun listed numerous cases, some of which 
resulted in death, and outlined familiar Hoferian symptoms such as fever, loss of appetite, 
and general dysentery. Like Hofer, he described the disease as an “affection of the mind” 
and an overall state of depression. In terms of treatment, he suggested that “the patient 
can often be laughed out of it by his comrades, or reasoned out of it by appeals to his 
manhood,”49 placing further gloss on Le Cointe’s proposed solutions of forced pain and 
terror. Like other military physicians of the time, Calhoun speculated that young, rural 
soldiers were more susceptible to nostalgia than those from urban centers and suggested 
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that this was likely brought on by correspondence with home in the form of letter-writing. 
In this milieu, nostalgia connoted weakness and a lack of internal fortitude, a boyish type 
of infirmity that was best expelled by bullying, intimidating, or antagonizing the 
patient—a desire so powerful that its failure to reproduce the accepted norms of 
masculinity appeared to threaten their validity, necessitating various mechanisms of 
repressive burial.  
For the first several centuries of its transmission, then, nostalgia circulated as a 
medical diagnosis almost exclusively in military contexts (“this disease is rarely seen in 
civil life,”50 one journal suggests). Moreover, unlike contemporary usage, its conceptual 
determination was entirely spatial. Soldiers from Hofer’s time up through the nineteenth 
century experienced nostalgia because they longed to return to their actual, physical 
homes. New conditions of forced mobility and dislocation generated their yearning, 
directing their desire toward a particular place or space; nostalgia and homesickness were 
synonymous with nostos as the main inflection point.51 This relation may seem 
counterintuitive to contemporary ears, but it was the norm for most of the nostalgia’s 
short lexical history. Following the U.S. Civil War, the term disappeared from medical 
nosology altogether, right around the same time psychiatry and psychoanalysis began to 
rise to prominence as a dominant diagnostic discourse. As a result, nostalgia was no 
longer recognized as an official disease. Instead, it was subject to live burial yet again, 
 
50 “Nostalgia, or Home Sickness,” The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal 39, no. 1 (August 2, 1848): 9–
10. 
51 For more on development of this conflation—and eventual decoupling—within the context of American 





this time through interiorization, by being transposed within the inner lift of the 
individual and her accretive memories, a process concomitant with burgeoning modernity 
and its dual emphases on temporality and subjectivity. 
In this context, nostalgia came to be understood as an incurable, introspective 
reaction to the conditions of time rather than a curable ailment related to spatial 
dislocation. Nostalgia settled into its more familiar set of meanings as a result, but the 
majority of its pathological associations were retained and also transposed or interiorized. 
To be nostalgic in contemporary contexts is to pine not necessarily for home in the form 
of a specific place or space, but for home as past or lost time. Spurious movement for 
Hofer and Praxin involved a physical leave-taking by returning home through 
unauthorized means; after this transition spurious movement came to involve a mental 
leave-taking characterized by a return to the past, and its homeliness, through inauthentic 
means. The focus shifts but in both cases the type of movement involved attempts to 
interrupt, halt, subvert, or reverse the normative course of direction. This is what unites 
Praxin’s soldiers with the contemporary nostalgic dismissed by Lasch: one laments 
leveled off movement, the other leveled off time—both revolt against the inertia of 
modern progress and linearity. Both emerged as failed, yet instructive responses to the 
losses and discontinuities those concepts amass. Against them, nostalgia can only read as 
a regressive, retrograde reaction—a symptom of general backwardness. Praxin treats this 
symptom by laying to living rest those who long for rest that only home can provide. 
Lasch furthers this gesture by construing nostalgia as an insubordinate form of desire that 




Nostalgia’s development thus involves a shift in focus from the spatial to the 
temporal. The shift in focus situates it less as a medical disease and more as a type of 
reaction to the passage of time and the linear determinations that encourage, in the wake 
of loss and discontinuity, a pervasive imperative to ‘go forward’ or ‘move on.’ Under 
these conditions, nostalgia acts as a means of longing and remembrance that often reads 
as pathological, excessively romantic, and otherwise specious or illegitimate. The most 
recent edition of The Oxford English Dictionary, for example, defines nostalgia simply as 
a type of “acute longing for familiar surroundings” and goes on to specify not only the 
decidedly temporal nature of its character, but also its relation to memory, specifically 
those types of memory that we might call bittersweet: “sentimental longing for or 
regretful memory of a period of the past…sentimental imagining or evocation of a period 
of the past.”52 This shift in focus can be attributed to at least two interlocking cultural and 
technological developments resulting from nascent modernity. First, a shift in medical 
epistemology characterized by a move away from Hippocratic psychosomatic diagnostics 
to anatomy and bacteriology led physicians to classify nostalgia as a psychiatric disorder 
rather than a physical disease.53 This development recast nostalgia as a type of 
generalized melancholia, a determination also facilitated by the rise of psychoanalysis. 
Second, due to the rise of industrialization and increased mobility, significant changes in 
 
52 “nostalgia, n..” OED Online. January 2018. Oxford University Press. 
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53 Cf. Starobinski, “The Idea of Nostalgia,” 99-101; G. Rosen, “Nostalgia: A ‘Forgotten’ Psychological 
Disorder,” Clio Medica (Amsterdam, Netherlands) 10, no. 1 (April 1975): 28–51; Michael S. Roth, “Dying 
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the conception, perception, and representation of time occurred which emphasized the 
supposedly inevitable entelechy of forward motion as well as individual, autonomous 
introspection. As Boym suggests, after the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries nostalgia 
comes to be representative of a very specific type of response to the Enlightenment, a 
side effect of its constituent linear teleology and a means of mourning or lamenting its 
temporal implications.54 If in Hofer’s time the object of nostalgic desire persisted under 
the spatially localizable signifier of home, by the end of the nineteenth century it had 
come to be the exact opposite, that is, time itself, fleeting time gone by and lapsed 
duration. 
 
Algos: Nostalgia, Introspection, and Time 
Immanuel Kant, now a type of shorthand for the inauguration of modernity, ties 
together these new threads of time, memory, and interiorized desire, highlighting the 
more familiar connotations of nostalgia for the first time. Commenting on the phenomena 
of Swiss homesickness, Kant suggests that Hofer’s treatment plan of homecoming is 
perhaps counterproductive. He contends that a full return does not satiate nostalgic desire 
because the desired object is itself conditioned by the flux and flow of time.  
The homesickness [Heimweh, nostalgia] of the Swiss…that seizes them when they are 
transferred to other lands is the result of a longing for the places where they enjoyed the 
very simple pleasures of life—aroused by the recollection of images of the carefree life 
and neighborly company in their early years. For later, after they visit these same places, 
they are greatly disappointed in their expectations and thus also find their homesickness 
cured. To be sure, they think that this is because everything there has changed a great deal, 
but in fact it is because they cannot bring back their youth there.55 
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Writing here in late eighteenth century, Kant stands at the precipice of nostalgia’s already 
shifting definition, gesturing toward the dissociation of nostalgia and homesickness 
achieved by the end of the next century. He keeps Hofer’s spatial language, but recasts it, 
emphasizing the irreversibility of time, the seeming inaccessibility of the past, and, 
especially, the incipient notion of ‘growing up’ or ‘coming of age’ now associated with 
Enlightenment rationality and progress by virtue of Kant’s work.56 The Swiss suffer from 
a form of Peter Pan syndrome, according to Kant. They long to return home but find this 
return impossible or unsatisfying because they do not recognize how the conditions of 
time affect them as well as their objects of desire (home, youth, etc.).  
This reading must be understood in the broader context of Enlightenment-era 
shifts in the conception of time that take subjective perception and individual experience 
as their primary point of departure. In Kant’s own schema, time is no longer considered 
as an objective reality independent of the mind. He instead situates it as an a priori idea, 
a form of inner sensibility that structures sense perception and conditions experience in 
general, along with other elements in his transcendental aesthetic.57 The perception of 
time, in other words, shapes how things show up for us and informs the process through 
 
56 In the opening lines of his seminal 1784 essay “What is Enlightenment?” Kant defines enlightenment as 
“the human being’s emergence from self-incurred immaturity [Unmündigkeit].” Like the American military 
doctors almost a century later, Kant thinks this self-imposed infantilism exacerbates a lack of courage and 
inner fortitude. Ultimately, it squelches individual liberty and prohibits the free use of reason by indulging 
lower, more unproductive forms of desire. The implication here is that nostalgia, a species of childish 
immaturity, impedes progress and rational thinking. Cf. Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: 
What is Enlightenment?” in Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J. Gregor (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 17. 
57 This one of Kant’s major points of departure in his first Critique, as is well known. Cf. Immanuel Kant, 
Critique of Pure Reason, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University 




which objects become intelligible and recognizable. This sets the stage for later 
considerations, like Husserl’s notion of time-consciousness which shows how all 
intentional acts of perception presuppose some awareness of the internal experience of 
time.58 When it comes to nostalgia, however, the essential distinction opened up by 
Martin Heidegger stands as perhaps the most germane. I turn to Heidegger’s work in 
detail in the next chapter; for now, it will suffice to note that his distinction between 
ordinary, objective, or cosmic time (clock time) and subjective, phenomenological, or 
inner time (lived time) allows us to speak of multiple temporalities. These multiple 
temporalities correlate with differing perceptions of time’s flux and flow like those 
observable in nostalgic experience. Time may stand over and above us as a limiting 
condition, but our perceptions of its traces and effects don’t always abide those same 
limits. They remain open, capacious, and malleable, subject all manner of mediation and 
intervention. 
This helps us make a bit more sense of Kant’s comment on ineffective responses 
to ‘the homesickness of the Swiss.’ These nostalgics perform Hofer’s suggested remedy 
of return but remain unsatisfied in large part because their sense of internal time—the 
way they feel time’s flow and experience its limitations—does not align with their desire. 
They remain unaware of how this inner sense of timing conditions their return home, 
shaping their world and how they receive objects of experience. They are “greatly 
disappointed” and remain so not because they cannot return home, but because home 
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itself is no longer home, or at least no longer the home they remember. The homecoming 
or return (nostos) is unsatisfying and therefore cause for further pain, grief, and mourning 
(algos)—an experience divided against itself. What Kant’s thinking shows us, then, is 
that the initial nostalgic desire to move or re-turn in space conceals a deeper desire to 
move or re-turn in time. What we are left with is a form of longing that does indeed pine 
for homecoming, but ultimately desires home as it was. The nostalgic thus remains 
forlorn because she cannot return and cannot satisfy the desire to “bring back” passed 
time. The return that occurs is impotent—a return that doesn’t actually return, we might 
say. The yield here is a nascent understanding that objects of desire and the affective 
experiences that sustain that longing are subject to time’s limiting conditions. Its 
irreversible flow marks and inscribes them. This Kantian insight begins to pry open a gap 
that eventually transforms nostalgia’s focus, one where lost objects of desire—past time, 
lapsed duration, and the pastness of the past—come to be forever misplaced. 
The space or place that is home—what the Swiss long for—is no more because it, 
too, is past. Once a curable malady, nostalgia is rendered here as commemorative 
reaction, an incurable condition of the human experience subject as it is to the pressure of 
temporization. The anticipated gratification and expected catharsis of full return or 
homecoming are replaced by a type of doleful remembrance that mourns the 
impossibility of such a homecoming. What was once considered physically impossible in 
space by Praxin becomes, after Kant, structurally impossible in time. Spatially errant 
desires become temporally errant desires. This is what nostalgia’s second syllable signals: 




results in realizing return is impossible. With this shift in focus—from space and place to 
time and temporality—nostalgia endures yet another moment of vivisepulture, this time 
buried within the mind. No longer marking the spatial distance between here and there 
alone, it indicates the temporal distance between past and present, between the presence 
of feeling and the pastness of that feeling’s origins in the now-longed-for object. The 
attachment or affection associated with the object is perceived in the present at a remove. 
The realization of that distance or interval inaugurates a type of belated understanding 
that galvanizes desire—it moves the nostalgic, in other words, and inspires a drive toward 
movement despite the absence. As we will see later on, this desire can generate 
propulsive, animating movement even and especially when the desired outcome—
temporal return—remains impossible. To experience nostalgia in this way is to 
experience the impossibility of the burning, fiery desire Hofer describes without denying 
its demands. This emphasis on temporality allows nostalgia to subsist and even thrive in 
conditions of futility, mourning the lack of immediate proximity with the past as a means 
of maintaining relations with it in memoriam. These conditions indulge nostalgic desire 
but frustrate it, denying its drive toward closure and finality, allowing the experience to 
be moving, but not all-consuming. 
For Kant, time is essentially a feature of the mind that serves to bring the work of 
the imaginative faculty into sharper focus. In his schema, the imagination—which retains 
both a creative and a reproductive aspect—works to recognize and then synthesize 
representations across time, categorizing them in accordance with existing concepts or 




require the immediate physical presence of intuited objects to synthesize their 
impressions and categorize their features. Though he writes well before Kant, Hofer uses 
a similar framework in his dissertation. Because nostalgia seemed to cause such distress, 
seizing movement or impelling movement in directions taken to be less desirable, Hofer 
took it to be indicative of an afflicted, betrayed, or damaged imagination.59 The Latin 
expression here is imaginations laesae, a classical notion of injured reason that was 
deployed during Hofer’s time to explain various forms of mental derangement.60 First 
theorized by Robert Burton in The Anatomy of Melancholy as a possible cause for forms 
of desire related to love and the loss of love, imaginations laesae refers to an imagination 
overrun or infected by certain passions that amplify images taken to be distortions of 
objective reality.61  
In the case of nostalgia, representations of home dominate the imagination, 
engendering a deep, fiery desire for homecoming, one strong enough to induce sickness. 
Nostalgics thus experienced an acute state of mental and emotional lassitude. Their 
minds—or, better, their imaginations—were said to be playing tricks on them and were 
thus not to be trusted. To experience feelings of nostalgia was to experience the 
vagrancies of a desirous, unruly, and promiscuous imagination, the consequences of 
which belied normal behavior, hence the perceived pathology. Operating under the 
Hippocratic medical knowledge of his day,62 Hofer thus attributed nostalgia to a deficient 
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and compromised imagination which affected the region of the brain responsible for 
recollected images and memory impressions. The animal spirits exacerbated this 
condition which resulted in obsessive contemplation of stored images and representations 
associated with home. He argued that incessant meditation and reflection on these images 
allowed the animal spirits to seize other neurological paths that normally house more 
healthy representations, leading, ultimately, to the pathological obsession of return to the 
original source (home, the Fatherland)—a problem of movement, once again.63 Nostalgia, 
it seemed, monopolized and hijacked the imagination and, by extension, memory, 
directing the focus of both toward images of home.  
Hofer did not yet have the language to analyze this problem’s temporal features, 
but with the help of Kant we can already detect their contours. Nostalgia installs an idée 
fixe and demands movement in attempt to compensate for loss, engendering a type of 
desire that subsists on the basis of absence. Early Swiss nostalgics suffered from an 
afflicted imagination because they remained fixated upon past memories no longer 
immediately present but still powerfully persistent. Hofer thought this was because they 
maintained an abnormal relationship with their imaginations. He wasn’t necessarily 
wrong at the time, but Kant helps us narrow the focus and isolate new points of friction. 
Today we would probably say that nostalgics have an abnormal relationship with time, an 
afflicted sense of time-consciousness rather than an afflicted imagination. This project is 
interested in exploring what such ‘afflictions’ allow nostalgic subjects to do, see, or feel 
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and how the experiences that move them might open up new, as yet unturned possibilities 
not just for responding to loss and discontinuity, but approaching the experience of time 
itself.  
 
Recent Iterations: Diagnostic Residues and New Frontiers  
Contemporary appraisals of nostalgia take these new interests in time and 
individual interiority as their overall point of departure. They take nostalgia to be a 
specific type of affective response rather than a treatable illness and generally fall into 
one of two typological categories, what Boym calls “reflective nostalgia” and “restorative 
nostalgia.” Reflective nostalgia functions as a resource for psychological health while 
restorative nostalgia “does not think of itself as nostalgia, but rather as truth and 
tradition,”64 obsessed with the return to or recreation of a mythic, fanciful past. Thus, on 
the one hand, there is a whole body of recent psychological research devoted to exploring 
and arguing the hypothesis that reflective nostalgia is a positive psychic and existential 
resource, providing mental stability and self-continuity to help cope with change and 
distress.65 For example, a recent piece in The New York Times that draws upon the work 
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of social psychologists like Constantine Sedikides suggests that “the net effect” of 
nostalgia “is to make life seem more meaningful and death less frightening” by 
“counteract[ing] loneliness, boredom, and anxiety” thereby “mak[ing] people more 
generous to strangers and more tolerant to outsiders.”66 Even more recently, a book-
length study explores the ways in which “nostalgia is triggered by psychological threat or 
negative affective states,” ultimately concluding, however, that “nostalgia is a critical 
meaning-making resource” that “people turn to in order to regulate distress or cope with a 
number of life’s challenges.”67 Literature that explores this more reflective side of 
nostalgia remains a minority and is a fairly recent development, typically focusing on 
nostalgia’s value as a ‘good’ or ‘positive’ phenomenon, leaving its genealogical 
associations with pathology untheorized.  
On the other hand, there is an even larger body of cultural criticism that explores 
the ideological underpinnings and political ramifications of restorative nostalgia, the sort 
of nostalgia that Lasch, for example, targets in his work.68 Concern for nostalgia’s ill 
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effects inspired Hofer’s Basel dissertation and its genesis as a pathological diagnosis 
lends itself quite easily to an overall disposition of skepticism and in some cases outright 
hostility. This line of thought draws direct nourishment from the history and development 
of nostalgia outlined above and enjoys broad currency in philosophy and other forms of 
critical thought. It privileges nostalgia’s initial status as a form of pathology, preserves 
many of its diagnostic associations, and wields them to leverage a critique based on 
regression, reversion, and general conservatism. As Lasch’s work shows, nostalgia 
certainly can, and often does, assume these registers. Thinkers like Janice Doane and 
Devon Hodges, Gayle Green, and Renato Rosaldo have shown how nostalgia can be 
wielded as a political weapon to ensure that the machinations of power keep historically 
oppressed persons circumscribed within subservient subject positions—positions, to be 
sure, that nostalgia can naturalize.69 As useful and illuminating as these evaluations may 
be, they remain limited. They conflate nostalgia en toto with various iterations of 
imperialistic dominance or puerile arrested development and do not adequately attend to 
the full breadth and depth of the role it plays in affective life—the way it sets up and 
maintains generative relations with different pasts and histories, multiple temporalities, 
and the variant possibilities each may signal. At best, such evaluations reveal how 
nostalgia can be instrumentalized to support oppressive politics and uneven power 
dynamics; at worse, they re-inscribe the gestures of vivisepulture performed by Praxin 
and typified by Lasch.  
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Examples of this sort abound and contribute to nostalgia’s impoverished position. 
In 1909, the German-Swiss philosopher Karl Jaspers linked nostalgic desire to juvenile 
criminality in his doctoral thesis (Heimweh und Verbrechen) at the Heidelberg School of 
Medicine.70 Allison Graham refers to the nostalgia boom of the 1970s as a type of plague 
or illness visited upon American culture,71 while social historian Fred Davis, in his 
otherwise insightful and illuminating study on the same phenomenon, still acquiesces to 
the old saw that “nostalgic reaction can be said to be of a distinctly conservative bent.”72 
In a different context, the philosopher Fredric Jameson calls nostalgia “the insensible 
colonization of the present” and situates it as one symptom of the broader logic of late 
capitalism, an assumption I unpack in chapter four below.73 In a similar vein, the Jungian 
psychologist Roderick Peters regards nostalgia as a universal archetype characterized by 
“an overwhelming craving that persists and profoundly interferes with the individual’s 
attempts to cope with present circumstances.”74 These literatures cohere with the popular 
notion that “nostalgia is always suspect”75 and the conflation of nostalgia in general with 
Boym’s restorative nostalgia. It is no wonder, then, that Susan Stewart, in her beautifully 
written study on longing and the souvenir, performs a wry repetition of Hofer’s diagnosis 
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by referring to nostalgia as a widespread “social disease.”76 Such assessments summarily 
dismiss nostalgic desire on the grounds that it harbors essentially reactionary sentiments, 
constituting what one author calls “a dangerous form of politics and a kind of lie…always 
a poor guide to the future.”77 Nostalgia may no longer be a medical disease, but all the 
associations remain firmly in place. Charles Maier’s ingratiating analogy—“nostalgia is 
to memory as kitsch is to art”78—appears to be the norm. Under this diagnostic gaze, 
nostalgia is taken to be inherently pathological, a symptom of some broader, enfeebling 
cultural malaise. Instead of positioning nostalgia as a more propulsive or animating force, 
figures like Jaspers, Peters, Stewart, and Maier take the feeling to be, at best, a burden, an 
embarrassment, or an irritating nuisance. Such glosses enact Praxin and Lasch’s gesture 
of vivisepulture. By privileging its connotations as a disease and adopting Hofer’s 
diagnostic frame of reference they cast an incredulous eye toward nostalgia and support 
its ongoing live burial by delegitimizing, repressing, or simply disavowing its broader 
range of expression in affective life. 
Given this history, it is not difficult to see how and why nostalgia continues to 
circulate as a critical analytical category with deeply embedded pathological associations. 
It continues to function as a degenerative diagnosis because it is understood to involve or 
engender a type of improper longing, what I have been calling, with the help of Hofer, 
errant desire and spurious movement. Within this frame, nostalgia betokens a form of 
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weakness, the acquiescence to a form of socially unacceptable desire directed toward a 
bygone, damaging, or otherwise phantasmal object—an ailment of pathos, an affective 
affliction. These disciplinary and discursive presumptions suggest that there are, in fact, 
proper forms of desire, proper objects of longing, and, especially, that certain types of 
memory and movement are more useful and reliable than others. This project complicates 
those presumptions by investigating how nostalgia intervenes in time and memory, 
highlighting instances of nostalgic expression that mobilize those interventions to 
animating, propulsive effect. Nostalgia was and continues to be stubbornly buried alive. 
What would it mean to raise it specters and exhume its remains?  
Thinkers like Kimberly K. Smith and Stuart Tannock offer helpful initial insights 
from which to explore such questions. Their efforts serve, in part, to depathologize the 
feeling without denying the desires to which it lays claim, without neglecting the 
experiences of loss and discontinuity to which it responds. They not only show how the 
values commonly attached to nostalgia and its attendant affective associations bear some 
vestigial resemblance to its initial diagnostic context, they also provide a means of 
making its propulsive and generative effects more legible. Smith, for example, tracks the 
transformation of nostalgia’s pathologization in the aftermath of its confrontation with 
modernity, highlighting the spatio-temporal shift in desire discussed above. This shift, 
she thinks, solidified nostalgia’s position as a counterweight to the new notion of 
progress. To be nostalgic is to be, at the very least, non-progressive and, at the very most, 
resistant to or antagonistic toward the very idea of progress. “The concept of 




emotional experiences suspect (even to themselves) and undermine their confidence in 
their memories, their unhappiness, and their hopes.”79 She argues that familiar critiques of 
nostalgia continue to rely upon its intransigent status as a type of pathology or regressive 
fixation. They ultimately serve to bolster homogenous time and linear teleology, 
supporting the notion that any forward movement is, ipso facto, good movement, one step 
along the way of inevitable evolution and improvement. By taking these principles to be 
axiomatic, critiques of this nature do not recognize the role nostalgia often plays in 
experiences not served by such principles.  
Tannock, for his part, seizes upon nostalgia’s interiorization and disappearance 
from official medical nosology to uncover its status as a deeply potent affect rather than a 
disabling pathology. Drawing on the work of Raymond Williams, he argues that nostalgia 
“becomes a widespread, general structure of feeling only with the massive dislocation of 
peoples in the modern period.” Nostalgia thus refers to, and mediates, “the distinctively 
modern sense of a radical separation of past from present,”80 what Boym calls a 
“historical emotion” or a “symptom of our age.”81 By situating nostalgia as a structure of 
feeling and highlighting its affective dimensions, Tannock short-circuits familiar 
formulations. He situates nostalgia as a sort of counter-diagnostic, reading it with an eye 
for what has been excluded or buried in nostalgia’s history and transmission. This 
approach reverses the polarity and supplies a means of interrogating the ramifications of 
valuations that position nostalgia as pathological alone. Tannock also provides a 
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compelling avenue for considering nostalgia as an affective phenomenon, that is, as a 
type of motivating response that allows us to move forward by turning back or looking 
sideways, calling to mind elements of our accretive experience that continue to propel 
and animate.  
 
Nostalgia and Affect Theory: Some Methodological Considerations  
Smith and Tannock do not identify as affect theorists but their work on nostalgia 
bears striking methodological resemblance to the so-called “affective turn” and 
Tannock’s deployment of Williams’ now famous turn of phrase suggests more than a 
slight comparison. These authors eschew the old thought-feeling binary and instead 
consider feeling and affect—and specific feelings or affects like nostalgia—as a 
productive site for thought and analysis. By critically interrogating the transformations 
that take place in nostalgia’s confrontation with modernity and, especially, by resisting 
the temptation to convert nostalgia into some usable social good, their work closely orbits 
similar projects in affect theory. Sara Ahmed, Anne Cvetkovich, Heather Love, and 
Teresa Brennan,82 for example, each aim to more seriously and closely attend to feelings 
or affects typically labelled ‘bad,’ ‘ugly,’ ‘negative,’ ‘counterproductive,’ or, in the case 
of nostalgia, simply ‘pathological.’ They de-pathologize so-called negative feelings to 
explore their function as resources for new sensibilities and alternative modes of being in 
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the world. Nostalgia is one such ‘bad’ feeling and its genealogical legacy of 
marginalization and vivisepulture demonstrates the ways in which it continues to be 
dismissed as both ineffective and toxic instead of animating or vivifying. Eve Sedgwick 
stands as a pivotal and pioneering figure in this regard and her interest in exploring the 
“under theorized middle ranges of affective agency”83 mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter opens up a generative avenue through which to sharpen the legibility of 
nostalgia’s more animating features. By exploring the texture and granularity of this 
middle range, and how nostalgia circulates within it, we can begin to see nostalgia less as 
a pathology more as a propulsive force, one that increases individual capacities for 
movement, offering a means of internalizing the past, retaining its losses, and weathering 
the vicissitudes of temporal experience with increased awareness and receptivity.  
Nostalgia may be many things, but at its most basic and rudimentary level it 
suggests a deep, intimate degree of affection for something lost, destroyed, or forgone. 
Philosophy and high theory maintain a tortured, tenuous relationship with feeling and 
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tend to harbor sedimented prejudices against affect and emotionality in general.84 Affects 
that appear to cast a backward-facing glance to the determinations of temporality are 
taken to be especially dubious in this regard. Such a long-standing enmity can be 
attributed to the customary and axiomatic habits of mind that undergird many critical 
projects—habits, to be sure, that are themselves propelled by affective investment in the 
unimpeachable values of skepticism, suspicion, and incredulity. As affect theorists and 
literary scholars alike have shown, this association has become so painfully obvious that 
these values are often taken to be primary identifiers of critique itself, and what it means 
to engage in rigorous critical scholarship. Thinkers like Sedgwick, Love, and Rita Felski 
employ a cluster of textual and interpretive tactics that work both within and against the 
legacies of critique in post-Kantian modes of thought.85 These modes of thought, often 
grouped together under the umbrella of “hermeneutics of suspicion,” place a discursive 
and epistemological premium on the procedures of unveiling and demystification in their 
approach to texts and other objects of analysis. According to these conventions, which 
draw methodological insights from various forms of Marxism and psychoanalysis, 
knowledge and the procedures of rationality and reading that attach themselves to it serve 
to reveal, expose, or make visible something hidden or inaccessible. This ‘something’ 
serves to delegitimize, unmask, or otherwise render suspect the object or cluster of 
objects associated with it. Thus, when subject to the fastidious hermeneutics of suspicion 
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exemplified by someone like Lasch, nostalgia is glossed as a mere symptom for deeper, 
more viscerally felt desires taken to be problematic, pathological, or simply backward.  
As Sedgwick puts it in a now classic essay, the methodological values and critical 
motivations that subtend a hermeneutics of suspicion serve to privilege paranoia over 
other ways of knowing, reading, and attending to subjective attachment. Suspicion, 
incredulity, and excavation facilitate productive critical habits and reading practices, to 
be sure, but the issue at stake, according to Sedgwick, is that these conventions and 
protocols have become sedimented and calcified into a paranoid subject position that is 
less diagnosis and more prescription. These prescriptions often take the form of pithy, 
slogans or tag lines: ‘nostalgia is always reactionary,’ ‘nostalgia never historicizes the 
past,’ and so on. This mode of reading and analysis takes governing superstructures and 
insidious, tacit ideology as its primary point of departure. It displays a pronounced 
proclivity “to reading through experience for structure,” as Love puts it.86 Ideology and 
structure are indeed operative and formative, but they are not the only or even the most 
significant factors and much is lost, erased, misrecognized, or simply buried alive in this 
‘reading through.’ Sedgwick aims to mend this reductionism. In doing so, she invokes the 
notion of reparative reading to augment or supplement a paranoia-stricken hermeneutics 
of suspicion. Such an approach provides a means of attending to the minutiae of 
attachment and the relations that occur and emerge between structure, ideology, agency, 
and the subjects they form.  
 




Nostalgia is one of the many affects that intervene between these elements, 
facilitating various modes of comportment and sensibility that issue from an experience 
of bittersweetness that is as motivating and propulsive as it is interminable and 
unfinished. It is difficult for these facets to show up when they are met, prima facie, with 
suspicion or incredulity. When Paul Ricoeur first coined the phrase “the hermeneutics of 
suspicion” he offered his own prescient insight into this tendency toward reductionism. 
“It is not regret for the sunken Atlantides that animates us,” he writes in the final pages of 
The Symbolism of Evil, “but hope for a re-creation of language. Beyond the desert of 
criticism, we desire to be called, questioned, again.”87 Ricoeur’s desire may in fact be 
nostalgic but it is not facile or uncritical. It yearns to be both addressed and interrogated 
by that which, though it has been buried, may still have life yet: tender address as a 
means of interrogation, interrogation in search of a new mode of relation, a new form of 
address. “Why,” asks Felski, “are we so hyper articulate about our adversaries and so 
excruciatingly tongue-tied about our loves?”88 Nostalgia is but one form of loving, of 
addressing and remembering lost loves by maintaining a vivacious and capacious 
relationship with them, despite their seeming inaccessibility. The chapters ahead push 
Felski’s image a bit further: what if nostalgia loosened the tongue instead of knotting it? 
They approach nostalgic desire from a more reparative vantage point, one better 
positioned to consider its capacity as a legitimate form of remembering and desiring, one 
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that refuses its more readily available associations in order probe its broader role within 
the fabric of human experience.  
Nostalgia does not need to be redeemed or converted into something more 
‘positive’ or ‘pragmatic’ and reparativity, to be clear, does not entail a simple reversal of 
habit that might supplant critical suspicions with some cloyingly sanguine opposite, 
whatever that might be. There will always be manipulative and toxic forms of nostalgia, 
just as there will always be Laschian critics eager to find and ferret them out. In reading 
nostalgia, one is always already dealing with these specters along with those of Hofer’s 
case studies and Praxin’s prematurely buried troops. Scholars like Lee Edelman, Heather 
Love, and Judith Butler have shown89 that the enduring legacy of Sedgwick’s work lies in 
its deeply generative sense of capaciousness, a style of thought that requires unalleviated 
tension between the paranoid and reparative positions which together cultivate a 
heightened sense of critical awareness. Sedgwick herself suggests as much in her own 
pioneering work on psychoanalysis and affect theory through the likes of Melanie Klein 
and Silvan Tomkins. Neither the reparative nor the paranoid represent a permanent, static 
achievement but instead function as markers “of a fluid, back-and-forth process between 
the two positions” that thrives upon the “authentically difficult understanding that good 
and bad tend to be inseparable at every level.”90 This scrupulous attention to the minutia 
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of affective attachments—both generative and indicative of comprised conditions of 
existence, what Lauren Berlant terms “cruel optimism”—91constitutes, according to 
Sedgwick, “a uniquely spacious rubric…in which challenges to a normalizing 
universality can develop.”92 Such a rubric also creates, as Edelman and Sara Ahmed 
remind us in their own registers, the preconditions necessary to interrogate the 
disciplinary function and cultural imperative of making certain feelings, like nostalgia, 
‘good’ or ‘happy’ by assigning them some ameliorative value.  
Nostalgia is a particularly fruitful site for exploring Sedgwick’s “spacious rubric” 
because it resists, while at the same time summoning, the normalizing universality of 
teleological trajectories and the linear conceptions of time they encourage. Those 
elements and the affective experiences they condition are also “inseparable at every 
level” even if they do not always serve or support those experiences. Nostalgic 
experience makes this incongruity especially clear by pining for and reworking the past 
while remaining fully aware that the form of return it so deeply desires remains 
impossible precisely due to the temporal conditions that generated it. The themes 
developed over the course of this project show that there is something to be gained in 
refusing the redemptive values so commonly associated with those structuring temporal 
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necessary for non paranoid knowing and utterance.” And later in the same piece: “It is sometimes the most 
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conditions. The sheer persistence of nostalgic desire complicates those conditions as well 
as the values that bolster them. To that end, the analyses below work to position nostalgia 
as an especially illuminating means of interrogating what we expect the experience of 
time and the work of memory to yield.  
What I am suggesting, then, and hope to show throughout, is that nostalgia need 
not be routinely dismissed as overly sentimental and retrograde, nor is it in need of 
recuperative measures that might transform it into facile, positive feeling. If anything, it 
stands in need of sustained reckoning that takes seriously the productive ambiguities that 
contribute to the role it plays in affective life, a role that does not easily confirm to 
readily available taxonomies. Nostalgia’s irreducible bittersweetness—a collision of 
opposites like Hofer’s combination of nostos and algos—is one such productive 
ambiguity and it shows how nostalgia resists the cold, Manichean logic that categorizes 
experiences of feeling as ‘good’ or ‘bad,’ ‘positive’ or ‘negative.’  A depathologization of 
nostalgia thus does not look to save nostalgia or make it more palatable as it is, by 
definition, an affect characterized by lack, unease, and restlessness. Reading nostalgia 
reparatively is, rather, a means of better attending to its form and effects, of closely 
interpreting it in a manner that is neither dismissive nor saccharine, but patient and 
attentive. For Sedgwick, this approach is “founded on and coextensive with the subject’s 
movement toward…the often very fragile concern to provide the self with pleasure and 
nourishment in an environment that is perceived as not particularly offering them.”93 That 
pleasure is specific and may not always (or ever) be completely pure or uncomplicated by 
 




the archives of experience that sustain us, refracted as they are through the prisms or 
flashpoints that (in)form the present. Bittersweetness is another name for nostalgia, after 
all. But the form of movement Sedgwick identifies can contribute to a generative type of 
expression, what Michel Foucault calls the care of the self and Marielle Macé the 
stylistics of existence.94 This project gains traction from these approaches to the extent 
that they can help us identify what experiences like nostalgia “set alight” in the 
consciousness of those who feel it—the forms of movement it impels, the shifts in 
perception it prompts, the adjacent affects its elicits, and the modes of attachment it 
convenes.95 What, exactly, nostalgia sets alight cannot necessarily be known in advance. 
It is possible the affective stirrings it elicits may squelch rather than increase movement, 
just as it is possible that nostalgia itself may be exploited by insidious mechanisms that 
 
94 I take these designations to be loose synonyms for Sedgwick’s notion of the “middle range.” For Macé, 
to “give style” to existence involves sketching, tracing out, or contesting possibilities within the self. She 
draws insights from Foucault’s own evocative turning of phrase “stylistics of existence,” which she takes to 
be a means of “modulating our living configurations, our forms of perception and attention, or our entire 
vision of the world.” This strategy is not loud, earth-shattering, or world-moving but emerges in the 
“opportunity of giving a certain aspect to our presence, accepting universal human positions on our own 
terms, fashioning our movements, external acts, or secret thoughts, complying with models or forming new 
ones….in the nuance of an ordinary but always reinvented gesture.” See her wonderful essay Marielle 
Macé and Marlon Jones, “Ways of Reading, Modes of Being,” New Literary History 44, no. 2 (August 8, 
2013): 213–29, especially 217-18. Foucault refers to this as a way of “giving form and style to life.” See 
Michel Foucault and Arnold I. Davidson, The Courage of Truth: The Government of Self and Others II; 
Lectures at the Collège de France, 1983--1984, trans. Graham Burchell (New York, N.Y.: Picador, 2012), 
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others.” See Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 3: The Care of the Self, trans. Robert Hurley 
(New York, N.Y.: Vintage, 1988), 238-239. Positioning the care, art, or style of the self as a question opens 
up the range of possibilities in which that question might be expressed, framed, or left open. What I am 
suggesting throughout this study is that the experience of nostalgia is but one means of attending to that 
question, a particularly idiomatic way of approaching the modes of existence Sedgwick, Macé, and 
Foucault take to be constitutive of experience but only ever incrementally achieved, negotiated, or 
reworked. 




squelch its more propulsive, animating features. That risk remains as persistent as 
nostalgic experience itself.  
 
Moved, But Not “Broken Up” 
“Nostalgia evokes the past only in order to bury it alive,” Lasch tell us. His turn of 
phrase not only re-animates the remains of Hofer’s afflicted youths and Praxin’s 
entombed victims, it also raises—quietly raises—aspects of nostalgic experience that 
subsist despite their vivisepulture. Those aspects do not show up in Lasch’s thinking 
because it is based on an understanding of authentic memory that cannot abide the forms 
of desire, movement, and affective attachment nostalgia encourages. The exercise of true 
memory provides genuine connection with the past based on recognition and appreciation 
while nostalgia, by contrast, only offers fantasy images that glorify the past as timeless 
and unobtainable, forever shrouded in reactionary sentimentality and maudlin kitsch. This 
binary between authentic remembrance and facile, inauthentic phantasm correlates 
historical memory with a sense of gratitude that “serves to link the present to the past 
and…provide a sense of continuity” by acknowledging the past’s “formative influence.”96 
Nostalgia can never perform this operation in any sort of legitimate way, Lasch argues, 
because it remains correlated with pathos and mere feeling. This evaluation re-inscribes a 
familiar and longstanding gesture that takes feeling, emotionality, and the modes of 
aesthetic representation in which they often find expression to be deficient and inferior 
ways of knowing—errant desires and spurious forms of movement as Hofer intimated. In 
 




this context nostalgia provides limited, inferior access to the past because it relies on 
equally inferior faculties. It simply does not cut the epistemological mustard, so to speak. 
Nowhere is this expressed more clearly than when Lasch announces that “nostalgia does 
not entail the exercise of memory at all” due to an “emotional appeal”97 where happy 
memories generate feelings of loss, discontinuity, and disillusionment. These feelings can 
only serve as memory’s other within this frame—that against which authentic acts of 
remembrance gain their value, essence, and identity.  
Hofer laid the conceptual groundwork for this type of posture, but his text already 
contains curious moments of hesitation and incongruity, faint traces, perhaps, of nostalgic 
potentiality that continue to speak, and haunt, beyond their living tombs. The remaining 
chapters of this study work to make those traces more legible by leveraging insights from 
philosophical and cinematic sources. Those sources serve to clarify nostalgia’s standing 
as an animating and propulsive response to loss and discontinuity, a strategy for 
mourning and remembrance that intervenes in temporal awareness to nourish generative 
relations with formative pasts.  
Hofer wasn’t interested in these aspects, but his text documents them nonetheless. 
He believed nostalgia was an eminently curable physical disease that “admits no remedy 
other than a return to the homeland.”98 He suggests a treatment plan that involves a 
recalibration of movement, one that indulges and satisfies the desire to return. He felt 
there was no other option. But the evidence he supplies does not always corroborate that 
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claim and lends itself to insights explored throughout this project: that the most 
propulsive, animating, and compelling forms of nostalgia indulge the desire to return 
without satisfying it, and often do so to generative effect.  
The Swiss doctor uses only two detailed case studies to support his argument. In 
the first case, a young girl remains utterly despondent in the hospital after suffering a fall. 
Refusing both food and medicine, Hofer reports that she would often wail aloud, 
responding to questioning only by repeatedly uttering the words “Ich will heim, Ich will 
heim [‘I want to go home, I want to go home’].” Once the request to return home was 
finally granted, Hofer states that “within a few days she got wholly well, entirely without 
the aid of medicine.”99 He goes on to claim that his remedy of return “has been proved by 
many examples,” but the example provided in his final paragraph calls that assertion into 
question. This case study offers a clue to features of nostalgic experience that all too 
often remain illegible and buried alive. It not only weakens his proposed treatment plan, 
it also calls into question the general diagnostic assumption that has persisted since 
Hofer, one that saw new use under General Praxin, and continues to enjoy popular 
currency via Lasch and other cultural commentators: that nostalgia buries the past alive. 
After mentioning cases of nostalgia that resulted either in death or acute mania, Hofer 
describes the following scenario: 
It was told me by a Parisian that he himself had a Helvetian bound servant who was sad 
and melancholy at all times so that he began to work with lessened desire; finally, he came 
to him and sought dismissal with insistent entreaties, of which he could have no hope 
beyond him. When the merchant granted this immediately, the servant changed from 
sudden joy, excused from his mind these phantasma for several days, and after while 
remained in Paris, broken up no longer by this disease.100 
 






Both of Hofer’s unnamed nostalgics convalesce not through the catharsis of full 
return but through the movement toward return, a means of indulging the desire without 
fully satisfying it. The young girl gets better en route, not by the return itself. Arrival at 
the destination is withheld, suggesting that the possibility of new movement is enough to 
sustain her. The Helvetian servant recovers without any form of return at all; the 
possibility of return at some point in the future not only sustains him, it keeps him in 
place (grounded, we might say). Once she is well does the unnamed girl find that Kant 
was ultimately correct about her ailment, that home itself remains touched by time and is 
no longer what it once was? Does the yearning for return then resurface with new 
inflection points, rousing animating movement despite its fundamental futility? We are 
not told. And what of the servant? The last sentence of Hofer’s dissertation offers a 
crucial, almost missable qualification, one that provides us with a clue for thinking 
nostalgia otherwise. He tells us that once the Helvetian’s desire is articulated and given 
space for expression he is no longer “broken up” by nostalgia, not that the desire itself is 
fully sated or even completely gone. The Latin verb Hofer uses here is corripiō which 
can mean to seize, snatch up, collect, or take a hold of. The implication is that nostalgia 
has snatched up or taken a hold of the Helvetian servant, overwhelming his faculties and 
seizing his abilities to move about in the world. By expressing and indulging his desire he 
is released from this seizure and free to resume activity. Questions of satisfaction and 
fulfillment are curiously suspended. Instead, the desire for movement is simply given 




experiences of feeling. Expressing his longing to another allows the Helvetian servant to 
be moved by his experience. Hofer tells us that it is through this exchange, through this 
capacity to be moved, that the servant is able to remain, no longer “broken up” by 
nostalgic desire. That desire may persist still, but it is no longer debilitating or 
immobilizing. Instead, it contributes to propulsive, animating movement. To the extent 
that this is the case, the remaining chapters explore what it might mean to be moved by 
nostalgia without being “broken up” by it.  
In each case—the young country girl and the Helvetian servant—nostalgia acts as 
a motivating force absent full closure or finality. These potentialities run counter to the 
diagnostic frame Hofer sets up and the gestures of vivisepulture exemplified by Praxin 
and Lasch. They are themselves buried in Hofer’s own text, a work that is, in this respect, 
as at odds with itself as the experience it names. Like Odysseus before them, both of 
Hofer’s nostalgics endure the experience and emerge from it neither enfeebled nor 
completely incapacitated. The desires they feel are truly bittersweet, eliciting pleasure 
and grief in equal measure—grief in response to the loss, pleasure for what came before 
it. More than that, their feelings and desires are motivating, compelling them to move and 
act. For Odysseus, the thought of home, while painful, impels his journey back to 
Ithaca.101 When homecoming and full return are found lacking, he discovers that the 
journey and the desires that motivated it were perhaps enough. They provide him with a 
source for survival in the face of his adversaries and a means of persistence through his 
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obstacles.102 The possibility and contemplation of return provide a means for animating, 
propulsive movement. In his discussion of nostalgia treatment, Hofer advises that “hope 
of returning…must be given as soon as the strength seems somewhat equal to bearing the 
annoyances.”103 A strategy for contemplating possibilities, hope can be dashed or 
fulfilled, exploited or actualized; it, too, can act as an annoyance. It is difficult to know if 
the hopes of Odysseus, the young country girl, and the Helvetian servant were ever fully 
or finally achieved. Hofer seems uninterested in addressing that question despite his 
instructions. But he does tell us that many patients recovered in media res, that is, by 
virtue of experiencing and expressing the desire regardless of its prospects for future 
fulfillment. Can this more propulsive dimension of nostalgic experience attain 
(re)animating significance beyond its living tombs? 
 
102 For more on this see Anna Bonifazi, “Inquiring into Nostos and Its Cognates,” American Journal of 
Philology 130, no. 4 (December 11, 2009): 481–510. The argument she advances maintains that nostos 
(nostalgia’s primary etymological root) carries connotations of “surviving lethal dangers,” connotations 
that have been obscured in favor of the more pathological associations I have outlined. 




Chapter 2: Nostos: Heidegger and Philosophy’s Uncanny Nostalgia for Presence 
 
Our being in the world, the world that is our only home, is marked by the uncanny discovery that we are 
not at home.104 
- David Farrell Krell 
 
A mood assails or invades us. It comes neither from ‘outside’ nor from ‘inside,’ but arises out of Being-in- 
the-world.105 
- Martin Heidegger 
 
I am scattered in times whose order I do not understand. The storms of incoherent events tear to pieces my 
thoughts, the inmost entrails of my soul…106 
- St. Augustine 
 
Philosophy’s Feelings About Feeling 
 Composed of two distinct words—nostos and algos—nostalgia remains internally 
divided, unable, at times, two differentiate or hold in tension the dual elements that lie at 
its roots. It indicates a longing for the rest roots can provide (nostos: homecoming, return 
to a point of origin) and signals an ache that emerges from the inability to complete the 
return it so desperately desires (algos: pain, turmoil, melancholic grief). This chapter 
initiates an investigation into how philosophy tends to handle each of these elements. 
Like nostalgia, philosophical speculation depends on the motivating experience of algos, 
of dissatisfaction, disappointment, or disillusionment, and proceeds without clear-sighted 
access to the nostos it so strongly desires.107 In doing so, it often privileges reason and 
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transparent intelligibility over the opacities of affective experience. This is why, near the 
end of the last chapter, I suggested that philosophy maintains a long-standing enmity 
toward feeling and emotion. That assertion deserves more elaboration. The attitude it 
implies bears some similarity to the diagnostic frame of reference that gave rise to 
nostalgia and contributes to its construal as a problem in need of a cure or solution, what I 
called gestures of vivisepulture in the last chapter. Johannes Hofer laid the groundwork 
for that frame and it establishes discursive habits of mind—like those often exhibited by 
philosophy—that fail to recognize the propulsive, animating features of nostalgic 
experience, instead positioning it as regressive or simply pathological.  
 In common use, ‘the pathological’ refers to those feelings and behaviors that 
indicate some sort of mental disease or cognitive malaise. This, in any case, is what most 
dictionaries tell us.108 But that usage all too easily neglects the Greek roots of the word 
and its association with another term, one that both speaks to nostalgia’s enduring 
exigence and philosophy’s equally enduring anxiety: pathos. Like nostalgia, pathos 
carries multiple, sometimes conflicting connotations. On the one hand, it can refer to 
pain, suffering, and death, particularly those instances that emerge from misfortune, 
calamity, or disaster. But, on the other hand, an additional set of meanings deal with 
experiences of passion, emotion, and especially strong feelings. Experiences of the heart, 
in other words, and not necessarily those of reasoned rationality. These experiences of 
feeling move us; they galvanize our affective state of mind and impel movement. Pathos 
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activates feelings that lead us to move this way or that. To construe a feeling or emotion 
like nostalgia as patho-logical is to imply that it deviates from the normal, customary 
course of movement—the spurious forms of movement and errant desires buried and 
expunged by the Hofer-Praxin-Lasch apparatus. Philosophy’s deep, abiding suspicion of 
feeling and emotion stems from the same basic assumption: that pathos slides all too 
easily into the terrain of the patho-logical. It misleads by directing movement away from 
approved means of rationality.  
 Yet, at the same time, we are told that philosophy begins with the most reasonable 
of feelings: awe and wonder. Martin Heidegger, one of the most influential and 
contentious thinkers of the last century, observes that feelings of wonder lie at the genesis 
of the most primordial type of thinking.109 In doing so he calls to mind famous lines from 
Plato and Aristotle who both suggest that feelings of wonder and curiosity impel 
philosophical inquiry. In his Theaetetus, Plato situates the wise Socrates as the midwife 
of wisdom, guiding the young Theaetetus, a burgeoning epistemologist, along the way to 
better understanding the nature of knowledge [episteme] and what it means to know or 
cognize.110 When Theaetetus pauses to complain that he is bewildered and confused by 
the essential differences between knowledge and perception, Socrates responds by 
claiming that that very “sense of wonder [thaumazein] is the mark of the philosopher” 
and that philosophy itself “has no other origin [arche].”111 Aristotle has something similar 
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in mind when, in Book I of his Metaphysics, he pauses his argument in favor of 
philosophy as “the most exact of the sciences [episteme]” to reflect upon its initial 
origins, its archen.112 “For it is owing to their wonder [thaumazein],” he writes, “that men 
both now begin and at first began to philosophize.”113 Even more pointedly, in his 
Rhetoric, Aristotle goes on to claim that “philosophy consists in the knowledge 
[episteme] of many things that excite wonder [thaumazein].”114  
 What this suggests is that the story philosophy tells about itself is, paradoxically, 
one that beings with both an excitation of feeling and anxiety about where that feeling 
might lead. Feeling gives rise to thought and thought ultimately supersedes feeling, 
offering explanations and arguments that press it into more noble and dignified ends. 
Like Plato, Aristotle ties philosophy to the arche of wonder through the theme of 
knowledge and beginnings. To philosophize is to be on the way to gaining or acquiring 
adequate knowledge, not only of philosophy’s own beginnings, but the beginning of 
beginnings, what the Presocratics called the unlimited and boundless apeiron, the origin 
(arche) of all things. Knowledge, in this itinerary, is the orienting motif, the governing 
philosopheme. It cannot be accessed through feeling even if feeling sets its search in 
motion. “All men by nature desire to know,” Aristotle writes, opening his Metaphysics.115 
This desire to know or apprehend may begin in wonder, but whereas feeling in itself 
impels an altogether spurious form of movement, proper philosophizing garners strength 
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and momentum by engaging in more valid and authentic forms of movement toward first 
principles, original causes, and grounding essences. This form of movement reaches its 
apex, for Aristotle, by arriving at knowledge commensurate to its object(s), an early 
version of Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason in which the telos of philosophy—
“grasping” a thing’s “why,” as Aristotle puts it—is guided by a desire to access the 
original beginnings and initial causes that constitute that ‘why.’116 This desire, we are 
told, begins in wonder, but ultimately outgrows it, moving beyond. Nevertheless, this 
wonder animates thinking, initiating its drive to movement. In the beginning was wonder, 
and wonder was with philosophy; wonder was philosophy in the beginning.  
 For Heidegger, this movement toward thought finds initial expression in wonder 
but is ultimately propelled by a deeper and more profound drive, one that closely orbits 
the contours of nostalgia—that of return and homecoming. Citing the same passages from 
Plato and Aristotle mentioned above, Heidegger claims that philosophy does indeed 
begin in feeling that its most basic form of feeling—wonder, thaumazein—acts as the 
discipline’s form of fundamental attunement, what he calls a Grundstimmung, or basic 
mood. He argues that by beginning in feeling, in wonder, philosophy can access a type of 
“primordial thinking” [anfänglichen denkens] that further impels it along the way to true 
knowledge.117 This involves returning to and reviving ancient forms of thought that, for 
Heidegger at least, contain the resources necessary to uncover Being its most genuine and 
authentic essence. As we will see momentarily, Heidegger isolates that essence as a type 
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of concealed presence, but the broader point is that for him, as for Plato and Aristotle, 
philosophy is about uncovering or re-accessing something that was lost, an exceedingly 
nostalgic operation in other words. In philosophy, wondering about something—anything 
really, but roots, essences, and origins especially—sets thinking in motion and mediates 
its returns. It inspires movement and gives rise to all manner of speculation and 
reflection. Reasoned meditation may be the aim but feeling still comes first and therefore 
presents a problem. It is there at the beginning and remains an open question. It impels 
movement and in philosophy that movement must be placed along the proper path to 
adequate knowledge. 
 Plato’s Socrates is a paradigmatic figure of this proper path, a custodian of 
wonder and the desire to truly know. Through him, we begin to see how this initial 
feeling of wonder conceals a more rudimentary feeling. This desire to know begins in 
wonder, but it is tinged with nostalgia for insight into its estranged beginning. Socrates 
acts as a midwife to Theaetetus’s birth of knowledge, but he also maintains that it is 
ultimately forgotten knowledge, knowledge that was there in the beginning but has since 
been obscured. Like virtue in Meno or piety in Euthyphro, knowledge in Theaetetus is 
that which subsists within the individual soul (psyche) and can be accessed through 
proper procedures of movement and return. These procedures involve recollection or 
reminiscence (anamnesis) and provide a means of transcending the sensible realm and 
returning home—to the intelligible, the proper origin of the soul—in order to access 
virtue, piety, and knowledge, all of which emanate from the supreme Form of the Good. 




only to wonder, but nostalgia. The entire journey of the individual immortal soul (psyche) 
expounded in Phaedo, for example, outlines a dynamic of proper movement. This 
nostalgically propelled return to origins becomes an orienting motif for the itinerary of 
philosophy, a discursive homecoming impelled by the desire to excavate and disclose 
first principles, primordial causes, and irreducible essences. Philosophy thus proceeds 
under the conditions of exile or homesickness, evincing a deep-seated desire to triumph 
over estrangement and close the gap between ignorance and knowledge. It does so by 
searching for some means of access to the real, the true, the good, the objective and 
apodictic, or any number of the manifold metaphors philosophy deploys to justify itself: 
the Cogito in Descartes, the transcendental unity of apperception in Kant, the cunning of 
reason in Hegel, and so on.118 Philosophy wonders about its wonder, a movement to and 
of thinking rooted in nostalgia. As Sylviane Agacinski puts it in her study on temporality 
and nostalgia, “ever since Plato and the metaphysical condemnation of the ephemeral, 
philosophy has been stricken with nostalgia—that is, a painful feeling of exile…the 
feeling that wherever one is, one is not at home.”119 In the beginning was nostalgia, and 
nostalgia was with philosophy; nostalgia was philosophy in the beginning.  
 This chapter commences a two-part effort to not only examine the relationship 
between philosophy and nostalgia Agacinski identifies, but also and especially to 
leverage certain moments in 20th century continental thought that help clarify the 
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animating, propulsive features of nostalgic experience that form the basis of this project. 
Those moments put us on the path to considering nostalgia as a motivating response to 
loss and discontinuity that intervenes in temporal awareness to rework memory in 
especially generative ways. I pursue the first part of this effort below by looking at 
Heidegger’s work with a particular interest in his understanding of the relationship 
between moods and temporality. That relationship, I maintain, helps us approach the 
temporality specific to nostalgia but also reveals the extent to which Heidegger remains a 
thinker of nostos alone, inhibited by his own nostalgia for presence and the Ancient 
Greek determinations of being.120 I begin by tracing the contours of Heidegger’s main 
project and establishing the context and motivation for key concepts like grundstimmung 
(fundamental mood or disposition), geworfenheit (thrownness), and befindlichkeit 
(Heidegger’s word for affectivity; literally the state in which one finds oneself). After 
delineating how these ideas interact with Heidegger’s understanding of time and 
discussing why he positions homesickness as a fundamental mood, I move to examine 
one of his key examples, that of the uncanny (unheimlichkeit) best typified by the figure 
of Antigone. Heidegger’s reading of Antigone as ‘the most uncanny’ links his work to 
nostalgia as a form of existential homesickness. It also reveals how the animating, 
propulsive features of nostalgic experience escape him due to his philosophical 
commitments to presence and disclosure.121 To the extent that it serves to clarify and 
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extend Heidegger’s own thinking on temporality and moods, I turn to insights from affect 
theory at key moments throughout. That body of literature has recently begun to engage 
Heidegger in useful ways that draw attention to both the constituted nature of subjectivity 
and its enduring openness to both affecting and being-affected, demonstrating how 
feelings and emotions like nostalgia serve to galvanize movement. My analysis of 
Heidegger below is informed by these engagements and works to marshal their insights 
in anticipation of the deconstructive analyses undertaken in the next chapter. Those 
analyses depend on Heidegger but ultimately go a step (or two) beyond.  
 Heidegger is both a thinker of nostalgia and a nostalgic thinker, or so I want to 
maintain. He begins in the same space as Plato and Aristotle, with the same speculative 
posture and the same philosophical attitude, interested in excavating initial beginnings 
and primordial origins. His thought, like theirs, is impelled by feelings of wonder. In the 
opening pages of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger famously blames Plato for inaugurating a 
pernicious oblivion of Being, suggesting that he elides crucial ontological distinctions 
first identified by Presocratic thinkers like Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides.122 
 
looking at how Heidegger both exudes nostalgia and approaches it obliquely in his work through the 
notions of homesickness and the uncanny. As we have seen, vivisepulture is meant to send its living 
victims to a slow, eventual death but in doing so it introduces some uncertainty as to when and if death 
definitively occurs and where or how life meets final closure. Despite his preoccupation with being-toward-
death and his continual insistence on the primacy of death as an ultimate, anxiety-inducing horizon, 
Heidegger rarely takes up this uncertainty and never explicitly references live burial. He does, however, 
approach vivisepulture and the set of questions it raises through his reading of Antigone, western 
literature’s most famous victim of live burial. The notion of the uncanny Heidegger develops in this context 
maintains close proximity to his understanding of homesickness as philosophy’s primary grundstimmung. It 
also demonstrates the limitations of Heidegger’s thinking, revealing his own nostalgia for beginnings, 
authenticity, and primordiality. 
122 This distinction refers to the ontological difference Heidegger’s identifies in Sein und Zeit. 
Plato, he thinks, obscures or conflates the difference between individual ontic entities (das Seiende) and 





A decade later he goes on to cite the passages from Plato and Aristotle referenced above 
with some approval, observing that philosophy’s unlikely beginning takes shape in 
feeling and that wonder [thaumazein] acts as a fundamental attunement or basic mood 
[Grundstimmung] of philosophy.123 This beginning in wonder, he argues, suggests the 
need for a type of “primordial thinking” [des anfänglichen denkens] that would further 
impel philosophical speculation to consider its “other beginning,” one that predates both 
Plato and Aristotle and is rooted, for the later Heidegger at least, in the continual 
emergence and unconcealment of Being as such—a type of ancient presencing in which 
humankind primordially dwells.  
 The notion of Grundstimmung is key to this type of thinking and although it does 
not feature prominently in Heidegger’s early work—he only mentions the term once in 
Sein und Zeit—it becomes an increasingly important touchstone in published texts after 
 
cave, Plato effectively transforms the thinking of being. On Heidegger’s reading, this marks the fateful 
moment when “aletheia comes under the yoke of the eidos,” when being comes to be understood as the 
proper or correct correlation that obtains between idea or form (eidos) and appearance, image, or 
representation (phenomena). Cf. Martin Heidegger, “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,”  Pathmarks, ed. William 
McNeil (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 176. This slow decline of the 
meaning of the question of being reaches its full apex when the Greek aletheia encounters Latin in the 
Middle Ages—under the aegis of the Thomistic axiom veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus—and 
reaches full closure with Cartesian rationalism and Hegel’s understanding of absolute knowledge (das 
absolute Wissen). For Heidegger, Plato pries open a gap and paves the way for a full-fledged 
correspondence theory of truth in which aletheia is taken to mean correct or adequate perception or 
representation of eidos—the way in which individual entities or beings appear—rather than the continual 
emergence or unconcealment of being itself found in the Presocratic relationship between aletheia and 
physis (nature). While Heidegger identifies the famous cave allegory in Republic VII as the nucleus of 
Plato’s reorientation of aletheia (and thus being in general), the Eleatic Stranger’s claim that true statements 
“state…things that are (or facts) as they are” in Sophist 263b fully encapsulates the operation Plato 
performs in his doctrine of truth. See also Cratylus, 385b. It is also worth noting that while Heidegger is 
generally more approving of Aristotle’s thought he does believe that Aristotle failed to fully step outside his 
master’s shadow vis-a-vis aletheia and indeed the so-called correspondence theory of truth is often 
attributed to Aristotle as well. See, for example, his Metaphysics, 1011b25; Categories, 12b11, 14b14; De 
Interpretatione, 16a3. See also Heidegger, “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,”  Pathmarks, ed. William McNeil 
(Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 178. 




1929.124 For Heidegger, feelings like wonder attain the status of Grundstimmung not 
because they are fundamental in the sense of being more primary or felt with more 
frequency than other Stimmungen (moods), though they certainly might. Instead, they 
constitute the conditions through which thinking, other entities and feelings, the world, 
and Being-itself are refracted in an especially illuminating manner. Their grounding 
status lies in the unique way they distill and lay bare the ungrounded nature of human 
experience, the way it remains accretive, ongoing, and fundamentally unsettled. 
Heidegger often refers to this laying bare in terms of displacement and disposition. A 
Grundstimmung both displaces within being (disorientation) and disposes to being 
(attunement). In Heidegger’s thinking wonder acts as a grundstimmung, a basic 
disposition, because it “disposes man into the beginning of thinking [by] displac[ing] 
man into that essence whereby he then finds himself in the midst of beings as such and as 
a whole.”125 The implied question of wholeness looms large here as does the assumed 
value of unity; both are always close at hand in Heidegger’s work. But this requires 
necessary context. In order to fully understand what is going on here we first need to 
clarify the stakes of Heidegger’s larger project, how it relates to Grundstimmung, how 
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Heidegger’s Project: Dasein and Homesickness as Philosophy’s Grundstimmung 
 There are no doubt a great many ways to characterize Heidegger’s work. The 
most germane to a thinking of nostalgia, however, include his critique of the modern, 
post-Kantian subject, his understanding of temporality, and his account of moods. Unlike 
Kant and Descartes before him, Heidegger does not consider the self, the subjective “I,” 
in terms of its cognitive relation with itself by virtue of its substance (res cogitans), nor 
does he hold that objects of experience are first cognized as concepts in the mental 
faculty of the understanding (the transcendental subject that consolidates experience 
across time through apperceptive unity). He instead considers the entire problematic of 
subjectivity from an existential point of view. The “I” identifies itself and finds itself—
Befindlichkeit—as always already there, always already existing in time (the Da of Da-
sein: being-there, being-here), faced with the possibility of authentic or inauthentic 
existence through various means comportment. In Sein und Zeit, the early Heidegger 
explores this dynamic by engaging in a project of what he calls fundamental ontology. 
Through this approach he rereads the history of Western thought in light of the all-
important but hitherto obscured ontological difference: the distinction between individual 
ontic beings or entities (das Seinede) and Being as such (das Sein).126 Characteristically 
obsessed with the ‘early’ and the ‘originary,’ Heidegger believes that this approach is a 
 
126 “In the question which we are to work out, what is asked about is Being—that which 
determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood, however we may 
discuss them in detail. The Being of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity. If we are to understand the problem of 
Being our first philosophical step consists…not in defining entities as entities by taking them back in their 
origin to some other entities, as if Being had the character of some possible entities. Hence, Being, as that 
which is asked about, must be exhibited in a way of its own, essentially different from the way in which 




“more primordial” (ursprünglich) mode of inquiry than the standard line of investigation 
hegemonic since Plato and Aristotle.127 He pursues this project, as is well known, by first 
“destroying the history of ontology” (Destruktion)128 to the extent that it has forgotten this 
ontological difference (and thus the meaning of the question of Being) and, second, by 
sketching an existential analytic of Dasein (“being-there”/“being-here”). This reaching 
back to another, more primordial or originary beginning is already suggestive of 
nostalgia: philosophy has ‘lost’ or ‘forgotten’ something it once had—access to the unity 
and totality of Being as such—and must, through processes of Destruktion, reclaim its 
true vocation by returning to its arche.  
 Dasein takes up this itinerary and, in the face of forgetfulness, is propelled by a 
similar desire for genuine, authentic existence. This approach mirrors, at the lower ontic 
level, the broader, more transcendental move Heidegger ventures in positing his essential 
ontological difference. That difference precedes and, in some sense, constitutes Dasein, 
but Dasein itself enjoys a unique position that can offer some access to its 
determinations, or so the early Heidegger wants to argue. Dasein is that entity whose 
being is always already an issue for it and is, in each case, its own (Jemeinigkeit: 
“mineness”).129 Dasein is granted special status and pride of place in Heidegger’s thought, 
especially in the early works. It is taken to be a privileged entity through which some 
light can be shed on the meaning of the question of being in general that propels his 
project. By engaging in an analysis of Dasein’s being, Heidegger uncovers various modes 
 
127 Ibid., §3. 
128 Ibid., §6. 




of intersubjective comportment and worldly engagement that are both specific to Dasein 
and revelatory of original, primordial Being as such (das Sein). Together, these modes of 
comportment constitute Dasein’s being-in-the-world (in-der-Welt-sein), the ways in 
which it is, in any given situation, thrown (geworfen) into the milieu of its own facticity 
(faktizität), into the intractable conditions and often recalcitrant determinations that 
comprise the world, other entities, and its own makeup.  
 Heidegger’s main concern, at least in Sein und Zeit, is to determine the precise 
nature of Dasein’s existence as either authentic or inauthentic. Dasein lives 
inauthentically by avoiding its own-most possibilities for existence and, especially, by 
succumbing to the determinations of average everydayness and ‘the They,’ what 
Heidegger terms das Man. In this mode of existence, Dasein forgets its own primordial 
relation to Being and, by becoming lost or absorbed in the fabric of social life, fails to 
choose the path of individual determination. Conversely, Heidegger argues that authentic 
existence involves those instances in which Dasein remembers the ontological difference, 
comports itself to its own potentiality by accepting its thrownness, and, risking the 
possibility of anxiety, faces the truth of Being and finitude through what he calls 
anticipatory resoluteness (vorlaufende entschlossenheit).130 Existentially, this means 
facing up to the possibility of one’s own death, that is, the possibility of Dasein’s own 
impossibility, a possibility that can only ever be its own, its being-toward-death (Sein-
zum-Tode).131 Accepting the thrown facticity of this ultimate horizon furnishes Dasein 
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with a proper path to beings in general and, eventually, Being as such in its most essential 
and primordial form. Like Plato’s Socrates who first initiates philosophy’s movement of 
nostalgic return and proper remembrance, Heidegger’s Dasein purportedly provides some 
access to what has been lost or obscured.  
 The various modes of comportment and engagement that shape Dasein’s being-
in-the-world are characterized by their disclosedness (erschlossenheit), according to 
Heidegger. This disclosedness determines the myriad ways Dasein is open to itself, other 
entities, and the world as well as the ways in which these modes are themselves 
disclosive of the forgotten object—Being as such—and the possibility of authentic 
existence. Taken together, these modes constitute the basic ontological structure of 
Dasein, a structure that Heidegger characterizes as Care (sorge). This care-structure is 
Heidegger’s version of Husserlian intentionality, that is, the directed-ness or about-ness 
of individual consciousness, the manifold ways in which the subject is able to forge a 
correlation between subject and object through its powers of representation.132 Dasein’s 
care-structure—the ways in which it is determined as open and directed both toward and 
outside itself—is comprised of four basic disclosive coordinates. One of these 
 
132 Heidegger’s argument for care as replacement for intentionality can be found in Martin 
Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, trans. Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 2009), §31ff. As a phenomenological concept, intentionality has its roots in 
Scholastic thought, specifically St. Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God, as a means of 
differentiating between objects that exist in the mental faculty of the understanding and objects that exist in 
reality. Intentionality fell into obscurity shortly thereafter, but was repurposed by Husserl and his teacher, 
Franz Brentano as a means of enumerating the powers of the mind and elaborating the nature of individual 
acts of consciousness. It was then problematized by psychoanalysis and one of Brentano’s most famous 
students, Sigmund Freud. Recently, thinkers associated with the speculative realist movement have 
deployed the concept in order to proffer a critique of post-Kantian forms of “correlationism,” that is, modes 
of thought that suppose thinking and being to be necessarily correlated. See, for example, Quentin 





coordinates is affectivity or Befindlichkeit. Befindlichkeit, along with Stimmung, is one of 
the two terms Heidegger variously uses to refer to affectivity, moods, and emotions in the 
existential analytic of Dasein.133  
 For Heidegger, Dasein’s being-in-the-world is always contingent upon its 
affective capacities and its ability to be imbued with this or that mood.134 This 
observation, along with his initial analyses of time, stand among Heidegger’s most 
enduring insights and offers a means of thematizing feeling by bringing it into direct 
relation with the conditions of existence that shape it. Being-in-the-world is moody, it 
seems, if by moody we mean one’s capacity to be moved, here or there, by a type of 
affective attunement that discloses not only matters of fact, but those facts that matter to 
us most intimately.135 This moodiness often cannot be predicted and lies outside the 
complete and immediate control of the knowing, speaking subject it often ventriloquizes. 
 
133 Both terms are notoriously difficult to render in English translation and must be understood, at 
least within the context of Sein und Zeit, against the backdrop of Heidegger’s ontological difference, where 
Befindlichkeit refers to affectivity more generally—Dasein’s capacity to affect and be affected—and has 
ontological connotations related to various states of Being, while Stimmung carries with it a sense particular 
ontic feelings or sensibilities, i.e., particular moods or emotions such as fear, hope, joy, or sadness. Both 
terms are intimately related such that Befindlichkeit, as the overall affective state in which one finds 
oneself, provides the necessary conditions for one’s being-attuned, for having the capacity to be affected by 
a specific Stimmung or feeling. However, in 1929, shortly after the publication of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger 
abandons Befindlichkeit as it is deployed in that text and opts instead for the more all-encompassing term 
Stimmung while retaining much of the original significance of both terms. This can be seen in The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger’s 1929 inaugural address at Freiburg University, Was ist 
Metaphysik?, and his Kantbuch (Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics), which unofficially supplies the 
missing third division of Sein und Zeit promised in that text’s initial outline (Cf. Sein und Zeit, §8). Later, 
in 1941, he admits that his conception of Befindlichkeit in Sein und Zeit coheres with and contains his later 
account and usage of Stimmung. Cf. Heidegger, Über den Anfang (GA70), 131. See also Dahlstrom, The 
Heidegger Dictionary, 63. Given this knotty situation, I will refer to affectivity as a more general and all-
encompassing term below except in those instances where either Befindlichkeit or Stimmung achieve more 
immediate contextual and conceptual clarity. 
134 “Stimmung has already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it 
possible first of all to direct oneself towards something. […] Dasein’s openness to the world is constituted 
existentially by the attunement of Befindlichkeit.” Cf. Heidegger, Being and Time, 137/176. 
135 “Existentially, Befindlichkeit implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can 




It simply happens, comes to be, or emerges. “A mood [Stimmung] assails or invades us,” 
Heidegger writes, “it comes neither from ‘outside’ nor from ‘inside,’ but arises out of 
Being-in-the-world.”136 Not only is being-in-the-world constituted by affectivity—one is 
never not affected, never not affecting—for Heidegger, the experience of being imbued 
by a particular mood marginalizes intentional consciousness. To be affected is to be 
moved or impelled to move by a particular feeling or affective experience that discloses 
but cannot always be predicted or consciously conjured. This sort of experience unfolds 
within the vicissitudes of everyday existence in the world, in solitude and isolation, in 
interaction and sociality, in all manner of engagement and comportment.  
 This leads us back to Heidegger’s notion of Grundstimmung, those moods or 
dispositions that orient and attune Dasein’s manner of comportment more fundamentally 
than others. If individual moods [Stimmungen] arise out of Dasein’s being-in-the-world 
and affect both its openness to experience and its receptivity to the modes of disclosure 
experience generates, then the notion of Grundstimmung raises things to the next power 
by disclosing how disclosure discloses, by showing how disclosure is always already 
colored by affective disposition, in other words. Grundstimmungen function as 
paradigmatic feelings or emotions that relate Dasein to itself, other beings, and the world 
in especially illuminating or disclosive ways that once again provide access to Being as 
such, Being as primordial, unconcealed presencing. The German root word here—
Stimmung—carries at least two connotations that are difficult to express in English.137 It 
 
136 Ibid., 136/176. 
137 For more on this see the entry for “Stimmung” in Barbara Cassin et al., Dictionary of 




can mean, on the one hand, vocal articulation in the sense of a particular mood, feeling, 
or emotion attaining some mode of expression. Johannes Hofer seems to have orbited this 
sense when, in his dissertation on nostalgia, he suggests that it is possible, on the basis of 
the word’s “force” and “sound,” to more clearly define the moodiness that emerges from 
the desire to return.138 The other meaning derives its sense from music: to be ‘in tune,’ ‘on 
pitch,’ or to maintain proper tension. Perhaps this is what Heraclitus has in mind when he 
suggests that there is some hidden or invisible harmony in a strung bow that keeps its 
shape and sound by maintaining constant, tensive pressure.139 Heidegger brings these two 
meanings together in his notion of Grundstimmung—a grounding attunement or 
fundamental mood—that simultaneously displaces Dasein among (ontic) beings present-
at-hand and disposes it to forgotten (ontological) Being, revealing its unity and totality, 
the manner in which it grounds all that issues from its continual, emergent presencing.  
 This helps clarify why Heidegger posits wonder as one of philosophy’s 
motivating Grundstimmungen. Wonder compels thinking and colors philosophy’s 
movement toward the primordial, what Heidegger calls the ‘first’ or ‘other’ beginning. It 
acts as a lens or filter through which other feelings, emotions, and experience in general 
become intelligible. I say one of philosophy’s motivating Grundstimmungen here because 
several years later Heidegger identifies an additional Grundstimmung that adheres to 
philosophy and brings us even closer to nostalgia: homesickness. To borrow from 
 
138 Johannes Hofer, “Medical Dissertation on Nostalgia,” trans. Carolyn Kiser Anspach, Bulletin of 
the Institute of the History of Medicine 2 (January 1, 1934), ¶2, 381. 
139 One version of his famous Fragment #51 reads: “They do not apprehend how being at variance 
it agrees with itself, how being brought apart it is brought together with itself. There is a back-stretched 
connection, as in the bow and the lyre. See G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, eds., The Presocratic Philosophers: A 




Agacinski once again, philosophy is stricken with nostalgia, with the growing and 
enduring realization that wherever it casts its gaze, it remains in exile, not-at-home. 
Unlike Hofer, Heidegger does not view this form of homesickness as a disease and has no 
interest in cataloging symptoms or developing a cure. His homesickness constitutes an 
existential condition, to be sure, but, at the same time, the form of desire he discusses still 
facilities movement and propulsion, much like Hofer’s. The impetus here is a famous 
fragment from Novalis, the German poet and mystic: “Philosophy is really homesickness, 
an urge to be at home everywhere.”140 Novalis pens these words in the late eighteenth 
century, right around the same time that homesickness began to see more frequent 
currency as a romantic metaphor of the type that Kant mentions—a response to the 
conditions of temporal experience—rather than a provincial physical condition. 
 Heidegger spends the majority of his 1929-30 seminar on the fundamental 
concepts of metaphysics offering extending commentary on this line from Novalis. As in 
Plato, Aristotle, and his own text on wonder published just three years prior, Heidegger 
observes that philosophy does indeed long to be at home. It yearns to relocate or regain 
access to its forgotten provenance, its primordial origins and initial first roots. But, even 
more importantly, he postulates that the urge or drive to be at home everywhere identified 
by Novalis can only be constitutive of philosophical reflection if those who philosophize 
are not already at home, experiencing the pangs of what Georg Lukács would later call 
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“transcendental homelessness.”141 It is because this homesickness remains, incessantly, 
both compelling and unsatisfied that it attains the status of Grundstimmung in 
Heidegger’s view, conditioning philosophy’s speculative impulse and animating its 
movement toward thought. Both unlocalized and unlocalizable, this homesickness 
establishes the coordinates for the sort of questions philosophy wants to ask and installs a 
frame of reference through which answers to those questions become intelligible. For 
Heidegger, these questions and their frame pertain to unity, wholeness, and finitude. To 
be at home everywhere, he suggests, is to be where or when the philosopher is not, that 
is, “to be once and at all times within the whole [im Ganzen],” within the aleatory 
manifold that is the world as we know and perceive it.142 For Heidegger, the philosopher 
remains estranged from home. The ‘where’ and the ‘when’ of this drive to be at home 
everywhere, this desire to become homely in every place and in every instance, is 
directed, Heidegger tells us, not only toward the whole, but toward “Being as a whole 
[Sein im Ganzen].”143 Heidegger describes this urge to become homely and this drive 
toward the whole in terms of restlessness (getriebenheit). Dasein remains restless and this 
restlessness impels its movement, its drive toward solace in Being as a whole, a whole 
that both contains and exceeds the totality of beings and entities in the world. This 
identification of philosophy with a type of unlocalizeable homesickness, a form of 
temporally-oriented nostalgia, marks a salient point of departure for Heidegger, the most 
 
141 Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. 
William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995), 5. Cf. Georg 
Lukács, The Theory of the Novel: A Historico-Philosophical Essay on the Forms of Great Epic Literature, 
trans. Anna Bostock (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971). 





influential and surreptitious thinker of philosophy’s nostalgia. Within this frame of 
reference, nostalgic desire, rather than being directed toward a specific place or space 
(home, classically understood), suffuses the entirety of existence, and is expressive of a 
type of yearning for Being-itself as it gradually emerges in time. This, for Heidegger, is 
the character of philosophy’s most basic disposition, its most rudimentary form of feeling 
and attunement.  
Resonances with Affect Theory 
 Heidegger’s vested interested in moods and feeling bear some interesting and 
productive resemblance to more recent theories of affectivity. Since the 1990s, high 
theory—perhaps motivated, at least in part, by what others have called its nostalgia for 
the real144—has been marked by what Patricia Clough calls “the affective turn” or “the 
turn to affect.”145 This turn offers a generative means of studying human experience by 
drawing attention to the ways that affectivity in general (the capacity to affect and be 
affected) and certain affects in particular (e.g., nostalgia, anxiety, hope, etc.) function as a 
chief means of motivation in human thought and experience. As we have already seen, 
 
144 As Josue V. Harari put it recently: “At the same time that theory claims to stand for the real, the 
discourse of theory inscribes within itself the very repression of the reality it promotes. […] From Proust to 
Beckett, from Blanchot to Derrida, from Freud to Lacan, from Lévi-Strauss to Girard, our entire literary 
theoretical modernity has been predicated upon a nostalgia for the real. Reality is accused of never 
showing its true face…or else…of always falling short of itself. See his Scenarios of the Imaginary: 
Theorizing the French Enlightenment (Cornell University Press, 2019), 19. Italics mine. Thomas M. 
Kavanaugh agrees. “Expelling the real,” he writes, “theory nonetheless expresses an abiding nostalgia for 
what has been lost in its choice of totality and closure.” See his The Limits of Theory (Stanford, C.A.: 
Stanford University Press, 1989), 20. 
145 Cf. Patricia Ticineto Clough and Jean Halley, eds., The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books, 2007). The genesis of what is now called contemporary affect 
theory is often attributed to a pair of essays first published in 1995: Brian Massumi’s  “The Autonomy of 
Affect,” Cultural Critique, no. 31 (1995): 83-109; and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank, “Shame 




feelings and emotions impel movement. They move us here or there, this way and that, 
oftentimes in ways that we cannot clearly predict, control, isolate, or even articulate. As 
Lisa Blackman and Couze Venn put it, they serve to “gesture toward something that 
escapes or remains in excess of the practices of the ‘speaking subject.’”146 As indicators 
of motivation and provocation, affects subsist before, beside, and beyond more familiar 
faculties like reason and judgment and are thus constitutive of elemental components of 
human behavior. They modulate, amplify, and intensify one’s capacities to act and be 
acted upon. While certainly felt in their fullness, they tend to exceed their naming, 
outstripping efforts to render them completely transparent, immediate, or accessible. 
They often do so by circulating just beneath the surface, intervening between sensation 
and thought, perception and activity. In light of this, one way to view affect theory is as a 
necessary corrective to the longstanding anxiety regarding feelings and emotion 
discussed above. 
 Heidegger was on his way to similar conclusions even if he never fully thematizes 
them. In his language, Dasein is transposed [versetzt] into this or that mood such that 
moods themselves constitute “powerful forces that permeate and envelop us…com[ing] 
over us…with one fell swoop.”147 Affects and affectivity thus contribute to and determine 
the incessant outworking of Dasein’s ‘Da’—its there-ness or here-ness—which shapes 
the responses, reactions, and reverberations that often exceed knowing, intentional 
consciousness. Dasein is thus on the way to finding itself affected before the mental 
 
146 Lisa Blackman and Couze Venn, “Affect,” Body & Society 16, no. 1 (March 1, 2010), 8. Italics 
mine. 
147 Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine,” trans. William McNeill and 




bifurcation into subject and object, “prior to all cognition and volition,” as Heidegger 
puts it.148 Perhaps this is why he chose to introduce his concept of “thrownness” 
(Geworfenheit)—a linchpin in his early project—in the middle of his discussion of moods 
and affectivity. Thrownness is a phenomenological correlate to Dasein’s ontological 
facticity and a basic attribute of its overall care-structure.149 For our purposes, it functions 
as a loose synonym for what Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth call the immanent 
between-ness and accumulative beside-ness of affect, the force and forces of encounter, 
“the subtlest of shuttling intensities.”150 In a Heideggerian register we might say that 
Dasein is always already thrown into the facticity of its existence, always on the way or 
in the midst of finding itself (Befindlichkeit) in the unsettled position of the ‘Da,’ the 
precarious foothold with which it identifies itself.  
 “Thrownness is neither a ‘fact that is finished’ nor a fact that is settled,” according 
to Heidegger.151 It instead refers to the constant pressure of Dasein’s existence, refracted 
through the disclosedness of affectivity and continually subject to the draw of inauthentic 
existence through the inertia of das Man. Thrownness discloses Dasein as ‘there,’ but, 
crucially, this occurs in a manner that is not graspable or present-at-hand, in Heidegger’s 
terms. Rather, this facticity is an essential attribute of the totality of Dasein’s being-in-
the-world. It permeates the entirety of things and, as such, it cannot be seen, viewed, 
beheld, or isolated as one element among others. The facticity thrownness indicates is the 
 
148 Heidegger, Being and Time, 136/175. 
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‘that-it-is-ness’ of Dasein’s constantly moving and morphing presence. This disclosure 
occurs, through affectivity in such a manner that Dasein is always on its way to finding 
itself in this or that position of affective attunement (Befindlichkeit), with this or that 
sense of feeling (Stimmung). It is thus that Dasein, in being affected, “is always brought 
before itself, and has always found itself, not in the sense of coming across itself by 
perceiving itself, but in the sense of finding itself in the [Stimmung] that it has.”152 We 
first find ourselves as being affected, as feeling, as felt—and if, as Descartes would have 
it, our thinking ‘grounds’ our ‘existence,’ this is only because our thinking is already 
affected by the time we engage it. The feeling comes first, it seems. And for Heidegger 
this means that Dasein is faced with the reality it must have always found itself (as 
affected), will continue to find itself (affected), and will find—or will have found—itself 
(affected) again and again.  
 Heidegger may not be interested in developing a full-fledged theory of affectivity, 
but his account of moods and thrownness offer some illuminating clarifications that can 
help us better understand nostalgic experience. Contemporary iterations of affect theory 
have often had occasion to refer to “the particular temporal logic of affect”153 as “neither 
linear nor homogenous;”154 the manner in which affectivity itself is “constitutive of lived 
time;”155 affects’ potential “resistance to teleological presumptions;”156 and, especially, the 
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burgeoning notion that all theories of affect are essentially “theories of timing,” that is, 
“theories of the self running ahead of itself….[and] catching up with itself.”157 Time is of 
the essence, as they say, and in this case that essence enables movement and increases 
capaciousness, what Purnima Mankekar calls “the affective potency of temporality” 
which reveals that “time is generative of agency.”158 Heidegger had some nascent 
understanding of this too, even if he presses his insights into different register concerned 
more with universal ontological structures than specific feelings or experiences like 
nostalgia. Like his teacher Edmund Husserl, Heidegger explicitly frames all his analyses, 
including those related to moods and affectivity, against the backdrop of time as the 
fundamental horizon for phenomenological interpretation, the horizon against which 
Dasein is thrown and seeks to find itself (affected).  
 According to Heidegger, affectivity “temporalizes itself primarily in having been 
[in der Gewesenheit]” such that its “basic character…lies in bringing one back to 
something [Zurückbringen auf…].”159 This “bringing-back” does not “produce” the 
essence or presence of the ‘having-been,’ but it does disclose or reveal the ‘having-been’ 
as a mode of being or sensibility available for analysis and interpretation. This is no 
doubt what St. Augustine had in mind when he offhandedly refers to memory as the 
stomach of the mind. “I can be far from glad,” he writes, “in remembering myself to have 
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been glad, and far from sad when I recall my past sadness…I remember with joy a 
sadness that has passed and with sadness a lost joy.”160 Sadness and gladness are as bitter 
and sweet food. “When they are entrusted to the memory they are as if transferred to the 
stomach and can there be stored, but they cannot be tasted.”161 If they could, of course, 
the sensation would be revolting and bilious. Instead, they sustain us in the ‘stomach’ of 
the mind, the region that both nourishes us and produces all manner of viscera and 
affective feedback, generating a unique experience with—but not of—the past, to 
paraphrase Walter Benjamin.162  
 What Heidegger seems to be suggesting, without explicitly saying so, is one of 
the central tenets of affect theory: that time is, above all, felt. It affects us and issues a 
relentless and unceasing of array of cumulative archival effects (memories, feelings, 
memories of previous feelings, memories of memories, etc.). These effects are always 
already at/in play and at times they reduce our capacities for abstract thought and clear 
articulation to a faint whisper. We are inscribed by affects and we often feel them in the 
form of a muted cry, a sensate twinge welling up in search of expression. At times they 
overwhelm us, but not always. Yet, we do find ourselves cast into their atmosphere, 
carried over into the contagious vibes they emit. Affect theory suggests, among other 
things, an ongoing shift in attention and a newfound interest in these vibes and 
atmospheres. It demands a reengagement with the non-conscious dimensions of 
subjectivity that often intervene to mediate thought and experience.  
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 This mediating liminality highlights affects’ distinctly temporal dimensions, the 
way they both disrupt and facilitate our temporal orientation. Affects and affectivity 
shape our experience of time, functioning as something of a shimmering, circuitous index 
of temporization, of the belated lag that persists between being affected by someone or 
something and rationally cognizing or apprehending that experience, between feeling and 
thought, sense and understanding, experience and consciousness. I feel something and 
this feeling overtakes me. It moves me, transports me, and seizes the ostensibly seamless 
flow of time as I perceive it, slowing it down, speeding it up—bending it and twisting it. 
My feelings grip and convulse my time just as my time tabulates the accruing, nearly 
undetectable expression of my feelings, the dim and shadowy archive of my unceasing 
experience. Time, in this matrix, becomes less of an immovable repository containing 
discrete, successive moments and more of vivacious, labile shoreline, revealing and 
concealing. Wave upon wave, the vagrancies of temporality’s tide indicate the opacities 
of an aggregate self that is because it feels, a buoyant and adrenalized “upsurge” of time 
and affective accretion, to paraphrase Maurice Merleau-Ponty.163  As such—and this will 
become clearer over the course of the next chapter or so—affects like nostalgia signal the 
possibility that consciousness never completely and fully coincides with itself. We are 
always running ahead of ourselves, and can be, at any given moment, thrust into the 
dense haze of our accumulative histories, overtaken by the build-up of affective 
associations that drag us into the future. 
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 When Heidegger says that the temporality of moods involves a certain ‘bringing-
back,’ he is referring to something that does not occur in a neat, linear, or successive 
manner. The time of affectivity appears, at times, to runs backwards, or, better, sideways, 
cutting across past and future in the present, intimating what Michael Warner calls a 
“dilated temporality.”164 Bringing-back always happens after the fact and does not adhere 
to the standard logics of cause and effect; the return occurs in the absence of any sort of 
object or ground cast in proverbial amber. Feelings are fleeting; they are but echoes, 
shimmers, reveries—duplicative feedback. They bring us back to our having-been, but 
reveal that the having-been is not now what is once was, as Kant first observed in his 
comments on Swiss homesickness. Instead, they emerge in an upsurge and then recede, 
gathering themselves within the oceanic expanse of the self to generate yet another series 
of teeming, crashing waves.  
 Being on the way to finding oneself with this or that feeling already suggests a 
sort of belatedness or nonlinearity, an essential feature of emotional life highlighted by 
nostalgic experience. I will have much more to say about this in the next chapter, but for 
now it will suffice to note that the protracted timing invoked here is characterized by 
deferral and accretion. Affect theory itself has yet to fully thematize this element, but 
Heidegger’s discussion of temporality and Befindlichkeit in Division II of Sein und Zeit 
offers some useful clarifications that begin to broach the sort of temporality involved in 
nostalgic experience. It is worth remembering that the entire existential analytic of 
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Dasein outlined in the first half of Sein und Zeit is only ever given the status of a 
“prepatory analysis”165 meant to lay groundwork for the explication of “primordial 
temporality” Heidegger offers near the end of the text. As such, and in order to “repeat 
the existential analysis in a more primordial manner,”166 he returns, in Division II, to key 
moments in the analytic under the general rubric of time. These include affectivity 
(considered as Stimmung and the basic existentiale of Befindlichkeit) the temporality 
specific to Dasein’s elemental disclosedness.  
 The meaning of Dasein’s being is found in care or concern, Heidegger tell us,167 
and the ontological meaning of care is located in temporality.168 That care-structure 
exhibits both the unity and totality of selfhood, an aggregate of Dasein’s being-ahead-of-
itself (existentiality), its being-already-in-the-world (facticity, thrownness), and its being-
alongside other entities in the world (fallenness). Rather than characterizing selfhood as 
either substance or subject—this is his dispute with Descartes and Kant referenced 
above—Heidegger contends that the phenomenon of the self is exemplified, or disclosed, 
through this care-structure, as a type of radical, ecstatic openness to the world. This 
ecstatic openness is part and parcel of Heidegger’s temporality of affectivity, which 
consists primarily in pastness, in one’s thrownness, the disclosure of how one is, how one 
feels, or how one finds oneself in any particular moment. This pastness or been-ness is 
one of temporality’s own ecstases, one of the modes in which time temporalizes itself as 
having-been (past), being-alongside (present), and being-ahead (future). Each mode 
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stands outside itself in standing alongside the others. In finding itself in this or that 
affective state, Dasein faces the facticity of its thrownness. In asking how it is, how it 
feels, or what causes it to be moved, Dasein finds itself confronted with this accretive 
facticity, the character of its ‘having-been.’ Both Dasein’s ‘having-been’ and its factical 
thrownness stand outside themselves as ek-stases in this confrontation and together 
contribute to its mood or state of mind in the present. 
 Affects reveal the experience of how time feels, an experience that often feels like 
constitutive stretchedness, of the self strung between having-been, being-alongside, and 
being-ahead. It is for this reason that Heidegger claims that affects would have no basis 
for signification whatsoever “except on the basis of temporality.”169 To feel this or that 
affect lays bare the manner in which the self is always in the process of catching up with 
itself by both reaching back and projecting ahead, reaching back as a means of projecting 
ahead and coming to terms with one’s experience and all the lag, attentiveness, and 
anticipation it entails. The temporality involved here entails linearity, to be sure, but it is 
not predicated upon it. It ‘brings one back’ to instances of ‘having-been’ but, instead of 
simply reproducing those instances, it discloses or makes manifest the way Dasein 
always carries its factical thrownness within itself, often in excess of its cognitive 
facilities. As we saw in the last chapter, feelings often emerge in the belated aftermath of 
that which prompts them and as such they rarely fully coincide with their initial impetus. 
Affective experience, then, is the experience of delay and deferral, of hesitation and 
protraction. One experiences something and later—who knows when—that experience 
 




elicits a certain feeling, a particular emotion or affect, the trembling travails of the 
aftereffect, or better, the after-affect: that which is felt (later) (on), which is to simply say 
that which is felt (right) (now).170  
 
The Uncanny and Counter-Turning 
 Heidegger’s favorite and most famous example of affectivity brings these 
temporal insights together and provides yet another link to homesickness and nostalgia by 
way of an additional concept, that of the uncanny (unheimlich). Uncanniness refers to the 
experience of the strange and the familiar, the unhomely in the homely, a cousin to 
nostalgia both in terms of etymological history (the notion of home) and affective 
experience (the feeling of estrangement, exile, or displacement). Heidegger is rarely 
known for his thinking on the uncanny but as Derrida observes, “the frequent, decisive, 
and organizing recourse he has to the value of Unheimlichkeit, in Being and Time, and 
elsewhere, remains generally unnoticed or neglected.”171 This, of course, places 
Heidegger alongside someone like Freud whose 1919 essay “Das Unheimliche” stands as 
something of an ur-text on the subject. Heidegger initially analyzes the uncanny under the 
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rubric of anxiety, perhaps one reason why he is not as easily associated with uncanniness 
as someone like Freud.  
 In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger characterizes Angst as an essential constituent of 
Dasein’s character as thrown being-in-the-world. Anxiety is the earliest example of 
Grundstimmung in his work. It anticipates his thinking on philosophy’s beginnings in 
wonder and retreads the same terrain as his Novalis-inspired discussion of philosophy’s 
essential homesickness, its constant drive to be at home everywhere despite its 
constitutive displacement. As an elemental Grundstimmung, anxiety colors the entirety of 
Dasein’s comportment and governs its capacities for affectedness. Heidegger thinks 
Angst reveals or discloses our state-of-mind and affective attunement, the way in which 
we already find ourselves (Befindlichkeit) feeling this way or that by virtue of our 
thrownness. He suggests that in Angst this grounding attunement is characterized by 
uncanniness. “In anxiety one feels uncanny [Unheimlichkeit.”172 This uncanniness not 
only suggests unfamiliarity or strangeness, but also and especially a type of “not-being-at 
home” [das nitcht-zuhause-sein]. This displacement stems from Dasein’s fraught 
relationship with das Man, its constant battle against alienation, estrangement, and 
average everydayness. In anxiety one feels uncanny and in uncanniness, like nostalgia, 
one feels unmoored and adrift, not at home yet longing to be at home, longing to find or 
seek out home despite its absence. This condition is never alleviated or assuaged. 
“Uncanniness pursues Dasein constantly,” Heidegger says later on, and poses “a threat to 
 




the lostness in which it has forgotten itself.”173 Here, again, forgetfulness acts as a 
precondition for philosophy’s movement toward thought, its nostalgic desire to remember 
its initial, primordial vocation—the ontological difference—and reinstall authentic 
thought by pursuing a return home perpetually beyond its reach.  
 Later, in his 1935 course Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger returns to the 
uncanny again, this time with reference to Sophocles and the figure of Antigone (who, 
like Praxin’s nostalgics discussed in the previous chapter, is sentenced to vivisepulture 
for disobedience and errancy). This is the first instance of his now famous rendering of 
the Greek “deinon”—a word more readily associated with the fearful, the marvelous, or 
the strange—as Un-heimlich, the uncanny. The chorus in Sophocles’ Antigone announces 
that the human being is deinon in the most supreme sense. In Heidegger’s hands, this 
means that Dasein acts as the uncanniest of the uncanny, an expression he takes to be 
“the authentic Greek definition of humanity.”174 He defends his translation choice here by 
drawing attention to the violent connotations built into deinon as well as its sense of 
negation, displacement, and thrownness. The uncanny “throws one out of the ‘canny,’ 
that is, the homely, the accustomed…the unhomely that does not allow us to be at 
home.”175 This idea receives further elaboration nearly a decade later in Heidegger’s 
commentary on Hölderlin’s “The Ister,” the middle third of which is devoted entirely to 
Sophocles’ tragedy. Heidegger is so interested in Hölderlin, at least in this case, because 
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he “poetizes the becoming homely yet simultaneous being unhomely of human beings.” 
This “poetic necessity,” as he puts it, finds “pure fulfillment” in the figure of Antigone 
who takes the uncanny within herself and becomes a poem of becoming unhomely in the 
most supreme sense.176 Building on the 1935 course, Heidegger goes on to offer further 
justification of his translation which he admits is ‘alien’ and ‘violent’ but still provides a 
great deal of conceptual clarity. Deinon as Un-heimlich may “go beyond what is 
expressed in the Greek” but provides some grounding for the word’s own manifold 
meaning: the fearful, the powerful, and, especially, the inhabitual or unfamiliar. 
Heidegger thinks the essence of deinon “conceals itself in the originary unity”177 of these 
connotations, the same sort of structuring, primordial unity that grounds Being as such 
and the same unity toward which Dasein is directed in its homesickness. For Heidegger, 
the phrasing deinon as unheimlich—humanity as the most uncanny among the uncanny—
grasps this concealed unity in an especially illumining manner  
 How does he arrive at this conclusion? Everything hinges on the choral ode, that 
moment of pause, of collective interruption, to thematize, respond, and portend. 
Heidegger is especially interested in the long choral ode that occurs right before Creon 
learns that Antigone has disobeyed his order not to bury her brother, Polynices, and 
summarily sentences her to death via live burial. Antigone, who in the wake of the loss of 
her brother longs to give him a proper burial, is herself subject to improper burial by 
means of vivisepulture, the same punishment wrought upon early nostalgics as we have 
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seen. Heidegger is interested in the opening lines here, claiming that they form “the 
essential ground of this tragedy, and even of Sophocles’ poetic work as a whole.”178 
Following Hölderlin, he translates them as follows: 
Manifold is the uncanny [deinon, unheimlich], yet nothing 
more uncanny looms or stirs beyond the human being.179 
 
The uncanny ‘looms’ and ‘stirs’ both within the manifold that is the world and, 
especially, within the human being, its most paradigmatic exemplar. It is both specific 
and diffuse, present in multiplicity and particularity, yet outstripping both by virtue of its 
own specificity, a specificity unique to Dasein, according to Heidegger. In this frame, the 
uncanny itself is manifold, “strewn among many kinds.” But the various folds that form 
this manifold never really un-fold in a way that might reveal the “simplicity of its full and 
pure essence.”180 Even the manifold itself, as uncanny as it is, fails to disclose the 
supreme level of uncanniness: the manner in which the human being, by virtue of its 
being, stands as the uncanniest of all. Heidegger places this designation—Dasein as 
deinon, deinon as un-heimlich—alongside Hölderlin’s poetic care for “becoming 
homely” to lay bare the “intrinsic relation” between the two, between being unhomely in 
uncanniness and being on the way to becoming homely in thrownness.181  The one always 
contains the other, he thinks. Uncanniness stands in relation to canniness just as the 
unhomely furnishes the homely with its essential sense.  
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 Freud thought this too. In his landmark essay “Das Unheimliche,” Freud engages 
in close philological analysis of the word’s different shades of meaning, observing that 
“what is heimlich comes to be un-heimlich” and that the homely ultimately “develops in 
the direction of ambivalence until it finally coincides with its opposite.”182 The unhomely 
is thus a sub-set of the homely, and the uncanny that which is secretly and intimately 
familiar, familiar unfamiliarity one might say. Nicholas Royle, in his insightfully witty 
study on the topic, notes that this valence of the uncanny “consists in a sense of 
homeliness uprooted, the revelation of something unhomely at the heart of hearth and 
home.”183 He notes that the feeling is often bound up with an “extreme nostalgia” or 
homesickness characterized by an all-encompassing desire to ‘go back.’ Royle goes on to 
connect this idea to Freud’s notion of the death drive, where extreme nostalgia reveals a 
deeper compulsion to return to an inorganic state.  
 Referring to the uncanny as “homeliness uprooted” gets at the intrinsic ambiguity 
identified by both Freud and Heidegger, a subterranean unity of opposites that can be 
traced all the way back to Presocratic thinkers like Heraclitus. The uncanny denotes 
dissonance and tension internal to home, the unhomely, and all the values of unity, 
identity, and belonging they depend upon. It is with this in mind that Heidegger finally 
arrives at his own definition of the uncanny, one that harkens back to and builds upon his 
earlier ruminations on anxiety in Sein und Zeit: “We mean the uncanny [unheimlich] in 
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the sense of that which is not at home—not homely in that which is homely…the sense of 
something that has an alienating or frightening effect that gives rise to anxiety.”184 The 
sense of feeling not-homely in that which is taken to be homely is one way of describing 
the early cases of nostalgia discussed in the last chapter vis-a-vis Hofer and Praxin. 
Nostalgia emerges as an uncanny experience because it reveals the degree to which one 
feels dislocated or displaced within what is called homely or said to be home. One finds 
oneself nostalgic or unhomely because homeliness (feeling) and home (object) do not 
exactly coincide, much like Dasein and its ‘Da,’ its immediate self-presence. 
 Not homely in that which is homely: this adds a bit more character to the initial 
connection between Angst and Unheimlich Heidegger leaves unthematized in Sein und 
Zeit. Not only does one feel uncanny in anxiety, uncanniness itself gives rise to anxiety 
and is never fully given as such. It is never merely present at hand, yet still contributes to 
an overall or state-of-mind characterized by being-not-at-home, a Grundstimmung of the 
highest order. It both displaces and disposes, casting one out of the homely and at the 
same time disposing one to the search for homeliness within the unhomely. Not homely in 
that which is homely: as thrown being-in-the-world, Dasein experiences being-unhomely 
even in those situations in which it is being-homely. Its Befindlichkeit, the state-of-mind 
in which it finds itself, is characterized by an essential ambivalence without which neither 
the homely nor the unhomely would attain sense or intelligibility. Not homely in that 
which is homely: given this situation, Heidegger will go on to say that the uncanny does 
not emerge as an effect of human experience, but the inverse. Human experience issues 
 




from the uncanny, it “remains within it, looms out of it and stirs within it.” It is the 
uncanny itself, he argues, that looms forth in the essence of the human being as that 
which “presences and at the same time absences.”185 Like Hofer’s initial nostalgics who 
pine for lost presence and Praxin’s soon-to-be victims of live burial who appear mentally 
absent, Heidegger describes Dasein’s uncanniness in terms of the interplay between 
presence and absence, between the homely and its other. He began to broach this in his 
commentary on Novalis, suggesting that philosophy can only be homesickness if the 
philosopher is not already at home, perpetually suffused by the unhomely that impels her 
to seek out the homeliness of primordial Being. Here that very same dynamic between 
displacement and disposition receives further determination by way of Antigone, the 
most famous and formidable of all live burial victims, a heroine who takes takes the 
uncanny within herself and finds the homely among the unhomely. Not homely in that 
which is homely. Anticipating Derrida, we could also say not present in that which is 
present, a means of expressing the sort of experience particular nostalgia, one that takes 
the present itself to be not homely, or at the very least a little strange, discontinuous, or 
spasmodic. 
 Not homely in that which is homely. Heidegger eventually goes on to juxtapose 
these opening words with those of the ode’s conclusion, a perplexing moment from his 
point of view where the chorus appears to banish the uncanny from the hearth, that is, 
from the homely, the house of Being. But before that juxtaposition he continues to tarry 
with his own definition: not homely in that which is the homely. The uncanny involves 
 




the experience of being not-at-home even while being-at-home, of being un-homely in 
whatever is taken to be homely, an experience of discontinuity, of feeling the unfamiliar 
at the core of the familiar. Given his new translation of deinon as unheimlich (the 
uncanny), it is unsurprising that Heidegger does not believe that the uncanniness of the 
unhomely constitutes some perversion or deviance from the homely. It is not as if the 
unhomely is completely unfamiliar with the homely and the sense of familiarity it 
depends upon. No, for Heidegger, uncanniness still impels movement—this is the 
restlessness he references vis-a-vis Novalis—and it involves a constant searching out of 
the homely, a constant desire for some repose in the midst of thrownness, even and 
especially when that searching out does not recognize itself as such. “This seeking shies 
at no danger and no risk,” he tells us. “Everywhere it ventures and is underway in all 
directions.”186 Uncanniness and unhomeliness do not connote pure lack or simple 
negation even if they appear to subsist on the basis of negation alone. For Heidegger, the 
‘un-’ constitutive of each term may hint at some deprivation but, calling to mind the 
ontological difference once again, this deprivation or displacement occurs on the ontic 
level and indicates deeper, more profound and ontological sense in which the homely and 
the unhomely remain conjoined, an imbrication that disposes and fundamentally attunes 
Dasein toward Being as such—this, again, is why both the uncanny and homesickness 
remain primary Grundstimmungen. In other words, the homely and the un-homely, like 
the canny and the un-canny, do not persist in simple opposition as Freud first noticed, but 
remain correlated. This correlation is forged, for Heidegger, through a type of disclosive 
 




counter-turning that unites the dual movements of displacing and disposing, of turning 
away from ontic homeliness in order to turn toward ontological unhomeliness and fully 
apprehend their essential relation.187  
 What is this counter-turning? In English, the word ‘turn’ contains an essential 
equivocation that relates to its transitivity in verbal form. One can both turn, or be turned 
(e.g., “I turn,” where ‘turn’ functions as an intransitive verb), and one can perform an act 
of ‘turning’ upon oneself or another object (e.g., “I turn my head,” with ‘turn’ as a 
transitive verb). One can turn and be turned, that is to say, one can affect a turn and one 
can be affected by a turn. The turning that takes place here involves a general 
arrangement of senses or meanings that include, but are not limited to: to rotate or 
revolve; to form or shape by rotation or revolution; to change or reverse position, course, 
or direction; and to change, alter, transmute, or simply render different.188 The 
etymological roots of the term are found in the Latin and Greek words tornāre and 
tórnos, respectively, both of which refer to the sort of action performed by a lathe, a tool 
used to shape, hone, form, and refine its object by turning on an axis. Other associations 
and connotations: to move about or around (something), to reposition or reorient in 
relation to a pivot or point of reference. I turn toward something by turning away from 
something else, leaving one mode of comportment or orientation in favor of another, 
narrowing the focus of attention and awareness. This turning is often elicited by some 
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sort of change in feeling or affective attunement. I sense someone behind me, and I turn 
my head over my shoulder. I detect someone or something approaching, and I turn 
around. I intuit the lingering gaze of my conversation partner and I turn to share the 
glance.  
 In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger discusses ‘turning’ in precisely these terms, i.e., 
through a shift in mood or affective disclosure (Befindlichkeit). “The way in which the 
Stimmung [mood, feeling, affect] discloses,” he writes, “is not one in which we look at 
thrown-ness, but one in which we turn towards or turn away [An- und Abkehr].”189 This 
turning toward or away not only reveals Dasein’s Befindlichkiet—the state in which it 
finds itself—it also makes experience phenomenologically interpretative.190 In turning 
toward or away, particular Stimmungen disclose Befindlichkeit just as in turning toward 
or away Dasein discloses the truth of being as presencing. When it comes to the later 
work on uncanniness, Heidegger holds that the homely and the unhomely participate in 
this counter-turning by turning away from themselves and toward the other. What we 
have, then, is a new dynamic of movement predicated upon his definition of the uncanny 
with Antigone as its paradigmatic exemplar: not homely in that which is homely—or, as I 
put it, not present in that which is present.  
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 When he claims that his translation of deinon as the uncanny discloses the 
originary unity of the original Greek term, this is what Heidegger has in mind: the 
counter-turning that subsists within the word grounds its intrinsic unity. This is why the 
choral ode describes deinon, the uncanny, as a manifold; it is a manifold because it is a 
counter-turning. The counter-turning signals the unity of its essence—an essence of 
multiplicity—but never makes that unity directly manifest. Similarly, when Heidegger 
supposes that the uncanny “presences and at the same time absences” he does not mean 
that uncanniness merely wavers between presencing and absencing. On the contrary, it 
initiates a counter-turning within presence itself to accomplish “a presencing that comes 
to pass by means of absencing,” as Katherine Withy puts it.191 The unhomely does not 
absence the homely but, by means of counter-turning, forges a new relation to the homely 
by constantly seeking it out, by constantly seeking refuge in its unity and wholeness. Not 
homely in that which is homely, not present in that which is present—a strange enigmatic 
type of presencing, but presencing nonetheless.  
 This turning and counter-turning directly correlate with temporality as well. In 
turning toward or away, the ‘having-been’ that affectivity ‘brings-back’ is revealed as 
‘there’ and we are transported and delivered over to it, remembering and recognizing it as 
having been ‘there’ even though we, at present, are not. The ‘there’ moves, it seems, and 
we with it by turning toward and away—orienting and reorienting ourselves to the 
rudimentary elements of our innermost makeup. It is thus, Heidegger suggests, that 
 





“within our being transported to that which has been…that something unsuspected is 
possible,”192 the mutual opening of the world and ourselves, both affected and affecting, 
to the quiet stirrings of attunement and intuition that otherwise escape us. By feeling this 
way or that, by finding oneself in this or that affective state (Befindlichkeit) one 
apprehends, as best one can, the ‘having-been’ character of one’s own experience. This 
adumbration—the remembering or ‘bringing-back’ to the feeling’s ‘origin’ or 
‘referent’—does not occur in a straightforward manner. It does not involve 
comprehensive grasping, direct confrontation, or immediate correspondence. It is, 
instead, mediated by the turning, a movement hither and thither that unsettles our 
temporal experience.  
 
Heidegger’s Limits 
 Heidegger’s thinking on moods, when read alongside insights from affect theory 
like those discussed above, help clarify how experiences of feeling influence temporality. 
He not only offers some insight into how time feels before it is thought or cognized as 
such, he takes great care to show how moods and emotions lay bare a structure of 
temporization often characterized by disjunction. Nostalgia highlights these disjunctive 
aspects of temporal experience and insists that they cannot be easily consolidated. But it 
is here, finally, that Heidegger’s work reaches its ceiling, inscribing a diminished but all 
too familiar form of nostalgia that only emphasizes one half of the word—nostos 
(homecoming, return, origins). The ongoing mourning, aching grief, and interminable 
 




bittersweetness of nostalgia (its algos) remain curiously absent. The insights Heidegger 
offers regarding time and affectivity, while useful, remain inadequate and ultimately 
reveal both the limitations of his thinking and his own surreptitious nostalgia for 
primordial presence and initial origins (his “other beginning”). 
 Before moving to sketch out a viable deconstructive alternative—one on its way 
to holding nostos and algos in open tension—we first need to establish the set of 
coordinates under which Heidegger’s thought remains constrained. After all, he never 
thematizes or even references nostalgia as such; his commentary on the Novalis fragment 
(philosophy as homesickness) and his discussion of Antigone are as close as he comes. 
Nevertheless, his entire project is steeped in nostalgia; it remains one of his most 
animating if unmarked concerns. His nostalgia is one that is directed toward, and seeks to 
preserve or restore, the pristine un-concealment of Being in the Ancient Greek sense 
(physis for the pre-Socratics). That forgotten determination of Being as continual 
presencing is the source of several key Heideggerian concepts, including especially 
authenticity and the notion of primordial, originary unity to which he constantly appeals 
in his discussion of temporality, homesickness, and the uncanny.  
 This nostalgia for primordial presence remains intact even after the supposed 
“turn” (die Kehre) his thought takes in the 1940s, characterized by a move away from 
traditional philosophers and toward poets like Hölderlin.193 Heidegger himself held that 
this turn does not amount to a radical break with his earlier project. Instead of signaling a 
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main change in standpoint from the perspective of Sein und Zeit, this turn or shift marks a 
clear attempt to change tack by re-treading that standpoint with the dual movements of 
turning and counter-turning in full view. Given this, it would not be an overstatement, I 
think, to claim that Heidegger’s own Grundstimmung remains constant from Sein und 
Zeit up through the later texts on art, technology, and poetics. This fundamental 
disposition is perhaps best typified by the desire, first expressed in his “Letter on 
Humanism,” to change the direction of his earlier work by abandoning not only the 
language of metaphysics but the prospect of subjectivity itself in favor of “another 
thinking” that requires recollection and “thinking back” to the early Greeks and their 
values of presencing and disclosure.194 Heidegger references this thinking back to an 
“other beginning” throughout his career and the language he uses to characterize this 
procedure is nothing if not wistful and nostalgic. He variously describes it as type of 
recollective thinking [Andenken] that accesses a lost or concealed original;195 a type of 
return or recovery that conserves and preserves being as continual presencing;196 a way of 
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regaining or rescuing the other beginning by turning back to the provenance of 
metaphysics;197 and a repetition of the initial beginning in order to attain original truth and 
‘bring back’ being in its full essence.198 It is not exactly fashionable to position Heidegger 
as some sort of crypto-Platonist,199 but the rhetoric he relies upon time after time closely 
orbits the dynamics of movement, recursion, and forgetfulness discussed at the beginning 
of this chapter. Authentic Dasein, like Plato’s philosopher-king, lives in exile and must 
return to its primordial origins to uncover and recollect what it has always known but 
since forgotten: the determination of Being as un-concealed presence.  
 These concerns drive Heidegger’s characterization of homesickness and the 
uncanny, positioning him as an eminent thinker of philosophy’s nostalgia for origins. 
When discussing Novalis and homesickness as one of philosophy’s motivating 
Grundstimmungen, he suggests that, as Dasein, human beings remain restless, driven 
toward Being as a whole. As a whole, Being as such—ontological Being, not individual 
ontic entities—keeps an originary, constitutive unity that Dasein lacks at the most 
fundamental levels. This is the forgotten determination of Being that Heidegger wants to 
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retrieve and protect. Dasein remains scattered and dispersed, but the whole toward which 
it is driven in its homesickness achieves and retains an ameliorative aspect of gathering 
and unification. Later in his career Heidegger refers to this as the event of appropriation. 
Being appropriates Dasein and this movement is what enables Being to unfold as pure 
presencing, a primordial un-concealment in which Dasein can dwell in its most authentic 
nature. The assumption here is that Being, as unified whole, acts as an ontological ground 
that can support and reinstate Dasein despite Dasein’s uncanny anxiety and unmoored 
restlessness—a type of concealed presence, to be sure, but presence nonetheless.  
 When Kant first remarked that the homesickness of the Swiss evinces a desire for 
lost time rather than return to lost space, he offered a new understanding of nostalgia that 
emphasizes its intrinsic bittersweetness and structural antinomies: a feeling that cannot be 
alleviated, one that emerges in the wake of enduring absence, longs to see it overcome, 
and only gains further strength and force as that absence persists. Heidegger’s philosophy 
cannot fully account for this because it exhibits a vested interest in seeing that absence 
conquered and subdued even if it plays a vital, but provisional role in the larger drama of 
presencing and disclosure. 
 The commentary on Sophocles only further corroborates this despite its 
recuperation of the uncanny and the unhomely as necessary moments in the movement of 
Being. Heidegger claims that, according to the choral ode, Antigone is the uncanny in the 
most supreme sense. As a paradigmatic instance of Dasein, she remains unhomely in that 
which is taken to be homely and therefore becomes homely by being unhomely, like 




standpoint, is that the choral ode banishes the uncanny from hearth and home near the 
end of tragedy. How does Heidegger reconcile this with his prior claim? He relies on the 
same notion of originary unity that governs his thought as a whole, a value that authorizes 
his translation of deinon as uncanny, characterizes the telos of Dasein’s authentic 
existence, and subtends his larger project of disclosure. On his reading the choral ode can 
only banish uncanniness from the hearth if it possesses some genuine knowledge of it, or 
else it would stand outside the sphere of Being he associates with the hearth. And for 
Heidegger nothing, absolutely nothing, can stand outside the sphere of Being. Sophocles 
says this without saying it, Heidegger tell us, and the play contains more than what is 
explicitly stated. “Being homely is no mere deviance from the unhomely,” he argues.200 
The chorus remains aware of this concealed, originary unity and the hearth exemplifies it 
by signaling some access to the other beginning, expressing a “relation to what was 
experienced at the commencement of Western thought yet at once became lost as a 
fundamental experience.”201 The expulsion from the hearth announced near the end of the 
play refers, according to Heidegger, to those instances in which the uncanny supports 
forgetfulness and thus a failure to “have being in view.” The expulsion occurs because 
the uncanny does not initiate the process of ‘thinking back,’ of thoughtful remembrance 
and recollection (Andenken) indicative of belonging to the hearth (Being as such).202 This 
allows Heidegger to ultimately claim that Antigone is “exempt” from the expulsion, not 
because she has no relation to the unhomely, but because she becomes the uncanny in the 
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most supreme sense by taking it within herself as a means of becoming homely within the 
hearth of Being and belonging.203  
 A clear sequence of events is implied in this exemption, one subtended by the 
familiar Heideggerian values of unity, harmony, and primordial origins: “In becoming 
homely, being unhomely is first accomplished.”204 Homesickness, the uncanny, the 
unhomely—each of these terms becomes instruments within a broader telos that lays 
claim to ancient, pre-Socratic presence. One gets the sense that they possess no real use 
or value otherwise. This becomes especially clear when Heidegger finally appeals to his 
ontological difference in order ground the subjugation of the unhomely and the uncanny. 
It sets up a clear and familiar binary “between being unhomely in the sense of being 
driven out about amid beings without any way out and being unhomely as becoming 
homely from out of a belonging to being.”205 It is unclear, in this context, how being amid 
other beings means that one has no way out or refuses belonging to being—and on this 
front Heidegger himself forgets Antigone’s primary motivation. She takes as her point of 
departure that against which nothing can avail—the inevitability of death through live 
burial—not because she aims to risk some abstract ‘belonging to being,’ but because she 
remains ‘driven about amid beings without any way out,’ namely one individual being in 
particular, her dead brother, Polynices, whom she mourns throughout the tragedy—an 
experience, like nostalgia, that emerges in response to loss and discontinuity. Heidegger 
tell us that the chorus’ closing words “do not reject the unhomely but rather let being 
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unhomely become worthy of question.”206 Perhaps, but if this worthiness of interrogation 
is to fully reverberate, if Antigone is to be “the purest poem herself,”207 as Heidegger puts 
it, then the particularity of her predicament, and her losses, must not be elided in favor of 
yet another abstract universal in search of primordial unity or authenticity.  
 I do not mean to imply that Heidegger conceives philosophy as some sort of 
elaborate time machine that might leapfrog the conditions under which ideas like the 
ontological difference become necessary. Nevertheless, he does believe something was 
obscured or forgotten prior to traditional metaphysics and in his later works especially we 
seem him struggling to arrive at a form of language adequate to what he sees as the pure 
essence of being as presencing and disclosure. It is precisely this nostalgia for lost origins 
and initial beginnings that others have found so problematic. Derrida will soon become 
my main interlocutor on this front, but he is certainly not the only one to have suggested 
as much.208 Despite this, Heidegger’s unacknowledged nostalgia becomes even more 
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insidious when considered against the backdrop of his truly disastrous politics. As I 
mentioned, for all his interest in anxiety, the uncanny, and homesickness, Heidegger 
never discusses or even explicitly mentions nostalgia as such. Yet his entire approach to 
politics—initial quietism and later support of National Socialism bolstered by appeals to 
the provincial German Volk and Heimat—exhibit a strong and disturbing degree of what 
Svetlana Boym would likely call “restorative nostalgia,” a form of nostalgia that veils its 
desires under the auspices of truth and tradition. The full extent of this debacle is only 
now beginning to be fully understood and only goes to show how Heidegger both 
thematizes and exhibits philosophy’s nostalgia for origins and pure presence.209  
 Despite all this, something would be lost, I think, in simply dismissing nostalgia 
out of hand due to the constraints inherent in Heidegger’s thought or his own 
shortsightedness. Such a move would only serve to reproduce the gestures discussed the 
previous chapter. Moreover, Heidegger’s work does offer some useful, albeit limited 
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insights into the sort of consideration of nostalgia we are after. By thematizing the 
thrownness of existence against the backdrop of temporality and emphasizing how that 
temporality interacts with Dasein’s affective state-of-mind, he offers some initial 
thinking into how nostalgia intervenes in temporal awareness, calling to mind things past 
and passing. But by tethering those insights to what he takes to be the unity and continual 
presencing of ancient, pre-Socratic Being, Heidegger comes down on the side of nostos 
alone, neglecting the animating, tensive function of algos. Perhaps an extension of these 
insights, not in the direction of antediluvian primordiality but something more haunting, 




Chapter 3: Algos: Derrida’s Nostalgia Between Presence and Absence  
 
 
One feeling which prevailed greatly with me, and could never find an expression odd enough for itself, was 
a sense of the past and the present together in one; a phenomenon which brought something spectral into 
the present…whenever it began to mix itself up with actual life, it must have appeared to everyone strange, 
inexplicable, perhaps gloomy. 
— Johann Wolfgang von Goethe210  
 
We are all of us celebrating some funeral.  
— Charles Baudelaire211  
 
 I love memory…how else can one love? 
— Jacques Derrida212 
The Attunement of Bad Moods 
 Through and through, Heidegger is a thinker of unity and harmony. Because of 
this, he roundly rejects so-called “bad moods.” Bad moods threaten unity and harmony. 
They depart from the proper path of basic attunement and jeopardize the fundamental 
concordance Dasein seeks in its being-in-the-world. In German, Verstimmung refers to ill 
feeling or ill-will, instances of feeling disgruntled or upset. It shares the same root—
stimmen—as Heidegger’s term for moods (stimmung) and, like that word, it also relies on 
a set of meanings associated with music. If stimmung refers to being in tune or attuned in 
the sense of being right or true, then verstimmung, by virtue of its negative prefix, 
connotes being out of tune, detuned, or simply out of sync. Heidegger only uses the word 
twice in Sein und Zeit and in both cases he uses it to refer to “bad moods” where Dasein 
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remains blind to itself and its environment.213 Strangely, Ver-stimmung does not enjoy the 
same moment of counter-turning that Heidegger (and Freud) associate with other terms, 
like the un-canny or the un-homely, that often express sheer privation in ordinary use. 
Bad moods are simply bad moods it seems, and Verstimmung has nothing to offer beyond 
demarcating the various states of annoyance, dissonance, or disjunction against which 
better, more in-tune stimmunen supervene.  
 Derrida doesn’t use the Heideggerian language of counter-turning, but he deploys 
Verstimmung to similar effect in his own register. In “Of an Apocalyptic Tone Recently 
Adopted in Philosophy,” an essay ostensibly on Kant and philosophy’s universalizing 
tonality, Derrida shows interest in how Verstimmung, by detuning or threatening “the 
unity of tone,” facilitates a different type of attunement.214 Verstimmung attunes by 
calling into question the stable, concordant identity of attunement and the governing 
values of unity it presumes. Noting the Heidegger connection in an unmarked way, 
Derrida observes that “Verstimmung can come to spoil a Stimmung” resulting in a 
“pathos, or the humor that then becomes testy.” He goes on to refer to the term as a 
“social disorder” and—calling Hofer’s diagnosis of nostalgia to mind—a type of 
“derangement” or “delirium” that might provoke a sudden change in mood or shift in 
tone.215 Derrida delivered an earlier version of this essay at a 1980 conference in Cerisy-
la-Salle devoted to his seminal “The Ends of Man” published in the late 60s.216 Like much 
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of his earlier, more famous texts that work with, but mostly against, traditional 
metaphysics, “The Ends of Man” offers a critique of consciousness by taking aim at the 
principles of unity and self-presence operative in Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger 
especially. Derrida believes that these principles constitute a “subterranean necessity” 
that, in Heidegger at least, reveals how his “de-limitations of metaphysical humanism 
appear to belong to the very sphere of that which they criticize or delimit.”217 In his 
famous essay on “différance” written during the same period, Derrida refers to that 
subterranean necessity as a type of Heideggerian nostalgia for “a lost native country of 
thought,” the initial or other beginning Heidegger attempts to restore as we have seen.218  
 Derrida believes that origins like Heidegger’s other beginning are always linked 
to ends and in his reading of Kant and the tonality of philosophy, he furthers this line of 
critique by drawing attention to how Verstimmung calls into question the unity of self-
identity and destination (Bestimmung, which can also mean determination).219 The 
sudden, mercurial shifts in mood or tone Verstimmung intimates suggest a type of  
“generalized derailment” that “mutipl[ies] voices” and creates the conditions for an 
“experience of presence…for which there is no self-presentation nor assured 
destination.”220 He goes on to directly associate this phenomenon with two other key 
ideas that receive further elaboration in his later work: ‘destinerrance’ or 
‘clandestination’ and “haunted memory” (what he later calls spectrality or 
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‘hauntology’).221 Like so many Derridean ‘non-concepts,’ both notions gesture toward the 
manner in which experience remains open and receptive to what it cannot foresee, the 
incoming of something other that forces it to wander off the charted course, erring as it 
approaches its destination, perhaps arriving at a destination the lies off map and out of 
frame. As a signifier of the capriciousness that often attends to so-called bad moods, Ver-
stimmung holds together connotations of derailment, delirium, and general discordance, 
evincing the irritable and iterable attunement that can occur within detuning. This 
“delirium of destination” and the attentiveness to a “wholly other path” leads Peggy 
Kamuf, one of Derrida’s translators, to claim that Verstimmung acts as “the watchword of 
deconstructive vigilance.”222  
 What is this deconstructive vigilance and how might it relate to nostalgia? These 
ideas need a bit more unpacking to really stick, but the notion of Verstimmung, which can 
also mean malaise in the Hoferian sense, already provides an entry point. In chapter one 
we saw how nostalgia often functions as a bad mood in the most supreme sense, from 
Hofer’s initial coinage in medicine up through more contemporary assessments. In both 
cases—despite significant shifts and semantic drift—nostalgia gives rise to an errant type 
of desire that facilitates spurious, unsanctioned, and unauthorized forms of movement. 
Under the diagnostic frame of reference initiated by Hofer and further perpetuated by 
various gestures of vivisepulture, nostalgia reads as a form of delirium or derailment, 
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destinerrance and clandestination in particular see J. Hillis Miller, For Derrida (New York, N.Y.: Fordham 
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what Hofer calls an affiliation of the imagination, the unproductive and ineffective 
condition of being out of sync or out-of-tune. Within this discursive milieu, nostalgia, 
like any other Verstimmung, disrupts proper attunement and the forms of movement it 
coordinates. That discursive milieu and the habits of thought that subtend it fail to 
recognize, as Derrida suspected, how Verstiummgen like nostalgia provide a sense of 
attunement even in dis-attunement. In the last chapter we saw just how pervasive and 
extensive these assumptions can be. A towering figure like Heidegger offers useful 
insights for reconsidering the temporality of nostalgia, but those insights remain severely 
limited by his desire for authenticity and primordiality. That desire—the same desire that 
impels philosophy’s first movement to thought—ends up reproducing a familiar form of 
nostalgia that fails to recognize its more animating and propulsive features.  
 This chapter takes up the temporal texture of those features in a more focused way 
by exploring how Derrida’s work sheds light on nostalgia’s utility as a so-called ‘bad’ 
mood (Verstimmung). That usefulness has to do with how nostalgia, by virtue of its 
constitutive bittersweetness, attunes otherwise, intervening in temporal awareness to 
rework our experience of time and the demands that experience entails. I argue that 
deconstruction offers insights pertaining to time and memory that serve to clarify how 
nostalgia engenders movement, paving the way for a consideration of how that 
movement shows up in cinema, a task I undertake in the chapters that follow. Those 
insights owe quite a bit to Heidegger, but ultimately depart from him by radicalizing and 




figure of nostos in this scheme, then Derrida acts as perhaps the most compelling and 
representative thinker of algos twentieth-century continental thought has to offer.  
 On the surface, Derrida is admittedly an unlikely figure for this sort of 
intervention and in many ways stands as one of the least nostalgic thinkers of the last 
century. He essentially made a name for himself by vehemently rejecting various forms 
of Heideggerian nostalgia for presence he takes to be emblematic of broader problems in 
Western thinking (logocentrism, the immediacy of self-consciousness, etc.). I maintain 
that this overt distance and reticence—he never writes on nostalgia directly and often 
uses it as little more than a foil—open up a fecund space for considering nostalgia 
otherwise. Derrida’s habit, undoubtedly, is to take certain forms of nostalgia, like 
Heidegger’s, to be subsidiary to a metaphysics of presence. His textual practice, however, 
helps in decoupling nostalgic desire from its initial diagnostic frame of reference, 
offering key insights that open up its range of expression. Those insights pertain to time 
and temporization and are often nested within the granular minutiae of Derrida’s 
scrupulous and exacting method of reading. Together they form what Nicholas Royle 
calls, echoing Kamuf, the vigilant attempt to “keep watch over other temporalities and 
other histories.”223 In keeping watch over these temporalities and their exigences Derrida 
so often takes up a position that, to me, can only be characterized as a type of romance 
with time’s intractability. His style and approach are expressive of a type of longing 
which takes that intractability less as a problem resulting in paralysis and more as 
stimulating opportunity for increased receptivity. He both laments time’s structuring 
 




conditions and celebrates the fleeting impermanence that issues from those conditions—
and often in the same moment. In doing so he ironizes or frustrates nostalgic desire 
without denying the fullness of the experience it induces, suggesting, in an indirect and 
serpentine manner all his own, that this feeling and its attendant desires are irreducible to 
the experience of time itself. In other words, while Derrida often seems to disavow 
nostalgia, his work deals with variegated ideas—like verstimmung, destinerrance, 
différance, spectrality, or any number of his neologisms—chiefly concerned with the 
same temporal ambiguities produced in nostalgic experience (he would no doubt call this 
their ‘play’). In this respect, deconstruction can work to unfold nostalgic experience, 
serving to make its propulsive, animating features more legible.  
  The path this chapter takes is as circuitous as that of nostalgia itself. I begin by 
introducing and situating Derrida’s work through a reading of one of his final seminars, a 
text that is representative of his thought as a whole and takes nostalgia as a minor theme. 
But just as nostalgia so often interrupts the seamless flow of time, my examination of this 
text is marked by necessary turns and detours. These deviations serve to contextualize 
Derrida’s work on several fronts. First, they establish the terms of his version of 
deconstruction as an elaborate gesture of what he calls re-marking, a designation that is, I 
think, commensurate with the experience of nostalgia to the extent that both involve 
retroactive acknowledgement and reworking. Second, these detours serve to outline the 
stakes of several key notions—différance, the trace, and afterwardness—that form the 
backdrop for Derrida’s work. I take special interest in his discussions of time and 




like Heidegger and Freud. Finally, the reading I undertake here positions Derrida both 
within and against the terms of nostalgia outlined in the previous chapters. That 
positioning is often taken with regard to Heidegger (and, to a lesser extent, Husserl and 
Levinas). Crucially, however, Derrida’s recourse to Heidegger is often strategically 
interrupted by psychoanalytic insights that serve to facilitate the idiosyncratic 
understandings of time and memory at play in his final seminars. My reading of the 
seminar in question is informed by these insights and marshals Derrida’s phenomenology 
of time toward an understanding of nostalgia that tarries with, rather than glosses or 
elides, its signifying vacillations—nostos and algos, bitter and sweet—one that indulges 
nostalgic desire but denies it full closure and satisfaction.  
 
Deconstruction as Re-Marking 
 Derrida gave the second half of what would become his final seminar a year 
before his death in the winter of 2002-2003. Titled “The Beast and the Sovereign” and 
given at L'École des hautes études en sciences sociales in Paris, the seminar pursues the 
interlocking questions of sovereignty and animality first signaled in The Animal That 
Therefore I Am (1997), Voyous (2002), and Derrida’s previous seminars on capital 
punishment and forgiveness, “La Peine de mort” (1999-2001). These seminars are often 
associated with a cluster of other ‘late period’ texts, beginning with the quasi-




of a religious or ethico-political turn in Derrida’s work.224 It may be the case that 
Derrida’s oeuvre in the mid-late 1990s and early 2000s does form a certain type of turn, a 
new type of inflection, but those themes do not stand in substantive contrast to his early, 
more technical essays on metaphysics and phenomenology. So-called “late Derrida” 
rigorously attends to a cluster of problematics that have occupied deconstruction since the 
beginning. The shift or turn simply involves a new series of vantage points or contexts. 
Derrida himself seems to espouse a certain degree of irritation at this assessment of his 
work. He claims, with heightened care and consideration, that a notable degree of 
continuity persists across his texts and defends his style of deconstruction—its impetus 
and “theoretical élan,” as Hector Kollias puts it—against those detractors who might 
dismiss it on that basis of some perceived aimlessness or lack of consistency.225 “There 
never was in 1980s or 1990s,” he writes in Voyous, “a political turn or ethical turn in 
deconstruction, at least not as I experience it. […] That is not to say…that nothing new 
 
224 Simon Critchley is best known for having first drawn attention to the possibility of an ethico-
political turn in deconstruction, while John D. Caputo remains perhaps the most prominent proponent of 
Derrida’s supposed turn to religion. Cf. Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas 
(Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell, 1992) and Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without 
Religion (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997). For more on the so-called ethical or political 
turn see Peter Baker, Deconstruction and the Ethical Turn (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 
1995); Michel Rosenfeld, “Derrida's Ethical Turn and America: Looking Back from the Crossroads of 
Global Terrorism and the Enlightenment,” Cardozo Law Review 27 (2005): 815-846; Richard Beardsworth, 
Derrida and the Political (NY: Routledge, 2013); and Robert Doran,The Ethics of Theory: Philosophy, 
History, Literature (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016). For a more circumspect take on this 
perceived turn see Richard Kearney “Derrida’s Ethical Re-turn,” Working Through Derrida, ed. Gary Brent 
Madison (Chicago, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993), 28-59. For more on Derrida and religion see 
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and Kevin Hart, eds., Derrida and Religion: Other Testaments (New York, NY: Routledge, 2004); Martin 
Hägglund, Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008); 
Dawne McCance, Derrida on Religion: Thinker of Differance (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014); and 
Edward Baring, ed. The Trace of God : Derrida and Religion (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 
2015). 




happens…but what happens remains without relation or resemblance” to the figure of a 
turn that might force one “to ‘veer’ away or change tack.”226 The overall tenacity or 
determination intimated here—deconstruction’s vigilance as Kamuf and Royle put it—is 
marked by an ardent, almost obsessive commitment to the proliferation of difference, a 
feverish responsibility for manifold particularity, and a deep, abiding respect for the 
 
226 Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 39. Derrida goes on in this paragraph to explicitly 
distinguish any sort of ‘turn’ in the larger trajectory of his work from the sort of shift or turn (Kehre) that 
occurs in Heidegger’s later period. Commenting on his notion of différance, one of deconstruction’s 
earliest neologisms and loose analogue or corrective to Heidegger’s ontological difference, Derrida 
suggests that “the thinking of the political has always been a thinking of différance and the thinking of 
différance has always been a thinking of the political, of the contour and limits of the political….” He no 
doubt has in mind here a few passages in his “La Différance” essay where he connects the difference of 
différance, a subtle misspelling that only be inscribed, never heard, to the political and the economic. This 
difference, he writes, “is offered by a mute mark, by a tacit monument, I would even say by a pyramid, 
thinking not only of the form of the letter [the ‘a’ of différance] when it is printed as a capital, but also the 
text in Hegel’s Encyclopedia in which the body of the sign is compared to the Egyptian pyramid. The a of 
différance, thus is not heard; it remains silent, secret and discreet as a tomb: oikos. And thereby, let us 
anticipate the delineation of a site, the familial residence and tomb of the proper in which is produced, by 
différance, the economy of death. The stone—provided that one knows how to decipher its inscription—is 
not far from announcing the death of the tyrant.” Jacques Derrida, “Différance,” Margins of Philosophy, 
trans. Alan Bass (Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press, 1984), 4. Derrida makes these implications 
even more explicit later on in the same essay: “[Différance] governs nothing, reigns over nothing, and 
nowhere exercises authority. It is not announced by any capital letter. Not only is there no kingdom of 
différance, but différance instigates the subversion of every kingdom. Which makes it obviously 
threatening and infallibly dreaded by everything within us that desires a kingdom, the past or future 
presence of a kingdom. And it is always in the name of a kingdom that one may reproach différance with 
wishing to reign, believing that one sees it aggrandize itself with a capital letter” (22). These remarks are 
echoed and corroborated, both directly and indirectly, in a variety of works that span the entirety of 
Derrida’s career. See, for example, his suggestion that deconstruction “is not a discursive or theoretical 
affair, but a practico-political one” [Derrida, The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, trans. 
Alan Bass (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987, 508)] and his insistence that his work is best 
characterized in terms of continuity rather than that of a ‘break’ or a ‘turn’ [Derrida, Paper Machine, trans. 
Rachel Bowlby (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 89, 153] as well as the general comments 
contained in John D. Caputo and Jacques Derrida, Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with 
Jacques Derrida (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 1996); Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth 
Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow . . .: A Dialogue, trans. Jeff Fort (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2004); and Jacques Derrida, Learning to Live Finally: The Last Interview, trans. Pascal-Anne Brault 
and Michael Naas (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Melville House, 2011). The sentiment outlined here forms the basis for 
the notion of a “democracy-to-come” that Derrida develops in Voyous, as well as his reading of Marxism in 
Spectres de Marx, his analysis of justice in “Force de loi,” his deconstruction of the tacit ontological 
foundations embedded in the concept of law in “Devant la loi,” and his radical extension of the scope and 




inimitable specificities of the singular, the heterogeneous, and the distinctively variable. 
“I totally refuse the label of nihilism which has been ascribed to me,” Derrida tells 
Richard Kearney in a 1981 dialogue. “Deconstruction is not an enclosure in nothingness, 
but an openness towards the other.”227 Derrida’s later work, then, does not mark a rigid 
conceptual break. To the extent that it does form a turn of sorts it is one that consists in 
elaborating the essential stakes and overall timbre of his larger project, deploying its 
insights in new discursive terrains that make it possible to reconsider rudimentary 
elements of experience like nostalgia. 
 In The Beast and the Sovereign, Vol. II (BSII), Derrida stages an encounter 
between perhaps the unlikeliest of bedfellows: Martin Heidegger and Daniel Defoe. 
Indeed, as a means of critically interrogating Heidegger’s famous theses in his 1929-1930 
seminar Die Grundbegriffe Der Metaphysik: Welt - Endlichkeit - Einsamkeit—“the stone 
is without world,” “the animal is poor in the world,” and “man is world-forming”—
Derrida proposes to read Defoe’s 1719 classic Robinson Crusoe in the margins of 
Heidegger’s seminar (and vice versa).228 As we saw in the last chapter, this is the same 
text where Heidegger, commenting on Novalis, claims that homesickness and nostalgia 
constitute one of philosophy’s most basic Grundstimmungen, one of its grounding moods 
and fundamental attunements. Derrida’s reading of this text eventually leads back to the 
orienting themes of sovereignty and animality, but it first confronts nostalgic desire and 
passes through its crucible in a manner that highlights both the distance and the proximity 
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228 Cf. Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. 




his work maintains with Heidegger. Heidegger and Defoe are thus subject to a certain 
sifting that never ceases to guide Derrida’s idiosyncratic reading practice, a type of 
phenomenological winnowing that displays a deep and abiding concern for the unceasing, 
transient, and generally episodic character of temporal experience. His readings in this 
seminar are thus emblematic of his own style of deconstructive thinking. They are 
animated by a profound desire to highlight, with rigor and care, the shifts and swerves of 
temporization, drawing attention to how they interact with memory’s inscriptions to 
achieve belated understanding. The cumulative aim of this practice is to champion and 
defend the irreducible, at times incommensurable, differences that comprise experience 
and, especially, to do justice, as best one can, to the unceasing velocity of life as it is 
lived. Whatever else it may be and however else it may be deployed, deconstruction is 
fundamentally interested in attending to the deeply felt temporal effects of the human 
condition: that consciousness never manages to fully coincide with itself, despite its 
constitutive contiguity; that experience is unable to completely gather itself together, yet 
still proceeds, somehow, without the mollifying powers of sovereign self-consolidation, 
final unity, and conciliatory synthesis. These insights are propelled, finally, by an 
interminable desire, both bitter and sweet, to remain receptive to experience, to celebrate 
its arrival and mourn its passing, to bear with its flow and be carried by it, tarrying with 
its marks even and especially when they refuse immediate incorporation. For Derrida, the 
type of nostalgic desire engendered by temporized experience is one that remains acutely 




 BSII broaches these themes in a slow, digressive, and indirect manner that builds 
upon and assumes some familiarity with Derrida’s previous texts. He begins by invoking 
no less than three proper names—Martin Heidegger, Daniel Defoe, Robinson Crusoe—
that circumnavigate the entirety of his text. As a type of shorthand, he fashions a fictive 
proper name, ‘Robinson Heidegger,’ itself a trope for the sort of “binocular vision” 
through which the texts are read.229 In doing so Derrida takes as his clue the question of 
the proper path, i.e., the problem of how to proceed, how to move (either forward or 
backward), and how to orient oneself or get one’s bearings amid temporized experience. 
How does life proceed? What is time’s path? Where do they lead? Forward? Backward? 
Sideways and diagonal? What does it mean to (attempt to) orient oneself between these 
two questions? By crossing the paths of Heidegger and Defoe, Derrida questions the very 
idea of the proper path, of clear bearings and directions, interrogating where such a path 
might lead and to what consequence. Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, stranded on a deserted 
island, is constantly looking for a new path, a path both promising and proper that might 
lead him home, to an equanimous new beginning. Heidegger, mutatis mutandis, opens his 
seminar by wondering what path is most proper for philosophical inquiry and decides, 
aloud and against his own best judgment, to set himself on a path first opened by a poet—
and not just any poet, but Novalis, a most nostalgic poet, transfixed by the beguiling 
allure of Romantic homesickness. As we saw at the beginning of the last chapter, this is a 
most improper path by conventional philosophical standards, but one Heidegger chooses 
 
229 Jacques Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume II, trans. Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago, IL: 




more often than not in his later work, a path that he believes might provide new access to 
authenticity, i.e., the origin or arche of the philosophizing endeavor whose unactualized 
possibilities were present in early Greek thought but have since been forgotten.  
 Derrida, for his part, chooses the (im)proper path between the two, between the 
interstices of Robinson Heidegger’s inventive identity as a figure of the type of 
ameliorative nostalgic desire indicative of modernity. Is there not, after all, a more 
nostalgic novel than Robinson Crusoe and a more nostalgic thinker than Heidegger, a text 
and a figure that exhibit a strong, wistful, altogether romanticized desire for the primitive 
and the primordial? Following this most (im)proper route, Derrida discovers that the path 
turns in on itself, leading not only toward the anticipated horizons of the seminar, but 
through that which destabilizes every anticipated horizon and diverts even the most 
proper of paths, an insoluble thematic that has haunted his work since the earliest stages 
of his career: the transient, enigmatic architecture of temporized experience. In returning 
to this leitmotif Derrida finds himself on the way to a self-reflexive understanding of 
nostalgia that suspends the rapprochement it is given in Heidegger and Defoe without 
denying the affective experience to which it refers. This improper path thus leads to an 
improper determination of a common and well-trod feeling, a feeling that emerges as a 
result of experience subject to the threshers of time and memory. 
 BSII is thus a seminar on a seminar, both an exercise in Derrida’s characteristic 
reading practice and an indirect commentary on the nature of time and memory, one that 
proceeds on the basis of various serpentine detours through the dense thickets of 




final contribution to Derrida’s decades long confrontation with Heidegger and the 
surreptitious nostalgia for presence he detects in fundamental ontology from the 
beginning.230 Confrontation is perhaps the most apt word here as Derrida’s relationship to 
Heidegger is both insightfully complex and exceptionally fraught. He is always careful to 
acknowledge a certain debt to the set of questions Heidegger poses while also 
maintaining a heightening degree of critical distance, suspicion, and ambivalence toward 
Heidegger’s proposed solutions.231 In an interview with Dominique Janicaud in 1999 
Derrida describes his “concerned relationship” with Heidegger as one of “frustrated 
admiration,” tinted as it is with both respect and recognition as well as “profound allergy 
and irony,” one of the many reasons why he turns toward both Heideggerian orthodoxy 
and anti-Heideggerian disregard with an equal measure of impatience and exasperation.232 
In this respect, Derrida’s ongoing (re)reading of Heidegger best typifies his overall 
textual practice more than any other interlocutor. On the one hand, he senses a certain 
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novelty of thinking in Heidegger’s work, the opening up of certain critical questions that 
he aims to examine, radicalize, and extend. On the other hand, however, he finds 
Heidegger’s conceptual apparatus woefully wanting and sees within his thought a certain 
provincialism tethered to and supported by a desire to return to some lost provenance. 
This “endless debate,” as Derrida puts it, centers on a series of interlocking concerns 
pertaining to Heidegger’s thinking of the ontological difference (which Derrida re-marks 
as différance), his determination of Being as presence, disclosure, or un-concealment 
(which Derrida re-marks as the trace), and his method of Destruktion (which Derrida re-
marks as déconstruction). Each of these strategic interventions is often supplemented by 
selective and equally strategic readings of other figures, and when it comes to time and 
temporization Freud looms especially large, as we soon shall see. Together these 
interventions constitute Derrida’s full-throated rejection of Heidegger’s romance with 
presence in favor of the play of absence, traces of a present that was never fully present, 
what he calls the spectral experience of haunting in his later work. 
 These various ‘re-marks,’ as I am calling them, are consistent with Derrida’s self-
professed style of thought and deserve further comment. When it first appeared in print in 
1967, the word “deconstruction”—now a loose shorthand not only for Derrida but the 
sort of Francophone inflected theory that has emerged in his wake—stood as Derrida’s 
own translation of Heidegger’s project of Destruktion or Abbau.233 That project, first 
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announced in §6 of Sein und Zeit, is an enterprise whose genealogical roots are 
themselves both Lutheran and, apparently, biblical.234 But whereas Heidegger’s aim is to 
raze the foundations of traditional metaphysics in Western thinking in order to 
(nostalgically) return to or uncover an authentic, primordial thinking of the meaning of 
 
Phenomena, the first major text that engages in what is now known as Derrida’s characteristic style of 
deconstructive reading. In that text, Derrida interrogates the conditions for Husserl’s transcendental 
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the question Being,235 Derrida insists on shaking up the very terms of such a program in 
order to show how such a thinking of Being often resorts to theatrical, histrionic, and 
metaphorical modes of self-presentation. In deconstruction, the stakes lie in an elaborate 
demonstration, on a very granular and micro-logical level, of the manner in which a 
project as grand and ambitious as Heidegger’s fundamental ontology remains, at root, 
within the very limits of the discourse from which it aims to move beyond.236 Derrida 
refers to this procedure as “the general strategy of deconstruction” in 1971, one involving 
the double-gestures of overturning or displacement, and, concomitantly, the intervention 
of re-marking (remarquer) within a particular structure of dyadic binaries (e.g., speech 
and writing, presence and absence, etc.).237 This gesture of re-marking, of intervening 
within a particular thematic or (con)text, is itself a means of “marking the interval 
between the inversion,”238 of tracing the gap that subsists between the terms, values, and 
significations in question, namely presence and absence.  
 
235 Cf. Heidegger, Being and Time, 22/44. “If the question of Being is to have its own history made 
transparent, then this hardened tradition must be loosened up, and the concealments which it has brought 
about must be dissolved. We understand this task as one in which by taking the question of Being as our 
clue, we are to destroy [Destruktion] the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those 
primordial experiences [ursprünglichen Erfahrungen] in which we achieved our first ways of determining 
the nature of Being.” 
236 As Derrida puts it in “Ousia and Gramme” his early essay on Heidegger’s conception of temporality 
in Sein und Zeit: “At a certain point, then, the destruction [Destruktion] of metaphysics remains within 
metaphysics, only making explicit its principles.” And later on, in the same essay: “Was this not 
Heidegger’s experience in Being and Time? The extraordinary trembling to which classical ontology is 
subject in Sein und Zeit still remains within the grammar and lexicon of metaphysics.” See Derrida, “Ousia 
and Gramme: Note on a Note from Being and Time,” in Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass 
(Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press, 1984), 48, 63. 
237 Cf. Jacques Derrida, Positions, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 41-
47. See also Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1981), 1-61. 




 Derrida’s most infamous misspelling, différance—itself a re-mark upon 
Heidegger’s lexicon—is a paradigmatic example of this tactic. This strange non-concept, 
a curious orthographic transgression, “puts into question the authority of presence”239 and 
its symmetrical opposite (absence) in a manner that would seem to lead back to 
Heidegger’s ontological difference and his determination of Being as presence (ousia, 
anwesenheit). But différance is “older” (these scare quotes are Derrida’s) than both the 
ontological difference the early Heidegger outlines and the truth (aletheia) of Being as 
presencing he aims to uncover or disclose later in his career.240 It “exceeds the alternative 
of presence and absence,”241 collapsing the two senses of the French verb différer and its 
Latin root (differre) into a single, non-transitive sheaf or weave of vacillating 
movement—differing and deferral, spacing and temporization. Rather than constructing 
an existential analytic of différance, as Heidegger might, Derrida insists upon the 
“intensification of its play,” a play both strategic and adventurous, one that anticipates 
later notions like destinerrance and verstimmung, “a strategy without finality…the unity 
of chance and necessity in calculations without end.”242 Différance differs (in) itself and 
defers (from) itself. It suggests that the value of ‘presence’ and the pull of ‘the present’ 
are contaminated by what they are not, constituted, from the inside, by what they cannot 
contain. Heidegger marks an essential distinction between Being (presence) and beings 
(the present) in the form of the ontological difference. Derrida overturns and intervenes 
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within this dyad through a strategic re-mark that works within and against the field of 
differences in which it is situated. Différance shakes and solicits the entire Heideggerian 
edifice (along with the metaphysical tradition of which it is a part), making it tremble 
through an ostensibly silent gesture of re-marking (its misspelling can only be read, not 
heard). Derrida re-marks or countersigns the Heideggerian text, which is to say he 
deconstructs it, or, better, he lets it deconstruct itself.243 The re-mark traverses the same 
terrain as the mark, while augmenting it and supplementing it, making the landscape it 
opens up intelligible in new, different ways. It is in this sense—and will become clearer 
below—that the experience of nostalgia is the experience of deconstruction: it traverses 
the familiar previously marked by experience and re-marks it, reworking it, and 
supplementing it with new insights, inscribing it yet again in order to make its marks 
differently legible.  
 
243 Throughout this essay, Derrida emphasizes différance’s basic non-transivity—it is neither active nor 
passive—suggesting that it operates (as a nonoperation, under the tutelage of no sovereign entity or 
individual) in “something like the middle voice.” See Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 9. Later, in his 
“Letter to a Japanese Friend,” Derrida expounds on this within the context of defending deconstruction 
against instrumentality, as if it were some pre-fabricated method or programme that could simply be 
deployed here or there, willy nilly. Rather, texts harbor deconstruction within themselves and are therefore 
always subject to auto-deconstruction. “Deconstruction takes place, it is an event that does not await 
deliberation, consciousness, or organization of a subject, or even modernity. It deconstructs itself. It can be 
deconstructed [Ça se déconstruit.] The ‘it’ [ça] is not here an impersonal thing that is opposed to some 
egolocial subjectivity. It is in deconstruction [en déconstruction]. And the se of se déconstruire, which is 
not the reflectivity of an ego or of a consciousness, bears the whole enigma.” See Derrida, Psyche: 
Inventions of the Other, Volume II, ed. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2008), 4-5. Derrida’s readings often seize upon moments within a particular text that 
signal this sort of auto-deconstruction, a moment that can be pried open or leveraged in order to show how 
the text remains within the system of significations it aims to critique, how it cannot account for the sort of 
ur-values to which it appeals, how it depends upon certain elements it aims to exclude or erase, etc. Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak, commenting on this style of reading, suggests that deconstruction produces or 
generates readings and in so doing “opens the textuality of a text…the moment that is undecidable in terms 
of the text’s apparent system of meaning, the moment in the text that seems to transgress its own system of 
values…the moment in the text which harbors the unbalancing of the equation, the sleight of hand at the 
limit of a text which cannot be dismissed simply as a contradiction.” See Spivak, “Translator’s Preface” in 
Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 





Derrida’s Rejection of Heideggerian Nostalgia   
 “I am alone.”244 Derrida opens BSII with these lines, cribbed from Defoe, which 
ultimately lead him to conjoin Heidegger and Defoe—‘Robinson Heidegger’—
surrounding the themes of loneliness, isolation, and the sovereign exception. Heidegger 
aims to investigate the ontological significance of nature, the world, the animal, and 
solitude in his seminar, while Defoe provides us with an epistolary account of a castaway 
stranded on a remote, tropical island for nearly three decades. Derrida is interested, at 
least initially, in the extent to which both texts orbit the themes of home, exile, and the 
possibility of movement between the two.245 Derrida holds together these themes, shared 
by an unlikely discursive couple, under the explicit rubric of nostalgia and homesickness 
(heimweh). He has in mind Defoe’s island of isolation and Heidegger’s other beginning, 
governing leitmotifs that reveal the degree to which both figures are stricken—that is to 
say, re-marked—by nostalgia, by longing to recover, retrieve, or return to something that 
has been lost. This unmarked rubric is first announced at the beginning of the second 
session of the seminar and persists as a minor refrain for the remainder of the text.  
 Novalis, again, lies at the crux of Derrida’s most unusual pairing. Novalis, who 
writes near the end of the eighteenth century, as we have seen, a time when nostalgia 
begins to take on a decidedly temporal character, no longer solely tethered to the spatial 
values associated with Hoferian homesickness and instead interiorized (or buried alive) 
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as an affective response to the ceaseless passage of time. “Philosophy is really 
homesickness,” he tells us, “the desire or drive to be everywhere at home.”246 Heidegger 
invokes this claim as a type of guide (Leitfaden) for determining the proper course and 
scope of philosophy, outlining its status as a Grundstimmung and showing how it remains 
yoked to its opposite, the unhomely, even as it seeks rest and repose in the grounding 
force of hearth and home. As we saw earlier, to be at home, for Heidegger, is to be both 
where the philosopher is not and where she longs to go, “once and at all times within the 
whole [im Ganzen].”247 The whole here stands as a synonym of the world, for Heidegger, 
the totality, unity, and presence of Being itself, of “Being as a whole [Sein im 
Ganzen].”248 The philosopher constantly seeks out this whole and remains within it, 
searching far and wide for some means of becoming homely within the whole even as it 
remains unhomely and estranged.  
 In BS II, Derrida is interested, among other things, in how this reading of Novalis 
functions as something of a shorthand not only for the conception of ‘world’ outlined 
later in the text, but for Heidegger’s thought as a whole. Being as a whole is the world, 
where the world signifies both the totality of beings and the entirety of Being as continual 
presencing, a presencing that coalesces or discloses itself as a whole. Heidegger’s Dasein 
is thus nostalgically driven to be at home in Being and with every being. It longs to 
become homely, as a whole, in the world, as a whole. This, again, is the filiation Derrida 
detects between Heidegger and Defoe, the strange resonance he pinpoints by reading one 
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text alongside the other, the one generating a new reading of the other: island and 
isolation (separation), existential exile (dispersal) and future return (gathering), home and 
homesickness, nostalgia and reminiscence—the realization of loss and the ambiguous yet 
propulsive desire that accompanies it. But on Derrida’s reading the ambiguity and 
bittersweetness intrinsic to nostalgia are assuaged and indeed eclipsed by Heidegger’s 
broader concerns for presence and the orienting values of unity, harmony, and essential 
concordance. Nostalgic, scattered Dasein wanders in search of gathering, longing for a 
unified whole within which it might itself attain unity, as a whole. Unity within the 
whole, as a whole, is thus the object of nostalgia in this case and nostalgia itself receives 
a decidedly ameliorative valence. One longs to be at home in the presence of the whole, 
in the presencing of the whole, to be united with and subsumed by the whole in its 
totality, as a whole. The relevant Heidegger passage, referenced above, is reproduced 
below with some additional context. Here Heidegger is commenting on Novalis’s 
aphorism, tying it to the larger concerns that Derrida believes animate his thinking: 
This is where we are driven in our homesickness: to being as a whole [Sein im 
Ganzen]. Our very being is this restlessness. We have somehow always already 
departed toward this whole, or better, we are always on the way to it. But we are 
driven on…We are underway to this ‘as a whole.’ […] Philosophy, metaphysics, 
is a homesickness, an urge to be at home everywhere, a demand, not blind and 
without direction, but one which awakens us to such questions as those we have 
just asked and to their unity (Einheit).249 
 
 This desire for wholeness, unity, and homeliness is why Derrida is so careful, 
early in BS II, to meticulously parse out Heidegger’s preoccupation with the specifically 
Presocratic and Aristotelian determinations of Being as presence and presencing (physis: 
 




“to grow,” “to appear”). This nostalgia for ‘early Greek thinking’ subtends the 
Heideggerian project in aggregate, constituting what Theodor Adorno calls “the mental 
posture of a permanent ‘back-to.’”250 It reveals a desire to return to the forgotten “other 
beginning,” the unthought origin of metaphysics that must be authentically repeated to 
retrieve its as yet un-actualized possibilities, the truth (aletheia) of being as disclosure or 
un-concealment (physis).  
 This deep, abiding desire to return to the whole (Ganzen) and to be (re)united 
with Being as whole (Sein im Ganzen) is not merely perfunctory. It is operative in 
Heidegger’s primary mode of investigation, an inquiry into the (forgotten) meaning of the 
question of Being; in his subsequent determination of Being as presence; in the constant 
and consistent valorization of the proper and the authentic in Being and Time; in the 
attendant account of primordial, ecstatic temporality; and, especially, in the elegiac, 
almost mystical style of the late Heidegger’s turn to poetics which best approximates, he 
thinks, how Being emerges in presencing (Anwesen) and appropriation (Ereignis), 
constituting the specific milieu in which Dasein is meant to dwell. This style of 
thinking—what Heidegger variously calls authentic repetition (Wiederholung), 
commemorative thinking or thinking-back (Andenken), and proper recollection or 
remembrance (Wiedererinnerung)— is suffused with nostalgic desire to regain or reclaim 
the bygone primordiality of yore, to become united with and at home in what he calls “a 
 




single primordially unitary phenomenon [ein ursprünglich einheitliches Phänomen]” that 
is both within the whole and constitutes the whole, as a whole.251 
 The point here is that Derrida, too, detects a surreptitious nostalgia for presence in 
Heidegger’s thinking. But while he roundly rejects this form of nostalgia early in his 
career, in BS II he nevertheless remains deeply interested in Novalis’ claim that 
philosophy begins in/with nostalgia. One of his primary aims is to examine the manner in 
which the structure of temporized experience necessitates affective responses like 
nostalgia that are often all too easily folded into a metaphysics of recursion and return. 
Unlike Heidegger, Derrida wants to tarry with nostalgia, redirecting the experience away 
from an understanding of temporality that might dampen its full force and impact. In this 
respect Derridean deconstruction and Heideggerian fundamental ontology could not be 
more at odds; the re-mark is surgical and devastating. Heidegger wants to return to lost 
Greco-Germanic provenance, to uncover the emerging presence of primeval Being 
(physis), while Derrida is interested in the manner in which time and temporization 
necessitate that this presence differ and defer from itself to such an extent that its status as 
presence is called into question. Heidegger, the austere, provincial German, is content to 
sequester himself in his isolated writing hut in the Black Forest, dwelling in the essential 
un-concealment of the pastoral four-fold, while Derrida, the urbane, cosmopolitan 
Parisian relentlessly traverses the interstices of various disciplines and contexts, 
performing writing as endless supplement and iterability.  
 




 Derrida’s ostensibly anti-nostalgic position is explicitly announced in 1968, near 
the end of his essay on différance, a text where he excoriates Heidegger’s desire to 
recover some form of Presocratic, ontological primordiality. “There will be no unique 
name,” Derrida writes, “even if it were the name of Being. And we must think this 
without nostalgia, that is, outside the myth of a purely maternal or paternal language, a 
lost native country of thought.”252 This is undoubtedly an unmarked reference to a crucial 
passage from Being and Time, one that Derrida and others, Richard Rorty most notably,253 
take to be emblematic of the Heideggerian gesture writ large. In the middle of a 
discussion of Dasein, disclosedness, and truth Heidegger pauses to offer a prescriptive 
statement that stands as a salient crystallization of his nostalgia for presence and the other 
beginning. “The ultimate business of philosophy,” he rhapsodizes, “is to preserve 
(bewahren) the force of the most elemental words (die Kraft der elementarsten Worte) in 
which Dasein expresses itself, and to keep the common understanding from levelling 
them off.”254 Heidegger, on Derrida’s reading, longs to return to and preserve the unique 
proper name(s) indicative of both Being (presence) and beings (the present), a proper 
 
252 Derrida, “Différance,” in Margins of Philosophy, 27. Italics mine. 
253 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), 112. 
254 Heidegger, Being and Time, 220/262. Italics original. The phrase “levelling off” (Nivellierung) 
appears several times throughout Being and Time (most notably in Heidegger’s discussion of primordial 
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the other. This distinction is, at root, tethered to a larger bifurcation between what Heidegger calls 
“authentic temporality” and the so-called “vulgar,” “ordinary” or “everyday” conception of time. Derrida 
subjects this dichotomy to a rigorous deconstructive reading in “Ousia and Gramme” (1968), a companion 
piece, along with “The Ends of Man” (1968), to his seminal essay on différance. In that text, Derrida 
argues, through a preliminary reading of Hegel’s Jena Logic and, especially, Aristotle’s essay on time in 
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name that sets thought along a proper path.255 Derrida, for his part, is interested in 
jamming up this procedure by demonstrating that there is no unique, proper name nor any 
fungible proper path, only what he calls, with the help of Freud, the errancy of 
“différance as detour.”256 If Heidegger, the twentieth century’s most specious nostalgic, 
aims to uncover or isolate a primordial, ontological origin, Derrida responds with a 
deconstructive re-mark by showing that this origin is essentially a phantom or prosthetic, 
constituted by the play of différance and another non-concept central to Derrida’s work, 
what he calls “the trace.”  
The Logic of the Trace and the Timing of Nachträglichkeit 
 The invocation of Freud above is not merely ornamental and is worth parsing out 
a bit further. It serves to clarify both Derrida’s relationship to Heidegger vis-a-vis 
presence as well as his understanding of the trace as a type of re-mark that best typifies 
the work of nostalgia. Since at least the publication of Of Grammatology, the majority of 
Derrida’s work—and his readings Heidegger in particular—are strategically interrupted 
by Freud. The earliest, most paradigmatic example of this practice comes in 1966 with 
the publication of “Freud and the Scene of Writing.” In that text, Derrida seizes upon 
 
255 Derrida goes on, in the final paragraph of his essay, to relate this (early) nostalgic sentiment of 
Being and Time to Heidegger’s 1946 commentary on the Anaximander fragment, a text often associated 
with a decisive shift in Heidegger’s thought, a shift Heidegger himself signals under the rubric of die Kehre 
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provenance, a desire to return to original primordiality, to recover, retrieve or re-appropriate the halcyon 
days before philosophy went terribly awry. 




Freud’s 1925 consideration of the psychic apparatus as type of writing machine and puts 
it into the service of his own burgeoning theory of différance in order to offer an 
immanent critique of both the metaphysics of presence and the ipseity of sovereign, 
selfsame consciousness. As with Heidegger, Derrida notes the affinities and resonances 
between psychoanalysis and deconstruction while also taking stock of the manner in 
which Freud’s work retains a certain residue of the metaphysics of presence. Crucially, at 
the outset, Derrida notes that while his concepts “are neither Freudian nor Heideggerian,” 
his work nevertheless necessitates “a comparison of the undertakings of Heidegger and 
Freud” that directly pertains to what nostalgia, by definition, tears asunder, i.e., “the 
meaning of presence in general.”257 This gesture of re-marking is continued with varying 
degrees of scope and emphasis in Of Grammatology (1968), “Me—Psychoanalysis” 
(1979), “Envoi” (1980), “Mes Chances,” (1982), “Fors” (1986), Archive Fever (1995), 
Resistances of Psychoanalysis (1998), and For What Tomorrow… (2001). The most 
prominent and salient instance, however, and one that combines the influence of both 
Freud and Heidegger in a single, multi-valenced effort, is The Post Card (1980). Along 
with Glas (1974), an avant-garde, intertextual reading of Hegel and Jean Genet, The Post 
Card is often regarded as Derrida most literary work.258 The text itself appears to speak in 
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multiple voices, a stylistic device that performs the deconstructive work set forth in the 
text, one that Derrida first experiments with in Glas and further refines in Cinders (1987) 
and On the Name (1993).  
 In The Postcard, Derrida stages yet another discursive encounter, another 
strategic re-marking, similar to the Heidegger-Defoe couplet explored in BSII, except 
this time it centers around a strange sort of clandestine correspondence he detects 
between Heidegger and Freud. “Here Freud and Heidegger,” he announces, “I conjoin 
them within me like the two great ghosts of the ‘great epoch.’ The two surviving 
grandfathers. They did not know each other, but according to me they form a 
couple…two thinkers whose glances never cross and who, without ever receiving a word 
from one another, say the same [disent le même].”259 Derrida’s play on the same (le 
même) here includes at least two levels. On the one hand, Freud and Heidegger say the 
same, i.e., they work within the conventions of metaphysics which, itself, says the same, 
inscribes the same, and installs the same, in terms of presence, identity, and homogeneity. 
This refers to Heidegger’s nostalgia for presence and Freud’s reductive biologism. On the 
other hand, however, Freud and Heidegger say the same. That is to say, they offer the 
same by providing insights that can be wielded against the same, ideas that can be 
leveraged in the service of a critique of the same, a critique that interrogates 
consciousness’s supposed immediacy and transparency. Yet, Freud and Heidegger fail to 
effectively marshal this critique themselves because they remain within and continue to 
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say, the same. Derrida, in other words, finds these two thinkers so important—reading 
them together, with and against the same—because they help facilitate his critical 
analysis of presence and absence. They allow him to further sharpen his deconstruction of 
the modern, post-Kantian subject and his growing suspicion that the endless play of 
différance is never not affecting—or infecting—individual consciousness. 
 At this point it will come as no surprise that Derrida’s conjunction of Heidegger 
and Freud revolves around the problem of time and temporization, a thematic that could 
no doubt be spun out in a variety of ways. Parallels between nostalgia and re-marking—
both serve to highlight the interval between presence and absence—necessitate a 
prismatic view of this heading according to what Derrida calls the logic of the trace. The 
trace is one the earliest nicknames Derrida deploys to indicate “the 
unmonotonous...unnameable movement of difference-itself,”260 a movement that impels, 
among other things, the experience of time and the experience of nostalgia, the 
experience of nostalgia as the experience of time. This notion of the trace first emerges in 
Derrida’s earliest works and remains an orienting concern up through the BSII seminar. 
In Of Grammatology, it is situated as a means of generalizing the Husserlian structure of 
retention—the manner in which intentional acts of perception are held or preserved in 
temporal consciousness—clarifying Derrida’s larger relationship to transcendental 
phenomenology. His primary critique, as outlined in The Origin of Geometry and, 
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especially, Speech and Phenomena, is that Husserl, in his discussions of temporality, 
tends to reduce the notion of experience in general to pure, transparent and immediate 
presence, what he calls The Living Present (lebendige Gegenwart).261  
 In order to complicate this matrix—and to do justice to the play of what he terms 
différance less than a year later—Derrida borrows the term trace from the work of 
Emmanuel Lévinas and, with the help of Freud, re-marks it. For Lévinas, the trace 
“signifies beyond being” because it “escapes the bipolar play of immanence and 
transcendence proper to being.”262 It refers to an “immemorial past” that was and is never 
fully present as such.263 Derrida seizes upon the manner in which the trace—which 
signifies without making appear—interrupts the metastatic inertia of presence, opting for 
the play of différance rather than the drudgery and bipolar play of the transcendence-
immanence dyad. Like Lévinas, he is interested in that which never quite attains the 
impregnable status of presence proper. But, unlike Lévinas, he claims that his 
deconstructive version of the trace will be “reconciled…to a Heideggerian intention” (the 
delineation of originary difference) that sometimes extends “beyond Heideggerian 
discourse” (by unsettling the value of originality and the power of the origin), an 
intervention that “makes enigmatic what one thinks one understands by the words 
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‘proximity,’ ‘immediacy,’ ‘presence,’ [and] the proper.”264 This “beyond,” Derrida tells 
us a few lines later, is made possible by Nietzsche and, especially, Freud. If Heidegger 
lays the necessary groundwork for Derrida’s critique of the metaphysics of presence, it is 
Freud who enables him to extend and radicalize the questions related to time and 
temporization initially outlined by Husserl and Heidegger. By excising the notion of the 
trace from the Levinasian corpus, Derrida offers his own re-mark, one that brings 
Heideggerian presence (Dasein) and Freudian absence (the unconscious) together by 
siding with neither. In the middle of a passage in The Post Card describing the strange 
“correspondence” between Heidegger and Freud, Derrida suggests that thinking the trace 
necessitates that one “reconsider the tranquil self-evidence of the ‘there is’ and the ‘there 
is not’…by exceeding, à la trace, the opposition of the present and the absence.”265 
Deconstruction, it seems, can only abide the ‘Da’ of Dasein if it is interpolated by the 
‘Da’ of Fort!/Da!. Like différance, the trace is one of Derrida’s many designations for 
difference and deferral, for the interval between presence and absence and the manner in 
which each term intervenes within and re-marks upon its other.266 
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265 Derrida, The Post Card, 357. 
266 In a conversation with Elizabeth Roudinesco Derrida reflects on these connections in an especially 
lucid way: “Up until 1965, I had not yet realized the necessity of psychoanalysis in my philosophical work. 
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therefore of putting the resources of psychoanalysis to work. […] Concerning the problematic of the trace, 
as an important principle of contestation and a strategic lever of deconstruction, situating it within and 
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 From Derrida’s perspective, Freud’s greatest achievement is his constant 
insistence that the human psyche retains indices of experience that are stored or archived 
in a manner that often escapes—and at times undermines—the sovereignty of 
consciousness awareness. This reading is first outlined in “Freud and the Scene of 
Writing.” The insights gleaned in that essay influence the majority of Derrida’s marquee 
non-concepts—différance and the trace, most notably—and remain operative for the 
remainder of his career. The idea here, as Freud himself puts it in Civilization and its 
Discontents, is that “in mental life nothing which has once been formed can perish, 
everything is somehow preserved and…in suitable circumstances…it can once more be 
brought to light.”267 The experience of nostalgia may be one such circumstance, as 
Derrida intimates in BS II, though the degree to which it is ‘suitable’ or not is as 
ambiguous and ambivalent as the desire itself. Freud variously refers to these preserved 
impressions as “memory-traces” or “mnemic images” throughout his work 
(Erinnerungsspur: literally “the trace of a memory”).268 These residual imprints are 
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Psychoanalysis” in Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow . . .: A Dialogue, trans. 
Jeff Fort (Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press, 2004), 170. 
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ed. James Strachey, (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2010), 30-31. Freud’s corpus is replete 
with similar lines of thought. Take, for example, the following extract from “Constructions in Analysis” 
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inscribed upon the psyche in a way that suggests a certain incongruity between 
consciousness and memory, an incongruity that nostalgia both requires and exploits. 
According to Freud’s topography, every instance of perceptual experience forges an 
indelible memory-trace upon the psychic apparatus. The majority of these traces never 
fully reach consciousness at the time of perception—that is to say, they are never 
completely present or cognized as such in the moment, hence Lévinas’s aforementioned 
reference to a past that was never present. These traces do, however, accumulate over 
time, circulating just below the surface of conscious awareness. They are constantly in 
the process of being reworked and rearranged in light of new experiences and fresh 
perceptions.269 It is thus that each memory-trace remains “currently active,”270 according 
to Freud, constituting an accretive reservoir that subtends and affects consciousness in 
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every instant, contributing to one’s overall character and affective disposition in a manner 
not at all unlike Heidegger’s notion of the Grundstimmung.271  
 In his early essays on différance, The Post-Card, and, especially, “Freud and the 
Scene of Writing,” Derrida is primarily interested in the manner in which familiar 
accounts of subjectivity and temporization—Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception, 
Husserl’s Living Present, and Heidegger’s ecstatic, originary temporality—are found 
wanting when confronted with this trace-structure. “Life,” he writes, “must be thought of 
as trace before Being may be determined as presence.”272 The trace signals neither 
complete absence nor full presence, but the interval or interstice between the two. Any 
presence whatsoever is contaminated, not necessarily by its diametrical opposite, but by 
the trace, which expresses, in a mode that is nearly undetectable, something like the 
presence of absence, an indefatigable mark left behind by something or someone whose 
presence was never fully apprehended in the present now past but is still, somehow, 
carried into the present now passing. To consider life according to the logic of the trace, 
then, is to broach what Derrida calls, in his earliest essay on Freud, a “discontinuous or 
episodic temporality”273 where experience is always contiguous but not necessarily 
continuous, shaped by the disparate fragments and scattered impressions that constitute 
memory. Life considered as trace, according to this temporality, results in an endless 
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phenomenon, one where the protean self is always both ahead of itself and behind itself, 
deciphering and translating itself without the aid of some Rosetta Stone or master key. 
 Derrida further clarifies the discontinuous, episodic temporality of the trace by re-
marking upon yet another Freudian notion, that of deferral or belatedness 
(Nachträglichkeit). For Freud, Nachträglichkeit refers to the manner in which latent (or 
repressed) memory-traces have both a deferred effect and a delayed affect upon the 
subject. Nachträglichkeit is not a central concept in Freud, but it does emerge often 
throughout his work, particularly in discussions on the relationship between subjective 
memory and temporized experience, leading Derrida to suggest that it is perhaps his most 
significant discovery.274 The German expression here is polyvalent and difficult to parse. 
James Strachey, the editor and English translator of Freud’s collected works, renders 
Nachträglichkeit as “deferred action” in the Standard Edition, while Jacques Lacan, who 
is responsible for introducing the term to French intellectual life in 1953, opts for the 
phrase après-coup (literally: “after the blow”) in his commentary on the famous “Wolf 
Man” case.275 Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, in their seminal The Language 
of Psychoanalysis, prefer the Lacanian designation and its English correlate, 
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“afterwardness,” arguing that Strachey’s more anemic and imprecise translation connotes 
“merely a delay or lapse of time between cause and effect”276 when the entire point of 
Nachträglichkeit in Freud is to invert this relationship or at the very least undermine the 
familiar, linear logics of causality and temporal succession. Simply put, Nachträglichkeit 
upends the myth of mono-causality. The delay or deferral involved runs in both 
directions, i.e., from the past to the present and from the present to the past. 
Afterwardness is not only the release or discharge of accruing tension or psychic energy, 
it is also—and especially—a retroactive re-working of experience in light of new 
circumstances. This is precisely what is at stake in Freud’s 1917 study of the Wolf Man. 
The primal scene is not experienced as such and only belatedly understood or worked 
over. The past is carried forward and, in light of fresh experience, it returns, belatedly, in 
the present to be heard again. Latent memory-traces that never fully reach consciousness 
facilitate this working over by virtue of the gap or interval between the times, between 
presence and absence. The essential, sequential distinctions between cause and effect, 
past and present, origin and epiphenomenon, therefore recede in favor of rhythmic co-
implication. The (present) experience of (previous) experience endows both with new 
meaning and affective force, ex post facto—a re-marking after the fact. 
 This understanding of Nachträglichkeit coheres with Derrida’s own usage of the 
term. In Of Grammatology, “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” and the pivotal essay on 
différance, Derrida reads the concept alongside the notion of the trace he borrows and 
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adapts from Freud and Levinas—the temporality implied in Nachträglichkeit is the time 
of the trace, a time that both enables the presence/absence dyad while also complicating 
their identity and continuity. “To defer (différer),” he writes, in agreement with 
Laplanche and Pontalis, “cannot mean to retard [verspätung] a present possibility, to 
postpone an act, to put off a perception already now possible.”277 The deferral is always 
already on the scene, in the scene, and the delay always already infiltrates those 
possibilities taken or assumed to be immediately present. Nachträglichkeit is thus the 
‘beginning,’ the non-originary origin constituted by the play of différance and the 
imbrication of traces. Afterwardness thus allows Derrida to think the problem of 
temporization outside the dialectical syntheses of experience explicitly outlined by 
Husserl and tacitly upheld by Heidegger.278 What we call the present or the now is not 
easily maintained—this is Derrida’s play on the French maintenant, “the now”—because 
the presence of the present is constituted by the logic of the trace, the work of memory, 
and the temporality of afterwardness.279 The capacious, opaque, and receptive character of 
consciousness discovered by Freud  is generalized and extended by Derrida, applicable to 
the structure of temporized experience itself. Consciousness fails to assimilate fully and 
completely that to which it is subject because consciousness is not immediately present 
and transparent. But these experiences are nevertheless inscribed as traces, traces that 
continue to mark and re-mark experience. They are themselves re-marked upon after the 
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fact—nachträglichkeit, après-coup, ex post facto—as the present confers with the past 
and vice versa. The temporal interval to which afterwardness bears persistent testament 
thus facilitates a boundless, interminable process of translation and re-inscription. 
Temporization is thus diffuse and time itself runs both forward and backward, sideways 
and diagonal, ordering and reordering memory and experience at speed.  
 In a letter to Wihelm Fliess that also contains one of the earliest extant references 
to Nachträglichkeit, Freud suggests that the “psychical mechanism has come into being 
by a process of stratification” where “the material present in the form of memory-traces 
[is] subjected from time to time to a re-arrangement…a re-transcription…in accordance 
with fresh circumstances.” This is no doubt what Derrida has in mind when he refers to 
Freud’s work as a “diaphoristics” or an “energetics” of the trace, where consciousness is 
considered as text, “a weave of pure traces…consisting of archives which are always 
already transcriptions…repositories of a meaning which was never present…always 
reconstituted by deferral.”280 Through this process of translation and re-inscription—of 
reading and re-marking—past experience is continually supplemented by present 
awareness and reworked in light of new experience, instances that are themselves 
subtended by the activity of afterwardness. For Derrida, as for Freud, the meaning that is 
attained by deciphering and translating traces is always overdetermined, i.e., it is always 
the effect of many conditions or causes that are themselves constituted by accretive 
experience and the cumulative workings of memory. This meaning emerges through the 
play of différance, supplemented and augmented by other meanings, events, memories, or 
 




experiences the full force and significance of which need not be and cannot be 
determined or contained by the dyadic representations of presence and absence. Traces, 
then, re-mark (upon) us and we re-mark (upon) them, belatedly—always belatedly.  
 
Nostalgia, Re-marked  
 This leads us back to BSII, specifically to the important turning point in the 
second session where Derrida reads Heidegger reading Novalis on nostalgia. Earlier I 
suggested that Derrida remains deeply interested in Novalis’ claim about philosophy and 
homesickness despite the sort of determination it receives in Heidegger. We are now in a 
position to make good on that claim as Derrida’s readings here are motivated and 
informed by the foregoing, by his understanding of deconstruction as a critical gesture of 
re-marking and his consideration of Freudian ideas like the trace and Nachträglichkeit. 
These analyses reach their apex in a stunning moment in the second session of the 
seminar. Derrida continues to follow and re-mark upon Heidegger’s clue from Novalis by 
providing a seemingly improvisational meditation on nostalgia, mourning and memory, 
and the episodic character of temporized experience. The muse here is a few lines from 
John Donne’s Holy Sonnets—“I run to Death and Death meets me as fast / And all my 
Pleasures are like Yesterday”—lines which serve to indicate both his distance from 
garden-variety forms of nostalgia as well as his desire for a nostalgia without closure. 
And all my pleasures are like yesterday, like the yesterday, as though come from yesterday, 
my pleasures are already of yesterday, my pleasures are the yesterday itself, in advance 
they are dated—from yesterday. In advance they have passed, they are past, already past 
and passed by, overtaken, already memories of bygone enjoyment or returns of pleasure. 
My present pleasures are in the present yesterday’s presents, they are yesterday. Not: they 




yesterday. […] What I live in the present, or even what I expect from the future, is already 
past, already memory and melancholy, or nostalgia (Heimweh).281 
 
The final sentence—‘what I live in the present…is already past, already memory and 
melancholy, or nostalgia (heimweh)—is particularly instructive and directly links 
nostalgia with Novalisian homesickness, signaling that Derrida plans to overturn the 
Heideggerian determination and offer another deconstructive re-mark. While his 1968 
comments on différance summarily reject nostalgia wholesale, Derrida’s prose in 2003 
exudes desirous yearning, eulogizing what has been lost and what has passed away, 
present only in the fragmentary traces of memory. The key difference here—the 
difference différance makes we might say—is that this restive nostalgic desire expects no 
recompense and makes no attempt at propitiation. It subsists in itself and persists for 
itself, by virtue of the trace, thriving on the interval(s) between presents, between what 
was (passing) and what is (passing). It is a desire that is born in passing, remains adrift in 
passing, and continues to pine for what is past—because the ambivalent, bittersweet 
pleasure associated with the passing past is only presently recognized. This is an 
insolvent nostalgia that remains active, propulsive, and animating nonetheless, a longing, 
both plaintive and festive, that yearns for the very thing that generates consternation—the 
passage of time. Derrida continues, a few pages later, sharpening the distinction: 
It is yesterday that gives the pleasure, pleasure is yesterday, like yesterday, it begins now 
by being yesterday, not only in the manner of yesterday, but as yesterday. I have pleasure 
only because there is the past of yesterday, only because pleasure is originarily yesterday, 
it is in its essence, in its now, in the presence of its essence and in the essence of its 
presence, a having-been-yesterday, it is (present) in its Gewesenheit, it is in its essence 
(Wesen), a Gewesenheit, a being-having-been, and that’s the nostalgia of yesterday, of a 
death already come, an originary mourning, this is the nostalgia that does not come after 
pleasure but which, alone, gives me pleasure and gives it to me as yesterday. I do not enjoy 
a pleasure first present that is immediately past, nostalgic, in mourning: no, the pleasure is 
 




born only of the mourning, of enjoyment as mourning. And not any mourning and any 
memory of death, but the mourning of myself. I am from yesterday, I am no longer, I am 
no longer present, I am already yesterday, I enjoy from yesterday not because I have 
enjoyed or have been, or because I was born yesterday, but because only yesterday will 
have given me…. […] Pleasure, my pleasures are yesterday, they are the yesterday, they 
are like yesterday. They are neither present nor future, I enjoy them only as a memory; and 
even then, “memory” and “past” are concepts that are too broad and vague. The yesterday 
is not only the past the memory of which I keep or lose: yesterday is the day ahead, the day 
that has just passed, who phenomenal light has just faded. Yesterday is the past imminence 
of today itself, the imminence of day’s dawning, the dawning that gives light to the day.282 
 
Here, just a year before his own death, Derrida refers to an anticipatory nostalgia for 
experience, for more life and increased receptivity, a receptivity not fully available or 
recognized as such in the immediate instant of what we call the present—in other words, 
the experience of nostalgia as an unending response to or re-mark upon the force of time. 
On this reading, nostalgia accentuates the manner in which temporization is felt as 
interval, distance, stretchedness, and in-betweenness. Unlike Heidegger, nostalgia is 
considered here not as a form of restorative return, ameliorative repetition, or salutary 
preservation, but as a type of animating force, coeval with our experience of time—the 
ache that comes from irreducible non-coincidence, from being neither completely present 
nor fully absent, but carried across the times, thrown and strewn, marked by something 
inaccessible, re-marked by something spectral.  
 This Derridean form of nostalgia ironizes and frustrates desire with denying or 
glossing over its demands or the experience from which it emerges. It allows some 
enjoyment, remains painfully aware of the impossibility of its yearning and, harboring no 
illusions of final fulfillment, relishes the bittersweet nonetheless—and relishes it as 
mourning. Derrida, then, does not deny nostalgia. On the contrary, he welcomes it by 
 




denying its teleological fantasies. That posture is indicative of his work in toto. He 
vigilantly maintains that time is generative yet always—increasingly, incessantly, 
irrevocably—passing away, that pleasure is in some sense born to us, in us, too late but 
also (partially) tasted ex post facto, that our most intimate, unstated, and accretive desires 
index us even as they escape and remain opaque. These insights (in)form 
deconstruction’s most animating concerns. Peggy Kamuf suggests that these concerns 
involve an ongoing, elaborate, and micro-logical demonstration that what we call 
experience is, ultimately, “the experience of experience,”283 a notion that is prominently 
on display as early as the initial interventions in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology 
where he explores the sense that even sense is, in some sense, nontransparent, that even 
immediacy is mediated, immediately.284 Derrida is concerned with—and feels some deep 
responsibility for—the irreducible force and exigence of afterwardness and the basic non-
coincidence that forms the episodic vicissitudes of life as it is lived from the inside—a 
nostalgia without end. 
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  Already, in 1996, decades after the famous “Différance” essay and nearly ten 
years before BSII, Derrida briefly evokes nostalgia in explicit connection with memory 
and mourning. Commenting on the possibility of a ‘resistance’ in psychoanalysis, he 
notes that the word résistance itself resists clear translation even as it conjures the 
specific pathos of verstimmung and a certain nostalgia for his Algerian childhood. The 
recollections themselves are neither clear nor transparent, however. Derrida feels 
nostalgia, but the precise specificity of his desired object remains indeterminate, 
undefined, and strangely cryptic. Indeed, the desire itself seems to impel him in the 
absence of any localizable object—how to decipher its tracks and traces, how to translate 
its impressions and imprints, its marks and re-marks? Nostalgia for…what? Which 
memories and recollections? Derrida responds: “I am going to tell you which ones even if 
I cannot discern the secret of my inconsolable nostalgia [le secret de ma nostalgie 
inconsolable]—which thus remains to be analyzed or which resists [résiste] analysis, a 
little like the navel of a dream.”285 An inconsolable nostalgia, wrapped around an 
intimate, tightly-kept secret whose umbilical center remains potent, yet barely legible, an 
almost indiscernible perforation. Like the Swiss peasants Kant discusses, Derrida remains 
inconsolable, remediless, incurable.286 The pathos and affective intensity of nostalgia 
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engulf him even if, especially if, the density and gravity of their force(s) far outstrip any 
future or present possibility of satiation. The reference to the navel of a dream inscribed 
here is, of course, another Freudian interruption, a wry allusion to The Interpretation of 
Dreams and the idea that every dream-work contains an intractable knot that resists or 
exceeds analysis, what Freud calls its “unplumbable…point of contact with the 
unknown.”287 Like nostalgia, the navel is, quite literally, the indication of lack and 
absence, a marker of distance and difference, of the impossibility of returning home and 
the irretrievable, irrevocable status of both the origin and its definite article. Yet, this 
marker is visible and legible. The absence is re-marked as a type of phantom presence. 
The absence this uncanny presence signals, though résistant and unnameable, is 
perceptible, detectable, felt, even as it is clothed and hidden, exposed in its concealment. 
The navel is inscribed upon the body as nostalgia is inscribed upon the structure of 
experience. It is, above all, a scar, the stigmatic trace of an old wound that remains both 
open and blocked, constituting the very center of one’s gravity, the fulcrum or point at 
which the cumulative mass of a body can begin to act, the silent custodian of movement 
and expression. The cut or score the nostalgic navel signifies reveals an opening, a 
depression or indentation that begins to re-mark the gap(s) of temporization, of time and 
timing as separation, scattering, and dispersal, the interval of différance. The navel of 
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nostalgia: this shallow pit, this dry cistern, once the hole through which the unified whole 
was sustained, is now the hole around which the disjunctive whole moves, advances, and 
gathers itself—cut and cordless. 
 Scars and re-marks such as these constitute what Derrida calls  a “congenital” or 
“originary” nostalgia, one that is ongoing, ceaseless, and interminable, one where 
“memory is…given over to mourning.”288 This is a mourning both propulsive and 
inconsolable due to the logic of the trace and temporality of Nachträglichkeit that 
accompanies it. Back to BS II, one final time: “I do not enjoy a pleasure first present that 
is immediately past, nostalgic, in mourning: no, the pleasure is born only of the 
mourning, of enjoyment as mourning. And not any mourning and any memory of death, 
but the mourning of myself.”289 The notion that present pleasure is felt, presently, due to 
its trace structure, its ‘presence’ in “the past of yesterday” and its ‘absence’ in the present 
of today—along with the notion that such pleasure is “originarily yesterday,” present 
only in its Gewesenheit, its being-having-been, “enjoyment as mourning”—this 
bittersweet experience of afterwardness, of mediated immediacy, does not install yet 
another familiar, recursive metaphysics of presence and primordiality, it remonstrates it. 
By invoking Gewesenheit, a lesser-known Heideggerian coinage, and willfully playing it 
against itself, Derrida exploits and undermines the nostrum panacea of authentic 
 
288 Jacques Derrida, Paper Machine, trans. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press, 
2005), 169; Jacques Derrida, Memoires for Paul de Man, trans. Cecile Lindsay et al., Revised edition (New 
York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1989), xviii. Cf. Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. Thomas Dutoit 
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repetition and return, the supposed apodicticity of presence and identity.290 As we have 
seen, the character of this ‘having-been’ is intimately bound up with Heidegger’s concept 
of thrownness (geworfenheit) and the particular timing specific to affectivity 
(befindlichkeit, stimmung), a temporality that overcomes Dasein in its affectedness, in 
disclosing the facticity of its existence, the reality that it is because it has-been. Derrida 
rightfully suspects that Heidegger dampens the force of this affectedness and the 
thrownness that generates it by filtering both concepts through the ur-values of (original) 
unity, (primordial) proximity, and (future) gathering, ultimately rendering both sapid and 
toothless. But, as we have seen, the pleasure that often accompanies nostalgic experience 
only becomes legible and recognizable as such through the constitutive bitterness that 
triggers it, ‘enjoyment as mourning,’ as Derrida puts it above.  
 Perhaps a further re-mark upon nostalgia’s etymological roots can sharpen this 
distinction. Nostos refers to homecoming or return, particularly of the epic sort embarked 
upon by figures like Odysseus who are placed in exile or depart from home and then 
attempt to ‘go back’ despite being thwarted or foiled again and again. Algos carries 
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Dasein, through authentic ownedness and anticipatory resoluteness, takes over, assimilates, and modifies 
its ‘having-been’ by taking control of its own existence and its own-most possibilities for being-in-the-




connotations of pain or grief that can result from the failure or impossibility of return, the 
travails undertaken during the return, or the additional losses incurred over the course of 
the return itself. As a compound, nostalgia internalizes both elements, suffusing both the 
word and the feeling it names with a productive tension, an animating ambiguity that 
offers attunement amid the vicissitudes of time and temporization. It is easy, all too easy, 
to excise that tension and alleviate the ambiguity by isolating one element at the expense 
of the other. In her book-length study on nostalgia, Svetlana Boym offers her own re-
mark, situating each element as a type of subject position or affective sensibility—
restorative nostalgia and reflective nostalgia, respectively—where the former emphasizes 
nostos at the expense of algos, and vice versa. But at a certain point the binary folds in on 
itself: nostalgia remains illegible without both terms, its bittersweetness remains neutered 
without the two movements or moments that together form its unique character.  
 Heidegger manages to construct an entire philosophy of nostos without ever 
deploying the word nostalgia because be remains interested in what is, or can be, 
appropriated, assimilated, or annexed under the determination of being as presence and 
disclosure. By tarrying with and recuperating algos, Derrida offers a plaintive if not 
corrective re-mark, one that calls into question the teleological presumptions embedded 
in concepts like Gewesenheit and Geworfenheit, subjecting both to “a principle of 
indetermination, chance, randomness, or destinerrance.”291 The result of this 
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deconstructive vigilance is an attunement to nostalgic experience as a response to the 
conditions of time. This experience cannot be easily or completely assimilated. It holds 
open the tension built-in to nostalgia and comports itself to the old aches to which time 
and memory give voice. This sort of nostalgia maintains an intimate, almost clandestine 
relation with the past, but, crucially, it is not directed toward the past, toward some 
primal origin or other beginning that might alleviate its intrinsic tension and restlessness. 
That provenance, too, is constituted by an amalgamation of available traces, after the fact, 
as a generative if not necessary phantom. The inconsolable, reflective nostalgia Derrida 
has in mind fully engages the future in the present by refusing to simply resuscitate the 
past and instead allowing it to exert a quiet, propulsive force, animated by the trace-
structure that enables memory and reminiscence. Derrida’s meditation on Donne—
inspired by Heidegger and Defoe, haunted by Freud—provides us with a phenomenology 
of how temporization feels, a re-mark upon nostalgia that underscores its persistent 
exigence, the manner in which it, too, both inscribes strange, nearly indecipherable marks 
and retreads the traces of the past by re-marking (upon) them, after the fact, between full 
presence and complete absence. The feeling of nostalgia here signals a forfeiture of 
complete, sovereign control over the force the past exerts upon the present. It intensifies 
how temporized experience feels. When nostalgia wells up, I do not, by sheer force of 
will and remembrance, return to the past again and again. No, the trace of the past, rather, 
returns to me and re-marks me, again and again. It haunts me, unsettles me, transforms 
and transports me. The loss is not regained, however, and there is no recompense to sate 




more time to be lost. Traces of the past return to me and I am transported, not to the 
past’s being as it was or to my being as I was, but to their ruins and remnants, to the 
past’s being as it now is and my being as I now am. This emphasizes the difference and 
distance between the two, highlighting the interval between the times that facilitates my 
persistence across time in spite of the continual drift to which I am subject.  
 One cannot, then, return to the past, to Gewesenheit, to being-having-been, this 
much is clear. Yet, when the specificity of its aura is brought to mind, however it is 
brought to mind, one is touched by it, visited by it, (re)marked by it, solicited by the 
sway—not quite present, not quite absent—of its traces, of its being-having-been. To feel 
nostalgic, without expectation for remedial unity or authentic repetition, is to feel the 
vicissitudes of temporized experience, their whiplash and their discordance, at their 
rawest, most visceral, and fiercely tempestuous. Life as it is lived prohibits a return to 
presence; it both feels behind and just beyond reach. Nostalgia’s re-mark emerges as a 
response to these conditions and heightens one’s felt experience of time—one’s 
experience of experience—precisely because it lays bare the distance and difference 
between the desired object, which may well remain undetermined, and the moment in 
which that accretive desire is most acutely felt, deepening and amplifying an interval that 
cannot easily be relieved. Derrida, in other words, is interested in the manner in which the 
affective force of nostalgia accentuates the internal tension of Gewesenheit, its 
subsistence as an intractable knot, inflected and refracted, through the flux and flow of 
time, neither here nor there, but between, re-marked and re-marking through the 




presence, is, for Derrida, no longer. Its essence lies in its ‘having-been’ in its ‘being-
having-been,’ in its having already past and gone by, as yesterday, something that cannot 
be given again. This being was (Fort!) and is no longer (Da!), accessible only through the 
faint but indelible traces it has left behind, marks and imprints that can only be translated, 
re-worked, and deciphered après-coup. It is thus that nostalgia provides what Walter 
Benjamin calls “a unique experience with the past.”292 An experience with the past, not of 
the past, to be sure; an experience formed by disparate, spectral traces and initiated by the 
time of deferral and delay, the temporality of belated feeling, both marked and re-
marking. 
 Nostalgia, on this reading, can only emerge within the space of dissonance and 
disjunction, within the play of différance and verstimmung—it is a feeling borne of time 
past and time passing, forged in the gap between times, the interval between now and 
then. It emerges in the wake of unyielding irrevocability, its full weight and force 
predicated upon interminable disconsolation, endless disunion. “My present pleasures,” 
Derrida tells us, “are in the present yesterday’s presents, they are yesterday.”293 The 
pleasure for which one pines, the irreducible yearning so specific to nostalgia, emerges 
today because of yesterday, emerges today because it is in yesterday. Its presence in the 
past, its Gewesenheit, its being-having-been, is what gives the pleasure because the 
pleasure itself is given in yesterday as today—après-coup. Nostalgia, then, can only ever 
be felt in the absence of that for which it pines, emerging in the distance between now 
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and then, the gap between here and there, Fort! and Da!. This absence is not nothing, 
however. Nostalgia’s re-marks evince an absence that feels something like presence, a 
present absence, a palpable lack that constitutes the present even as the present must 
continue to endure it, like the persistent pain from an old wound, irritated, re-opened and 
inflamed. Presence and absence appear to coeval, it seems, slowly orbiting each other like 
blindfolded shadow-boxers, only ever able to land glancing blows that are as phantasmic 
as they are fantastic. It is thus that nostalgia does not come after this or that duration or 
period of time. No, nostalgia comes now because it is now given in that which has 
forever passed. This, and nothing else, is what makes such an experience nostalgic: the 
pleasure it gives does not come after present pleasure, it is given as yesterday’s pleasure, 
as past, as being-having-been, a belated enjoyment that can only be felt as something that 
was never experienced as such, a loss that is to be both mourned and celebrated—an 
experience of the bittersweet.  
 
Toward a Spectral Cinema 
 Perhaps this experience of bittersweetness is why Derrida speculates about 
“translating” and further re-marking Heidegger’s ontological difference as a “rhetoric of 
memory.”294  To my knowledge, this is not a re-mark that Derrida himself performs in 
any sort of focused or organized way, but he does offer some intriguing clues. In the 
space that remains, I would like to briefly sketch out some possible avenues for those 
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clues, to the extent that they link up with the remaining chapters on cinema. Cinema is 
often referred to as ‘the moving image.’ It mobilizes and animates still images much in 
the same way that nostalgia mobilizes and (re)animates memory. When Derrida wonders 
out loud about translating the ontological difference into a rhetoric of memory he notes 
that memory “gives access to [the] difference” not by linking “the essence of a being to 
its past-being” (this would be standard Heideggerian orthodoxy, the proper path from 
Wesen to Gewesenheit) but by “stay[ing] with traces in order to ‘preserve’ them” in a 
manner that respects their spectral status as traces, available yet not fully or immediately 
present, ungraspable but not completely abandoned to pure void or absence.295 Instead, 
this memory, which he consistently associates with “life,” spectrality,” and “haunting” in 
works from the same period, “projects itself toward the future…constitut[ing] the 
‘presence’ of the present” where memory is mobilized and energized in advance, 
anticipating the incoming moment of Nachträglichkeit, of afterwardness, in a manner that 
“does not resuscitate a past that had been present [but] engages the future.”296 Derrida’s 
congenital, inconsolable nostalgia remains so irreducibly propulsive because it maintains 
a temporal orientation toward the future, toward what is to come, an orientation that is 
equal parts enlivening and melancholic, wholly bittersweet—nostos and algos, held 
together in precarious, animating tension.  
 Solicited, in the present, by both past and future, this form of spectral nostalgia 
draws attention to their very relation, stretched between the two, propelled by an errant, 
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roving desire that persists without recourse to a clear, determined destination (stimmung). 
That persistence facilitates the bittersweet work of mourning nostalgia is predicated 
upon—“neither life nor death, but the haunting of the one by the other”—and in his 
eulogy of Roland Barthes, itself nestled within a work the bears the title The Work of 
Mourning, Derrida describes it thusly, as a type of return or visitation: “Though it is no 
longer (present, living, real) its having-been-there [avoir-été-là, Gewesenheit] presently 
as a part of the referential or intentional structure of my relationship to [it], the return of 
the referent indeed takes the form of a haunting [le retour du référent a bien la forme de 
la hantise].”297 He is referring to the photograph here, specifically Barthes’ key 
distinction between studium and punctum where each term serves as a shorthand for the 
capacity of the photographic image to simultaneously elicit general enthusiasm by virtue 
of its composition (studium) and also pierce through that frame of reference to make an 
affective re-mark that so often initiates the nostalgic experience of haunting (punctum).298 
As especially forceful and propulsive traces, photographs figure a return of the dead—the 
experience, for instance, of looking at a photograph one has not seen before, either of 
oneself or someone who only remains in memory, a form of phenomenological whiplash. 
Barthes explicitly prioritizes photography over the moving image in this regard, due to 
the former’s special ability to fix or localize presence (his own nostalgia is very 
 
297 Jacques Derrida, The Work of Mourning, ed. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Chicago, I.L.: 
University Of Chicago Press, 2003), 41, 54. 
298 Cf. Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard Howard (New 




Heideggerian in this way), but Derrida, while somewhat reticent (he rarely discusses film 
in itself) is less circumspect.299  
 With this in mind, then, it might be more appropriate to refer to a cinematics of 
memory or a spectral cinema in an effort to re-mark upon Derrida’s desire. Like the 
restrained experience of nostalgia deconstruction intimates, this spectral cinema would 
perform its own gestures of re-marking, gestures unique to its form. “The cinematic 
experience belongs thoroughly to spectrality,” Derrida suggests, and this spectrality is 
irreducibly linked to “the very nature of the trace.”300 Cinema mobilizes available traces 
and exploits their ambivalent relationship to presence and absence—their spectrality, 
their haunting effect—in a manner that allows the camera and the filmmaker to ‘play’ 
with or manipulate the different temporalities nostalgia so often engenders, temporalities 
not always immediately available or recognized as such. Film, in essence, captures the 
flux and flow of time. It preserves or inscribes, as trace, the transience of temporization, 
and offers ostensibly passed time back up for analysis and re-marking in the present. The 
medium relies upon the antinomies of nostalgia—its ability to impel a form of active 
desire that can never be fully fulfilled—and approaches the possibility of their resolution 
without ever filling the gap. Derrida, in an interview with Cahiers du cinéma in the late 
90s, seems to have thought that this “spectral dimension” amounted to a new kind of 
phenomenology not possible before the invention of the camera and the moving image.301 
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Cinematic traces move, and by moving they move us. The animating movement they 
generate, like that of nostalgia, is neither dead nor alive, neither completely absent nor 
fully present. Elsewhere, Derrida calls this “the restitution…of what is dead,”302 a means 
of bringing into the present traces of that which has died, passed on, or passed by, a 
means of mourning or re-marking, subtended by the most inconsolable of nostalgias. This 
nostalgia orients by disorienting and attunes by detuning, calling into question the 
determination of attunement (stimmung) by offering its own re-mark (ver-stimmung). 
How might this re-mark make us more attuned to the cinematic effects of haunting303 and 
the sorts of movements or desires that haunting might galvanize? It is to these horizons 
that the next two chapters turn. 
.
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Chapter 4: Nostalgia and the Moving Image 
 
Cinema began in wonder, the wonder that reality can be transcribed with such immediacy. All of cinema is 
an attempt to perpetuate and to reinvent that sense of wonder.304 
         — Susan Sontag 
 
Film delivers baroque art from its convulsive catalepsy. Now, for the first time, the image of things is 
likewise the image of their duration, change mummified as it were.305 
         — André Bazin 
 
It makes sense, then, to reconsider nostalgia not as blindness but as sightfulness.306 
— Peter Fritzsche 
 
 
Cinema’s “Perfect Illusion” 
 Three days after Christmas in 1895 members of the French public wandered into 
an unglamorous basement billiard room known as the Salon Indien, inside the Grand 
Café Hotel near downtown Paris. Paying one Franc each they came to see a show. But 
not just any show. This show, they were told, would be unlike anything they had ever 
experienced. Purported to have elements of theater, vaudeville, and photography, this 
event would present a series of successive images—except this time they would not sit 
still as before. No longer static or inert, these images would move, as if they were living 
and alive. And, miraculously, they would move in time. These images would move, they 
would move in time, they would move in time for everyone, and they would move in time 
for everyone at the same time. “Living photographs in natural size and motion,” the 
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advertisements read.307 This would prove to be the first public motion picture screening.  
 Local inventors Auguste and Louis Lumière were set to premiere a new creation, 
a supposed improvement upon Thomas Edison’s kinetoscope, one that would radically 
democratize the viewing experience. Debuting in Brooklyn, NY just two years prior, 
Edison’s invention was ground-breaking, but primitive. Billed as a device that would “do 
for the eye what the phonograph does for the ear,” recording and reproducing visible 
objects in motion, the kinetoscope depended upon a solitary viewing experience.308 For 25 
cents, the same price as vaudeville or amusement park admission, a single individual 
would approach the instrument, a wooden cabinet equipped with a peep-hole lens and 
viewfinder on top. Inside, 35mm film threaded on large rollers and spools created a 
continuous ribbon, approximately 50 feet in length. Gazing into the aperture, lit by an 
electric lamp housed under the perforated film, the viewer would ‘see’ motion, a 
sequence of silent images delivered at 30-40 frames per second, depicting various scenes 
of everyday life—a group of blacksmiths hammering at an anvil, a man sneezing, a horse 
and rider, brief bouts of fisticuffs, etc. This was an illusion of motion, to be sure, but an 
incredibly compelling one nonetheless.  
 The Lumière brothers took this burgeoning technology and extending it, bringing 
it to the threshold of global popularization. They called their invention the 
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cinématographe, from the Ancient Greek, referring to the instrument’s capacity to write, 
record, or inscribe movement in time. It functioned as both an early motion picture 
camera and a film projector, allowing a sequence of successive, moving images to be 
shown before a gathered audience for the first time. The images themselves were larger, 
sharper, and better lit than Edison’s. Powered by a manual hand-crank rather than 
electricity, the device was much smaller, and therefore more portable than its American 
counterpart. Finally, a motion picture show specifically designed for a gathered audience, 
an illusion of motion closely approximating the transient, temporized nature of human 
experience—its flux, its flow, its expansive variance and capriciousness.  
 A total of ten short, silent films were shown that day in the dimly lit room, 
ranging in length from 38-49 seconds. One—La Sortie de l’Usine Lumière à Lyon 
(1895)—became one of the most famous and popular Lumière productions. Shot on 
35mm film at 16 frames per second, the 17-meter strip lasted only 46 seconds, projecting 
a total of 800 movement-insinuating frames. Like many of the Lumière brothers’ early 
shorts—actualités they called them—La Sortie was a sort of proto-documentary, 
depicting the minutiae of French socio-economic life in the late 19th century, a primitive 
form of the type of direct, observational cinema that would come to the fore in the late 
1950s and early 1960s across North America. Its setting was simple and its mise-en-scène 
uncomplicated. As its title suggests, the black and white film captured employees leaving 
a Lumière factory in Lyon, France, a facility that was, at the time, one of the world’s 





 As the lights dimmed further and the cinématographe cranked on, the gathered 
audience was subject to series of seemingly familiar, flickering images. Uncannily 
familiar, yet strangely illusory. The factory doors open and a steady flow of workers 
stream forth, most of them women donning long dresses and ornate hats. Most bear right 
once out the door, but after a few seconds another line to the left emerges. Laborers 
leaving work, streaming left and right, some even appearing to head straight toward the 
camera and, by extension, the newfound audience. Again, mostly women but soon men, 
too, and some riding bicycles. About a third of the way through a large dog comes 
bounding out the door, followed by more workers, on foot and bicycles. Around the 40-
second mark the stream begins to slow and dwindle with the last frame showing the 
factory door closing as slowly as it opened. Audiences were astounded. Here, for the first 
time, they could view duration and experience as they unfold, seeing, yet again, what 
every instance of nostalgia longs to revisit: past experience and passing time. Soon, a 
marketing slogan presented itself: « La vie prise sur le vif » (“Life caught in the act”).310 
 The original première audience consisted of just 33 people, hardly a crowd. But 
word of mouth proved immensely successful and soon people came far and wide to catch 
a glimpse of these living photographs. In the weeks following the premiere the Salon 
Indien accommodated up to 2,500 curious individuals per day, despite the Lumière 
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brothers’ belief that their new device would likely never catch on.311 How might those 
original audience members in Paris have described the seemingly magical experience of 
viewing living, moving photographs? Early accounts and initial critical reviews provide 
some sense of just how moving these moving images turned out to be. One media outlet 
commended the screening with surprising prescience, offering both exaltation and 
circumspection. “Whatever the scene thus taken,” the French newspaper Le Radical 
reported, “and however large the number of individuals…you see them again natural [in] 
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the initial premiere. When Georges Méliès, an artist and stage magician who attended an early screening, 
approached them with an offer to buy the cinématographe he was met with stark, nearly exasperated and 
now, tragic, cynicism. “It [the cinématographe] can be exploited for a certain time as a scientific curiosity,” 
Auguste Lumière is purported to have said, “but, apart from that, it has no commercial future whatsoever.” 
See, for example, Robert Brasillach, The History of Motion Pictures (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and 
Company, 1938), 10. Several years later the brothers shuttered the filmmaking branches of their factories, 
turning their interest to color photography instead of moving pictures. Auguste and Louis Lumière never 
lived to see the full scope of how wrongheaded such as statement might be, and they never could have 
predicted cinema’s relatively quick rise as an ascendant form of entertainment, cultural expression, and 
popular art. Méliès, who always had a certain flair for the fantastical and the illusory, went on to become a 
technical pioneer in the field, developing new tools for special effects, narrative plotting, and 
storyboarding. He produced hundreds of films over the course of his career, including the seminal Le 
Voyage dans la Lune (1902), one of the first films to contain elements of surrealism and science fiction. In 
1905, just ten years after the Salon Indien première, the first theater fully devoted to cinema opened its 
doors in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, a precursor to the extravagant, lavish movie palaces of the 1920s-1930s. 
That same decade feature-length films began to emerge and by the late teens-early 20s American 
filmmakers like D.W. Griffith and Cecile B. DeMille solidified the institutional and commercial status of 
what we now call “Hollywood” with immensely popular works like The Birth of a Nation (1915), 
Intolerance (1916), The Squaw Man (1914), and The Ten Commandments (1923). “Talkies”—films that 
synchronized sound and image—arrived on the mainstream scene around this same time and by 1939 a 
new, vibrant technique called technicolor was showcased in successful films like The Wizard of Oz (1939) 
and Gone with the Wind (1939), constituting a final, triumphant rebuke to the Lumière brothers, both of 
whom were still living at the time. In 1997, almost 100 years to the day after the first Salon Indien 
premiere, James Cameron’s Titanic went in wide-release, crushing all expectations and earning a 
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size…with perspective…a perfect illusion of real life.”312 The Lumière brothers’ moving 
pictures re-presented objects, placing them in view yet again, but through an aesthetic 
vehicle of illusory artifice yet to be fully recognized as such. Temporized experience, 
hitherto withdrawn into the recesses of time and memory, gathered together and offered 
up for reflection and meditation—the marvel of being able to look at what we cannot see, 
as Jean-Luc Godard puts it.313 “Speech has already been collected and reproduced,” the 
review continues, echoing the Edisonian parallel between the kinetoscope and the 
phonograph. “Now, life is collected and reproduced.” Nearly 70 years later, in 1960, 
André Bazin, an early film theorist and co-founder of the preeminent Cahiers du cinema, 
reiterates this sentiment. Developing his influential argument for cinematic realism, 
Bazin compares film to the ancient practice of Egyptian mummification. Both suggest an 
almost quasi-religious use that “lays bare [a] primordial function…the preservation of 
life by a representation of life.”314 Another mainstream review of the Salon Indien 
premiere makes this connection even more explicit, casting cinema’s potential in 
compensatory, almost salvific terms. “When these cameras are made available to the 
public,” La Poste exclaimed, “when everyone can photograph their dear ones, no longer 
in a motionless form but in their movements, their activity, their familiar gestures, with 
 
312 Quoted in Noël Burch, Life to Those Shadows, trans. Ben Brewster (Berkley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1990), 20. Italics mine. 
313 This is one of Godard’s many pithy voice-over utterances in his massive Histoire(s) du cinéma 
project. This one comes during the first chapter, Toutes les histoires (1A), when Godard is commenting on 
a juxtaposition of George Stevens use of 16mm color film in the Auschwitz and Ravensbruck death camps, 
Elizabeth Taylor’s ascendancy in Stevens’ A Place in the Sun (1951), and Giotto’s Resurrection (Noli me 
tangere). As is typical with Godard, there are always many layers. For more on this see Richard I. 
Suchenski’s reading of the sequence in his Projections of Memory: Romanticism, Modernism, and the 
Aesthetics of Film (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2016), 143-201. 
314 André Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” in What Is Cinema?: Vol. I, ed. and trans. 




words on their lips, death will have ceased to be absolute.”315 Le Radical suggests a 
similar possibility, noting that “it will be possible to see one’s loved ones active long 
after they have passed away.”316 These early critical evaluations are incredibly evocative, 
suggesting that technological innovations in popular art might finally be able to 
transcend, at least in part and for a brief moment, some of the most intractable limitations 
of the human condition: death and time. 
 This chapter takes the forms of longing and desire expressed in these statements 
as its major point of departure, exploring what Alessia Ricciardi calls the “inherently 
nostalgic function of film.”317 To the extent that this function attends to conditions of 
cultural and experiential belatedness, it finds initial expression in Le Radical as a perfect 
illusion of propulsive experience and animated life. Throughout I maintain that the 
illusory status of cinema remains ‘perfect,’ necessary, and inescapable against the 
backdrop of temporized experience explored in the last chapter, an experience whose 
character is always both ahead and behind (in time), never fully coinciding with itself to 
attain consolidated unity. Cinema aestheticizes this intrinsic belatedness in ways that 
closely correlate with the trace-structure contained in Derrida’s re-marks upon the 
circuitous timing of Nachträglichkeit, the temporality of afterwardness, and his all too 
brief speculations about a rhetoric of memory, what I called a cinematics of memory or a 
type of spectral cinema near the end of the last chapter. Ricciardi’s comment about the 
nostalgic function of film gets at this connection, as does the birth of cinema itself as 
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those early Lumière screenings—along with their reception, then and now—illustrate. I 
unfold these connections throughout as a means of reconsidering cinema’s relationship to 
nostalgia and setting the stage for my reading of Terrence Malick’s work in the closing 
chapter. I begin below by taking up Fredric Jameson’s notion of the “nostalgia film,” a 
useful conceptual category but one that remains constrained and cannot account for 
alternative views of nostalgia. This necessitates an examination of wide-ranging 
secondary literature on Jameson a well as certain antecedents in philosophy and film 
studies like Plato and Bazin. It also requires a re-evaluation of Jameson’s primary foil, 
George Lucas’s American Graffiti (1973), a work widely regarded as the first and most 
influential nostalgia film. Whereas Jameson take the film to by symptomatic of broader 
cultural diagnoses, I reposition it as more nuanced and complex, a work of cinematic re-
marking illustrative of both the potential of film as an art form and the productive, 
propulsive understanding of nostalgia that forms the overall basis of this project. 
 The Lumière brothers and those early Salon Indien screenings remain so 
significant, in part, because they provide us with the precise moment when the powers of 
visual art began to develop a mode of expression equal to the temporal objects it aims to 
represent: images that do justice to the episodic nature of human experience by moving in 
and across time. Film, by virtue of its formal features, offers up images commensurate 
with this experience, images of passed and passing time. It transmits—and mediates—
personal and cultural memory as well as their attendant histories, offering time and 
experience back up to us for reflection through the perfect illusion of the moving artifice. 




temporal use of the long-standing tension between referent and representation, between 
the real and its image. For example, Démolition d’un mur (1895), another early Lumière 
picture and ostensible documentary, depicts Auguste Lumière overseeing the demolition 
of a factory wall. During one screening, by happenstance, an unsuspecting projectionist 
accidentally displayed the film while it was being rewound, screening it backwards, in 
effect.318 Audiences were shocked and exhilarated by this, a moving picture that willfully 
exploited their subjective experience of time, fragmenting and reversing linear 
temporality. The Lumières capitalized on this and began showing the film in reverse as a 
standard practice. This sort of technique is now commonplace and has been used to some 
narrative success in films like Christopher Nolan’s Memento (2000), Jean-Luc Godard’s 
short De l’origine du XXIe siècle pour moi (2004), and Michel Gondry and Charlie 
Kaufmann’s award-winning Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (2004). In its earliest 
stages, however, film had yet to fully mobilize its potential achievements and limitations; 
likewise, audiences had yet to fully develop collective viewing habits and clear 
expectations of the form. But as the reception of early works like Démolition shows, 
audiences did exhibit some nascent understanding of film’s power to represent, and in 
this case manipulate, ordinary, successive perceptions of time, offering up the movement 
of temporality itself as an object for reflection. This manipulation closely correlates with 
a fantasy that strikes at the heart of nostalgic desire: the wish to see time regained, to 
overturn its seemingly irreversible flow.  
 





 “Death will have ceased to be absolute,” says La Poste. The impossible desire to 
overcome or intervene within the conditions of temporality—and, by extension, the 
reality of death—forms the basis of nostalgic experience as we have seen. The drive to 
make death (and time) less absolute persists because and in spite of the partial failures it 
incurs. I say partial here because if we follow the link Bazin makes between 
mummification and filmmaking, some objects of nostalgic desire attain a second, re-
animated life by virtue of aesthetic representation. In this respect, cinema mobilizes the 
productive ambiguities between life and death, movement and stasis, explored in chapter 
one vis-à-vis live burial, generating a type of spectral existence, both real and not, a 
perfect illusion of real life, to use Le Radical’s memorable phrase once again. Film is 
unique in this regard because it generates a representation of time, an image of duration, 
contingency, and change. But the representation is not the thing itself, as the 
phenomenologists constantly remind us.319 The ecstatic, enraptured Lumière reviews in 
Le Radical and La Poste offer a more romantic take on this phenomenon, the tension 
between the real and its aesthetic representation in and across time. But these are not the 
only critical accounts. Standing in contrast is someone like Maxim Gorky, a Russian 
critic who lambasted Lumière films for what he took to be their lifelessness, their 
inability to adequately re-present the living objects to which they refer. Expressing 
disdain for the films’ lack of both sound and color, Gorky refers to the movie theater as a 
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Sobchack, The Address of the Eyes: A Phenomenology of Film Experience (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
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kingdom of phantoms, a chimera that produces only specters, generating “the movement 
of shadows.”320 These provocations—and their resonances in philosophy and film 
theory—will be more fully analyzed below. For now, it will suffice to simply take note of 
the undecidability exhibited by the popular French press, on the one hand, and more 
circumspect figures like Gorky, on the other. Film produces compelling representations 
of life, of the real, but they retain an eerie, haunting quality. We could say that they stand 
in or stand as, but we can’t because they don’t stand at all, they move. Therein lies the 
rub, the tension between real authenticity and inauthentic mimicry intrinsic to the image.  
 “Life is collected and reproduced,” Le Radical tell us, “a perfect illusion of real 
life.” Cinema may be an illusion, but it remains a perfect one to the extent that it mediates 
past and passing time, offering them back up to us for reflection and re-marking. Objects 
are seen yet again, collected and reproduced; their representations act as a perfect illusion 
of the real. The tension here between collection, preservation, or transcription and the 
duplicative connotations of a word like ‘re-produce’—to exhibit, generate, or present a 
second time, to see or regain something (back) again through an image—is as old as 
philosophy itself, hearkening back to Plato’s cave. Le Radical places this sentiment at the 
birth of cinema disclosing the same animating tensions intrinsic to nostalgic experience: a 
desire, both propulsive and insatiable; a feeling, both bitter and sweet, a preservation by 
means of representation, as Bazin would have it. Together, tension and time suggest a 
certain remove, a degree of separation from the real, the so-called original, suggesting a 
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modification of the original, or, as we saw with Derrida in the last chapter, a supplement 
to or re-mark upon it. To reproduce or represent something is to augment or amplify it, to 
highlight or enhance some aspect of what Walter Benjamin calls its aura.321 Like 
experience itself, the gesture retains a strange additive quality, which is why Le Radical’s 
characterization of the cinematograph as a “perfect illusion” is so appropriate and 
suggestive.  
 
Fredric Jameson and the Nostalgia Film 
 Certain elements of nostalgia may have been present at the birth of cinema, but it 
is not until the 1970s-1980s—following the so-called golden age of classic Hollywood 
cinema—that the notion of “nostalgia film” emerges as a formal conceptual category. 
And, of course, the timing here is not incidental; it is coeval with the “nostalgia boom” 
discussed in chapter one and the rise of high theory, in both its textual and filmic forms. 
During this time the focus is less on the sort of formal and temporal features of film that 
initially dazzled the early Lumière audiences. Those elements still exert some tacit force, 
to be sure, but the emphasis moves more toward the types of stories that are told, their 
setting in time, and, especially, how they are conveyed cinematically, i.e., how they re-
 
321 For Benjamin, the aura that adheres to any work of art connotes a quality of presence and distance 
that, by definition, cannot be communicated through most modes of aesthetic reproduction. He discusses 
this notion most prominently in “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire” and “The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction.” Both essays are included in his Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, ed. 
Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York, NY: Schocken Books, 1969). For an illuminating critical 
discussions of this concept and its use in cinema see Miriam Hansen’s work, particular her “Benjamin, 
Cinema and Experience: ‘The Blue Flower in the Land of Technology,’” New German Critique, no. 40 
(1987): 179–224; Miriam Bratu Hansen, “Benjamin’s Aura,” Critical Inquiry 34, no. 2 (2008): 336–75; 
and, more recently her Cinema and Experience: Siegfried Kracauer, Walter Benjamin, and Theodor W. 




present a referent. Fredric Jameson stands a pivotal figure in this regard, largely 
responsible for the proliferation of nostalgia-related discourse in film studies due to his 
discussion of the “nostalgia film.”322 
 For Jameson, the nostalgia film exhibits the same features as other 
contemporaneous art forms that position the artwork more as a commodity or consumable 
product. In this sense, aesthetic production reflects the broader cultural logic of what 
Ernest Mandel first called late capitalism in 1975, a new postwar epoch that succeeds 
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See Michael D. Dwyer, Back to the Fifties: Nostalgia, Hollywood Film, and Popular Music of the Seventies 
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more industrial or monopolistic configurations by virtue of its multinational character 
and, especially, the ways in which it both encourages and depends upon mass media and 
globalized consumption.323 Jameson’s project since at least the late 1980s involves 
excavating the extent to which late capitalism structures socio-political life. That 
endeavor also entails a rigorous investigation into how artworks and new modes of 
aesthetic production remain constrained by its all-encompassing conditions. Andy 
Warhol’s Diamond Dust Shoes (1980), for example, cannot measure up to Vincent Van 
Gogh’s A Pair of Shoes (1886) in Jameson’s view because it functions only as a 
representation of commodity fetishism. As such, it cannot support a properly hermeneutic 
moment that might allow us to reconstruct its initial historical situation and gain some 
greater awareness of our own. By contrast, Van Gogh’s work encourages that moment 
and “can be taken as a clue or symptom for some vaster reality which replaces it as its 
ultimate truth.”324 Pop artworks like Warhol’s do emerge as symptoms for Jameson, but 
they cannot speak beyond those conditions. Such works are emblematic of “a new kind of 
flatness or depthlessness, a new superficiality in the most literal sense.”325 This 
shallowness stems from “a whole new culture of the image or the simulacrum” that 
contributes to what he famously calls the weakening, enfeeblement, or eclipse of 
historicity in the late twentieth century.326  
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 Jameson takes up cinema as an especially illustrative example of this 
phenomenon and a key symptom of the broader contradictions and antagonisms endemic 
to late capitalism. Because it is produced under the auspices of mass consumption, what 
he calls the “nostalgia film” functions as a recent iteration of commodity fetishism. It 
conjures the artistic codes and associations of a particular period or historical moment—
the 1930s, the 1950s, and so on—but without clear historical grounding. This grounding, 
and the awareness that issues from it, constitute what Jameson calls historicity, i.e., a 
sense of and relationship to the present “which somehow defamiliarizes it and allows us 
the distance from immediacy which is at length characterized as a historical 
perspective.”327 By favoring a superficial history of aesthetic stylization over the depth 
and richness of, say, the historical novel, Jameson’s preferred counterweight to 
commodified art, the nostalgia film contributes to general loss or enfeeblement of 
historicity that he takes to be symptomatic of the broader cultural logic of late 
capitalism.328  Nostalgia films thus function as a deceptive representations that ultimately 
engender a form of false consciousness unable to grapple with its own moment in history, 
a sort of abdication or evacuation of the present. They accomplish this by means of 
stylistic free association, amalgamating, in aggregate, a set of glossy simulacra and glitzy 
images that convey surface-level pastness, gratifying collective fantasies by offering up 
the past as yet another commodity for mass consumption rather than an occasion for 
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critical reflection. Within this new culture of the image all the aesthetic styles and artistic 
conventions once rooted in specific periods or historical moments are rendered 
omnipresent and made available for random re-ordering and cannibalization with 
impunity. Nostalgia films, with their enticing glossy images, construct a phantasmic, 
unreal version of the past, assembling its pop associations through a mélange of free-
floating surfaces that connote a shallow veneer without depth or substance. They act as 
mesmerizing illusions, in other words, but not in the sense meant by Le Radical. Instead, 
they augur a moment where the “the world momentarily loses its depth and threatens to 
become a glossy skin, a stereoscopic illusion, a rush of filmic images without density.”329 
 Jameson’s general interest in reading through surface in search of depth is 
informed by psychoanalytic insights, Marxist dialectics, and the critique of mass culture 
put forward by Frankfurt School theorists like Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer. He 
situates texts, films, and other aesthetic works as objects in need of decoding to ferret out 
symptoms of broader cultural pathologies. Jameson’s influential 1981 work The Political 
Unconscious sets the compass for these efforts and provides an initial outline of the 
interpretive schema that guides his later analyses, including his evaluation of “nostalgia 
film.” As he puts in that pathbreaking text, proper interpretation involves, or presumes, 
“some mechanism of mystification of repression in terms of which it would make sense 
to seek a latent meaning behind a manifest one, or to rewrite the surface categories of a 
text in the stronger language of a more fundamental interpretative code.”330 This a priori 
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posture of suspicion and incredulity—and the commitment to depth over surface that 
issues form it—resembles the forms of symptomatic or paranoid reading discussed in 
chapter one above. Unlike the affect theorists and scholars of post-critique, Jameson here 
outlines an eminently diagnostic program supported by values and critical habits of mind 
that lend themselves to a posture of detachment, distance, and disillusionment. If writers 
like Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Rita Felski display an interest in what Susan Sontag 
first called an “erotics of art,” i.e., an attention to the generative modes of attachment, 
desire, and relationality induced by artworks even and especially under comprised 
conditions of existence, then Jameson is more interested in rendering those modes 
problematic precisely because they remain compromised and complicit in the larger 
machinations of late capitalism.331 Something is lost in those machinations, he thinks, and 
that loss must be overcome. 
 Others have noticed this too. Writers like Susannah Radstone, Catherine 
Constable, and, especially, Linda Hutcheon have pointed out that a deep sense of loss and 
decline permeates Jameson’s narration of this new dominant cultural logic and suffuses 
his assessment of cinematic nostalgia in particular. Constable compares Jameson’s 
discourse to that of Jean Baudrillard, whose pioneering theory of the simulacrum no 
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doubt informs Jameson’s thinking, and takes both figures to be emblematic of more 
nihilistic assessments of so-called postmodernism.332 This positioning, she argues, 
“seriously circumscribes the aesthetic possibility of postmodern Hollywood film” as it 
emerges alongside the 70s summer blockbuster and beyond.333 Underneath that 
circumscription Constable detects a lament for “the end of modernism…the decline of the 
individual subject and the concomitant death of art as a form of personal vision,” all of 
which signal “the end of the possibility of originality in aesthetic production.”334 Radstone 
tends to agree, highlighting how “Jameson’s descriptions of pastiche [the practice of 
assembling recycled images] and nostalgia convey an overwhelming sense of 
entrapment” characterized by attenuated realism.335  Along with Hutcheon, she connects 
this sense of entrapment to his mourning the end of modernism and attributes it to 
“Jameson’s nostalgia for that depth of perspective lost to postmodern nostalgia and 
granted, on his terms, by Marxist historical consciousness.”336 Hutcheon herself notices a 
similar valuation at work in Jameson’s discourse, observing that when something is 
deemed nostalgic “nostalgia is meant to be taken negatively as regressive,” a type of 
privation or loss that negates the possibility of enriching or substantive aesthetic 
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representation.337 This view will be discussed a bit further below with regard to the merits 
of intertextuality, but the point here is that Hutcheon, like Radstone and Constable, 
complicates Jameson’s more negative assessment of nostalgia by arguing that it 
ultimately depends on his own nostalgia for previous, once dominant modes of aesthetic 
and historical representation. As she puts it, construing “this loss of the modernist unique, 
individual style as a negative, as an imprisoning of the text in the past” prevents Jameson 
from viewing it differently, “as a liberating challenge to a definition of subjectivity and 
creativity that has for too long ignored the role of history in art and thought.”338 This line 
of thought furthers the view I have been developing across this project, that nostalgia 
does indeed respond to instances of loss and discontinuity, but can provide generative 
means of engagement when decoupled from a dynamics of negativity, regression, and 
generalized pathology. 
 By equating nostalgia with negativity, loss, and regression as Hutcheon et al. 
suggest, Jameson’s approach closely coheres with familiar appraisals that treat nostalgia 
as a form of pathology, on the one hand, while tacitly indulging it on the other. In chapter 
one we saw how this attitude informs the work of Christopher Lasch, who constructs a 
clear binary between older forms of memory and puerile, symptomatic nostalgic while 
lamenting, in a nostalgic key, the loss of the former. Modernist modes of historical 
representation provide clear access to the past, in his view, but when they are lost or in 
decline he resorts, in an unmarked way, to the phantoms and fantasies of nostalgia as 
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mourning strategy. Even Johannes Hofer, who introduced nostalgic experience to formal 
conceptualization, cannot see as anything other than what Jameson would no doubt call a 
surface symptom, i.e., an indication of some deeper condition of affliction or 
derangement—it fails to become legible otherwise. And, of course, Heidegger, despite 
his key insights in thematizing time and its affective implications, develops an entire 
philosophy tinged with a surreptitious for presence and primeval un-concealment. Each 
of these valuations take nostalgia to be  an immediate manifestation of some deeper, 
more fundamental malady, a disease of the imagination or a misplace sense of awareness. 
By positioning contemporary forms of aestheticized nostalgia as a less-than-desirable 
outcome of late capitalist culture, Jameson situates himself within a formidable tradition 
that adopts Hofer’s diagnostic frame of reference. As we have seen, that frame and the 
discursive habits of mind that buttress it all too easily occlude alternative views of 
nostalgia that complicate its status as unthinking illusion or pathologized fantasy.  
 Now, to be fair, Jameson himself seemed to have sensed the possibility of an 
alternative view albeit in some limited sense. As early as 1969 he refers to a “nostalgia 
conscious of itself” with reference to Walter Benjamin, a type of political stimulus that 
honors the future through lucid meditation on the past.339 And, over two decades later, in 
the same text that positions the nostalgia film as vacuous, superficial, and cannibalistic, 
Jameson allows some room for “postnostalgia” films like Something Wild (1986) and 
Blue Velvet (1986) that might, as he puts it, engage in “some properly allegorical 
 




processing of the past.”340 But even these instances still remain constrained and can only 
provide the preconditions for a heightened sense of historical consciousness. As 
Constable observes, “the sole distinction between the post-nostalgia film and the 
nostalgia film is that the former overtly fail to delineate the present, while the latter 
unwittingly obliterate it.”341 The broader narrative of loss and decline identified by 
Radstone and Hutcheon thus shows how “the logic of negation that structures Jameson’s 
overarching aesthetic model prevents him from capitalizing on his own positive 
insights.”342 In this context, the assessment of nostalgia films as empty and specious 
makes it exceedingly difficult to detect moments of disruption or meaningful 
engagement, however small or provisional. Is there space for a more capacious 
understanding of the nostalgia film?  
 
 
American Graffiti as a Nostalgia Film  
 George Lucas’s American Graffiti (1973) stands as Jameson’s prime example, a 
sort of nostalgia film ur-text that exhibits the superficial waning of historicity he sees as 
endemic to the new culture of the moving image. Other prominent films from the same 
period also figure into his analysis, including Roman Polanski’s Chinatown (1974), 
Bernardo Bertolucci’s The Conformist (1970), and Lawrence Kasdan’s Body Heat 
(1980). But the full force of his critique is reserved for Lucas’s first major success, an 
unlikely but massive summer blockbuster that jumpstarted his career, ultimately enabling 
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him to fund his long-imagined dream, a small space opera pet project that would later 
become the generation-spanning, multibillion dollar Star Wars franchise. For Jameson, 
American Graffiti is all surface and no depth, opting, in the main, for style over 
substance, lacking adequate grounding despite its basis in Lucas’s own personal history, 
his teenage experience with the cruising and rock ’n roll subcultures in his hometown of 
Modesto, California. 
 Set in Modesto in the early 60s, American Graffiti marks an interesting, even 
abrupt point of departure from Lucas’s more somber, dystopian science fiction debut, 
THX 1138, released two years prior. Though the material for this more intimate, semi-
autobiographical work had been gestating for some time, the story goes that on the set of 
THX 1138 producer Francis Ford Coppola challenged Lucas to make his next film more 
“warm and fuzzy” to garner mainstream appeal.343 The wager worked and Lucas found 
himself turning to his own past with a twinge nostalgia. “Cruising was gone,” he 
remembers, “and I felt compelled to document the whole experience.”344 The first 
nostalgia film thus highlights a certain temporal discontinuity and takes memory qua 
mourning as its main impetus. Created out of an explicit desire to document a felt loss, it 
strives to preserve and remember through acts of artistic recollection and reminiscence,  a 
means of working in and through a felt loss with all the bittersweetness it entails.  
 The film opens with a still shot of Mel’s Drive-In, a classic American fast-food 
restaurant chain founded in 1947 in San Francisco. It remains the backdrop for an 
 





opening credits sequence buoyed by the rockabilly guitar and frenetic rhythm section of 
Bill Haley and His Comets’ 1955 hit “Rock Around the Clock,” a single that all but 
solidified rock ’n roll’s status as a legitimate mainstream genre. The combination of the 
static frame—a photograph, in essence—and the era-specific song, the first of over 40 
used diegetically throughout the film, suggest something of a familiar theme: the 
disjunctive tension between movement and stasis across the passage of time. This 
tension, which is intrinsic to both nostalgia and cinema as Hofer’s dissertation and the 
early Lumière pictures indicate, evinces a desire to capture, freeze, or preserve something 
that cannot, by definition, be ‘caught,’: transient experience subject to the contingent and 
capricious conditions of time. Mel’s Drive-In functions as a sort of rendezvous point or 
hangout spot throughout the film. Various characters end up at the diner, either by choice 
or happenstance, to meet others or simply pass the time. Some stay, some leave, either 
together or alone, as different social groups morph and coalesce, reforming themselves in 
light of changing circumstances. The loose plot follows a motley crew of close friends 
and recent high school graduates over the course of a single night. Facing the inevitable 
end of their time together, these friends quite literally ‘rock around the clock’ one last 
time before dispersing into their unknown futures. 
 Much of the action centers around obligatory adolescent rites of passage. Teenage 
dating rituals, moving away for college, and the potential guilt and shame that can 
accompany never leaving home all feature prominently and are punctuated by moments 
of combined euphoria and dread (scoring alcohol as a minor, facing the impending 




dawn, etc.). Curt Henderson (Richard Dreyfuss) and Steve Bolander (Ron Howard) are 
scheduled to leave the next morning, traveling to the east coast to embark on a new 
journey at an unnamed university. Curt receives a scholarship from the local Moose 
Lodge which plunges him into a mode of melancholic, nostalgic reminiscence. He spends 
most of the night mulling over his trajectory and questioning whether he should actually 
leave. After a stint at the high school sock hop and a brief run-in with “The Pharaohs,” a 
gang of local greasers, Curt sets out to find the beautiful blonde girl driving a white ’56 
Thunderbird he spotted early in the evening. Steve dates Curt’s sister, Laurie Henderson 
(Cindy Williams). They attend the sock hop with Curt and a series of back-and-forth 
conversations portend the unraveling of their relationship with Steve’s impending 
departure. Laurie approaches the breakup with a sense of gloom, while Steve 
disingenuously redefines the scenario not as a breakup but as a chance to see other people 
and ultimately strengthen their relationship.  
 Terry “The Toad” Fields (Charles Martin Smith) is the quintessential geek 
seeking comeuppance but lacking sex appeal and an alluring but undefinable sense of 
“cool.” Early on in the film, at Mel’s, Steve gives Toad his ’58 Impala to borrow until 
Christmas while he is away at college, an indication of each character’s class position 
(Steve owns an enviable car and has no qualms letting it go for months at a time; Toad 
can’t even afford a clunker as his initial arrival at Mel’s in a beat-up moped 
demonstrates). Toad spends the majority of the night engaging in practices presumably 
inaccessible to him before due to lack of mobility: cruising, drinking, and developing the 




Clark) and the two drag the streets together in Steve’s car. Finally, John Milner (Paul Le 
Mat), acts as both the film’s affective center and its source of knowing nostalgic 
subjectivity. John is the self-proclaimed and undefeated drag-race king of Modesto. He 
spends the night cruising and inadvertently babysitting 16-year-old Carol Morrison, 
played by Mackenzie Phillips, an absolute revelation who makes the most of her 
unfortunately meager amount of screen time. John is annoyed by Carol but she remains 
playfully fond of him. As the night progresses one of the film’s more developed and 
complex relationships begins to unfold, where the entrenched, nearly bitter form of 
nostalgia embodied by John is made more self-aware and self-reflexive by accepting its 
losses and confronting the possibility of a future that viewers in 1973 know will be more 
Carol’s than his own. As the film commences, this initial ensemble—Curt, Steve, Laurie, 
Toad, and John—meet at Mel’s around dusk and immediately disperse, reuniting again at 
sunrise to witness John’s treacherous if not tragic race against a new, debonair 
challenger, Bob Falfa, played by a young, unknown but rising actor at the time named 
Harrison Ford.  
 The disparate, meandering vignettes that compose American Graffiti’s overall 
structure—its assemblage of small, discrete narrative elements into a single plot—were a 
new (and risky) innovation for commercial motion pictures at the time. In a ‘making of’ 
feature included in the 1998 DVD release of the film, Lucas reveals that this method was 
so controversial that many studios, including Paramount, Columbia, and 20th Century 
Fox, initially passed on the project. Even Universal Pictures, which agreed to distribute 




encouraged Lucas to adhere to classic Hollywood conventions (a single overarching 
narrative rather than four loosely connected stories intercut). Lucas refused and now this 
style has itself become a dominant convention in modern film and television.345 Each 
individual story and narrative element is set against a highly aestheticized backdrop of 
shimmering, deeply saturated images, a backdrop Jameson characterizes as illusory, 
fashion-plate glossiness. Period-specific clothing, hairstyles, and popular music all act as 
references, signifiers, and archival traces of the era—instances of graffiti, in other words, 
that constitute one node of American cultural memory, documenting its effects and re-
marking upon its transmission. “No sociological treatise could duplicate the movie’s 
success in remembering exactly how it was to be alive at that cultural instant,” wrote the 
late Roger Ebert, referring to the film’s re-creation of the overall world, style, and mood 
of the late 50s and early 60s.346 This layering of different signifiers and cultural references 
reaches its zenith with the music and automobiles, Lucas’s own lost objects of personal 
nostalgic desire. Sleek, sporty hotrods—Chevy Impalas, Ford Thunderbirds and Deuce 
Coupés—with bright, primary colors and whirring engines evoke period sentiment more 
than perhaps any other stylistic element save Wolfman Jack’s iconic disc jockey narration 
streaming from car radios with near ecstatic constancy. 
 In Jameson’s view, American Graffiti provides no sense of depth or perspective 
precisely because of this surface-level stylization. All the period-specific detail Lucas 
provides in his series of Altmanesque vignettes situate the past as a mere set of 
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consumable, retro images. According to Jameson, the film does not suggest a working 
through loss so much as it fetishizes loss and lost objects through new modes of aesthetic 
production. The film, in this view, does not re-present the past so much as it conveys 
‘pastness’ through the glossy qualities of the illusory image,347 recapturing the allure of a 
period on the precipice of profound countercultural change and near total socio-political 
upheaval.348 He maintains that the film does not account for these historical realities by 
withholding any sort of comment on their events, events that continue to have present 
effects. Lucas never really complicates the privileged lost reality he so lovingly 
reconstructs, leaving affective attachments to its objects and values wholly un-
interrogated. In Jameson’s hands, the film becomes a microcosm for nostalgia in general, 
a feeling that he takes to be inseparable from its more noxious effects and connotations. 
This “insensible colonization of the present,”349 as he calls it, valorizes a pseudo-past 
created for the expressed purpose of mass consumption through pastiche, simulacra, and 
stylistic free association. Because it remains so enfeebled, American Graffiti can only 
confirm recognizable, pre-existing historical stereotypes at the level of narrative and 
form, completely lacking any basis upon which to contradict, nuance, or otherwise 
complicate those conventions and clichés.350 
 In outlining his theory of the nostalgia film vis-a-vis American Graffiti, Jameson 
does not engage previous work that lends itself to alternate readings. Writing in the 
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Journal of Popular Film four short years after Lucas’s release and ten years before 
Jameson’s Postmodernism, Marc Le Sueur coins the term “nostalgia film,” largely in 
reference to American Graffiti. He carries the category in a different direction than 
Jameson, noting the presence of “surface realism” in the film, a stylistic choice that 
willfully muddles the way things were and the way they are preserved and circulate in 
culture.351 Jameson rejects these surfaces for reasons outlined above, but Le Sueur 
suggests that the film may be aware of that and may even serve to question the normative 
assumptions about what surfaces are and what they can do. The surface-level colors that 
so exasperate Jameson are instructive here. All the deeply saturated images cast in 
primary hues emit an almost hyper-real quality, all but drawing attention to themselves as 
simulacra, as signifiers of the associations we have of the period. Members of his 
production team note that from the beginning Lucas wanted American Graffiti to “look 
like a jukebox.”352 Obviously the late 50s-early 60s do not look like a jukebox, they do 
not ‘look’ like anything, really, but the jukebox comes to serve as a type of aesthetic 
shorthand encoded in the story American pop culture tells about itself. This is a stylistic 
association, an instance of surface realism that willfully combines, plays with, and 
exploits both the period and our understanding of it, an understanding mediated through 
cultural artifacts like the jukebox that incite nostalgic desire.  
 Le Sueur also discusses what he calls “deliberate archaism” in relation to the film, 
another stylistic strategy that gives a work the “appearance” of age and vintage patina in 
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order to exploit the disjunction and qualitative differences between past and present. 
Jameson does not notice any possibility for this exploitation beyond sheer commodity 
fetishism but for Le Sueur it, can “entail a healthy re-examination of old techniques and 
formats”353 that serve to accentuate distance and discontinuity. The most compelling 
example of this in American Graffiti is a subtle one and has to do with the use of cameras 
and film stocks. Lucas always knew that he wanted to give the film a documentary “feel,” 
but with a knowing wink. Because CinemaScope, the 35mm widescreen format dominant 
during the 60s, proved too expensive, the film was shot using TechniScope. A cheaper 
medium, this format uses 35mm film but only half of the standard frame, one step up 
from the more homey-looking 16mm in terms of negative size. The result is a grainier, 
grittier look, more documentary-esque, but still recognizably cinematic. As Ron Howard 
puts it in an interview, the film has all the grain and the documentary look of 16mm but 
presented in widescreen. An economic necessity turned out to be an artistic innovation. 
As Christine Sprengler puts it in her reading of Le Sueur alongside Jameson, the use of 
surface realism and deliberate archaism means that nostalgia films like American Graffiti 
harbor “the potential for more than just reactionary fantasies obfuscating truth and 
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Realisms, Old and New 
 Le Sueur’s initial work on surface realism and deliberate archaism depends on the 
same ontology of the (moving) image that enables Jameson’s negative assessment of the 
uses of nostalgia in cinema. This tradition could no doubt be narrated in a variety of 
ways, but given that our guiding thread here has to do with the image’s capacity for 
representation and deception in equal measure—its function as a perfect illusion, to recall 
those early Lumière reviews—Plato and André Bazin stand as especially illuminating 
figures. Mobilizing insights first laid out by Siegfried Kracauer, a film theorist often 
associated with the Frankfurt school, Bazin develops a theory of cinematic realism that 
lays the groundwork for later critiques of filmic nostalgia like Jameson’s.355 Like 
Kracauer, and other early thinkers of the cinematic image like André Malraux, Bazin 
positions cinema as a singular form of art, an extension of baroque painting and one that 
fulfills the realist aspirations he sees in the plastic arts. In doing so he draws the 
interesting parallel mentioned above between the “mummy complex” of ancient Egyptian 
religion and the emergence of film as a means of aesthetic representation.356 The primary 
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function of mummification and the significance of statuaries in the sarcophagus 
symbolize, according to Bazin, the persistence of survival in the face death, a drive that 
necessitates “the preservation of life by a representation of life.”357 For the early 
Egyptians, death is warded off by mimesis and mortal existence kept alive through 
resemblance. Photography and cinema operate by the same logic, according to Bazin. 
They proceed by way of mimetic resemblance, extending and deepening the drive for 
survival or immortality that subtends the plastic arts. 
 This sentiment ultimately leads to Bazin’s notion of the “myth of total cinema,” 
an all-encompassing illusion, to be sure, but a necessary one that bespeaks the exigencies 
of cinema and sets it apart from photography given its capacity to record or preserve 
reality at speed. The key, of course, is temporal duration, the representation of 
contingency, flux, and variance. Unlike painting, photography, in Bazin’s view, achieves 
true objectivity—revealing the true power of the image—because it makes use of 
intervening technologies and techniques of mechanical reproduction that, in essence, 
depend upon the absence of the individual. It therefore frees itself from the “inescapable 
subjectivity” attached to interpretation and expressionism, representing the object itself, 
without manipulation (or appropriation, to use Jameson’s language).358 Photographic 
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images thus act as “fingerprints” of reality, “contribut[ing] something to the order of 
natural creation instead of providing a substitute for it.”359 But while still photographs can 
only embalm single moments, out of sequence, the moving image mummifies duration, 
giving time, for the first time, a form of aesthetic representation.  
 
Photography does not create eternity, as art does, it embalms time, rescuing it simply from 
its proper corruption. Viewed in this perspective, the cinema is objectivity in time. The 
film is no longer content to preserve the object, enshrouded as it were in an instant, as the 
bodies of insects are preserved intact, out of the distant past, in amber. The film delivers 
baroque art from its convulsive catalepsy. Now, for the first time, the image of things is 
likewise the image of their duration, change mummified as it were. Those categories of 
resemblance which determine the species photographic image likewise, then, determine 
the character of its aesthetic…. The aesthetic qualities of photograph are to be sought in its 
power to lay bare the realities.360  
For Bazin, film documents the passage of time, achieving a visual transcription of 
sustained duration. Cinéma, a shorter nickname for the Lumière brothers 
cinématographe, combines the Greek kinema (“movement”) and graphe (“to write or 
draw, to scratch or cut into”). The cinematic image records motion in time, writing or 
marking movement by etching or imprinting patterns on the celluloid strip. But the 
recording itself is mutable and the deconstructive gesture of re-marking—of invoking, 
overturning, displacing, and reworking known traces, codes, and conventions—haunts 
Bazin’s desire for realism and verisimilitude. The insoluble aporia here, one that both 
Bazin raises but sets aside, has to do with the connections between temporality, the 
image, and the “proper corruption” that is supposedly absolved when the image is put in 
motion. This is the idea La Poste gestures toward in its review of the original Lumière 
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premiere, that death will cease to be absolute. Kracauer, in the subtitle of his seminal 
work, calls this “the redemption of physical reality” and Bazin, for his part, emphasizes 
cinema’s power to record as a means of restitution via resemblance. The moving image 
documents, preserves, or catalogs the essential features of reality—generating a sequence 
of images in its likeness—and not only saves these realities from the corrupting 
accretions of time and contingency but records, for the first time, those very same 
accretions, achieving compelling aesthetic representations of movement, of temporal 
duration. Film, it seems, briefly—all too briefly—frees experience from the conditions of 
time by documenting its vicissitudes, by creating images congruent with its unfolding.  
 This version of cinematic realism motivates Bazin’s critique of montage, a riposte 
that anticipates Jameson’s critique of pastiche in nostalgia films like American Graffiti. 
Bazin remains suspicious of montage—the editing practice of intentionally ordering a 
sequence of images in time—on the grounds that it valorizes the image itself and what it 
“adds to” the representation rather than its status as an adequate reflection of reality.361 
Montage, through juxtaposition and collocation, creates or contrives a meaning not 
objectively contained in the image itself, where the image, on its own, adequately 
resembles reality, or so Bazin would want to argue. While the plastics of the image itself 
achieve objective similitude, montage, on this view, relies upon manipulation and 
beguilement, imposing interpretation on the viewer through metaphor and free 
association. Bazin has Soviet montage theorists like Sergei Eisenstein and Lev Kuleshov 
in mind here. Eisenstein, in written works and films like Battleship Potemkin (1925) and 
 




October: Ten Days That Shook The World (1928), uses cinema to advance revolutionary 
political ideologies by formalizing Marxist class struggle, while the so-called “Kuleshov 
Effect” offers an aestheticized version of the Hegelian dialectic where a resultant third 
image in a given sequence—close-up shots expressive of joy or sadness, for example—
shift in meaning depending on antecedent images and their position in the sequence.362 
For Bazin, these techniques undermine the supposed natural unity of meaning contained 
in a dramatic event. Montage creates a spectacle and proceeds by way of deceptive, 
illusory attraction, while cinematic realism provides a more clear-eyed view of reality.363  
 Bazin’s emphasis on natural unity free of intervening manipulation lays the 
groundwork for later iterations like Jameson’s assessment of American Graffiti, a reading 
that is predicated, at least in part, on the moving image’s capacity for illusion, deception, 
and beguilement. But this sort of realism pre-dates both figures and relates to certain 
nagging leitmotifs endemic in the history of western thought, namely, the longstanding 
distrust of the image, an anxiety closely related to the philosophical distrust of feeling 
discussed at the beginning of chapter two. Before Bazin, before Jameson, and before 
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cinema, there was Plato, whose entire metaphysical edifice is based upon a foundational 
opposition that values the invisibility of the intelligible idea over the visibility of the 
sensible image. In Books III and X of his Republic Plato famously banishes poets from 
the kallipolis, his ideal city governed by the equanimous philosopher-king, a figure who, 
unmoved by appetitive, affective desires and guided by reason alone, retains privileged 
access to true, intelligible ideas.  
 But these aren’t just any poets. In his quest for the true, the real, and the 
absolutely immutable, Plato specifically banishes imitative or mimetic poets. These are 
the artists who create images that acts as representations, stand-ins, or copies of the 
authentic, eidetic original. Plato worries that these images create—and here is that key 
word again—an illusion that appeals to the baser aspects of the soul at a distorted remove 
from the truth. They copy mere appearances, leaving too much room for subjective 
(mis)interpretation, ultimately leading the individual soul astray, rather than guiding it 
upward in its proper ascent toward the form of the good, the beautiful, and the real. So it 
is that Plato introduces a profound aesthetic anxiety into western thought, injecting a 
deep, distrustful incredulity toward images, their capacity for expression and 
representation, their mimetic function, and their affective power. This is the ancient 
“quarrel” he sees between philosophy and art, and nowhere is it more prominent than in 
his paradigmatic image of the cave as one of the first movie theaters, a wry cipher for 
cinematic experience, itself an aesthetic illustration, a means of using the image to 
critique its powers of representation. 




and dividing line, Plato’s cave is one of philosophy’s founding myths, an allegory that 
pries open the essential distinction between noumenon and phenomena, between the 
things themselves and their sensible but sullied appearances, or so the story goes. In the 
darkened cave proto-moviegoers face the dimly lit grotto wall, their silver screen, 
anticipating those first Lumière audiences in the Salon Indien. They sit and watch moving 
images, flickering projections of compelling theatrical appearances. These images, 
Socrates tells Glaucon, are mere shadows, superficial reflections and illusory phantoms 
that our captive audience take to be real things, unvarnished by mimetic iteration. For 
Socrates, these primitive cinephiles are held hostage by the power of the (moving) image, 
unaware of its limited capacity for resemblance and adequation. Like the forced 
conditioning of Alex DeLarge, the disturbed, ‘ultra-violent’ protagonist in Stanley 
Kubrick’s A Clockwork Orange (1971), these prisoners are “compelled to hold their 
heads unmoved through life,”364 forced to passively transfix their gaze upon flickering 
mirages and glimmering apparitions that deceive and desensitize them.  
 The unsurprising hero of this story is the philosopher-king, the paragon of the 
soul’s ascension to the intelligible realm and its contemplation of the authentic ideas the 
tawdry shadows simply ape. In Plato’s imagination, this figure frees himself from the 
chains of aesthetic representation in order to gaze directly upon its blinding source. After 
fully apprehending this beneficent reality, he takes it upon himself to offer instruction to 
his peers. He models superior vision and the proper direction of the soul much in the 
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same way that Johannes Hofer initially proposed proper forms of movement to treat 
nostalgia and heal the imagination. In Plato’s cave, the shadowy images only offer 
superficial images of the really real, like the animal spirits that plague the nostalgics 
diagnosed in Hofer’s dissertation. They stand as cheap counterfeits that distract from the 
luminosity of the original just like the imitative and mimetic poets that bookend the 
allegory. No wonder, then, that Maxim Gorky dismissed the early Lumière screens as a 
mere ‘kingdom of shadows.’ 
 Interestingly, Plato’s critique of images requires the use of images to really stick. 
Socrates asks Glaucon to “picture” the cave and the pitiful prisoners shackled to the floor, 
to imagine the flickering shadows cast on the cavern wall.365 After outlining the parable, 
Plato suggests that the entire “image” should be applied, in toto, to the entirety of the 
preceding text, i.e., the theory of the forms, the discussion of the soul, and the 
enumeration the kallipolis.366 The key to the efficacy of the Republic lies in an image that 
Plato deploys to diminish the efficacy of images and admonish its mavens. He uses 
aesthetic representation to delegitimize aesthetic representation, offering up an instructive 
image to advance an argument against the use of mimetic images. Plato may fail to make 
this contradiction explicit, but its exigence is prominently inscribed elsewhere in texts 
like Phaedo, Symposium, and, especially, Phaedrus.367 Images like those viewed by the 
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poor souls in the subterranean screening room facilitate the initial stirrings of philosophy 
and can ideally lead to contemplative recollection of the higher truths and more noble 
ideas. They are necessary, it seems, but deceptive at best and dangerous at worst because 
they all too easily pull a veil of illusory ignorance over the otherwise circumspect and 
judicious eye of the philosopher-king. Plato’s concern, like that of Bazin and Jameson 
after him in their own registers, is that the semblance of a thing may be mistaken for the 
thing itself, that depth may all too easily be concealed by the glossy allure of surfaces. 
Images, in this view, are necessary illusions, but they can never be perfect in the manner 
Le Radical ascribes to the early Lumière pictures because they lack an immediacy of 
presence. 
 This anxiety infiltrates the discourse of both Bazin and Jameson. For the former, a 
normative thinking of the image celebrates its power to preserve and record reality. In the 
absence of this archival quality, images become mere wraiths and cheap imitations, 
feeble knockoffs that ape their source but lack its essence and vitality—illusions, in other 
words, perfect or otherwise. And this is where Bazin’s debt to the legacy of ambivalence 
becomes most clear. In his rejection of Soviet formalism Bazin uses familiar Platonic 
tropes to identify an ostensible tension where fanciful, chimeric, and illusory images 
threaten to undermine the integrity of dramatic and historical events. In such cases, the 
 
necessary, it seems, and both must struggle mightily, for “beauty alone this has been ordained, to be most 
manifest to sense and most lovely of them all,” plunging the ideal, philosophical soul into anamnesis, 
remembering “some likeness of the things yonder” ( 250d8, 250a7). The first inkling of wisdom, then, and 
the first movement of philosophy involves apprehension of visible images of beauty, which galvanizes the 
impulse to contemplate higher, intelligible ideas. As Socrates puts it in Symposium, the great companion 
piece to Phaedrus, one mustn’t mistake the semblance of beauty for the thing itself (Cf. 218e6). Socrates, 
who brashly reproaches the unrequited Alcibiades’s advances, takes him to be on the same level as the 




meaning of an object or scenario, Bazin claims, “is not in the image, it is in the shadow of 
the image projected by montage.”368 The reference goes unmarked here, but the allusion 
to Plato is clear. Assembled images function at a remove from the truth, so their 
manipulation and ordering must be scrupulous and discriminating. Jameson makes the 
connection even clearer in his critical discussion of nostalgia films that offer mimesis 
without substance or depth, transmitting the past in a limited way through the history of 
cultural and aesthetic stylization. Within this milieu the subject, as he puts it, “can no 
longer look directly out of its eyes at the real world for the referent but must, as in Plato’s 
cave, trace its mental images of the world on its confining walls.” “If there is any realism 
left here,” Jameson continues, “it is a ‘realism’ which springs from the shock of grasping 
that confinement and of realizing that…we seem condemned to seek the historical past 
through our own pop images.”369 His sentiment echoes that of Hofer. ‘Pop images,’ like 
the form of nostalgia they rely upon, limit possibility, suggesting an afflicted imagination 
that cannot muster legitimate acts of memory or maintain a proper relation to its past.  
 
 
368 Bazin, “The Evolution of the Language of Cinema,” 26. Italics mine. 
369 Jameson, The Cultural Turn, 10. I do not mean to suggest that Bazin and Jameson are 
straightforward Platonists in any sense, nor is my intent to position Plato as somehow more antagonistic to 
aesthetic representation than is already well known. My aim is more modest: to underscore the deep, 
suspicious ambivalence toward aesthetic representation Plato introduces into the thinking of the image and, 
especially, to note the sort of purchase it finds in considerations of film, especially those dealing with 
nostalgia. Jameson’s primary concern—and a noble one at that—is with new modes of aesthetic production 
in late capitalist societies and how those modes promote doltish, wanton, nearly automatic consumption. 
These are valid points, but my interest here is with the normative, diagnostic assumptions that subtends 
Jameson’s larger conceptual apparatus, with nostalgia and the moving image acting as especially prominent 
pressure points. These tacit suppositions simply assume too much, occluding the ways in which cinema 





Intertextuality in Cinema 
 In Jameson’s framework, pop images cannot help us better understand our present 
moment in history. They cannot communicate the present as history or galvanize thinking 
within such a perspective. All the stylized detail Lucas provides in American Graffiti—
the sock hop fashion, the crewcuts and greaser comb-backs, the 50s era Impalas, the 
Thunderbirds and Deuce Coupés, the near mystical omnipresence of Wolfman Jack’s 
raspy radio bravado—all these signifiers situate the past as a mere product, an aggregate 
of aesthetic associations and commodity reification. Bazin rejects montage because it 
adds too much to the natural realism of the image, undermining its unity. Jameson 
eschews pastiche on similar grounds. Both practices involve the process of assembling a 
composite from seemingly disparate elements. Nostalgia films like American Graffiti 
essentially raise montage to the next power by way of pastiche. According to Jameson, 
they “restructure the whole issue of pastiche and project it onto a collective and social 
level” resulting in the “desperate attempt to appropriate a missing past” through fashion-
plates and the glossy qualities of the image.370 This leads him to the conclusion that 
pastiche is an especially vacuous form of imitation, a type of mimicry without conviction, 
a “statue with blind eyeballs,” as he puts it.371 In Jameson’s view, the omnipresence of 
past styles and unfettered availability of previous aesthetic techniques means they can be 
freely assembled without much of a connection to their initial situation or set of 
references. He attributes this to a lack of perspective or historical consciousness—the 
 
370 Jameson, Postmodernism, 19. 




inability to apprehend the present as history—and sees it as a symptom of mass 
consumption and cultural amnesia under the new modes of aesthetic production. Stylized 
nostalgia is thus decoupled from memory and recollection.372 
 If we follow Jameson’s claims about the waning of historicity this analysis might 
make sense. But Le Sueur’s twin notions of surface realism and deliberate archaism seem 
to intimate that another, more capacious approach is available, as does the critical 
scholarship of Hutcheon, Constable, Radstone, and others. Does the nostalgia film really 
condemn us to a perpetual present, severing our access to previous periods and packaging 
them instead as glossy consumer products? Are the highly aestheticized representations 
of the past contained in such films no longer our own, as Jameson suggests? Are we now 
incapable of crafting compelling aesthetic representations of our current moment? Do the 
images Lucas and others pull together via pastiche only serve to mesmerize by 
confirming preexisting stereotypes and associations? Is aesthetic production under the 
conditions of late capitalism forever comprised and thus unable to speak beyond the 
determinations of mass consumption, reification, and commodity fetishism, or can it 
retain some critical capacity and reflective power despite its complicity?373 Jameson’s 
 
372 Cf. Grainge Paul, “Nostalgia and Style in Retro America: Moods, Modes, and Media Recycling,” 
Journal of American & Comparative Cultures 23, no. 1 (March 22, 2004), 29. Grainge’s intent is to show 
that there are available conceptions of memory that can incorporate the nostalgia film in ways that 
acknowledge but also extend his analysis. He locates one such concept in Andrew Hoskins’ work. See 
Andrew Hoskins, “New Memory: Mediating History,” Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television 21, 
no. 4 (2001): 333–46. See also Paul Grainge, ed., Memory and Popular Film (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2003). 
373 This seems to be what is ultimately at stake for Jameson, an animating concern that drives his 
conceptual apparatus. One gets the sense that the structuring and totalizing power granted to late capitalism 
in his work—its ability to subsume and incorporate just about everything—makes it nearly impossible for 
cultural objects created under its determinations to anything more than reproduce prepackaged norms and 





comparison of the late capitalist moment to the conditions of Plato’s cave referenced 
above already contains something of an answer. When he says that today we ‘can no 
longer directly look out at the real world for the referent’ and are thus ‘condemned to 
seek the historical past through pop images’ he places the subject in an exceedingly 
passive position and further construes the historical past and its referents as inaccessible 
from that vantage point. In Postmodernism, he offers a clear description of this 
assessment: 
  This approach to the present by way of the art language of the simulacrum, or of 
the pastiche of the stereotypical past, endows present reality and the openness of 
present history with the spell and distance of a glossy mirage. Yet this 
mesmerizing new aesthetic mode itself emerged as an elaborate symptom of the 
waning of our historicity, of our lived possibility of experiencing history in some 
active way.”374  
 
For Jameson, the nostalgia film distills the formal impoverishment of contemporary 
aesthetic production and prohibits active engagement not only with the past but also and 
especially with the present as one possible future of that past. Hutcheon once again offers 
some instructive pushback that furthers her interpretation of Jameson’s work as a 
narrative of negativity and privation, a form of mourning, nostalgic in its own right, for 
 
published in 1984, the same year as Jameson’s initial critique: “The notion of the artwork a critique 
actually informs some of the more thoughtful condemnations of postmodernism, which is accused of 
having abandoned the critical stance that once characterized modernism. However, the familiar ideas of 
what constitutes critical art (Partielichkeit and vanguardism, l’art engagé, critical realism, or the aesthetic 
of negativity, the refusal of representation, abstraction, reflexiveness) have lost much of their explanatory 
and normative power in recent decades. This is precisely the dilemma of art in a postmodern age. 
Nevertheless, I see no reason to jettison the notion of critical art altogether. The pressures to do so are not 
new; they have been formidable in capitalist culture ever since romanticism, and if our postmodernity 
makes it exceedingly difficult to hold on to an older notion of art as critique, then the task is to redefine the 
possibilities of critique in postmodern terms rather than relegating it to oblivion. If the postmodern is 
discussed as a historical condition rather than a style it becomes possible and indeed important to unlock 
the critical moment in postmodernism itself and to sharpen its cutting edge, however blunt it may seem at 
first sight. What will no longer do is either to eulogize or to ridicule postmodernism en bloc. The 
postmodern must be salvaged from its champions and from its detractors.” See Andreas Huyssen, 
“Mapping the Postmodern,” New German Critique, no. 33 (1984), 9. 




the decline of modernism.375 She draws attention to how postmodern cinema, beginning 
in the 1970s with films like American Graffiti, works to consciously mediate collective 
histories and cultural memory through aesthetic practices like allusion and pastiche. 
Jameson does not notice this, she maintains, and thus fails to rethink what he calls ‘the 
openness of present history’ because he does not properly acknowledge “the distanced 
relation of every film from its historical referent.”376 Hutcheon attributes this limitation to 
Jameson’s understanding of history, rooted as it is in a version of Marxism that takes the 
unfolding of history to be a single story with a common, universalizing utopian theme—
what Jameson calls a remembered “moment of plentitude”—refracted through 
contradiction and antagonism.377 As she puts it, “Jameson laments the loss of a sense of 
his particular definition of history…while dismissing as nostalgia the only kind of history 
we may be able to acknowledge: a contingent and inescapably intertextual history.”378 In 
this context, intertextuality refers to the myriad ways a text or object is shaped or 
 
375 As indicated above, the dispute between Jameson and Hutcheon closely correlates with two 
different approaches to film and aesthetic production generally in the mid-late twentieth century. Brian 
McHale, in “Postmodernism, or the Anxiety of Master Narratives,” Diacritics 22, no. 1 (1992): 17–33, 
offers an early assessment and initial schema for these critical postures which for him ultimately boil down 
to differing positions in relation to operations of dialectics and totalization, and the value of positing an 
ultimate referent. See also Andreas Huyssen, “Mapping the Postmodern,” New German Critique, no. 33 
(1984): 5–52. More recently, volumes like John N. Duvall, ed., Productive Postmodernism: Consuming 
Histories and Cultural Studies (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 2002) attempt to make these tensions more 
transparent and thus, as the title suggests, more agile in application. 
376 Hutcheon, The Politics of Postmodernism, 176. Here she is drawing on the work of Anne Friedberg 
who makes a nice gesture toward Le Radical’s initial description of film as a perfect illusion: “The 
narrative or art direction of a nostalgia film may confuse its sense of temporality. But cinematic speculation 
itself confirms the illusion of a perpetual present interminably recycled. Taken to its apparatical extreme, 
what Jameson describes only to the nostalgia genre is true of every film’s relation to its historical referent.” 
Anne Friedberg, “Les Flâneurs Du Mal (l): Cinema and the Postmodern Condition,” PMLA 106, no. 3 
(1991), 427. Italics mine. 
377 This mention of “some remembered moment of plentitude” comes in the same moment that 
Jameson’s evokes the notion of a “nostalgia conscious of itself” discussed above. See Jameson, “Walter 
Benjamin, or nostalgia,” 68. 




determined by its relation to and connection with other texts, objects, weaves of 
references, etc.—a means of recognizing and re-marking upon available traces to use the 
deconstructive language developed in the previous chapter.379   
 For Hutcheon, acknowledging a contingent and inescapably intertextual history 
does not signal the enfeeblement of historicity. Instead, it enables us to “critically 
confront the past with the present…against the tendency of our times to value only the 
new and the novel” by thinking with artworks like the nostalgia film that “return us to a 
re-thought past to see what, if anything, is of value in that past experience.”380 To 
continue with Jameson’s comment on the passive, enchained prisoners in Plato’s cave, 
this more approach makes space for reconsidering the notion of the ‘referent’ and how we 
go about looking for it or seeking it out. For Hutcheon, this means focusing our attention 
on the textuality of the past and broadening its status as a discursive reality. “The past as 
referent is not bracketed or effaced as Jameson would like to believe,” she writes, “it is 
incorporated and modified, given new and different life and meaning.”381  Writers like 
Richard Dyer agree and demonstrate how pastiche, an aesthetic practice deemed facile in 
Jameson’s thinking, often work to contest received notions of access, pastness, and 
referentiality.382 Such practices rework available traces, offering a supplementary re-mark 
 
379 Derrida, for example, uses intertextual strategies to situate his own text in relation to a host of 
others, including Heidegger, Defoe, Donne, and Freud. The result is both argumentative and performative. 
He works with an amalgamation of figures and texts to show how subjective experience functions as a text, 
constituted by the trace structure and the temporality of Nachträglichkeit which both induces a self-aware 
experience of nostalgia that frustrates desire by deferring its closure. Derrida works intertextually to 
elaborate his own understanding of intertextuality, in other words, and this effort serves to show how 
relations between key concepts are meditated, negotiated, and transmitted. 
380 Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism, 39. 
381 Ibid., 24. 





that complicates the relation between referent and representation, demonstrating how the 
past is both mediated and constructed, thereby charting new avenues for active critical 
engagement.  
 The conceptual and cinematic precedent for this approach in film studies enables 
a reading of American Graffiti that runs counter to Jameson’s assessment. In terms of 
nostalgia, Le Sueur certainly paves the way, developing notions like surface realism and 
deliberate archaism discussed above that served to heighten the discontinuity between the 
past and the present in productive ways. But additional examples abound and usually 
involve homage or self-reference to genre conventions, longstanding tropes, literary 
influences, and major cinematic milestones or techniques383. Noël Carroll is among the 
first film scholars to thematize this, discussing the potential merits of intertextual 
 
holds a more positive view, suggesting a more complex cultural mode that has the potential to be critical 
and transgressive, but that can also suggest an awareness about the constructed nature of feelings and 
emotions while allowing them to be experienced and enjoyed.” Grainge, Memory and Popular Film, 10. 
383 Sometimes filmic intertextuality may simply entail the use of certain narrative elements such that 
the source material attains a sort of modernized adaptation. For example, 10 Things I Hate About You 
(1999) and O Brother Where Art Thou (2000) give us updated, sardonic iterations of Shakespeare’s The 
Taming of the Shrew and Homer’s The Odyssey, while more recent films like Chi-Raq (2015)  and Easy A 
(2010) rework and re-mark Aristophanes and Nathaniel Hawthorne. But some of the most compelling 
instances of cinematic intertextuality involve affectionate, self-aware and knowing reference to iconic, 
influential shots, images, or archetypes—instances of creative expression, in other words, that are intrinsic 
to film as a form of aesthetic representation. This practice is now commonplace in contemporary 
Hollywood and the summer blockbuster especially, giving rise to the proliferation of sequels, reboots, and 
remakes, a climate of near incessant reiteration that remains successful, at least in part, because of its 
intertextual exploitation. The Marvel Cinematic Universe is composed of almost nothing but self-
reference—a tactic that accounts for most of its dramatic payoff—and most Pixar films constantly refer to 
their antecedents, both within the genre and beyond. Other uses are more discerning and circumspect. Most 
Quentin Tarantino and Martin Scorsese films contain so many different homages, parodies, and referential 
layers that many viewers are likely to miss at least a few. The latter’s Hugo (2011)—to provide just one 
recent and apropos example—exhibits cinematic intertextuality on several different levels. The film is 
inspired by Brian Selznick’s 2007 The Invention of Hugo Cabret, a work of historical fiction based in large 
part on the life and work of none other than Georges Méliès. Méliès (Ben Kingsley) plays a prominent role 
in Scorsese’s adaptation, as does his seminal Le Voyage dans la Lune (1902). In gesture similar to that of 
Godard that combines the image with its history and memory, Scorsese also pays homage to the Lumières’ 




referentiality in a pivotal essay published just two years before Jameson’s initial critique 
of the nostalgia film. Using Body Heat (1981) as his chief example, Carroll observes “a 
tendency…that distinguishes the seventies and the eighties from every other decade in 
Hollywood’s past—viz., allusion.”384 He is especially interested in how this became, in 
his reading, the defining practice of the New Hollywood movement in which Lucas is 
often situated. Allusion includes a whole range of techniques—pastiche, reconstruction, 
homage, referential staging, etc.—and functions as “a mean that directors use to make 
comments on the fictional worlds of their films.”385 Carroll thinks the rise in allusion is 
due, in part, to “an unprecedented awareness of film history” coming out of the 1950s-
60s that results in a new style that works to change the nature of cinematic symbol 
systems.386 Created by informed artists for informed viewers, this “explicitly film-
historical consciousness” entails “a reworking that evokes a historical genre and its 
associated myths, commonplaces, and meanings in order to generate expression through 
fiction between the old and the new.”387 Carroll uses the work of Robert Altman to draw 
out his analysis, ultimately arriving at conclusion that allusion amounts to cinematic 
reworking or re-marking that functions as a deliberate assertion of style and expressivity 
that can, at times, subvert expectations and frustrate desire. Whereas Jameson reads these 
practices through as instances of passivity and amnesia, Carroll suggests that they begin 
from a position of active engagement and awareness. Hutcheon treads similar ground, 
 
384 Noël Carroll, “The Future of Allusion: Hollywood in the Seventies (And Beyond),” October 20 
(1982), 51. 
385 Ibid., 52. Italics mine. 
386 Ibid., 54-55. 




arguing that what Jameson sees as the enfeeblement of history is actually a mis-
recognized obsession with how the past is constructed and how history is mediated and 
transmitted by aesthetic means.388 If “Jameson’s estimations of pastiche rely on a passive 
audience easily provoked into unthinking nostalgia,” as Amelia DeFalco puts it, then the 
view first signaled by Le Sueur and thematized here by the likes of Hutcheon and Carroll 
positions nostalgia films as a “text that affects and provokes the entire 
subject...encouraging self-conscious spectatorship in order to destabilize epistemologies 
of ‘history’ and ‘reality.’”389 
 This sense of provocation and self-conscious spectatorship is present in nascent 
form at the dawn of cinema, and the Lumière filmography offers an additional and 
instructive example. Earlier I mentioned that initial audiences at times displayed an 
impressive appreciation of cinema’s capacities for aesthetic representation and 
manipulation. Films like the backwards-projected Démolition d'un mur (1895) portray an 
impossible and nostalgic fantasy— the reversal of time’s flux and flow—that became 
popular precisely because audiences recognized it as such. But this was not always the 
case. L'Arrivée d'un train en gare de La Ciotat (1896), one of the more famous Lumière 
productions, released about a month after the initial Salon Indien première, tested the 
limits of this recognition, complicating the idea that cinema acts as a perfect illusion of 
real life. Like many Lumière productions, the silent, black and white film, only 50 
 
388 “Postmodernist film (and fiction) is, if anything, obsessed with history and with how we can know 
the past today. How can this be an enfeeblement of historicity?” Hutcheon, The Politics of Postmodernism, 
109. See also Dika, Recycled Culture, 14. 
389 Amelia DeFalco, “A Double-Edged Longing: Nostalgia, Melodrama, and Todd Haynes’s Far from 




seconds in length, shows a single, continuous, unedited shot of everyday life in real-time. 
The subject matter involves the arrival of a train at the La Ciotat railway station near the 
southern French coast. As the film opens, the train tracks are empty and in full view. 
After a few seconds smoke begins to build in the distance and suddenly a steam 
locomotive engine, initially quite small, fills the screen, first moving into, then across, 
and finally outside the frame. A new aesthetic medium, cinema had yet to develop 
conventions specific to its form and, likewise, audiences had not yet learned what to 
expect from the experience. The initial screening of L'Arrivée has attained near 
mythological status among cinephiles as a result. Legend has it that the audience was so 
shocked and overwhelmed by the image of a realistic train charging full speed directly at 
them that many cried out in fear, shielding their eyes, and retreating to the back of the 
screening room. The arrival of this phantom train—what Gorky calls a “train of 
shadows”390 —also marks the arrival of cinematic perception and mis-recognition, a literal 
iteration of Plato’s anxiety later taken up by Jameson. 
 We now know that this legend is likely apocryphal and either did not happen at all 
or, at the very least, did not happen in such a dramatic fashion.391 But these revelations are 
moot on a certain level. The larger point is that this myth was for many years—and still 
is—an integral part of the story that cinema tells about itself, a primal scene of sorts. The 
fantastical image of audiences flinching at a mis-recognized image—one not perceived as 
fantastical—has become a sort of short-hand for the uncanny power of images, their 
 
390 Gorky, “The Lumière Cinematograph,” 7-8. 
391 See, for instance, Martin Loiperdinger and Bernd Elzer, “Lumiere’s Arrival of the Train: Cinema’s 




ability to mobilize feelings and motivate reactions. The mythology surrounding L'Arrivée 
thus functions as a chief means by which the legacy, inheritance, and memory of cinema 
continues to be transmitted, an intertextual trace that constitutes its history and continues 
to be woven into the fabric of its self-narration. 
 Jean-Luc Godard affectionately portrays this self-narration in a pivotal scene from 
his Les Carabiniers (1963). At one point, Michel-Ange (Patrice Moullet), a poor peasant 
lured into the machinations of war on the promise of future wealth and riches, enters a 
movie theater for the very first time. He views a series of short films, including a scene of 
an arriving train, like the early Lumière audiences. And, like the early Lumière 
audiences, so the story goes, he covers his face in shock and fear, taking the image to be 
more than an image, a likeness of the real as real as the real itself. Later, when he sees 
projected images of a woman disrobing and entering a bathtub, he clamors to the front of 
the theater and attempts to enter the world of the film, yet another Godardian homage, 
this time to the famous mise en abyme sequence in Buster Keaton’s Sherlock Jr. (1924), 
which also exploits the tension between image and reality. Michel-Ange desperately 
wants a better view, to see what the image suggests but the frame obscures. He takes the 
cinematic image to be perfect but hasn’t read Le Radical’s Lumière review and is 
unaware that it only remains perfect as an illusion. He tries in vain to peer over the edge 
of the tub, ultimately collapsing the screen in a gag that is played for ironic laughs. The 
viewing experience is thus interrupted by an attempt to catch a glimpse at what the image 
conjures but withholds. This scene is set within the context of a film that comments on 




referent. In the end, the treasure and wealth promised to Michel-Ange and his companion 
amount only to mere picture postcards documenting their travels and exploits. As Susan 
Sontag puts it, Godard’s wry references and clever gags serve to highlight “the equivocal 
magic of the photographic image.”392 His deft re-mark not only pays homage to the 
Lumière brothers’ L'Arrivée, but also references, even parodies, its apparently apocryphal 
reception and continued legacy by accentuating the tension between the real and the 
image. If this means that we are still within the confines of Plato’s cave, as Jameson 
suggests, it is the cave re-figured, one where passive prisoners become active spectators, 
who come and go at will, exploring every nook and every cranny, focusing their attention 




American Graffiti, Re-marked 
 So far, I have been suggesting, with reference to relevant secondary literature, the 
possibility of approaching Jameson’s nostalgia film from a more generative position with 
a view beyond familiar modes of symptomatic reading. Such an approach acknowledges 
its allure, maintains some critical awareness of it, but goes further by taking it an 
occasion for additional engagement rather than diagnosis alone. In the space that remains 
I want to return to the founding nostalgia from such a perspective to see how it might be 
read otherwise in a manner that furthers Jameson’s category by expanding its horizons 
and broadening its parameters. In light of the foregoing, my claim here is that Lucas’s 
 




American Graffiti induces a form of what DeFalco calls “productive nostalgia,” a notion 
similar to Boym’s reflective nostalgia discussed in chapter one. It does so by mobilizing 
familiar aesthetic conventions and stylistic association in a way that heightens the 
discontinuity between the present and its recent past to forge a propulsive relation with 
the unknown future. It is in this sense that all the ephemera and pop touchstones Lucas 
aggregates—the music, the sartorial codes and conventions, the cars and social mores, the 
overall mood, tone, and atmosphere—function as traces available for cinematic re-
marking. The instances of surface realism and deliberate archaism referenced above—the 
use of “jukebox” colorization and Techniscope—work as instances of intertextual 
intervention as well, as do some of the more compelling composite characters. John 
Milner, for example, evokes cinematic predecessors, archetypes, and heirs, both in 
appearance and attitude. Equal parts juvenile rebel and washed up ‘has-been,’ Le Mat’s 
performance summons Rebel Without a Cause-era James Dean while also anticipating 
later, even more stylized iterations like a young Matthew McConaughey as David 
Wooderson, the puerile party animal in arrested development in Richard Linklater’s 
Dazed and Confused (1993). These cinematic traces, references, and signifiers signal 
mobilization and transmission to a knowing audience. They encourage creative and 
critical engagement with history and memory that not only discloses what we expect 
aesthetic representations of history to do for us, but also the ways in which memory and 
historical consciousness are themselves constituted, at least in part, by those same modes 
of representation. As Paul Grainge puts it drawing upon Kaja Silverman’s work on 




Jameson might claim “but can suggest an increasing semiotic awareness of the textuality 
of the past.”393 Nostalgia films and nostalgic experience take things a step further by 
mobilizing and re-marking upon the propulsive, animating, and in some cases haunting 
effects of that textuality, making them sharper, more legible, and acutely felt.  
 Nearly everything is already contained in the film’s title, a somewhat enigmatic 
heading that executives at Universal Pictures initially rejected. Lucas persisted, however, 
and eventually the studio acquiesced. Graffiti, of course, refers to the presence of 
markings, often scratched or etched, on public surfaces that contain sometimes cryptic 
messages and coded meanings for further iteration and dissemination. Traces, in other 
words, meant for supplementary comment or mobilization. The word shares an 
etymological and functional filiation with the early cinematic apparatus—Edison’s 
kinetoscope and the Lumière brothers’ cinématographe—as both bespeak the exigence of 
generalized writing, of deciphering and re-marking upon available traces, themselves 
marked by the march of time and the work of memory. The cars, the pop music, the 
vintage styles and dated social mores all function as traces in this regard, graffiti marks of 
American cultural history inscribed in the annals of cinematic memory.  
 Some of these graffiti marks suggest a particularly toxic and destructive form 
nostalgic desire, at least at first blush. For a long time, the critical consensus suggested 
that these traces and their intertextual re-marking form an overall composite evocative of 
a form of nostalgia that takes rampant patriarchy as its primary object of desire. Pauline 
 
393 Paul Grainge, “Nostalgia and Style in Retro America: Moods, Modes, and Media Recycling,” 
Journal of American & Comparative Cultures 23, no. 1 (March 22, 2004), 29. See also Kaja Silverman, 
“Fragments of a Fashionable Discourse,” in Studies in Entertainment: Critical Approaches to Mass 




Kael, for instance, the longtime film critic for The New Yorker, anticipates Jameson’s 
critique of American Graffiti’s surface-level aestheticization with her characteristic 
combination of acerbic wit and devastating exactitude. She lampoons the film’s 
“shallowness” in using women as mere plot functions while allowing its audience to 
remain “happy condescending toward its own past.”394 This, she believes, in a very 
Jamesonian turn of phrase, is because “there’s nothing to back up the style.” Kael chalks 
this superficiality up to the film’s most flagrant omissions.395 For example, none of the 
major female characters receive any mention in the end credits epilogue that details the 
fate of each of the male leads. This suggests an unfettered nostalgia reserved “only for 
white middle-class boys whose memories have turned into pop.”396 Pace Jameson, Kael’s 
critique of the film does not contest the textuality of the past. It interrogates how that 
textuality is constituted and which traces are deemed worthy of re-marking.  
 Frances Smith, in a recent Quarterly Review of Film and Video article, works with 
and against this now conventional reading of the film. She has no desire to situate 
Lucas’s sophomore effort as some sort of proto-feminist text, nor does she merely 
sideline Kael’s valid concerns. Her aim, instead, is to complicate the omissions and 
occlusions Kael identifies in order to show—with an eye toward what she calls “nostalgia 
for potential”—397that they are not simple absences or straightforward erasures. Her 
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reading of the film identifies instances where certain filmic cliches and genre conventions 
often associated with the past become what Vera Dika calls oppositional strategies and 
general resistant practices made possible through intertextual engagement.398 These 
strategies serve to highlight the disjunction between the past and the present through a 
juxtaposition of images and styles. On Dika’s reading, Jameson does not consider these 
strategies and thus cannot account for the ways that “American Graffiti accomplishes a 
number of discontinuities that ultimately serve to destabilize its surfaces.”399 This 
destabilization opens up a productive tension between memory and history encoded 
within the film. This tension mirrors the productive ambiguities of nostalgia explored in 
previous chapters, i.e., the manner in which the structural contradictions and antagonisms 
that form its bittersweet character can yield motivating, even animating effects. As we 
saw in the last chapter, these effects become hauntingly legible when the form of 
impossible desire nostalgia engenders is indulged, but not satisfied. In American Graffiti 
the friction generated by this productive tension—the clash of textual traces, surface 
aesthetics, and historical discontinuity—induce a nostalgic experience that is both 
ambivalent and propulsive, a strategy for mourning in the wake of loss and upheaval.  
 This reading of the film broadens the conceptual value of Jameson’s nostalgia 
film category by highlighting the ways nostalgia accentuates and re-marks upon the 
disjunction between past and present. Lucas’s work plays with and frustrates the 
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audience’s own knowledge and understanding of the past (1962) in conjunction with its 
precarious, uncertain position in the present (1973). Only 11 years have passed. 1962 is 
the recent, almost immediate past, but the disjunction and discontinuity between ’62 and 
’73 make all the difference as the film’s promotional tagline—‘Where were you in 
’62?’—indicates. The audience returns to its contiguous past knowing full well that the 
assassination of JFK, the blunder of Vietnam, the revolutions in civil rights, sexual 
liberation, and popular culture all lie just beyond the horizon. After all, Curt, whose “big 
ambition in life” is to become a White House aide and shake President Kennedy’s hand, 
resolves, by the film’s end, to complete his coming-of-age journey by boarding a plane 
flown by “Magic Carpet Airlines.” In 1973, the audience is painfully aware that this 
dream will be prematurely foreclosed, and that Curt will soon be propelled into the 
tumultuous, psychedelic 60’s (Steppenwolf’s hit single “Magic Carpet Ride” was 
released in 1968, exactly halfway between the film’s present and its year of release). 
Nowhere is this disjunction and the truly bittersweet nostalgia it produces more 
prominently on display than in the controversial postscript that details the fate of each 
male character. After the climatic drag race where John Milner, a cipher for the audience 
and an avatar of nostalgia at this point, narrowly beats Bob Falfa and reflectively admits, 
“I was losing, man” to Terry the Toad, the following postscript appears on screen: 
 
John Milner was killed by a drunk driver in December 1964. 
Terry Fields was reported missing in action near An Loc in December 1965. 
Steve Bolander is an insurance agent in Modesto, California. 
Curt Henderson is a writer living in Canada. 
 
Pauline Kael lambasts the film’s more chauvinist elements, identifying in particular 




conservative penchant is an ever-present undercurrent throughout the film, to be sure, 
forming what Richard Brody calls “the relentless regime of catcalling and pickup-
aggression to which women are seen enduring.”400 But Smith and Dika read this coda 
differently, more tragically, as an instance of nostalgic expression more indicative of 
oppositional strategy or resistant practice—using nostalgia to undercut its more readily 
available associations, in other words.401 The credits plate and the tragic biographies that 
accompany it suggest, in the wake of the 60s and Vietnam in particular, that each of the 
male protagonists meet a literal or metaphorical death: John’s fate comes in the form of a 
car accident, perhaps similar to the one he has just barely escaped; Terry the Toad, like 
many of his socio-economic class, is drafted and killed in action; Curt lives in exile as an 
expatriate, presumably to avoid the draft; and Steve, initially deferring his college 
experience, never leaves home at all, and instead remains stuck in the past, succumbing 
to the sway of inert, suburban domesticity. The overall effect here is twofold. First, rather 
than simply underwriting, without equivocation, the retrograde gender norms identified 
by Kael, the film, according to Smith, “portrays moribund models of masculinity and 
heterosexual coupledom…demonstrating that they are not to be mourned.”402 By invoking 
and subtly overturning these conventions through intertextual intervention, American 
Graffiti complicates the common associations adhering to “the 1950s” in popular culture 
and collective memory, its function as a sort of shorthand for tranquil, trouble-free Pax 
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Americana. It uses nostalgia to critique nostalgia, in other words. Second, the film gives 
full voice to nostalgia by contesting it transmission through a single, regressive valence 
and refusing to close its wounds. It produces and elicits feelings of nostalgic desire while 
denying their full satisfaction and highlighting their undecidable pleasure. The past is 
gone and (some of) its potential irrevocably lost. The viewer affectionately returns to its 
aesthetic surfaces fully aware of their ‘inauthentic’ status and impending dissolution, 
using them as a means of productive, propulsive memory. As Lucas puts it, the coda 
before the credits puts the entire film in perspective, highlighting its primary theme of 
change delivered through the compelling and effective vehicle of period-specific 
nostalgia.403 
 It is worth noting that certain elements of this reading of the film are not 
necessarily new, despite the preponderance of Jamesonian interpretations that dismiss it 
as indulgent, backward, or retrograde. “The nostalgia boom has finally produced a lasting 
work of art,” wrote The New York Times, which went on to characterize the films as both 
elegiac and “unsentimental.”404 The paper attributes this achievement to the film’s use of 
elements—cinematic traces, we might say—that evoke and illicit bittersweet feelings of 
longing and loss without lapsing into the sort maudlin schmaltz typically associated with 
nostalgia. “Although it is full of the material of fashionable nostalgia,” Roger Greenspun 
observed, “it never exploits nostalgia…in its feeling for movement.” Greenspun went on 
to suggest that, in spirit, American Graffiti is “oddly closer” to the early, oneiric work of 
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Frederic Fellini than more cloying nostalgic films like The Last Picture Show or Summer 
of ’42, both released just two years before Lucas’s work.405 Likewise, Michael Dempsey, 
writing for Film Quarterly shortly after the movie’s release in August 1973, notes that the 
film seizes upon the pathos of an audience primed for wistful longing but its “surprising 
resonance...stems from its understated but trenchant criticism of nostalgia.”406 He 
suggests that while the film is clearly a product of the 70s ‘nostalgia boom,’ it still 
manages to capture “the sheer disposability” and fleeting transience of 1950s pop 
culture.407 The world Lucas depicts is barely past, yet its look and feel seem jarring and 
incalculably distant on screen. The nostalgia at play here, it seems, is more a vertigo-
inducing experience of discontinuity than an uncomplicated desire to return or repeat.  
 Stephen Farber, in an interview with Lucas less than a year after American 
Graffiti’s blockbuster success, observes that the film succeeds by accessing and 
mobilizing a “depth of feeling” missing in Lucas’s previous work, an affective and 
aesthetic achievement that serves to “recapture the past without sentimentalizing it.”408 In 
the same interview, Lucas himself intimates that the film is, ultimately, about the 
continual pressure of impermanence, highlighting the necessity of moving forward while, 
at times, glancing backwards or swerving sideways, a sort of temporal torsion.409 For 
Farber, the film’s unpredictable success can be attributed to the unique manner in which 
it elicits an undercurrent of potent pathos while also undermining its teleology, a move 
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similar to Derrida’s re-marks upon nostalgia explored in the last chapter. To reference Le 
Radical once more, the film acts as a useful, perhaps perfect illusion by propelling the 
viewer into an affectionate representation of the immediate past, a past now rendered 
strange yet intimate, familiar yet foreign. By amplifying the discontinuity between the 
‘present’ of the film (1962) and the ‘present’ of its release (1973) Lucas forces the viewer 
out into the future by confronting a series of incurred losses.  
 The controversial postscript accomplishes this, but it is certainly not the only 
element. Despite what Kael would no doubt call its malignant, patriarchal nucleus, 
American Graffiti actually concludes with a subtle wink toward Carol’s future.410 In the 
middle third of the film, when an annoyed John finds himself cruising with the style-
cramping Carol, the two engage in a brief dispute over pop music, an element that 
conveys the overall mood and outlook of the period more than perhaps any other element. 
Walter Murch—who Ebert has called “the most respected film editor and sound designer 
in modern cinema”—worked with Lucas on these aspects of the film, overseeing sound 
montage and re-recording.411 Prior to this time the position of music supervisor, a role 
designed to integrate sound and music in films, didn’t really exist. Lucas more or less 
invented it by listening to records and painstakingly making selections for virtually every 
scene, contributing to what Murch calls the film’s wall-to-wall popular music soundtrack, 
the first of its kind. According to Murch, the music is meant to immerse the viewer into 
the period-specific world of the film, a world completely natural and organic to its 
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characters and their positions in space and time. More than that, he says, “the music 
sometimes acts like a Greek chorus, to sort of comment on the events taking place.”412 
The music, in other words, offers its own re-mark, drawing attention to its own position 
as a re-marked trace in the cinematic tapestry Lucas and Murch have woven together. 
 The scene in question is no exception and sets the stage for what is to come 
following the postscript. In a gesture of exasperation, John abruptly shuts off the car radio 
as a comment from our Greek Chorus blares through the speakers: the Beach Boys’ 
“Surfin’ Safari.” “I don’t like that surfing shit,” he mutters. “Rock ’n roll has been going 
downhill ever since Buddy Holly died.” At this point, John is already established as a 
walking anachronism within the world of the film, an old-school beat out of sync with the 
new tremolo-drenched rhythm, more James Dean than Frankie Avalon. He nostalgically 
pines for the pop music of an era on the cusp of profound sonic change, calling the 
viewer back to the opening sequence, the still shot of Mel’s Drive-In set against Bill 
Haley’s jangly opening number. Carol, on the other hand, thinks the Beach Boys are 
“boss” and affectionately mocks John for both his age and his aging taste. Later, as the 
final credits roll and the somber biographies of John, Curt, Toad, and Steve fade out, the 
film offers up its first non-diegetic song, a final comment from Murch’s Greek chorus in 
the form of a tune not firmly rooted in the 1962 setting and eerily out of step with the 
film’s temporality, forcefully pushing the audience out into the 60s counterculture. This 
number is the Beach Boys’ 1964 hit “All Summer Long” from the album of the same 
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name. Anticipating the sonic innovations of Pet Sounds, one of the most iconic records of 
the late 60s, the single is indelibly marked by Phil Spector’s pioneering “wall of sound” 
production style that would soon come to define the era, a style Lucas mimics in his 
nonstop top-40 soundtrack. The cheery anthem revels in “having fun all summer long” 
but admits, in a lyric that is nothing if not nostalgically bittersweet, that it “won’t be long 
’til summertime is through.”  
 The films opens with Bill Haley set against a still shot of Mel’s Drive-In 
conveying stasis. Throughout it pays proper homage to Buddy Holly and, after the 
mournful postscript, ends with the ascendant Beach Boys, a sequence that conveys 
movement and transformation. It mobilizes these reference and traces, evoking nostalgia 
in order to effectively communicate one of its major themes: things move, people change, 
times change, and the present cannot last, cannot be long, as St. Augustine puts it.413 
Something is indeed lost and nostalgia, when given space for full expression, generates 
an active, ongoing relation with the past and its losses. Buddy Holly and Bill Haley’s 
rock ’n roll made the present and enable the future but it, too, cannot last; it can only 
remain as one of many aesthetic reference points, an archival trace encoded within the 
accreting fabric of cultural history along with Wolfman Jack’s howling rasp. In this 
sense, then, it could not be more fitting that the Beach Boys newfangled surf pop carries 
us beyond the past, beyond John’s death, through the closing credits, through the present 
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now passing, and into the unknown, propulsive horizons of Carol’s future.  
 
The Nostalgic Function of Film 
 As a cultural object, American Graffiti exhibits internal tensions that broach 
nostalgia’s structural ambivalence and intrinsic bittersweetness. As imperfect as it may 
be—Kael and Brody’s concerns will only increase as it continues to age—the film can be 
viewed as a propulsive use of nostalgia, a true work of graffiti that elicits the affective 
attachments specific to nostalgia while also re-marking upon the forms of desire it 
engenders. By deploying all the familiar aesthetic styles and pop ephemera of the period 
it conjures, which evoke and induce feelings of nostalgia, the film works critical 
displacements and subtle, granular oppositions that belie Jameson’s reductive reading of 
the film as symptomatic of inauthenticity. The internal antagonisms its displays generate 
an organic type of resistance that works precisely because it is situated inside a variant 
form of nostalgic desire.414 The film therefore achieves a level of re-marked, knowing, 
and self-reflexive nostalgia that extends the “nostalgia film” category beyond the 
determinations codified by Jameson. 
 This is no doubt what Alessia Ricciardi has in mind when she refers to “inherently 
nostalgic function of film.”415 The medium portrays durations of time, offering time back 
to us for meditation and critical intervention. It satisfies the nostalgic fantasy of regaining 
lost time, but only in part; it is a structurally unfulfilled fantasy, after all. The loss 
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remains, made available for reflection only through its moving image. The image subsists 
as a memory apparatus, facilitating the work of mourning, to use the Derridean register. 
This apparatus galvanizes the Bazinian drive to preserve life through its representation, a 
means of investigating the past and its attendant losses in order to raise critical questions 
about future(s)—those imminent and those foreclosed—through the freshly cut prism of 
the present. Film aestheticizes afterwardness and nachträglichkeit, mobilizing the 
enigmatic function of belated recollection, and laying bare what Ricciardi calls the 
“complicated webs of temporality in which memory is not only taken in, introjected, or 
accrued, but reworked, projected, and given back.”416 This was first made possible due to 
the formal features unique to cinema discovered by early filmmakers like the Lumière 
brothers: its ability to portray and manipulate the passage of time to compelling affective 
effect. Nostalgia films like Lucas’s American Graffiti do the same thing by underscoring 
the highly textual nature of our pasts, mediated as they are through aesthetic traces and 
cultural artifacts.  
 Richard Linklater, who has always had a deep interest in using film to mark the 
passage of time, pushes these features to their limits in Boyhood (2014), a drama filmed 
over the course of 12 years that quite literally documents its protagonist’s coming of age 
in real-time. As the child (Ellar Coltrane) grows and changes so do his parents (Patricia 
Arquette and Ethan Hawke), their bodies—faces and hands, most of all—bearing the 
effects of things in the process of passing away. In a final scene one character explicitly 
delivers the film’s main thesis: that moments seize people, not the other way around. 
 




Before Linklater there was—and still is—the Up project, a series of documentary films 
produced by Granada Television and directed by Michael Apted. These films follow 14 
children from a range of socio-economic backgrounds, representing a cross-section of 
British life. Inspired by a Jesuit adage—“Give me the child until he is seven and I will 
give you the man”417 —the longitudinal series began in 1964 when each child is in 
primary school and checks back in with their lives every seven years (This leads to a 
series of titles: Seven Up, 7 Plus Seven, 21 Up, 28 Up, and so on. A new installment, 63 
Up, premiered in early summer 2019). The result is staggering—equal parts exuberant 
and mournful, altogether deeply human. Some of the now late middle-aged adults pass 
away, others are subject to passings away of various kinds, and all are, themselves, in the 
process of passing away. They change and morph against the constant backdrop of time’s 
ceaseless pressure, at times looking back at their previous selves with longing and 
distaste in equal measure, noting the qualitative difference and discontinuity, a literal 
version of the sort of accomplishments Lucas dramatizes in American Graffiti. Could 
there ever be a more appropriately nostalgic gesture, a more bittersweet cinematic 
experience? Like living, visual time capsules, each Up episode exhibits its own organic 
tone befitting the stage of life it approaches. Some focus on mortality and regret, others 
youthful angst and restless uncertainty, and others still tranquility and quietude. In an 
interview with Ebert—who, echoing the early Lumière tagline, called the project “an 
inspired, even noble use of the film medium” where “life itself flashes across the 
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screen”—Apted expresses a deep desire to see the series continue because “it dignifies 
the ordinary life.”418 He was 22 when Seven Up premiered, his first major film 
production. Now 78, eight installments later, Apted has wryly stated that he hopes to do 
84 Up in 20 years, around his 99th birthday.419 Is he joking? The films’ scope, both 
intimate and metaphysical, universal yet specific, make it hard to tell.  
 Those early audience members seated in the Salon Indien that winter day in 1895 
could never have anticipated how cinema would develop in this regard, and neither could 
the Lumière brothers. But they did recognize, albeit partially through works like 
Démolition d'un mur, that the art form retains a unique and singular ability to 
compellingly re-present (and disturb) the linear flow of temporality, a function that shares 
common ground with the experience of nostalgia. Cinema, like philosophy, begins in 
nostalgia, with the desire to see or experience yet again and recoup certain losses.420 The 
moving images that flicker past the screen allow us to return, yet again, to what has 
already passed away, depicting the very phenomenon of passing away, portraying things 
as they change, morph, grow, and wither away. The desire to see and experience again is 
the desire of cinema, a desire shot through with both nostalgia and spectrality. Gorky, 
Bazin, and Jameson were partially right when they invoked the crepuscular phantoms of 
Plato’s cave. These living, moving images are indeed shadows. But their tenebrous 
quality does not conceal the real. On the contrary, it heightens it, revealing opacities and 
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imbrications not otherwise seen. The images generated in an explicit nostalgia film like 
American Graffiti complicate this relation between the real and its representation, 
ventriloquizing the referent, and destabilizing its orienting status. In doing so they draw 
close attention not only to the plurality of histories, but to the trace-structure of memory 
and the textuality of the past(s) toward which that memory stretches. This is possible 
because of the nostalgic desire that inheres within the moving image. Because of the 
temporal achievements intrinsic to its form—the ability to represent time, duration, and 
temporization, in time—cinema depends and thrives upon nostalgia. It can portray it, 
exploit it, mobilize and manipulate it, induce it, transmit it, dispel it, and critique it. This 






Chapter 5: Screen(ed) Nostalgia: The Propulsive Cinema of Terrence Malick 
 
Guided by film, then, we approach, if at all, ideas no longer on highways leading through the void but on 
paths that wind through the thicket of things.421 
— Siegfried Kracauer 
 
Return the past to the present. Magic of the present.422 
— Robert Bresson 
 
These are the images that have marked me and leaving me wondering still.423 
— Kristen Johnson 
 
From Philosophy to Cinema 
 Terrence Malick had every intention of becoming a philosopher. And perhaps he 
did, in a roving, roundabout way not at all unlike the cinematic style for which he is now 
known. In 1965 Malick completed formal study in philosophy at Harvard College under 
the direction of the late Stanley Cavell. Cavell, an American philosopher with continental 
proclivities and a vested interest in film, would later go on to suggest that Malick’s Days 
of Heaven (1978) “contains a metaphysical vision of the world,” bringing “the scene of 
human existence” into full cinematic view.424 Cavell has Heidegger in mind here. He 
suggests that the “formal radiance” of Malick’s images depict what Heidegger calls the 
‘Being of beings’ in What is Called Thinking?, the “presence of what is present” gathered 
together in sustained, iterative luminosity.425 But this is Heidegger at his limit, Heidegger 
re-marked, so to speak, by the spectral qualities specific to the moving image, iterative 
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qualities first mobilized by the Lumière Brothers as we have seen. For Cavell, Malick’s 
genius lies in his unparalleled ability to show or re-present how objects participate in 
their own recreation on a screen where “their presence refers to their absence,” to their 
feigned origins in a different time and a different place.426 If nostalgia remains intrinsic to 
the experience of time as Derrida suggests,427 then the formal radiance Cavell identifies 
here begins to broach how Malick’s cinema puts that dynamic to work through aesthetic 
representation. His films offer a compelling, evocative mediation on loss, memory, and 
the persistent passage of time that limits and conditions both. Malick’s own abbreviated 
relationship to philosophy, a discipline that provides some conceptual coordinates for 
these themes, serves as an instructive microcosm of this dynamic between presence and 
absence, time and memory, loss and desire. His academic pursuit of philosophy was all 
too brief, yet his filmic contributions loom large, re-marking on the discipline and its 
concerns from without, a re-marking predicated on absence and enlivened by 
adjacency.428 Though fruitful now, this absence was not intentional, at least not initially.  
 Malick excelled in his studies with Cavell, so much so that he was awarded a 
prestigious fellowship to continue his work abroad. In June 1966 the Harvard chapter of 
Phi Beta Kappa announced its Rhodes Scholar recipients, among them “Terrence 
Frederick Malick of Bartlesville, Oklahoma.”429 A small town just northwest of Tulsa 
near the Kansas state line, Bartlesville was home to the now defunct Phillips Petroleum 
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Company at the time. Malick’s father, Emil, worked for the company as a geologist and 
projects director. As a boy, Malick and his family split their time between Bartlesville 
and central Texas, due in large part to the vicissitudes of the then booming oil industry—
a far cry, in any case, from Oxford’s hallowed halls. The Rhodes Committee awarded 
Malick a generous stipend to complete a doctorate in philosophy at Oxford’s Magdalen 
College. It was a frustrating and deeply disappointing venture. Malick left the program 
almost immediately, exiting due to an apparent disagreement with his advisor, Gilbert 
Ryle, over the direction of his work. He had proposed a project on the concept of world 
in Heidegger, Kierkegaard, and Wittgenstein, a continuation of his undergraduate work 
with Cavell on Husserl and Heidegger. Ryle, an analytic philosopher, evidently chided 
Malick for not proposing something more “philosophical,” or so the story goes.430 Hence 
the ensuing absence, an abandonment of philosophy in favor of cinema. Malick 
completed the translation of Heidegger’s Vom Wesen des Grundes (The Essence of 
Reasons) he had been working on and took his leave.  
 This chapter takes up Malick’s work following that leave-taking and explores 
how themes like movement, loss, and the passage of time emerge and converge in his 
2011 Palme d’Or winner The Tree of Life. I demonstrate how his cinematic approach, 
informed by Heideggerian and post-Heideggerian strains of thought, serves to open up 
nostalgic expression by highlighting its more propulsive and animating features. In the 
last chapter we saw how the formal qualities of the moving image put cinema in a unique 
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position to manipulate and re-mark upon temporality. We also saw how those qualities 
can be brought to bear on memory traces in ways that mobilize nostalgia without 
predictably acquiescing to regression. This chapter furthers that mode of inquiry. I begin 
by contextualizing Malick’s filmography, noting how key themes like memory, loss, and 
temporal passage occupy a principal place in his work, achieving new meaning and 
significance in The Tree of Life. I then move to show how that film works with and 
against certain psychoanalytic concepts, orbiting insights explored in chapter three to 
portray compelling instances of nostalgic experience that facilitate the work of mourning 
in response to a felt loss. Malick embeds those instances in the story and structure of the 
film; he also elicits them in the viewer by wielding, in a manner all his own, filmic 
techniques especially suited to temporal manipulation and re-marking. As such, I claim 
that the film screens nostalgia in both senses: it offers a profound, arresting aesthetic 
representation of nostalgia on the cinema screen and uses nostalgia as a screen affect 
within the inner life of its main protagonist. The result is as personal and particular as it is 
universal and abstract, a work of unrivaled cinematic achievement that elevates the 
medium’s capacity for temporal intervention to new heights.  
 Cavell was the first among many to observe that Malick’s background in 
philosophy informs and nourishes his cinematic oeuvre. Malick’s philosophical training 
focused on Heidegger’s work. His filmic contributions deal with similar themes but 
extend them in a manner not unlike the deconstructive interventions explored in chapter 
three. But whereas Derrida can only speculate about a cinematics of memory that 




enacts this form of spectral cinema across his career, achieving a new, spellbinding 
iteration in The Tree of Life. Should this lead us to believe that Malick succeeded in film 
where he failed in philosophy? It is difficult to determine whether Malick’s work in film 
accomplishes what he sought to do through speculative reflection—his career ended 
before it even began, after all. But available philosophical texts do offer some very 
interesting clues. Malick’s translator’s introduction to Heidegger’s The Essence of 
Reasons, for example, offers some interesting ideas that shed light on his turn to cinema. 
Those ideas appear to have occupied Malick’s mind since his early years studying with 
Cavell. They form the basis for his 1966 undergraduate thesis at Harvard and likely 
would have extended beyond that arena, given what we know about his aims for doctoral 
study. It stands to reason that the ideas occupying his mind during the time he chose to 
turn to film might also affect his cinematic approach. What exactly are they?  
 In his introduction Malick rightly observes that Heidegger’s Vom Wesen des 
Grundes is principally concerned with the concept of “world,” a notion Malick takes to 
be synonymous with “horizon” as his proposed doctoral project indicates. He goes on to 
point out that, for Heidegger, the world “is not the totality of things but that in terms of 
which we understand them.” “The world,” Malick writes, “is meant to be that which can 
keep us from seeing, or force us to see, that what we have is one.”431 First published in 
1929, the text in question expands and clarifies what Heidegger called “the worldhood of 
 
431 Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Reasons, trans. Terrence Malick (Evanston, IL: 




the world” two years earlier in Sein und Zeit.432 It is also the text where Heidegger first 
turns an intransitive noun into a transitive verb.433 “The world never is,” he announces, “it 
worlds” (“welt ist nie, sondern weltet”).434 In his footnote to this line, Malick suggests 
that Heidegger coins this somewhat unwieldy phrase—the world worlds—in order to 
denote the sheer strangeness that attends to the ever-receding temporal horizons against 
which Dasein is thrown.435  
 In exploring that strangeness, and the attendant uncanniness of existence, 
Heidegger famously sought to abandon traditional philosophical language later in his 
career, turning instead to the poets. Malick shows great interest in this drive to push 
language to its limits (the phrase ‘the world worlds’ standing as prototypical 
Heideggerian example). He notes the difficulties in approaching Heidegger’s work but 
defends its opacity on precisely these terms. “If Heidegger resorts to his own peculiar 
language, it is because ordinary German does not meet his purposes,” he tells us. “And it 
does not because he has new and different purposes.”436 He says something similar in a 
more interesting way a several years before in his Harvard thesis noting that the “least 
 
432 See William McNeill’s introduction to an alternative translation of Vom Wesen des Grundes, 
which acknowledges and draws upon Malick’s, in Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks, ed. William McNeil (New 
York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 97. See also Division I.III entitled “The Worldhood 
of the World” in Sein und Zeit. 
433 Cf. Martin Woessner, “Brave New Worlds,” Los Angeles Review of Books, accessed October 
16, 2019, https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/brave-new-worlds/. As Steve Rybin puts it, “Perhaps the most 
striking aspect of Heidegger’s concept of ‘world’ is the extent to which it pivots around world as an active 
verb, rather than a noun.” See his Terrence Malick and the Thought of Film (New York, N.Y.: Lexington 
Books, 2012), 14. 
434 Heidegger, The Essence of Reasons, 103. 
435 “Heidegger makes a transitive verb of Welt (‘world’), as he did earlier with Nichts (‘nothing’),” 
writes Malick. He does this “evidently to encourage the reader to think of Welt and Nichts as existing, or 
functioning, in a way so peculiarly their own that it can only be expressed tautologically.” Ibid., 142n44. 
Italics mine. 




accessible” points of departure may be the “most illuminating” and that “we can only 
hope to keep faith with that ambiguity, not to dissipate it.”437  Cavell identifies one such 
ambiguity in his comparison of Malick to Heidegger quoted above: the dynamic between 
presence and absence, concealment and disclosure, where a thing’s “presence refers to its 
absence.”438 Heidegger struggled to come to terms with this ambiguity and how to express 
it throughout his career, ultimately alleviating that ambiguity under the rubrics of 
authenticity, presencing, and primordial unity. Malick abandoned philosophy in order to 
pursue that tension through a different mode of expression and has been, by all accounts, 
fruitful. His films give the ideas they contain space to breathe and expand, highlighting, 
for example, how the ‘presence’ of moving images refers to something not fully present. 
By pointing to something not immediately there and holding that gaze, his images allow 
that not-there-ness to linger, loiter, and hold sway. 
 What I am suggesting here is not that Malick identified cinema as a viable arena 
in which to pursue his philosophical ideas, or even that he views cinema as a form of 
philosophy, although that may very well be the case, who knows. My point is less 
beholden to divining individual intentionality than that, and in this respect it is important 
remember that Malick’s only published text in philosophy is a translation accompanied 
with a critical introduction. Malick may have changed careers, moving from philosophy 
to film, but his relation to what Walter Benjamin first called “the task of the translator” 
remains, I think, the same. He strives to achieve a form of representation adequate to its 
 
437 Terrence Malick, “The Concept of Horizon in Husserl and Heidegger” (Cambridge, M.A., 
Harvard University, 1966), 2; 18. 




subject matter, a form that lets the remote remain and approach in its remoteness, one that 
ripens the seeds of expression by creating echoes or reverberations of the ‘original,’ to 
use Benjamin’s language.439 It is in this sense that the remarkable value of Malick’s work, 
a value best typified in The Tree of Life, lies in his unparalleled ability express and enact 
notions like ‘the worlding of the world’ through means not readily available to 
speculative thought. He portrays, in minute detail, the manner in which our experience of 
the world often recedes as quickly as it emerges, adding rich cinematic texture to one of 
life’s deepest, most persistent conundrums: that although we may orient our lives around 
time’s delimiting determinations, our experience of its effects does not always align with 
those structuring conditions. That asymmetry or misalignment, which gives birth to 
 
439 Benjamin introduces this phrase in a highly influential essay by the same name. See “The Task 
of the Translator,” in Walter Benjamin, Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. 
Harry Zohn (New York, N.Y.: Schocken Books, 1969), 69-82. The operative word in the title is the 
German Aufgabe which can mean “task” or “failure,” but also “to give up,” introducing an undecidable 
play in the intercourse between two languages. For Benjamin the Aufgabe of any translation is not to 
simply communicate or convey, but to continue and reiterate the creativity and formal ingenuity of the 
original, to allow what is remote, foreign, or unintelligible to approach us on its own terms. Although 
Benjamin is responsible for the seeds of this idea, it is Derrida who exfoliates its full potential in “Des 
Tours de Babel.” See Jacques Derrida, Acts of Religion, ed. Gil Anidjar (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 
2001), 102-134. There he provides his own commentary on Benjamin’s theory of translation, pushing it 
further toward the deconstructive logic of the supplement which makes the language of the original grow, 
not by reproducing but by adding. Derrida explicitly connects this to the notion of re-marking discussed at 
length in chapter three above. Instead of transporting, transferring, or representing communicable content, 
translations re-mark by respecting spectral absence, by “render[ing] present an affinity that is never present 
in the presentation…a presentation inadequate to that which is nevertheless presented (120). Because of 
this inadequacy, the original harbors a demand, injunction, or desire to be translated. “There is some to-be-
translated” (Il y a de l’à-traduire) as he puts it (121). And, once again, the act of translation helps the 
original grow, giving it more life, what Derrida calls survival or living-on (survivance) where “the work 
does not simply live long, it lives more and better, beyond the means of its author (114). The gap or interval 
that subsists between language—original and translation—cannot be finally overcome; it can only be 
touched by an intensification of expression that “render presents what is absent…allowing remoteness to 
approach as remoteness, fort/da” (132). Derrida ultimately goes on to identify translation with experience 
as such, in a manner not unlike his meditation on nostalgia by way of John Donne mentioned above. Much 
remains to be written using this line of thought as an interpretive lens for demarcating, in a more direct and 
comprehensive way, the terms through which Heideggerian and post-Heideggerian strains of thought 




nostalgic experience and suffuses Malick’s work, also opens up space for increased 
movement and propulsion. By turning to cinema, Malick’s philosophical failure in this 
regard becomes an enduring success, an exit that animates, gesturing toward new modes 
of movement and passage.  
 That exit took time to really solidify. Once back in the states, Malick taught as a 
visiting philosophy lecturer at MIT, filling in for Hubert Dreyfus during the latter’s 
sabbatical. Dreyfus, of course, was a noted Heidegger expert and Malick stepped in to 
deliver his famous Being and Time seminar.440 A short time later, in 1969, he published 
his Heidegger translation.441 Malick wore many hats during this time and these were not 
his only post-Oxford endeavors. He freelanced for Life and Newsweek and wrote 
obituaries of Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr. for The New Yorker. In late 
1967, The New Yorker sent him to Bolivia for four months to cover the widely publicized 
trial of Régis Debray, a rising French philosopher who came under fire for his Marxist 
commitments and association with Che Guevara’s guerrilla uprisings. The piece was to 
be on Debray, principally, but Malick had larger plans to profile Guevara himself. He 
traveled with Michele Ray, a former Chanel model and fellow freelance reporter who had 
just escaped the Vietcong and was herself under fire for her reporting on the Vietnam 
 
440 Cf. Thomas Deane Tucker and Stuart Kendall, Terrence Malick: Film and Philosophy (New 
York, NY: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011), 80. 
441 Malick’s translation, the first of its kind, remains an important version of that text. John Sallis 
cites it as a critical guide for his own translation of Heidegger’s text in Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks, ed. 
William McNeil (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1998). As others have noted, such a 
project perhaps indicates that Malick intended to operate as a sort of independent researcher and thinker, 




War. They arrived on October 10, one day after Guevara was captured and summarily 
executed by Bolivian authorities. The essay never came to fruition.442 
 Malick’s own restlessness and inner consternation further exacerbated these false 
starts. Thwarted scholarly and professional aspirations led to stagnation, self-sabotage, 
and personal turmoil. He intended to complete The New Yorker piece despite Guevara’s 
death but failed to do so in large part because the project kept increasing in scope. He 
amassed copious notes but struggled to find clear focus. Friend and colleague at the time 
Paul Lee recalls Malick working on the piece for months and months. “I have memory of 
it piling up to six feet of copy. He got obsessed and he overwrote.”443 Malick’s family life 
was also marred by tragedy during this time. His younger brother Lawrence, a promising 
musician, moved to Alicante, Spain to study flamenco guitar under a virtuosic but 
extremely demanding instructor. The pressure proved insurmountable and Lawrence 
ultimately succumbed, dramatically breaking his hands during a manic episode. He later 
phoned his older brother before committing suicide in a hotel room. Malick’s youngest 
brother, Chris, would also die by his own hand during an illness years later.444 It is 
difficult to watch Malick’s 2011 magnum opus The Tree of Life—its familial reckoning, 
its tender homage to lost siblings with artistic potential—without bearing these events in 
 
442 Malick did, however, attempt to revive his work in filmic form decades later, working on a 
biographical Che Guevara screenplay based in part on his experience in Bolivia during this time. When 
funding eventually fell through, Malick left to complete The New World (2005). The Che project was 
eventually helmed by Steven Soderbergh, starring Benicio del Toro in the titular role. 
443 Richard Brody, “Terrence Malick, the Way He Was,” The New Yorker, May 26, 2011, 
https://www newyorker.com/culture/richard-brody/terrence-malick-the-way-he-was.Elsewhere, Lee 
suggests that “the issue was…he didn’t know how or what to say, or what audience to address, other than 
writing for himself.” See Paul Maher Jr., One Big Soul: An Oral History of Terrence Malick (Lulu, 2012). 
29. 
444 Cf. Peter Biskind, Easy Riders Raging Bulls: How the Sex-Drugs-And Rock ’N Roll Generation 




mind, without detecting some sense of personal, autobiographical nostalgia, a type of 
ongoing re-marking and bereavement.  
 Professionally, Malick’s experience teaching Dreyfus’ Heidegger course in 1968 
was also a disaster, similarly marked with nearly crippling disquietude, obsession, and 
one can surmise, grief. He felt that in order to teach the material one must experience it, 
which made for some palpably awkward moments in the lecture hall. “At one point,” 
Dreyfus remembers, “[he] got to the part on anxiety and discovered he wasn’t 
experiencing anxiety, so he couldn’t talk about anything. He just stared off into space for 
about ten minutes.”445 Perhaps Malick succeeded in inducing the experience he sought to 
impart that day, but such immersive strategies are rarely, if ever, effective. And he knew 
this. In one of the only public interviews he has ever given, a Sight and Sound piece 
published in 1975, Malick admits as much. “I was not a good teacher,” he confesses to 
Beverley Walker. “I didn’t have the sort of edge one should have on the students. So I 
decided to do something else.”446  
 That something else was film—and Malick certainly had the necessary sort of 
edge. In 1969, he began study at the American Film Institute (AFI) alongside Paul 
Schrader and David Lynch, paragons in waiting of what would become the “New 
Hollywood” movement.447 Malick released Badlands, his first feature, several years later 
 
445 Maher, One Big Soul, 25. 
446 Lloyd Michaels, Terrence Malick (Chicgago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2009), 102. 
447 During this period Malick also met longtime collaborator and production designer Jack Fisk, 
one of Lynch’s old childhood friends. While at AFI, Malick continued to pursue various freelance work 
and side projects. He worked as a script doctor on early, uncredited drafts: Drive, He Said (1971), Pocket 
Money (1972), and, most notably, Dirty Harry (1971). Under the pseudonym David Whitney he co-wrote 
The Gravy Train with Bill Kerby and penned Deadhead Miles himself. When Paramount Pictures shelved 




to impressive critical acclaim. It debuted in 1973 at the New York Film Festival—the 
same year, incidentally, as Lucas’s American Graffiti—and stole the show, even usurping 
Martin Scorsese’s highly anticipated Mean Streets.448 Warner Brothers picked up the film 
almost immediately. Five years later, Malick’s sophomore effort hit theaters. A romantic 
period drama set in west Texas during WWI, Days of Heaven (1978) is now widely 
regarded as the film where Malick really began to come into his own as a distinctive 
American director. Initial reviews were somewhat mixed and split along a familiar divide 
that still resurfaces with any new Malick release: those who find value in the poetic tone 
and visually stunning imagery, and those who find his work too elliptical and 
impressionistic, lacking a clear narrative and relatable dramatic stakes.449 Nevertheless, 
the film went on to garner four nominations and one deserved win in cinematography at 
the 51st Academy Awards. Malick also won the best director award at the 1979 Cannes 
Film Festival. The film built upon the critical success of Badlands and effectively 
launched Malick’s career, solidifying his position as a visionary auteur among his peers.  
 Charles Bluhorn, head of Paramount’s parent company Gulf+Western at the time, 
found Days of Heaven so compelling that he offered Malick a million dollars to fund his 
next big project, sight unseen.450 Malick accepted but old tendencies soon reemerged. As 
with the failed Che profile, he struggled to find focus and became more and more irritated 
 
448 Peter Biskind, “The Runaway Genius: Behind Terrence Malick’s The Thin Red Line,” Vanity 
Fair, April 23, 2010, https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2010/04/runaway-genius-199812. 
449 For example,  Harold C. Schonberg of The New York Times and Monica Eng of The Chicago 
Tribune stated that the film “never really makes up its mind what it wants to be” and that “the story is 
secondary to the visuals,” while Robert Biskind called Days of Heaven “a dark jewel of a film,” going on to 
praise its “melancholic tone and dreamy landscapes” in Vanity Fair. See Biskind, “The Runaway Genius.” 





by the need to present an attractive project that adhered to mainstream standards. Pressure 
and frustration mounted, and he became increasingly detached and disillusioned. He 
eventually shelved the project and disappeared from public life altogether. Nearly three 
decades and two feature-length films later, he would finally return to that semi-
autobiographical project, working a majority of its material into The Tree of Life. Years 
later, when asked about this hiatus, Malick displays striking modesty and characteristic 
intuitiveness, as if such a seismic decision were just another fleeting directorial impulse 
indulged on one of his sets, almost an act of habit. “I never even thought about it,” he 
says. “I was just in Paris. And suddenly it’s been 17 years.”451 
 In “The Origin of the Work of Art” Heidegger reiterates his key phrase—the 
world worlds—adding that the worlding of the world brings it “more fully in being than 
the tangible and perceptible realm in which we believe ourselves to be at home.”452 This 
is noteworthy on at least two fronts. First, it further conjoins the main themes discussed 
in chapters 2-3, i.e., the conceptual linkage between home, homesickness, affective 
attunement, and nostalgia. Heidegger, drawing on Novalis, defines homesickness, the 
fundamental mood of philosophy, as a form of desire that emerges in the wake of 
estrangement and loss, the drive to be at home everywhere, even in the most unhomely of 
places. As nostalgia, this homesickness registers as desire, the ache to dwell within the 
worlding of the world and make of it a home.453 Second, Malick’s short-lived 
 
451 Maher, One Big Soul, 109. 
452 Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Basic Writings, Revised and Expand Edition, 
ed. David Farrell Krell (New York, N.Y.: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2008), 170. Italics mine. 
453 As Frank Schalow and Alfred Denker put it: “Dwelling is in its more profound sense a 





philosophical efforts draw out the connotations of movement and propulsion embedded 
in Heidegger’s positioning of the world as a transcendental phenomenon, a horizon or 
limit concepts that both outstrips and conditions Dasein’s modes of being.454 
Transcendence, of course, carries connotations of exceeding or surpassing a boundary, of 
crossing a clear limit to the passage beyond. In Heidegger’s thinking, alienation and 
estrangement (the inability to adequately move about) emerge due to our deep 
entanglement within the world, a world whose worlding teems with its own movement, 
what Heidegger calls unconcealment and emergent presencing.455 I have already 
discussed the entangled values that undergird Heidegger’s determinations here (unity, 
wholeness, presence as such, etc.) and the tensions they create between loss, movement 
in time, and nostalgic desire. Malick is no doubt aware of these tensions too, but unlike 
Heidegger he does not seek to alleviate them. Instead, he makes productive use of them 
in his cinematic body of work by prising them open further, giving them space to breathe, 
and “dar[ing] to unfurl something of life in the present tense.”456 That unfurling is shot 
through with, and in some cases motivated by, a form of nostalgic desire deeply 
 
measure from the way that the world fits together and lets entities show themselves as they are. Dwelling is 
building a home in the world. […] Human beings attend in their dwelling to the world by responding in 
their thinking to the address of being.” See their  Historical Dictionary of Heidegger’s Philosophy, 2nd 
edition (Lanham, M.D.: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 41. 
454 Malick explicitly mentions this in his critical notes to Vom Wesen des Grundes. See Heidegger, 
The Essence of Reasons, 138n26. 
455 James Morrison and Thomas Schur suggest that this is “the defining paradox of Heidegger’s 
thought…that we are detached or alienated because we are so unavoidably entangled in the world.” See 
their James Morrison and Thomas Schur, eds., The Films of Terrence Malick (Westport, C.T.: Praeger, 
2003), 14. 
456 Michael Nordine, “Hollywood Bigfoot: Terrence Malick and the 20-Year Hiatus That Wasn’t,” 





concerned with how experiences of loss or temporal discontinuity continue to animate 
and re-mark.  
 
Memory at Work 
 Taken as whole, Malick’s cinematic oeuvre offers us a sustained and compelling 
meditation on the work of memory and the temporized nature of the human condition, the 
interminable stretching out of the moving subject across time.457  Nourished by the 
recollective absence of things past, propelled by the anticipatory absence of things to 
come, and longing for some repose through things presently becoming absent, this 
subject often seeks refuge in the solace of the (moving) image. Malick seizes upon this 
dynamic and combines some of the most radical insights of phenomenology—that, in 
time, the self never completely coincides with itself—with the formal qualities unique to 
the moving image, i.e., its ability to portray the fleeting passage of time. This is what 
Cavell has in mind when he refers to the “formal radiance” of Malick’s cinema, the 
manner in which the director’s images suggest a “metaphysical vision” predicated upon 
the interplay between presence and absence, things present and things past. Malick 
approaches this interplay with a probing, contemplative eye that focuses its attention on 
the fleeting nature of experience and the mutable traces of memory. If memory is more a 
leaking sieve than a perpetually open shutter—some things forever escape, others slip 
through, often unannounced—then Malick’s camera isn’t a camera at all, at least not in 
 
457 St. Augustine is among the first to have pointed this out, referring to the experience of time as a 
type of distention or constitutive stretchedness, what he calls distentio animi. I turn to this idea briefly in 




the traditional sense.458 Its aperture serves to shed some light on the persistent gaps lodged 
in recollective experience. It orbits those gaps and re-marks upon them, but ultimately 
withholds closure and resists finality. The gaps persist and remain; with enough time and 
distance they form the space in which nostalgia emerges.  
 These themes reach their sublime apex in Malick’s 2011 masterpiece The Tree of 
Life, but nearly all of his features deploy them to some degree. His first two films are 
especially instructive. A continuation of his 1969 AFI thesis project Lanton Mills—a 
short Texas western starring Warren Oates and Henry Dean Stanton—Badlands tells a 
loosely fictionalized version of the Charles Starkweather and Caril Anne Fugate killing 
spree of 1958. Starring Martin Sheen and Sissy Spacek, young, unknown principal actors 
at the time, the neo-noir crime drama melds the lovers-on-the-lam motif of Bonnie and 
Clyde (1967) with the titillating adolescent delinquency of Rebel Without a Cause (1955), 
forming the basis for the circuitous and atmospheric directorial style for which Malick is 
known: a loose, meandering plot firmly rooted in the modern American psyche, extensive 
use of enigmatic voice-over narration, symbolically rich visual imagery shot with 
cascading natural light, and a pronounced conflict or tension between the forces of nature 
and the arbitrary strictures of human civilization, between the cosmic and the mundane, 
the universal and the particular.459 In these early films, Malick knits these elements 
 
458 This is a riff on John Green’s musings on sports rivalries and Apple’s Notes app. See John 
Green, host, “Notes App and Sports Rivalries,” Anthropocene Reviewed (podcast), November 27, 2019, 
https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/anthropocene-reviewed/episodes/anthropocene-reviewed-notes-app-
and-sports-rivalries. 
459 This may seem like an obvious point in hindsight. Malick wrote the screenplay in his late 20s 
and was only 30 when the film was released. But it is worth noting that there are those who valorize 





together with a concern for the passage of time and the losses or defeats that passage 
often entails.  
 In a glowing retrospective on the film, Roger Ebert situates Badlands within 
Malick’s larger body of work, drawing particular attention to how he mobilizes these 
elements. When comparing Malick’s debut with The Tree of Life, Ebert notices a curious 
similarity between the homes used in each film and observes that “we sense [Malick’s] 
own memories at work.”460 As we saw with Hofer, the concepts of ‘home’ and 
‘homeliness’ give rise to more modern and contemporary forms of nostalgia that evince a 
longing to return to the time of formative provenance, a time characterized by a strong 
sense of belonging and identification. In Badlands, we see Malick working to develop a 
cinematic vision, one informed by his own memory and experience, that begins to 
approach a probing, meditative form of nostalgia more animating and propulsive than it is 
stultifying.  
 That vision deepens in Days of Heaven, the feature that gave Cavell good reason 
to link the director’s cinematic vision with the nexus between presence, absence, and 
temporization. The film follows two lovers—Richard Gere and Brooke Adams—
employed to harvest fall crops for a wealthy farmer (Sam Shepard, in one of his first 
major roles). Principal photography began in 1976, but the film did not see wide release 
 
remains arguably the most perfectly realized of his four works to date.” This is hardly the case now—
Malick has made five more films since 2011’s The Tree of Life, the apex of his career—and it is difficult to 
see how Days of Heaven, The Thin Red Line, and The New World do not stand as important moments in his 
development, each film improving upon its predecessors and more fully realizing its intrinsic aims. Current 
critical consensus seems to suggest some stagnation or regression in Malick’s post-2011 period, but this is 
certainly not the case in his earlier work. Cf. Michaels, Terrence Malick, 20. 





until 1978 due in large part to environmental factors and, especially, Malick’s 
unconventional methods.461 He rejected auxiliary lighting equipment in favor natural 
light, composing many shots around dusk, during “magic hour” when the light is soft and 
evenly diffuse.462 He also pared down daily call sheets, enabling him to improvise on set 
and capture things on the fly as conditions warranted. His describes his approach during 
production as follows: 
I was able to capture absolute reality. That was my wish: to prevent the appearance of any 
technique, and that the photography as to be processed to be visually beautiful and to ensure 
this beauty existed within the world I was trying to show, suggesting that which was lost, 
or what we were now losing.463 
 
While met with some initial resistance, this technique ultimately proved quite successful, 
serving to formalize the approach Malick has deployed in virtually every feature since.464 
This quiet, searching style prioritizes mood and atmosphere over histrionic dramaturgy, 
allowing Malick to evoke a very specific set of feelings. That set of feelings orbits the 
 
461 Production was notoriously arduous, Malick’s developing style notwithstanding. Although the 
film is set in Texas, it was mostly shot in Alberta, Canada where the cast and crew had to contend with 
brutal conditions, including overpowering winds and the bitter cold. See Maher, One Big Soul, 80. 
462 For more on this approach and what it entailed see Néstor Almendros, A Man With a Camera. 
New York, NY: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1984. Along with Haskell Wexler, Almendros worked as a 
principal cinematographer on the film. 
463 Maher, One Big Soul, 82. Italics mine.This often meant changing or aborting plans in order to 
capture small, fleeting moments. Sam Shepard recalls: “Terry’d be all set up to do a scene and there’d be a 
flight of geese across the sky. He’d get everybody to turn their cameras and shoot this thing because it was 
happening right then. And the crew would be like, ‘ahh shit, what is this bullshit?’ And then there would be 
this absolutely gorgeous shot in natural light. There it was. But that’s one of the parts of his genius, I think, 
is his ability to see the moment and say, “Okay, now, if we don’t get this, we’ll never get it,” and to ignore 
the conventions of how you shoot a movie.” 
464 Malick’s unorthodox style led to an air of discontent and impatience on set. Several prominent 
crew members quit, accusing Malick and his inner circle of unprofessionalism and a lack of technical 
knowledge. Actors like Gere were also a bit displeased, or at the very least disoriented, by Malick’s manner 
of direction, a probing, curious style that valued mood and atmosphere over the histrionic dramaturgy of 
classical Hollywood. Nevertheless, Malick’s main cinematographer, Almendros, went on to win an 
Academy Award for his work on the film and Malick was awarded  the Prix de la mise en scène at the 
Cannes film festival. Days of Heaven continues to be a canonical reference in American cinema, largely 




same affective terrain as nostalgia and coheres with Ebert’s assessment of Badlands, 
eliciting an experience of bittersweetness that often emerges from the opacities of 
memory and wistful reminisce, the stirrings that arise from some mythical idea of 
‘home.’ Malick himself suggests that the film’s title “comes from a feeling that a place 
exists that is within reach…where we will be safe…a place where a house will not rest on 
the sand, where you will not become crazier by fighting again and again against the 
impossible.”465 These distinctly homely feelings—safety, security, belonging—surface in 
the wake of the losses and discontinuities generated by temporized experience, the 
phenomenon of being thrown hither and thither, cast here and there by the vagrancies of 
time and the vicissitudes of the human condition Malick takes great care to re-present on 
screen. The title also conjures Deuteronomy—“that your days be multiplied…as the days 
of heaven upon the earth”—a line uttered during the film as a nameless preacher prays 
over whispering fields of wheat. Those wheat fields occupy a central place in Malick’s 
own homely recollections. “I have a very good memory of it,” he remembers, recalling 
his work in the wheat and oil fields across the Great Plains of Texas and Oklahoma as a 
boy.  
 But, much like nostalgia itself, those affectionate, visually striking memories are 
not without ambivalence and equivocation. Malick disliked the unpredictable precarity of 
harvest time, both its unmoored transience and petty criminality. As he puts it in an 
interview with Michel Ciment of Positif, “I was raised in a violent environment…what 
struck me was how violence erupted and ended before you really had time to understand 
 




what was happening.”466 As time marches on understanding comes belatedly, as do the 
sometimes conflicting feelings associated with nostalgic desire, feelings that long to slow 
the passage of time so it might be experienced more fully. As in Badlands, Days of 
Heaven juxtaposes stunning natural beauty with the churning, ever-present threat of 
violence and indifference. In both films, Malick re-marks upon Heidegger’s ‘worlding of 
the world’ and in each case “the beauty of nature carries a penitential charge…the sense 
of irrecoverable loss the films convey.”467 This loss emerges in the moment and attains 
true recognition after the fact. Here, in this space of belatedness, nostalgia begins to come 
into view, taking root in the gap that subsists between lived experienced and delayed 
understanding, between the initial moment when impressions make their lasting marks 
and their deferred, sometimes retroactive effects. These are the main themes that 
undergird Malick’s filmography, themes that achieve new meaning and significance in 
his long awaited 2011 feature.  
 The Tree of Life opens with an utterance, a barely heard address to an as yet 
unknown recipient. So does nostalgia. In his 1688 dissertation Hofer writes that “it is 
possible from the force of the sound Nostalgia, to define the sad mood [tristem animum] 
originating from the burning desire  [ardenti desiderio] for the return.”468 The force Hofer 
identifies suggests a nearly tangible intensity of feeling, a deep desire for return, rooted in 
recollection, in images that have made their marks and remain in memory. The sound 
 
466 Michaels, Terrence Malick, 110. Italics mine. 
467 Hannah Patterson, The Cinema of Terrence Malick: Poetic Visions of America, Second Edition 
(New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 2012), 202. 
468 Johannes Hofer, “Medical Dissertation on Nostalgia,” trans. Carolyn Kiser Anspach, Bulletin of 




nostalgia generates comes to us through two discrete sounds—nostos and algos, 
homecoming and ache—that together constitute the force, a force that forms an address. 
It is through this address, this sound, that nostalgic longing achieves recognition and 
expression, intimating a desire for movement in the form of return. The forceful address 
nostalgia forges cries out for return, a re-turning toward home, origins, beginnings, and 
provenance—a turning back toward something lost, perhaps even irrevocable, but no less 
animating. From a feeling, then, a proper name—nostalgia—a name in search of a 
recipient, a hearer, an addressee who might be able to sate the desire that both elicits the 
name and exceeds it. For Hofer this proper name indicates a seizure of movement, the 
inability to turn, to move, a failure to re-turn or go back suggestive of a doomed or 
thwarted passage home. Doomed or not, the address this name calls forth persists, 
impelling movement through a turning toward or turning away that reorients and 
unsettles. 
 The nearly inaudible address that opens The Tree of Life initiates one such 
turning, a turning toward some unknown other. This address goes on to take many 
serpentine, disorienting turns over the course of the film, acting as a strange sort of guide, 
unclear in its sense of direction. Each of these turns elicits the force of Hofer’s neologism 
by virtue of the moving image. Initially, this enigmatic, indeterminate address is set 
against the image of a single, flickering orb light.469 “Brother. Mother.” To whom or what 
 
469 The orb of light (and, it seems, the much talked about cosmogonic sequence) was one of the 
first elements of the film to emerge, dating all the way back to 1979 when it was only known as “Project 
Q.” In an early document titled “Cosmogony: First Light” Malick describes “a great rose window of light, 
lasting only five or six seconds, so you can’t testify to what you have seen.” Given the effects technology at 





is this address addressed? And who issues the address? “It was they who led me to your 
door.” A door suggests a threshold of sorts, a sign of potential crossing or passage—
movement, in other words, nostalgia’s most fundamental theme. Our as yet unnamed 
speaker thus faces a decision, a crossroads. Is the crossing completed? Does the passage 
occur? The film’s opening both raises the question and defers the answer, imparting a 
cryptic address that exerts a quiet force even as its precise sense and status remain 
unclear.  
 The film has a long history rooted, as I have intimated, in Malick’s own 
biography, and dating all the back to the years leading up to his infamous hiatus. After 
securing a deal with Bluhorn and Paramount, Malick commenced work on a strange, 
sprawling project known simply as Project Q. He produced pages and pages of 
enigmatic, tenebrous prose, but nothing that resembled a conventional Hollywood 
narrative. Studio executives found this exorbitant, unrealistic, and unacceptable, 
imploring Malick to “send a script that starts with page one and at the ends says, ‘The 
End.’”470 Malick continued to draft and refine the script throughout the 1980s while the 
mainstream press wondered where “Hollywood’s Bigfoot” might have gone.471 But he 
 
more at his disposal, opting to use the musician, inventor, and early light artist Thomas Wilfred’s 
penultimate lumia image “Opus 161” “to suggest ethereal light emerging from the darkness of the void” 
See Maher, One Big Soul, 101. 
470 Ibid., 104-105. 
471 Cf. Michael Nordine, “Hollywood Bigfoot: Terrence Malick and the 20-Year Hiatus That 
Wasn’t,” Los Angeles Review of Books, May 12, 2013, https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/hollywood-
bigfoot-terrence-malick-and-the-20-year-hiatus-that-wasnt/. What Malick was doing during this 20-year 
hiatus instantly became the subject of massive speculation and has since become canonical cinephile lore. 
As Nordine observes, Malick’s near categorical refusal of the modern cult of celebrity only served, 
ironically, to solidify his absorption within it. See Ibid. Rumors proliferated. Was he living in a garage 
somewhere in central Texas? Was he working as a hairdresser? Maybe he moved back to Paris to teach 





never really took the notes he received from Paramount seriously. When critics chided 
Days of Heaven for offering a thin narrative without enough story, Malick simply 
doubled down. “I want to go more in that direction,” he would say, expressing what some 
have called a deep “interest in non-narrative style, the cinematic equivalent of 
how…Beethoven structured his symphonies.”472 Like the Che Guevara project abandoned 
years before, Project Q kept expanding in scope, nearly jettisoning narrative altogether in 
favor of poetic abstraction. The initial idea involved an impressionistic multi-character, 
multi-period drama set in the Middle East during the early 20th century with a prehistoric 
 
traveled to the Middle East to explore his father’s Assyrian lineage. See Nordine as well as Gaby Woods, 
“Absence of Malick,” The Irish Times, February 13, 1999, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/absence-of-
malick-1.152668 and Eric Benson, “The Not-So-Secret Life of Terrence Malick,” Texas Monthly, 2017, 
https://www.texasmonthly.com/the-culture/the-not-so-secret-life-of-terrence-malick/. It turns out that 
American cinema’s own J.D. Salinger, a Hollywood version of Thomas Pynchon, was covertly splitting his 
time between France and Texas, nurturing a new love. At one point he ran into one of his Badlands 
principals, Martin Sheen, in Paris and gave him a copy of Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, a 
moment to which Sheen still attaches deep significance. Cf. Maher, One Big Soul, 106-107. During this 
time Malick also quietly resumed worked as a script doctor. He wrote his own version of The English-
Speaker, based on Josef Breuer’s analysis of Anna O., a prominent case history in Freud’s Studies in 
Hysteria, and contributed to adaptations of Walker Percy’s The Moviegoer, Larry McMurtry’s The Desert 
Rose, and Mori Ōgai’s Sansho the Bailiff, as well as an early and eventually completely rewritten iteration 
of Jim McBride’s Jerry Lee Lewis biopic Great Balls of Fire!. See see “The Lost Projects And Unproduced 
Screenplays Of Terrence Malick,” IndieWire, July 12, 2011, https://www.indiewire.com/2011/07/the-lost-
projects-and-unproduced-screenplays-of-terrence-malick-117563/. He was also attached to an early, 
undeveloped version Elephant Man (1980), a historical drama based on Joseph Merrick, before David 
Lynch signed on. None of these projects ever came to full fruition. By the mid-1980s he resurfaced in 
Austin, Texas, attending a screening of Bresson’s Au Hasard Balthazar organized by Richard Linklater (a 
film inspired by The Idiot, yet another Dostoevsky connection). At the turn of the decade, he began to 
spend even more time there, supporting local artists and recruiting young, unknown talents to take on 
larger, more ambitious projects. Malick returned to prominence in 1998 with an adaptation of James Jones’ 
The Thin Red Line, a project subject to more than 10 years worth of extensive negotiation and lengthy pre-
preproduction planning. Peter Biskind documents this saga in detail in his “The Runaway Genius: Behind 
Terrence Malick’s The Thin Red Line,” Vanity Fair, April 23, 2010, 
https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2010/04/runaway-genius-199812. Tragically, the film was released 
just one month after Spielberg’s Saving Private Ryan—a classic Hollywood war film in virtually every 
sense—and continues to live in its long shadow. In the best way possible, Malick’s foray in the genre 
“seems [at times] to be a war picture in name only…as interested in a newborn bird on the battlefield as the 
ins and outs of combat.” Cf. Ebiri, “Thirty-Three Years of Principal Filming.” Famed director Martin 
Scorsese has stated that The Thin Red Line remains one of his favorite films of the 1990s. 




prologue. As Michael Nordine observes, many of “the prehistoric elements were 
eventually integrated into The Tree of Life,”473 while the more bizarre and cerebral 
sequences were excised. These included a sleeping, minotaur-type god who dreams of the 
origins of the universe while submerged underwater as fish swim in and out of its 
nostrils.474 The images Malick wanted to obtain were equally ambitious and while some 
can still be found in The Tree of Life’s illustrious cosmogonic sequence, much of the 
footage remains in storage.475 He sent close collaborators across the globe to “[capture] 
images nobody had ever seen before”—volcanic activity on Mt. Etna, ice shelves 
disintegrating in Antarctica, micro jellyfish along the Great Barrier Reef.476 Film crews 
captured a full lunar eclipse from an observatory near Palmdale, California477 and 
lemmings running into the sea in Nova Scotia.478  
 Malick was clearly separating himself from other more mainstream, tentpole-
oriented directors—Lucas, Spielberg, Coppola—by forging a new aesthetic path 
unparalleled in American cinema, a new mode of expression not unlike the one 
Heidegger failed to obtain in his own register. The magnitude of what he was attempting 
to portray calls the scale and scope of 2001: A Space Odyssey to mind, but even Stanley 
Kubrick managed to ground his epic in something tangible. In the early days Project Q 
 
473 Ibid. 
474 Some collaborators suggest that Malick drew inspiration from the ancient Sumerian diety Apsu. 
Cf. Maher, One Big Soul, 103ff. 
475 Some of that footage can be seen in Malick’s 2016 documentary The Voyage of Time. 
476 Cf. Biskind, “The Runaway Genius.”  See also Maher, One Big Soul, 102-103. 
477 Eclipse footage is commonplace, of course. This was not what Malick was looking for. As Paul 
Ryan, who shot on Days of Heaven’s second unit puts it, “Terry wasn’t just interested in the classic shot of 
the sun being eclipsed. That’s a dime a dozen. I filmed a pasture, to see the effect of the eclipse on the 
animals, the darkening of the shadow across a field.” See, Ebiri, “Thirty-Three Years of Principal Filming.” 




lacked this element. Malick ended up delivering “a poetic science book, pages and pages 
of prose with no dialogue.”479 The deal with Paramount stalled. Malick continued to let 
the idea gestate but would only return to it in earnest nearly three decades later once he 
identified where and how to anchor the more human side of the drama. That reworked, 
re-marked version would eventually become The Tree of Life. 
 
An Initial Beginning 
 The film is set in Texas in 1956 and the loose plot revolves around an ordinary 
nuclear family. Mr. and Mrs. O’Brien (Brad Pitt, Jessica Chastain) have three sons and 
the film is principally interested in the eldest, Jack (Hunter McCracken). This frame story 
is more or less a standard coming of age drama and all the prototypical Oedipal motifs 
are on clear display. The gentle and benevolent Mrs. O’Brien—whom the film only refers 
to as ‘Mother’ throughout, signaling a familiar archetype—is, at various moments, seen 
glimmering before the radiant sun under a massive oak tree outside the O’Brien’s home; 
dancing in the front lawn with her children; and, in an especially spontaneous and organic 
moment, gently caressing a delicate butterfly on her fingertips, almost shimmering 
against stunning natural light filtered through leaves and tree branches. These images 
suggest Mother’s metonymic subject position as it unfolds over the course of the film. 
“The nuns taught us there are two ways through life,” she says. “The way of nature and 
the way of grace. You have to choose which one you’ll follow.” Grace “doesn’t try to 
please itself” while nature “only wants to have its own way.” If grace delights in granular 
 




details of the particular—the oak tree, the lawn, the precious butterfly—nature “finds 
reasons to be unhappy when all the world is shining around it, when love is smiling 
through all things.” 
 It comes as no surprise that the more adversarial subject position—nature—is 
occupied by Mr. O’Brien, who appears as the stern, excessively draconian Father. He 
goads his children into feigned self-defense, is quick to irruptive anger at even the 
smallest of improprieties, and displays characteristics of classic narcissism, both jealous 
and contemptuous of his family’s affection. His rigid, Darwinian approach compels him 
to advise Jack and his brothers that “it takes fierce will to get ahead in this world,” a stark 
contrast to the way of grace he dismisses as meek and naive. The film explicitly inscribes 
the tension between these two approaches within Jack’s own being. As his journey and 
coming of age gain more texture the dissonance infiltrates Jack’s guiding soliloquy, his 
internal address to himself that began, we discover, with the flickering orb of light that 
opens the film: “Mother. Father. Always you wrestle inside me, always you will.” The 
film never really alleviates this tension. Instead, it suggests a different manner of 
managing and maintaining it. 
 On the surface, then, the film presents an all too familiar coming-of-age narrative 
nested within a family drama complete with well-trod tropes: predictable domestic 
disputes, garden-variety adolescent angst, stereotypical gender roles, increased Oedipal 
conflict. If these psychoanalytic clichés seem too clearly on the nose it is because they do 
not encapsulate the entirety of the story nor do they completely exhaust the full depth of 




view beyond. The main narrative described above does not constitute the film’s 
beginning; it calls the very idea of origins and beginnings into question. In lieu of a 
traditional three-act plot, Malick offers up an aggregate of fragmented, yet vivid memory-
traces, a composite of abstract visions and impressions, an elaborate dream-work 
apprehended by Jack. As the film develops, we learn that this main narrative is not really 
a narrative at all, but a protracted sequence of nostalgic reminiscence set off by a sullen, 
despondent Jack decades later. And this—the film’s ‘present’—is itself introduced 
against the aftermath of a tragedy, an initially unremarked tragedy the full detail of which 
Malick withholds though its magnitude reverberates across nearly every shot. A different, 
more conventional film might violate that stillness, exploiting an unknown tragedy to 
build clear character arcs and sure-footed dramatic tension. One could imagine such a 
film eventually satisfying the desire to directly depict this unknown tragedy in gratuitous 
detail, as if such exposition could somehow explain the continued effects. But The Tree 
of Life is not a different, more conventional film and Malick rarely, if ever, depicts 
anything directly, opting, in the main, to frustrate desires for closure and continuity.480 In 
The Tree of Life we never directly see the tragedy that continues to torment Jack, only its 
persistent marks and re-marks. This event is only indirectly mentioned in passing, 
through a barely heard whisper, one of Jack’s many addresses to himself and others. Yet 
its echoes resonate throughout the entirety of the film, forming a silent yet deafening 
knot, only ever glimpsed briefly and obliquely through the opacities of Jack’s fragmented 
 
480 Perhaps this explains why Malick continually faces complaints of pretension and 




memory. In light of all this, one might be obliged to wonder if there is a more appropriate 
psychoanalytic analog with which to read the film, something more commensurate than 
the now standard miscellany of Oedipal anxieties and pre-Oedipal symbiosis.  
 In the 1970s, when Malick was working on Badlands and Days of Heaven, so-
called ‘screen theory’ was just beginning to gain traction in critical film studies. Closely 
affiliated with the Screen journal, a prominent film studies publication responsible for 
highly influential essays like Laura Mulvey’s “Visual Pleasure in Narrative Cinema,”481 
screen theory brings Marxist and psychoanalytic insights to bear on the moving image. 
Major screen theorists like Mulvey, Colin McCabe, and Stephen Heath “treat filmic 
images as signifiers encoding meanings but also as mirrors in which, by (mis)recognizing 
themselves, viewers accede to subjectivity.”482 Charles F. Altman offers a particularly 
useful means of interpreting this development by noting how film theorists “often resort 
 
481 Laura Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” Screen 16, no. 3 (October 1, 1975): 6–
18. 
482 Henry Krips, “Extract from Fetish: An Erotics of Culture,” in Jacques Lacan: Society, Politics, 
Ideology, ed. Slavoj Žižek (New York, N.Y: Routledge, 2003), 163. This approach is best understood 
within the wider context of new developments in film theory throughout the 1960s-70s that sought to 
theorize cinema under the tutelage of adjacent disciplines like semiotics and literary theory. These methods 
mark a major departure from earlier formulations. Initial theorists like André Bazin, Siegfried Kracauer, 
and Sergie Eisenstein, in an effort to outline the defining elements of the nascent artform, focused more on 
cinema’s capacities for aesthetic representation, its ability to construct “perfect illusions” that closely 
approximate the contours of temporized experience discussed in the previous chapter. Starting with major 
works by Christian Metz, who adopts the same Saussurean distinction between signifier and signified 
deployed by Derrida, film theory began in earnest by exploiting the old Platonic tension between image and 
referent, working to generalize its effects with the constitution of subjectivity. While perhaps a bit unfair in 
his characterizations, David Bordwell, a prominent neoformalist, offers a useful narrative of this shift and 
its history in the first chapter of David Bordwell and Noël E. Carroll, eds., Post-Theory: Reconstructing 
Film Studies (Madison, W.I.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996). See also Andrew Dudley’s account vis-
a-vis the concept of identification in chapter eight of his  Concepts in Film Theory (New York, N.Y.: 




to metaphors which indirectly explain the nature and function of the screen.”483 Film 
theory, like most theories, analogizes through abstraction in order to identify mediating, 
explanatory concepts commensurate to cinema’s achievements. For Christian Metz, a 
precursor to screen theory, this meant developing a more specific understanding of the 
manner in which cinema generates animated impressions of reality through the screen 
apparatus, what he calls a “semiotics of cinema.”484 This is an analogizing gesture of the 
highest order. Cinema does not produce ‘language’ in any obvious sense just as films do 
not present themselves to us straightforwardly as ‘texts’ that invite ‘readings’ even if we 
tacitly treat them as such. Metz was keenly aware of this tension, but Altman again offers 
perhaps the most clear-sighted position, characterizing this shift as an “attempt to create a 
new metaphor for the screen, one which would take into account the process of 
signification itself.”485 Metz further extends this metaphor in his later work by turning to a 
more psychoanalytic frame of reference where the screen offers an apparition of the self 
 
483 Charles F. Altman, “Psychoanalysis and Cinema,” in Movies and Methods: Vol. II, ed. Bill 
Nichols (University of California Press, 1976), 521. Italics mine. See also Dudley, 134. Dudley’s text also 
draws on Altman’s work and highlights the function of metaphor in film theorizing. 
484 For Metz, this is necessary because “going from one image to two images is to go from image 
to language.” His envisioned semiotics of cinema would thus closely attend to how film differs from 
photography by generating a unique form of movement, one that “orders signifying elements within 
ordered arrangements different from those of spoken idioms…[and] which remain scattered and 
fragmentary within the open field of simple visual duplication.” See Christian Metz, Film Language; A 
Semiotics of the Cinema, trans. Michael Taylor (New York,: Oxford University Press, 1974), 46, 91, 105. 
This marks his point of departure with earlier film theorists. On Metz’s reading the significance of the 
famous Kuleshov experiments does not simply validate the ‘montage or bust’ dogma of Soviet directors 
like Eisenstein and Roberto Rossellini. Instead, it “demonstrate[s] the existence of a logic of implication 
thanks to which the image becomes language.” See, Ibid., 47. 
485 Altman, “Psychoanalysis and Cinema,” 522. For his part, the driving motivation of Metz’s 
project is to explore this tension rather than simply gloss it. As he puts it: “When approaching the cinema 
from a linguistic point of view, it is difficult to avoid shuttling back and forth between two positions: the 
cinema as language; the cinema as infinitely different from verbal language. Perhaps it is impossible to 




rather than a Bazinian frame of reality.486 No longer simply a window to the world, the 
screen takes on reflective and spectatorial significance as a mirror, motivating (self-
)viewership and assembling projections that orient and mediate experience. 
 Screen theory mobilizes this metaphor in full force. Mulvey, for example, 
combines Jacques Lacan’s insights regarding the gaze and the mirror stage with a critique 
of patriarchal norms to complicate the politics of spectatorship. She notes the ways that 
“the unconscious of patriarchal society has structured film form”487 to occlude sexual 
difference by situating objects on screen that depend upon uneven dynamics of 
recognition and fascination. The structuring function at play here parallels the Lacanian 
symbolic order, one of several “elementary registers”488 that contribute to ego formation. 
In Lacan’s work, the symbolic mediates between the imaginary and the real through 
various modes of reproducible—and calcifying—signification. The imaginary acts as the 
pre-linguistic arena where the subject first gains some nascent awareness of its ostensibly 
whole, imaginal self. The real, by sharp contrast, chastens both the imaginary and the 
symbolic, indicating an unattainable, unassimilable element that outstrips the ego’s 
capacities for integration. If the imaginary provides a jejune illusion of unity and 
consolidated identity, the symbolic continually disabuses this fantasy by structuring and 
disciplining the ego, inculcating it into assigned subject positions that demand the 
 
486 Cf. Christian Metz, The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema, trans. Celia 
Britton (Bloomington, I.N.: Indiana University Press, 1982). See also, Christian Metz, Language and 
Cinema, trans. Donna Jean Umiker-Sebeok (Paris: Mouton, 1974). 
487 Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” 6. See also Kaja Silverman, Male 
Subjectivity at the Margins (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 1992). 
488 Jacques Lacan, “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis” in Ecrits: 





reproduction of familiar norms. Lacan’s most famous treatment of this tension is the 
mirror stage where he reads the child’s first encounter with themself via the mirror as 
both the apex of the imaginary and the beginning of entry into the symbolic.489 Before the 
mirror the child recognizes “the relationship between the movements made in the image 
and the reflected environment,” attaining a sense of apperceptive identification that 
subtends the “ontological structure of the human world.”490 This moment offers a 
situation in which ‘the I,’ is “precipitated in a primordial form” prior to social 
determination. It both installs an ego-ideal based on unity, permanence, and wholeness 
and demarcates that ideal’s limits—the reflection is an image, after all, and retains the 
structure of subjective fantasy. Here the self receives its universal, determining function 
as a subject—that which is sub-ject—charting a circumscribed course that leads “in a 
fictional direction that will forever remain irreducible for any single 
individual…symbolizing the ‘I’s’ mental permanence at the same time as it prefigures its 
alienating destination.”491 In other words, the self’s encounter with its reflective image in 
the mirror marks the discovery of subjectivity and the beginning of its attenuated 
constraint. In screen theory, Mulvey and others posit an instructive homology between 
cinema’s screening mechanism and the primal mirror stage based on this zero-sum 
economy of recognition, fantasy, and desire. Cinema offers us fantastical images in 
which we recognize our positions as subjects, confirming and shaping our desires as 
functions or effects of the symbolic order. 
 
489 See Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic 
Experience” in his Ecrits, 75-81. 





 Lacan’s insights are not the only psychoanalytic themes that might relate to 
cinema despite their prevalence in screen theory. Freud, on several occasions, writes of 
the ‘screen’ mechanism that adheres to the machinations of recollection. In a cluster of 
texts written between 1899 and 1914 Freud discusses what he calls “screen memories.” 
These special memories illuminate the relationship between ego formation and 
recollection, particularly as it pertains to memories forged in early childhood, the 
traditional material of nostalgia, the subject of Malick’s film, and the same period in 
which Lacan situates the mirror-stage.492 Such experiences, Freud tells us, perhaps 
anticipating Derrida, “leave ineradicable traces in the depths of our mind.”493 These traces 
often correlate with random, seemingly indifferent or insignificant everyday events—
minor details, in other words, that are later, through belated and retroactive processes 
imputed with great value.494 Freud speculates that these ostensibly trivial memories serve 
as a cipher for latent psychic content long since forgotten. They ventriloquize the 
fundamental through the nonessential, veiling deeper, more objectionable events subject 
 
492 The principal texts in this regard are Screen Memories,” in The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 3 (Hogarth Press, 1971), 303-322; “Creative 
Writers and Daydreaming,” in Sigmund Freud et al., The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 9 (Hogarth Press, 1971), 419-428; “Childhood Memories and Screen 
Memories,” in Sigmund Freud et al., The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, vol. 6 (Hogarth Press, 1971), 43-52; and “Remembering, Repeating, and Working 
Through,” in Sigmund Freud et al., The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, vol. 12 (Hogarth Press, 1971), 147-156. 
493 Sigmund Freud, “Screen Memories,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 3 (Hogarth Press, 1971), 303. 
494 I discussed this phenomenon at length with regard to both Freud and Derrida in chapter three 
above, but I am not the only person to draw these connections between Nachträglichkeit and the screening 
function of both memory and affect. Jean-Claude Rolland, for example, explicitly yokes the two concepts 
together because they attend to the manner in which “memory disorganizes time,” thematizing, as it were, 
“the temporal flux of mental life much better than a direct reference to time…could ever do.” Cf. his 
“Unconscious Memory From a Twin Perspective,” in The Experience of Time: Psychoanalytic 




to repressive processes. Fragmentary recollections such as these quite literally ‘screen’ 
their correlate, suggesting a “value that lies in the fact that [they] represent 
impressions…of a later date whose content is connected…by symbolic or similar 
links.”495 The ‘original’ impression is therefore worked over, or re-marked, belatedly, and 
translated or re-inscribed in memory as a benign association. This reworked impression 
thus “owes its value as a memory not to its content but to the relation existing between 
that content and some other.”496 What is forgotten or repressed is never really gone, it 
seems, only quietly circulating beside and astride, available for reworking due to the 
same logic of implication that adheres to the cinema, a type of mental Kuleshov effect 
central to the screening mechanism.  
 The screen apparatus applies to affectivity as well, especially in cases where 
memories are bound up with present and prior feelings that can function as a surrogate or 
substitute. As thinkers like David. S. Werman have shown, nostalgia stands as a 
particularly paradigmatic example of this phenomenon due in large part to its internal 
ambivalence, its combination of both negative (bitter) and positive (sweet) feeling. 
Nostalgia, for Werman, “not only serves as a screen memory but may also be said to 
operate as a screen affect” precisely because it is so often associated with mourning and 
loss. In this view, screen affects like nostalgia represent an attempt to “master” earlier 
experiences by “present[ing] themselves to hide others,” concealing and reworking 
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something much more elemental.497 This screening aspect, in addition to subjecting prior 
memories and affective states to various processes of re-marking, also tends to “deceive 
as to chronology,” engendering a more fluid and flexuous form of temporality that 
closely orbits the twin notions of nachträglichkeit and après-coup explored in chapter 
three.498 By unsettling time and offering up ideal images and memory-traces of the past, 
nostalgia provides the ego-subject with a means of incorporating and retaining part of the 
lost object along with the bittersweet feelings associated with it.  
 This is precisely what takes places in The Tree of Life. Malick crafts a cinematic 
labyrinth that contains various marks, fragments, and impressions that refuse the more 
doctrinaire psychoanalytic glosses offered by Lacan and screen theory. These memory-
traces exercise a decisive influence upon Jack’s subject position, but they increase, rather 
than impoverish, his capacities for movement.499 Malick mobilizes feelings of nostalgia, 
 
497 David S. Werman, “Normal and Pathological Nostalgia,” Journal of the American 
Psychoanalytic Association 25 (1977), 398, 395-396. See also Bertram David Lewin, The Psychoanalysis 
of Elation (London: Hogarth Press, 1951), 70-73. 
498 Bertram David Lewin, The Psychoanalysis of Elation (London: Hogarth Press, 1951), 70-73. 
499 Lacan and the screen theorists are only partially to blame here. Freud, for his part, authorizes 
this sort of passive fatalism as others have noted. With regard to the screen memory, he claims that the 
impressed mark remains, as a trace, “exercis[ing] a determining influence for the whole of…later life.” Cf. 
Sigmund Freud, “Childhood Memories and Screen Memories,” in  The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 6 (Hogarth Press, 1971), 45. In Freud’s view screen memories 
mainly serve as a tool to isolate and ferret out various neuroses, as do so many of his concepts. Nostalgia, 
too, emerged as a diagnostic tool during Hofer’s time and continues to circulate with those same negative 
associations. Ever the grand master of suspicion, Freud is concerned with diagnosing the pathological, 
proliferating decidedly symptomatic readings that pit the constrained, impoverished ego against 
intransigent outside forces, as pointed phrases like “determining influence” suggest. For his part, Lacan, 
places an even stronger, more doctrinaire gloss on this tendency, as we have seen. Malick does not, 
however. Instead, he offers us a cinematic view of the untapped potentials of Freud’s insights, insights 
partially identified by Derrida that service to complicate Freud’s more immovable, zero-sum proclivities. 
The screen memory conceals a deeper, more all-encompassing truth, to be sure. But it also owes it status as 
a memory to the mnemonic links and symbolic associations it shares with the forgotten content it 
ensconces. Freud himself tells us that these links and associations exist between. In Malick’s film, this 
liminality suggests possibilities for movement beyond the usual psychoanalytic bromides, beyond the 
simple enfeebled-subject versus fixed-structure dyad where strategic interventions are always already 




depicting the type of desire those feelings engender by demonstrating how screened and 
screening memories show that “the past is present,” pointing toward “a continual 
remaking in the present” where the past takes on a life of its own inside the life of the 
mind.500 Nostalgia screens Jack’s grief and bereavement, making it possible for him to 
engage in broader, more propulsive forms of movement initially inaccessible to him. 
Through nostalgia he pursues the work of mourning via reminiscence and recollection, a 
re-marking of impressed memory traces that continue to persist. The enigmatic address 
that opens the film already raises the possibility of this transformation and acts as a sort 
of lighthouse signal that guides Jack through this journey. This address is accompanied 
by and set against innumerable snapshots from Jack’s memory. Malick knits these images 
together in a manner that willfully frustrates the determinations of linear time and 
playfully resists the long-standing conventions of traditional cinematic storytelling.  
 With this in mind, it is worth noting that while the main narrative of The Tree of 
Life certainly consumes a majority of screen time, it is bookended by several enigmatic, 
dreamlike vignettes indicative of the film’s strange, serpentine sense of timing, the same 
timing so often characteristic of nostalgic desire. We are presented with at least six 
different time periods: 1.) snippets from Mrs. O’Brien’s childhood; 2.) Jack’s childhood 
memories of living in Texas, i.e., the nostalgic ‘narrative’; 3.) later memories, belonging 
to Mrs. O’Brien it seems, in the immediate aftermath of tragedy; 4.) the cosmogonic 
emergence of our current universe and organic life on earth; 5.) the future destruction of 
 
500 Henry F. Smith, “Foreword” in The Experience of Time: Psychoanalytic Perspectives, ed. 




our solar system and the emergence of new planets; 6.) the ‘present’ in which the 
previous five emerge and converge. Though numbered here for the sake of convenience, 
Malick does not present these ‘periods’ in successive, sequential order; he re-presents 
them as fragments that often overlap and snake back upon another. Linearity itself is 
immobilized in favor of belated (re)working and retroactive re-marking as the film 
unfurls. Jack, our fledging protagonist, appears to apprehend these seemingly 
incommensurate ‘times’ within the span of a single day—perhaps even a single instant—
holding them in ponderous tension as he contends with his own memory, desire, and 
potential for movement. He vies with the contrast and discontinuity that inheres within 
and between these ‘times,’ hence the difficulty in localizing a definite start point—the 
origin or the beginning.  
 Every film has an identifiable beginning, but in The Tree of Life Malick manages 
to portray, in a deeply compelling way, something already underway. We encounter Jack 
in media res; we watch as he finds himself in the midst of things, as he discovers himself 
thrown ‘here’ and ‘there,’ to use the Heideggerian register. Many films rely on this sort 
of device as a mere gimmick; Malick does not. Where a more mainstream Hollywood 
blockbuster might throw its viewers into the ‘middle’ of some frenzied action sequence 
meant to grab immediate attention, an extended car chase or a conversation in process for 
example, The Tree of Life manages to sustain a useful form of disorientation for the 
majority of its runtime. That disorientation is an effect of one of the film’s finest 
achievements: its ability to offer compelling moving images that convey how temporized 




machinations of a linear narrative anchored to clear beginnings and full, final closure, 
Malick depicts the fluid movement between seemingly disparate periods and events, the 
various ‘heres’ and ‘theres.’ Rather than sating the desire to fill in the blanks or close the 
gaps, he offers us apertured remains, and through the aperture of the camera he shares 
with Emmanuel Lubezki we receive a cinematic assemblage that closely approximates 
the work of mourning, the timing of memory, and the propulsive force of nostalgic 
desire.  
 
To Begin, Again  
 The film’s multiple timelines create space for multiple beginnings and entry 
points. Let us begin again, then, in order to track the itinerary of the work’s main 
character. A middle-aged Jack (Sean Penn) works as an architect in an unnamed 
metropolitan area. The tedium and movement of modern life appear overbearing, 
exhausting, and jumbled. The shiny surfaces of the skyscrapers, windows, and mirrors 
reflect only themselves, revealing a noticeable absence of nature and organic life, a lack 
of latitude and expansiveness. As Jack traverses this anesthetized, anemic environment 
we learn that it is the anniversary of a death, that of his younger brother R.L., who “died 
when he was nineteen.” This brief, almost missable revelation frames the entire film as an 
intricate scene of loss and grief. Triggered by bereavement and commemoration, Jack 
slowly begins to re-turn to his childhood in order to re-mark (upon) his memory and 
facilitate the previously arrested work of mourning. This takes time to fully develop and 
unfold. In a phone conversation with his father—which intimates that Mrs. O’Brien is 




reveals that he lacks a sense uncluttered internal space. “I just feel like I’m bumping into 
walls,” he mutters. Malick depicts Jack’s rote, habituated milieu here as one of 
dispassionate, slap-dash mobility. There is movement, to be sure, but it is cloistered, 
suffocating, aimless movement with fast, jarring cuts that suggest a lack of rhythm or 
passage. The harsh, sterile lighting stands in stark contrast to later sequences in the film, 
further contributing to a Jack’s stifling, inhibited disposition. In one brief shot an 
eminently distracted Jack, on the phone yet again, double and triple-checks a blueprint 
draft to ensure that the building in question will have proper depth and dimension. But 
under Malick’s direction this juxtaposition signals a lack of dimension, depth, and texture 
both on the part of Jack and his work environment. 
 
 Skywalks and elevators in particular figure prominently in these scenes. Jack is 
constantly traversing, ascending and descending his office building. Again, technically 
movement, but no extension, no breadth. Cowering alone in the corner of an elevator, he 
invokes his lost brother. “I think about him every day.” This invocation conjures a 
specter, of sorts, perhaps two: R.L. (the brother) and Jack’s younger self, his memory of 
himself as a child. Malick assembles images of these specters that remain with Jack and 
the viewer for the remainder of the film, screen markers of discontinuity, separation, and 
loss. Haunted by his past and his lost brother, Jack becomes increasingly detached from 
his work environment. Conversations with co-workers become indistinct. Meetings drone 
on, his gaze and attention cast elsewhere. His inner thoughts take the mode of yet another 




opened the film, an intimate, almost elegiac expression of nostalgia: “How did I lose 
you? Wandered? Forgot you?”  
 Like the previous address that opens the film, we are left to wonder to whom this 
wandering solicitation is addressed. The precise status and direction of these addresses 
become increasingly unstable as the film unfolds. They emerge, often quietly, through 
different characters and iterations, mingling and intercrossing, ultimately forming a 
contemplative, polyvalent manifold. In this particular instance, the address seems to come 
from Jack, directed toward his dead brother, an absent addressee. The camera, however, 
is directed elsewhere, panning sideways and craning upward—constantly moving, in stark 
contrast to Jack. The fluid, searching maneuvers of Malick’s direction and Lubezki’s 
camera suggest that this address, while not not oriented toward R.L., already begins to 
hint at the possibility of a broader, more capacious and propulsive mode of movement. It 
is through the address and its multiple crossings and turnings—its persistence across the 
film’s multiple timelines—that the work of mourning, screened by nostalgic desire, 
works itself upon Jack, in something like the middle voice. 
 The elevator serves as a bookend, of sorts, a figure of transition and passage. It 
sets off the beginning of Jack's waking vision, his means of screening grief through 
nostalgia. It returns again near the end of the film as Jack re-turns once more, this time 
away from the memory-scape of his past and back to the world, his present, itself 
refigured in light of his journey. It is through his itinerary as an elevator passenger—
traversing various passages between—that Jack begins to slip into the oneiric state that 




Jack wanders across a skywalk, an especially unmoored means of crossing and passage. 
He stops—abruptly—between two buildings, which is to say between two ‘times,’ past 
and present. Turning away from both ‘origin’ and ‘destination,’ as if to draw attention to 
their very relation, he pauses, a gesture that blurs the lines between the two ‘times.’ 
Turning toward the act of turning, the crossing itself, Jack, in a gesture indicative of 
nostalgic movement, glances sideways.501 Facing the skywalk’s glass edges and the city 
beyond, he begins to find himself subject to memory traces that re-present and re-turn 
him to his past. The address also re-turns, this time in the form of R.L., the absent 
brother. A faint murmur: “Find me.” Images, memories, and fragments come flooding in, 
reveries of Jack’s childhood interrupting his wearisome, unvaried day-to-day. It is within 
the architecture of this vision, this dreamwork, that Jack, the architect, begins to 
nostalgize, to mourn something lost by remembering and re-marking upon it.  
 As these recollective traces emerge the address widens, incorporating a chorus of 
guiding voices, both past and present. Mother, Father, Brother, and the larger universe 
itself all appear, speaking through and to various iterations of Jack as the film moves, 
sliding between the personal and the impersonal. Returning to the voice-over technique 
he perfected in films like Days of Heaven and The Thin Red Line, Malick works to 
disorient the viewer’s sense of temporal direction, highlighting Jack’s position as a 
nostalgic subject freely traversing the ‘times’ that have shaped him. As we are led into 
the cracks and crevices of Jack’s memory-scape, Malick presents us with a striking series 
 
501 Cf. Svetlana Boym, “Nostalgia and Its Discontents,” Hedgehog Review 9, no. 2 (2007), 9. 
“Sometimes [nostalgia] is not directed toward the past either, but rather sideways. The nostalgic feels stifled 




of sustained, impromptu images characteristic of his free-flowing style. At dusk, as the 
sun sets, the camera, still constantly moving, follows a massive colony of bats, a singular 
plurality, as they move, morph, and circulate. As the group and groups within the group 
veer and swerve, shimmering gradations of black, gray, and brown emerge and recede. 
Soon the entire whole pulsates, mutating into new, more capacious configurations.  
 This intermediate image stands in stark contrast to the washed-out, stagnant 
movement characteristic of Jack’s ‘present’ and portends the forms of propulsion to 
come. Supremely nocturnal creatures, these bats mark a transition, instantiating a type 
fluid, meandering movement with spacing, rhythm, and variation—a manifold of 
torsions, twists, and turns. This lingering image propels the viewer headlong into Jack’s 
passage, into his visionary dreamscape of nostalgic reminiscence. Comprised of 
fragmented impressions and disparate memory traces, this dreamscape centers around 
Jack’s childhood home in Texas. His wistful desire for this period is triggered by 
ongoing, memorative grief following the death of his brother. That same desire enables 
him to more fully attend to the unassimilated loss of R.L. as the film unfolds. Back 
(again) to (yet) another beginning, a return to birth, infancy, early childhood, and the 
onset of adolescence. 
 Lacan and the screen theorists would be disappointed to discover that there are 
not many mirrors in this film. There are, however, plenty of windows, doors, gates, 
doorways, sidewalks, and ladders. Like the elevator and the skywalk, these figures 
suggest the presence of a liminal threshold and the chance of movement. Malick inserts 




possibility of crossing or passage. What are we to make of these images? Given the 
psychoanalytic associations that characterize the topos of Jack’s memory-scape—the 
Oedipal and pre-Oedipal histrionics mentioned above—one might expect mirrors to 
emerge at some point. This is Jack’s own inner journey, after all, and what else is a 
mirror but the reflection of self? Can it, too, act a figure of movement like the elevator or 
the skywalk? For Lacan the mirror does the opposite, constituting a primal scene of sorts, 
ground-zero for one’s soon-to-be expansive contention with constraining and 
deterministic outside forces—no latitude, no leeway, only symbolic assignation. Malick 
frustrates and reframes this expectation, offering propulsive images that refuse easy 
assimilation into classic screen theory or Lacanian models of ego development. 
 The only shot featuring a mirror in The Tree of Life comes early on once Jack 
enters the space of nostalgic remembrance and childhood recollection. Then a toddler, he 
approaches a full-length mirror as his Mother follows closely behind. This mirror is not 
static. It rests on a wooden stand with a swinging swivel. It can move, in other words. As 
Jack approaches, he pushes the mirror ever-so slightly and it sways back and forth, 
delivering a moving image that contains both his reflection and that of his mother—the 
mirror itself moves just as the mirror-image Malick offers also moves, the camera quickly 
panning in, anticipating an impending cut. Unlike Lacan’s enfeebled subject, Malick’s 
vivacious subject appears more interested in the mirror’s movement than his own 
reflection, more fascinated by its three-dimensional extension in space than the flat 
reproduction of self-image. Immediately following the cut, Malick gives us a very brief 




the type of propulsion the film the generates by way of nostalgic recollection. We see the 
mirror again, from Jack’s POV, as his Mother stands behind it. This time the reflective 
image moves, rather than the mirror itself. Jack sees his Mother’s hands and wiggling 
fingers—both their physical presence and their reflection—as she playfully hides behind 
the mirror. This moment does not confirm a preconceived ego-ideal nor does it solidify 
the constitution of impoverished subjectivity. It is simply there, alongside other equally 
important snapshots, fragments, and memory-traces, contracted together as Jack revisits 
his early childhood—and it connotes movement, or at the very least, its inviting 
possibility.  
 If there is anything remotely correlate to Lacan’s mirror-stage it comes near the 
beginning of this montage when Jack meets his brother, R.L., face-to-face for the first 
time. In a brief, accidental, yet eminently powerful scene, Jack’s Mother brings the infant 
R.L. in close and the two share a small encounter that has, for reasons that become 
clearer as the film develops, prominently lodged itself in the annals of Jack’s (adult) 
memory.502 Jack stares at R.L. with an equal measure of curiosity and reticence, 
accumulating affection and almost instinctual distrust. The wonder is almost palpable as 
Jack, inquisitive scrutiny clearly visible across his face, searches for some form of 
 
502 This scene was not “acted”or rehearsed in the traditional sense. As Lubezki puts, it Malick 
often pushes shooting “to a place where these wonderful accidents start to happen.” Of the scene in 
question, he recalls: “You have to be ready to capture all these things that could just fall away in a second 
and it’s beautiful. [It] is such a true moment. I have kids and I’ve seen it and it’s fleeting. You cannot talk 
to a 3-year-old and say, ‘Hey, man listen this is the first time you see your brother.’ It has to happen in front 
of you and with Terry, these things happen. He allows them to happen and it’s not like he’s waiting, but 
there is a little of that with shooting and shooting and shooting and shooting and suddenly something like 
that happens. And then it happened, I remember feeling such an emotion. I was about to cry.” Maher, One 




recognition in R.L., his strange, new other. Initially startled as R.L.’s tiny hand brushes 
across his face, Jack leans in closer and the mirroring begins. R.L. lets out a sharp cry 
and Jack attempts to mimic him, letting out a louder, sharper cry of—or for—recognition. 
This encounter barely lasts a moment and Jack, of course, goes on to exhibit classic elder 
toddler behavior: acting out, orchestrating stunts to regain his Mother’s attention, 
announcing what is mine in defiance, etc. But the point here is that Jack’s nostalgic return 
to this set of memory images begins to open up space for increased movement, a 
possibility intimated by the swaying mirror, the wiggling hands, and Jack’s recollection 
of his first encounter with his lost brother. The entire memory-scape acts as a means of 
Jack’s return, of course, and return is, above all, the primary movement of nostalgia, as 
Hofer first noted—an achy yearning for return or a pain that (re)surfaces when full return 
proves impossible. Jack returns to his childhood to remember and attend to the loss of his 
brother, a loss that still marks him. But here, in the wake of that loss, we find him 
returning to a loose composite of equally primal scenes that screen—for him and for the 
viewer—his mourning process through nostalgia. Jack’s nostalgic desire propels him 
throughout this sequence, allowing him to revisit his relation with his brother and 
initiating the elegiac journey to come by re-marking upon those traces he has deemed 
prominent and originary. By revisiting this relation, Jack works through a profound loss 
that, while permanent and in some sense final, need not be debilitating or immobilizing. 
 So many of the scenes in this section of the film exude this same quality, allowing 
Jack to revisit and re-mark the formative moments that continue shape and afflict him. 




inaccessible and forever lost: the sincere wonder, overwhelming magnitude, and 
penetrating fascination so often associated with childhood. Under the auspices of 
bereavement and nostalgic recollection he offers us a deeply compelling and truly 
original picture of our own ancient alchemy, the rise of the thinking life, the memory of 
our memory of emerging consciousness: screen(ed) nostalgia.503 Trace after trace, 
fragment upon fragment, Jack finds himself subject to the memory of memory, a type of 
heightened remembrance in which past and present momentarily coincide. “Tell us a 
story from before we can remember,” Jack recalls a younger version of himself 
exclaiming, interrupting his Mother’s animated reading of The Jungle Book. The film 
gives us this story, one that predates us and our capacity to mark dates, our inner ability 
to register (the) time(s). Jack’s re-collective vision, set against and upon the screen of 
nostalgia, evokes the past and its losses alongside the possibility of brief, fugacious 
moments of intimate connection. Muted colors against golden natural light imbue these 
scenes with the aura of things past, while close-up shots with an extremely wide lens 
render objects and faces enlarged and outsized, amplifying the detail and enormity of the 
world from Jack’s (past) perspective (as a child).  
 Editing, like cinematography, also conveys this newfound sense of rhythmic, 
propulsive movement. Malick’s strategy here consists of a conglomeration of techniques 
that achieve a type of melodious pacing consistent with nostalgic desire and the manner 
in which it manipulates and unsettles time. As André Green observes, the film 
 
503 Albert Paretsky, referencing both Malick and Andrey Bely, calls this “the adult’s memory of 
the child’s memory of…emerging consciousness.” See Albert Paretsky, “The Persistence of Memory: The 
Questfor Human Origins and Destiny in Andrey Bely’s Kotik Letaev and Terrence Malick’s The Tree of 




“agglomerates recollections belonging to different periods of life,” assembling them 
together, collage-like, such that their detail and particularity “rarely present in the form of 
a continuous [linear] chain of events.”504 Instead, Malick uses the tactics specific to filmic 
montage to mimic and depict the sort of internal, mental montage nostalgic subjects 
experience. This editing style has its origins in Malick’s early work. He spent nearly two 
years editing Days of Heaven, working to assemble shots together in order convey the 
sense of transience, reflexive impermanence that film evokes. A breakthrough of sorts 
occurred when he returned to voice-over experimentation, a feature he toyed with to 
some success in Badlands. This allowed him to emphasize the strictly visual elements of 
his footage, excising unappealing dialogue in order to establish a clear, rhythmic cadence 
that elicits a deeper sense of contemplation and emotionality. He recorded over 50 hours 
of meditative voice-over narration for Days of Heaven, often seizing upon one or two 
lines here and there and playing them on loop against 10-minute film reels to see if, 
when, and where they might evoke the set of feelings he wanted to achieve.505 In The Tree 
of Life, a wide range of disparate ostensibly unconnected voice-overs form the manifold 
address that opens that film and continues to guide Jack throughout its twists and turns, 
through the different ‘times’ he experiences as he moves through nostalgic remembrance.  
 Film scholars often resort to designations typically reserved for other art forms 
when characterizing cinema—“painterly” stands as a particularly prominent 
superlative—and in this respect Malick’s work is no different. Many formal elements of 
 
504 André Green, “From the Ignorance of Time to the Murder of Time. From the Murder of Time 
to the Misrecognition of Temporality in Psychoanalysis,” in  The Experience of Time: Psychoanalytic 
Perspectives, ed. Leticia Glocer Fiorini and Jorge Canestri (London: Karnac Books, 2009), 3-4. 




his style, luminous shot composition and impressionistic editing especially, invite this 
sort of comparison. Several of Malick’s closest collaborators over the years offer similar 
insights. Costume designer Jacqueline West suggests that Malick frames his cinematic 
ideas “like a painter, like Van Gogh,” the Dutch artist renown for both his unyielding 
self-portraits and a post-impressionistic style that values expression over realism, 
distorting the viewer’s perception in order to achieve the desired emotional effect.506 The 
most insightful accounts come from Lubezki, Malick’s cinematographer, and Mark 
Yoshikawa, one of his editors, who suggest that the director’s approach attains a type of 
“cubizing” in film, a strategy presumably borrowed from the early 20th century art 
movement of the same name. Picasso’s work, for example, depicts objects from multiple 
points of view, manipulating perception to achieve representation within a broader 
context. For Lubezki, Malick’s films do something similar and possess the added 
advantage of being able to depict temporization and manipulate time.507 This creates 
multiple, fragmentary layers from different angles, offering them up for assemblage. 
Malick knits these layers together such that they converge around the same feeling or 
cluster of feelings, in this case longing, grief, and loss, the very substance of nostalgic 
 
506 Ibid., 231. Dan Glass, a visual effect specialist, makes a similar observation: “A lot of what you 
see in the film is something closer to poetry or painting in the way that it was made up. But I think the 
beauty of that is it allows everyone to draw their own different impressions of what they’re seeing and 
enjoy it in a personal way.” Ibid., 236. Cinema scholars have made this comparison as well. See Steven 
Rybin, Terrence Malick and the Thought of Film (New York, N.Y.: Lexington Books, 2012), 72; 79 and 
David Davies, ed., The Thin Red Line (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2008), 57-58. 
507 To Lubezki, like Tarkovsky and others, this is something that only cinema can accomplish: 
“Films inherit a lot from other arts, like theater and literature. Since I first met him many years ago, I have 
felt that Terry is trying to make films, and to express himself, without using the part of film’s DNA that 
comes from these other arts.” Cf. Maher, One Big Soul, 213. See also Bill Desowitz, “Immersed in Movies: 






desire. This often means rejecting the traditional shot-reverse shot approach—a popular 
editing convention whereby shots are assembled to establish successive continuity—in 
favor of something more diffuse and ethereal. As Yoshikawa puts it, Malick “wanted to 
avoid anything with even a hint of being presented or intentional,” opting instead to shoot 
and edit “multiple scenes covering similar ground” where a dominant theme, mood, or 
feeling can emerge to produce a sense of flow and movement.508 In order to achieve this, 
Yoshikawa reports that Malick would often “prefer to speak in metaphors.”509 These 
metaphors—‘Make this scene feel more like a fleeting thought,’ for example—tend to 
evoke the same sort of experience nostalgia engenders, an experience that tries, in vain, 
to catch up to the ever receding horizons of temporization.  
 In basic cinematic grammar, establishing shots offer context by providing some 
background for the relationships between the people we see, the objects they interact 
with, and the ensuing events that unfold. Images of recognizable skylines and aerial shots 
of prominent landmarks establish a certain environment or milieu. Calling specific 
memories to mind may feel ‘cinematic’ at times, but we don’t always get grounding 
images that immediately orient us in space and time. Memory rarely offers establishing 
shots. Neither does The Tree of Life, almost aggressively so. Viewers are left adrift and 
unmoored. Like Jack, we often see “cubized” movement, multiple shots of the same 
action, suggestive of the way memory often offers up and contracts many instances in a 
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single impression—a type of highly concentrated reminiscence that “marginalizes 
consciousness”510 in order to emphasize memory’s marks and nostalgia’s re-marks.  
 In one sequence, a small movement within a larger montage-like section of Jack’s 
early childhood, we see Jack and his brothers throwing a ball on the roof and watching it 
roll down before they compete to catch it. But we don’t see the entire duration of this 
event. Instead, we see many repeated iterations of the event across time, quickly edited 
together out of order. Duration is excised in order to highlight iterative repetition, a 
manipulation only possible given the formal qualities of the moving image. Later, in the 
same sequence, the film offers a similar assortment as Mrs. O’Brien enters the children’s 
room to turn off the lights and kiss them goodnight. And again, the event is never seen 
directly or in its entirety, at least not in one instance. Instead, we see a crystallization of 
the passage of time, an image of temporized experience that contains a plethora of 
iterations from multiple angles, standpoints, and periods in time, a series of affectionate 
moments consolidated in memory and offered up as a single trace fragment. As 
Yoshikawa puts it, these sequences unfold “like a memory that is crawling, [like] a 
broken record.”511 Malick and his team of editors knit these images together in a manner 
that closely approximates not only the nonlinear workings of memory, but especially the 
process of recollection under the conditions of nostalgia and mourning.512 Together they 
establish a vivacious, almost lyrical rhythm reflective of propulsive, nostalgic re-
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marking. The film moves.513 And, by the end, Jack, like the viewer, moves and is moved 
too. 
 
A Beginning Before Beginnings 
 We first began with an initial beginning: adult Jack recalls and continues to 
mourn his brother on the anniversary of his death. Then, we began again with another 
beginning, one a bit more difficult to suss out: Jack’s ongoing grief plunges him headlong 
into a vision of ‘before,’ a vision propelled by nostalgia, that links past and present, 
leading him to the threshold of his birth, his own beginning. But is there a beginning 
before these beginnings? A beginning that sets in motion all subsequent beginnings? 
Where do we begin, after all? A young Jack’s discovery as he plays with his brothers in a 
grassy meadow provides us with a clue. “I found a dinosaur bone!” he exclaims in an 
almost ecstatic central Texan drawl. Malick goes on to offer us a glimpse of what this 
primordial beginning might have looked like, delivering one of the film’s more stunning 
and much-talked-about sections, an extended cosmogonic sequence portraying the 
beginning of beginnings, complete with images of the Big Bang and proto-reptilian 
creatures that almost look like something cribbed from Steven Spielberg’s Jurassic Park 
(1993). Has Jack found their remains? If the film’s more narrative-driven section offers 
up ‘a story from before we can remember’ from Jack’s perspective, this section expands 
that same scope, raising it to the highest possible power. Is it possible for the universe to 
 
513 Early Project Q-era documents suggest that “Malick wanted the film to move like the constant 
flow of water,” a sentiment corroborated by the film composer Alexandra Desplat who, at Malick’s urging, 
worked backwards so to speak, writing music prior to editing so the film could be edited to music. Maher, 




be nostalgic for itself? Jack feels a form of nostalgia triggered by grief, a form that drives 
him inward so he can be moved and propelled outward by the film’s conclusion. Here 
Malick depicts a universe directed in on itself, a universe that contracts in order to move 
and expand—a move from individual, to familial, and finally cosmic reflection.  
 The sequence is often compared to 2001: A Space Odyssey and for good reason—
thematic content and cosmic scope notwithstanding, the film relies on many of the 
technical innovations pioneered in Kubrick’s 1968 masterpiece.514 The main concept 
dates all the way back to the early Project Q days as does much of the material and 
footage, greatly enhanced by advances in effects technology unthinkable at the time. 
Taken together, the visual choices are just as speculative as Jack’s own memory of his 
memory’s beginning, attending to the phenomenon temporal non-coincidence. Volker 
Bromm, an astronomer who focuses on the formation of stars in the early universe, 
worked closely with Malick and his team on this sequence out of the Texas Advanced 
Computing Center in Austin. He notes that Malick’s intention was to portray the origin 
and evolution of the universe with as much realism as possible. This, of course, presents 
 
514 Renowned special effects supervisor Douglas Trumbull worked on both films. CGI was utilized 
in early versions of this sequence, but Malick was not happy with the results so Trumbull suggested, “Why 
not do it the old way? The way we did it in 2001?” Cf. Rebecca Keegan, “TCM Festival: Hollywood 
Visionary Douglas Trumbull Working on Terrence Malick Movie,” Vanity Fair, April 25, 2010, 
https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2010/04/tcm-festival-hollywood-visionary-douglas-trumbull-to-
work-on-terrence-malick-movie. As effects specialist Dan Glass notes, this retro-style process was highly 
experimental and improvisational, indicative of Malick’s overall directorial approach both on set and in 
pre-production: “We worked with chemicals, paint, fluorescent dyes, smoke, liquids, CO2, flares, spin 
dishes, fluid dynamics, lighting and high speed photography to see how effective they might be…it was a 
free-wheeling opportunity to explore, something that I have found extraordinarily hard to get in the movie 
business. [Malick] didn’t have any preconceived ideas of what something should look like. We did things 
like pour milk through a funnel into a narrow trough and shoot it with a high-speed camera and folded lens, 
lighting it carefully and using a frame rate that would give the right kind of flow characteristics to look 
cosmic, galactic, huge and epic.” Cf. Hugh Hart, “Tree of Life Visualizes the Cosmos Without CGI,” 




the same sort of problem as recalling early childhood and typifies the antinomies of time 
and memory. “The closest we can come is a computer simulation,” Bromm admits, 
“because at this point we cannot directly observe it.”515 In a certain sense, this 
illuminating admission thematizes the film as a whole: it offers a compelling visual 
representation of what was not and cannot be directly seen, an achievement wholly 
unique to cinema, i.e., its ability to portray duration and temporization, its capacity to 
“sculpt time,”516 as Andrei Tarkovsky famously puts it. The problem of presence and 
absence, which is to say, the problem of time, resurfaces, always lurking nearby. Malick 
does not attempt to solve this problem or alleviate its pressure. Instead, he mobilizes 
cinema’s formal achievements to offer a re-presentation that mirrors Jack’s plunge into 
his memory, a sequence that depicts something that cannot be apprehended in the 
moment, at speed, as it happened—a visual response to the intractable, incessant passage 
of time.  
 This primeval beginning also sheds some further light on the provenance of the 
film itself. One of the main reasons why Malick shelved Project Q and went on extended 
hiatus is that he could not figure out how to meld the more abstract and cosmic elements 
 
515 Maher, One Big Soul, 221. Italics mine. Bromm continues, even more pointedly, linking the 
beginning of the universe with Jack’s own journey and re-turn to origins. “It’s a very metaphysical 
moment—it was a long period of boring, almost depressing darkness and then suddenly activity explodes, 
kicks in. This resonated with the story line that the movie wanted to tell. What did the universe have to go 
through to eventually enable intelligent beings like us with our emotional life? It’s this very long cosmic 
timeline that led to it. The movement of first light has a very special place.” Cf. Maher, One Big Soul, 226-
227. 
516 Cf. Andrey Tarkovsky and Kitty Hunter-Blair, Sculpting in Time: Reflections on the Cinema 
(University of Texas Press, 1987). Donna Cox, one of Bromm’s associates in Austin, puts an even finer 
point on this commensurability, noting how the film offers visual images above and beyond previous 
cinematic achievements. “We wanted to combine accurate science with artistic sensitivity,” she adds. 




of his vision to something more intimate and particular. He always knew he wanted to 
underscore “the powerful connection to be made between the universal and the 
personal”517 but struggled to combine the two. It was only years later, following a series 
of personal tragedies, that Malick, a notoriously private and hermetic filmmaker, 
pinpointed the loose through-line necessary to integrate those elements. He did so, 
Vulture film critic Bilge Ebiri observes, by “turn[ing] the camera on himself, figuratively 
speaking.”518 By reframing the unresolved problem at the heart of a passion project he 
tabled so many years ago Malick was able to “marry the cosmic and natural journey of 
[Project Q] with a semi-autobiographical story…seen through the eyes of the oldest 
child.”519 So the personal, more human side of the story came to center around Jack 
O’Brien and his family in 1950s Texas, slowly refracted through the dual prisms of time 
and memory.  
 Instead of showcasing the origins of the universe as the center of the film, Malick 
situates this sequence as a flashback to the beginnings of time, a waking vision triggered 
by Jack’s existential crisis and ongoing grief for the loss of his brother, a loss that bears 
striking resemblance to Malick’s own, as mentioned above.520 Sarah Green, one of 
 
517 Ibid., 208-209. For a similar take on this see Bilge Ebiri, “Will Terrence Malick Ever Really 
Finish The Tree of Life?,” Vulture, September 11, 2018, https://www.vulture.com/2018/09/will-terrence-
malick-ever-really-finish-the-tree-of-life.html. “The ambition and scope of Q presented plenty of 
challenges, but one of Malick’s biggest obstacles turned out to be his inability to nail the human story that 
would be the heart of his epic about time, space, and creation. At one point, he contemplated a second-half 
love story set thousands of years ago.” 
518 Ebiri, “Will Terrence Malick Ever Really Finish The Tree of Life?” 
519 Ebiri, “Thirty-Three Years of Principal Filming,” New York Magazine, March 13, 2011, 
http://nymag.com/movies/features/terrence-malick-2011-5/. 
520 I mentioned some of these parallels in the introduction above. Here it is worth noting that “Q” 
in the initial title stood as a shorthand for Qasida, a gesture of homage, perhaps, to Malick’s Persian roots 






intentionality, i.e., to aim for or toward, to intend. See Edward Hirsch, A Poet’s Glossary (New York, N.Y.: 
Harcourt, 2014), 505. This aiming or intending is often directed toward a lost object or absent beloved and 
serves to solidify the qasida’s “role as a vehicle for past memories,” according to Sephardic scholar 
Jonathan P. Decter. He further observes that this form of poetic expression “possesses a distinct nostalgic 
mode” indicative of Arabic literature more broadly where “a set of forms, motifs, and semantic 
uses…resonate within a deep matrix of longing and loss.”  See Jonathan P. Decter, Iberian Jewish 
Literature: Between al-Andalus and Christian Europe (Bloomington, I.N.: Indiana University Press, 2007), 
43. Ibn Qutaybah, a ninth century Islamic thinker widely regarded as a progenitor of the qasida, codified its 
form into a tripartite structure that begins with a nostalgic evocation, typically in the form of a creation 
myth similar to the cosmogony Malick depicts, and moves through the pain of diaspora where the poet, like 
Jack O’Brien and perhaps the director himself, ventures an attempt at “rediscovering a place and recalling 
his lost beloved.” Cf. Hirsch, A Poet’s Glossary, 505. Often viewed as one of the highest forms of poetry in 
Arabic literature, the qasida, like The Tree of Life, is typically composed of disparate, impressionistic 
fragments. Decter argues that by evoking this poetic form and assembling its attendant fragments “the poet 
is able to create an emotional backdrop that charges the poem and molds the listener’s response.” Cf. 
Decter, Iberian Jewish Literature, 43. This assemblage of traces often follows a serpentine, non-narrative 
trajectory that serve to disorient unknowing readers by giving “no visual hint as to where individual 
subsections end or begin,” commemorating an event or period by referring to it through indirect allusion 
rather than a linear, detailed account. See Stefan Sperl and Christopher Shackle, eds., Qasida Poetry in 
Islamic Asia and Africa, Vol. II: Eulogy’s Bounty, Meaning’s Abundance (New York, N.Y.: Brill, 1996), 
44. The overall ‘message’ of the qasida lies in its ability to both evoke and induce a certain mood, offering 
fragmentary memory traces that achieve a form of affective meaning that can only emerge through the 
juxtaposition of and interaction between seemingly disparate lines and subsections. As Stefan Sperl and 
Christopher Shackle suggest, the effect of this composite suggests a “transformation of consciousness” that 
is often “tantamount to a movement of ascent: from sorrow to relief, from grief to consolation, from 
ignorance to understanding, or from despair to hope.” Cf. Cf. Stefan Sperl and Christopher Shackle, eds., 
Qasida Poetry in Islamic Asia and Africa, Vol. I: Classic Traditions and Modern Meanings (New York, 
N.Y.: Brill, 1996), 66. See also their, Qasida Poetry in Islamic Asia and Africa, Vol. II: Eulogy’s Bounty, 
Meaning’s Abundance, 44. Italics mine.  
 No one knows why Malick opted for the “Q” abbreviation of Project Qasida or why he ultimately 
abandoned that title altogether in favor of the one for which the film is now known. Perhaps the changes in 
subject matter—showcasing a family drama rather than a prehistoric celestial being—led him to select a 
more conventional, less esoteric title; or, maybe the new centerpiece of the film, the large, almost primeval-
looking oak tree that rises from the O’Briens manicured yard, proved too prepotent to resist. In his 
screenplay Malick suggests that the tree’s “roots reach down into the darkness of the earth, towards its 
center and source. The branches spread towards the light, toward discovery and utterance; a fountain of 
life.” At other moments it is described as almost possessing agency, a silent witness looking down on the 
O’Briens with sympathy.Terrence Malick, The Tree of Life (screenplay). First Draft. (New York, N.Y.: 
Writers Guild of America, 2007), 8, 51. In the final pages of the script, Malick sharpens this point even 
further: “The great oak tree stands like a sentient being — thoughtful, benevolent — looking down on him 
[Jack]” (126). The parallels and deep resonances between the Arabic poetic form and Malick’s film are 
striking regardless. Both stem from the inner workings of memory and battle against the inevitability of 
loss and temporal irrevocability, a futile battle perhaps but a noble and necessary one nonetheless. They 
persist, with and against the passage of time, in an attempt to generate what Jaroslav and Suzanne 
Stetkevych call “permanent memorability,” the nostalgic drive to “guarantee the memory of what which 
would otherwise be overtaken by oblivion.” See Jaroslav Pinckney Stetkevych and Suzanne Pinckney 
Stetkevych, The Poetics of Islamic Legitimacy: Myth, Gender, and Ceremony in the Classical Arabic Ode 
(Bloomington, I.N.: Indiana University Press, 2002), 26. This all out resistance against forgetfulness and 
fading memory pursues “an evocative topography of nostalgia” typified in The Tree of Life by (adult) Jack’s 





Malick’s producers, rightly observes that “the film can be seen as a requiem to a lost son” 
and, we could add, to a lost brother, a re-mark Malick performs upon his own memory 
through the moving image521. Re-turning to his own past gave Malick good reason to 
draw upon the cosmogonic images that had occupied his imagination for so long. Many 
of these images and the themes they evoke emerge from Malick’s own personal memory. 
Richard Taylor II, a special effects designer who worked with Malick on Project Q notes 
that “many of the conceptual ideas were taken from a book Terry had read as a kid” titled 
The World We Live In.522 The introduction to that text extols the natural wonders of the 
world—what Heidegger would no doubt call its ‘worlding’—purporting to “present 
knowledge born of human curiosity” by translating cutting-edge scientific research into 
visual form so readers could “see the earth as it was in the beginning.”523 Beginnings and 
origins resurface once again. Malick depicts a series of beginnings by returning to his 
own beginnings, his own origin story. Near the beginning of The Tree of Life, during the 
montage of infancy and early childhood that sets off the main narrative, we see Jack’s 
mother reading to Jack and his brother from a similar picture book, one that offers up 
very similar images, images that no doubt make lasting impressions in a child’s receptive 
 
the mind that house the memory-traces to which he returns. Each step of the way signifies an attempt to 
reconstruct his abandoned home, to reclaim or recall his lost past as a means of advancing the working of 
mourning. 
521 Maher, One Big Soul, 240. 
522 Ibid., 102. 
523 LIFE, November 24, 1952. Italics original. For more on this series, and the magazine at larger, 
see Dora Jane Hamblin, That Was the Life (New York, N.Y.: W. W. Norton, 1978). The text initially 
appeared in the pages of Life magazine as a 13-installment series and gained even greater popularity as a 
standalone book published in 1955. Comparable to the magazine’s widely influential History of Western 
Culture, The World We Live In promised to offer “the greatest series of science stories we have ever 





imagination. As with Badlands and Days of Heaven we see Malick—who at age eight 
once “surprised his classmates at Lake Waco Elementary School by presenting a 43-page 
paper on plants”—once again reaching back into his own memory to anchor his 
cinematic images.524  
 Finally equipped with a fully human story, a meditation on loss and the passage of 
time rooted in his own past, Malick knits together an amalgamation of stunning shots set 
against yet another address. This address comes from the Mother, grieving her lost son, 
Jack’s brother, but given the images it is set against, the addressee remains as disparate 
and indeterminate as the universe itself. Is this address heard? Is it received? The 
questions remain as the address guides Jack further into the annals of cosmic time. Here 
Malick masterfully assembles a loose narrative of the time before time, drawing on the 
full arsenal of images captured in the early Project Q days as well as those generated and 
enhanced by Bromm and others. We see, as best a moving image can approximate, the 
beginning of our universe in its current form, along with the beginnings of our galaxy, the 
place in space where we live; we see shots depicting the emergence of our solar system, 
the only real home we have ever known, a small place within the larger universe, the 
place where everything we have known or will know originated, the place were all 
human life, all human experience, and all human history are confined; we are subject to 
imagery that conjures the evolution of primitive ecosystems and the emergence organic 
life as we know it; we see microscopic images that show life taking on new, more 
 





increasingly complex forms, leading to diversity and difference as well as the seemingly 
intransigent forces of predation and survival.  
 As the sequence draws to a close, Malick, using the full range of technological 
tools available to him, offers us images of an encounter between two prehistoric reptiles. 
One stronger, more aggressive dinosaur appears to show compassion rather than 
malevolence toward another injured, more vulnerable creature—perhaps an act of 
inchoate, incipient mercy. In an early draft of the screenplay Malick suggests that 
“among the dinosaurs we discover the first signs of maternal love, as the creatures learn 
to care for one another.”525 Like the archetypal parents, Mr. and Mrs. O’Brien, these 
creatures exhibit the unresolved tension between the way of nature and the way of grace. 
When a young Jack finds his “dinosaur bone” what sort of clandestine connection with 
the past does he forge? What inheritance does he take up? Is he, perhaps, taking up a 
fossilized relic of this tension, a further iteration of the inner tension revealed in his 
almost prayerful address to himself (“always you wrestle inside me, always you will”)? 
How, still, to make this tension productive? The benign encounter between two primal 
creatures is sharply contrasted with images showing more brute and Darwinian 
expressions of life in all its ambivalence, indifference, and contradiction—a school of 
hammerhead sharks slowly circling their prey, for instance. From beginning to end, the 
images in this sequence depict the fullness of the cosmos, the very space within which the 
world’s various pluralities and singularities emerge, evolve, flourish, and wither away. 
They evoke a strange type of ersatz nostalgia, of wonder and longing for something never 
 




experienced as such, something forever mediated by moving images that continue to 
move us in their capacity for representation, their ability to re-turn us toward our own 
history, our own past.  
 The musical score eventually fades in favor of the droning hums and buzzing 
whirs of life working with and against itself. Initial accompaniment, however, is provided 
by Polish composer Zbigniew Preisner’s majestic arrangement of “Lacrimosa,” a 
movement in his Requiem for My Friend. Preisner composed the work in 1988 as means 
of mourning the sudden death of his friend and collaborator, the filmmaker Krzysztof 
Kieślowski. Lacrimosa, of course, connotes weeping in Latin and comes to us from the 
Dies irae sequence of Catholic requiem mass, a rite offered for the rest and repose of 
those who have departed. It is a doleful piece of music referencing tears, mourning, and 
the ultimate fate of all finite creatures. This piece is set against a series of truly stunning 
images depicting the labor of the universe, the gestation of organic life, and the birth 
travails of its more complex forms. This juxtaposition, like the unmoored, indeterminate 
address that sets it off, underscores a generative ambiguity that persists throughout the 
film, a propulsive ambiguity, transparently opaque. That ambiguity often presents itself in 
the form of nostalgia’s own inner contradiction, i.e., the bittersweet, an undecidable word 
that cannot make up its mind between prefix or suffix. Here that ambiguity surfaces in the 
title of the piece. Lacrimosa: how are we to localize the tears? To whom do they belong? 
From where do they flow? Mother as she grieves the loss of her child? Jack as he returns 
to re-mark upon the continued loss of his brother? The universe itself as it works to 




valence of these tears? Tears of grief and mourning in response to these losses, or tears of 
unsuspecting joy in light of what once was? Malick, content to leave such questions 
unresolved, seems to suggest that in moments such as these it is impossible, perhaps even 
ill-advisable, to discern the difference. How could one decide, after all?  
 Mother’s address lamenting R.L. emerges again: “Lord…why? Where were 
you?” This invocation is set against the immense, protracted backdrop of cosmic 
evolution and the provenance of time, movement, and temporal passage as we know it. 
“Did you know,” she whispers, “who are we to you?” These lines reverberate against a 
vision of the Big Bang and resonate with the film’s epigraph, a quotation from the book 
of Job, yet another address: “Where were you when I laid the foundation of the 
earth?...When the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for 
joy?”526 Unsatisfied, Mother whispers again, this time with more force and determination: 
“Answer me.” With this, Preisner’s music reaches a booming climax as the Milky Way, 
our home, begins to form. Later, as organic life begins to emerge on our planet she 
whispers again, “Hear us.” The only (non)response here is the roaring, deafening 
formation of a waterfall, as deadly as it is vivacious. Throughout, both Jack and the 
viewer are confronted with a type of double-edged awe characteristic of Malick’s 
directorial predilections, a contradictory feeling that treads the same affective terrain as 
the bittersweetness engendered by nostalgia: marvel at the enormity and majesty of the 
universe along with a sense of impending dread at its entropic possibilities. How do we 
 
526 Cf. Job 38:4; 7. Recall here that in the early minutes of the film Mother is explicitly situated as 
a Job-like figure, complete with a group of friends who come to ‘comfort’ her following R.L.’s death, 
“He’s in God’s hands now,” says one, “The pain will pass in time, you have the other two,” avers another. 




contend with the co-existence of realities like loss, death, and tragedy alongside 
recuperation, life, and unsuspecting fortune? All of this occurs before the bulk of Jack’s 
vision of his childhood. It is this eminently cinematic experience—the juxtaposition of 
opposites with feelings of trepidation and wonder—that pushes him further along, fully 
plunging him into a deeply personal series of nostalgic recollections that are both 
chastened and made more intimate by this cosmic perspective.  
 
Bittersweetness Remains 
 Jack’s visionary journey through the annals of his own memory-scape, his 
memory of his memory, began with a series of turns and re-turns. At the close of the film, 
Jack instantiates one final movement of re-turn, this time back to the world, the present, 
his waking life. This final re-turn completes his journey. Here, at the end, screen(ed) 
nostalgia increases his capacities for propulsive movement and facilitates the unresolved 
work of mourning that troubles him at the beginning. That work will no doubt continue, 
but as Jack re-turns one last time he finds himself better positioned to attend to its marks 
by generating his own re-marks. Malick sets the scene for this re-turn back to the present 
with some of the film’s most enigmatic and oblique scenes. Jack, who began his vision 
by admitting that he had ‘wandered’ away, wanders yet again, this time upon the rocky, 
desert terrain that forms the architecture of his vision. The address that has guided him is 
inscribed at the level of the image here as he is led by a younger version of himself to yet 
another threshold, another potential crossing, an empty doorway in the middle of the 
desert of his imagination. This door appears to lead nowhere, but as Malick has shown us 




vast beach where he falls to his knees in awe and wonder as he and other nameless 
figures are reunited and reconciled with deceased family members. R.L. is there, as a 
child, as Jack remembers him, as are his Mother and Father, who look younger, as Jack 
remembers them. Together the family leads R.L. to yet another doorway one that is 
curiously similar to that of the childhood home, opening onto an endless, bright 
landscape. R.L. crosses and makes passage alone; he must depart while Jack remains. 
Mother, accompanied by figures from her own past, including a younger version of 
herself, raises her hands to the sky and in a gorgeous shot facing almost overwhelming 
light she utters the film’s final words: “I give him to you—I give you my son.” Another 
address. To whom is it addressed? Still, after all this, we know not. But it must be uttered 
still, and can only be uttered following Jack’s nostalgic journey, his re-turn to and re-
collection of his past, a re-marking that leads him to this final threshold, to nearly 
tangible contact with what has been lost, contact that he must both indulge and refuse in 
order to keep moving—a moving forward by turning back.  
 At the conclusion, another stark juxtaposition. This one propels Jack out of his 
nostalgic memory-scape and back into his ‘present,’ back into a world that still lacks his 
brother but bears his marks more legibly. Malick begins to cut in and out of the vision, 
taking both the viewer and Jack back to the urban landscape in which the film began and 
back again to the beach, to the shores of Jack’s recollection. The shots vacillate back and 
forth between a vision of ascendency featuring Mother and R.L. and a reality of 
descension where Jack, an elevator passenger once again, is led to the threshold of 




it seems, but Jack’s own vision has shifted, his capacities for movement increased. This 
contrast between ascent and descent within the world belies teleological finality and 
instead instantiates a moment of internal pause for Jack. His world looks different. 
Outside, he whirls around, stunned, his style of movement in the world already beginning 
to modulate. The skyscrapers no longer dimly reflect only themselves, but are instead 
shimmering, glimmering with images of the sky, the sun, and surrounding trees, all of 
which were obscured before. The camera catches a glimpse of Jack’s face—almost 
completely affectless prior to this point—and along with it the beginnings of a muted 
smirk before quickly cutting away. As Malick puts it in the final page of the screenplay, 
“the vision is not the journey; the real journey has yet to begin. Will he give himself to 
this new life? Does he dare? A stranger, smiling. A threshold.”527 Will he cross? 
 The viewer is not privy to future iterations of Jack’s movement and address, only 
the intensification of a certain awareness, a certain attentiveness, the possibility of 
crossing yet another threshold, another passage between the many twists, turns, and 
openings of temporized experience. “The last chord melts into ordinary production 
sound,” Malick tells us. Jack is re-immersed in his world, propelled by re-marked 
memory traces that screen nostalgia in response to grief. He persists in the wake of his 
brother’s continued absence. The work of mourning is ongoing, to be sure, but perhaps a 
little less strenuous now, by virtue of the re-turn. The loss subsists and the marks remain, 
but they no longer feel immobilizing, only bittersweet, opening up the space for increased 
capaciousness. “All ends in peace, as music does,” Malick writes. “Time has reappeared; 
 




resumed its sway.”528 For a brief moment, Jack’s time has been seized, his forfeitures 
regained through the moving image. As the music fades, the diegetic resonances of his 
immediate environment return, offering novel, unturned possibilities, an invitation to join 
in a newfound, yet-to-be-formed sense of movement and propulsion.  
 Malick has released no less than five original films since The Tree of Life hit 
theaters in May 2011, including one documentary feature that contains additional Project 
Q-inspired footage unused in the original cut. By contrast, it took him nearly 40 years to 
release his first five films and one of them, The Thin Red Line, was an adaptation. It is 
almost as if finally working through and re-marking upon a decades-long passion project, 
one both personal and abstract, opened up the floodgates, accelerating the pace of his 
creative output by giving him a new sense movement, propulsion, and direction. Each 
recent film offers similar insights into temporized experience and its transient, episodic 
nature but none reach the same levels of ambition and care as The Tree of Life. It remains 
a crowning speculative and cinematic achievement—Malick’s true masterpiece, one that 
mobilizes and enacts, in a truly novel way, the philosophical ideas that have shaped him. 
At the height of his powers, the allusive director draws upon his own experiences of 
nostalgia (his losses, desires, and memories) and wields film’s formal features to show 
how screen(ed) nostalgia conjures and re-marks upon available memory traces. That re-
marking facilitates the work of mourning and serves to increase subjective capacities for 
movement and propulsion in the film’s protagonist, its viewers, and perhaps even its 






manipulate and re-present the process of temporization itself, Malick unfolds and 
amalgamates varying temporalities (what I have called the film’s different beginnings) 
that overlap to form a cinematic whole that is much more than the composite sum of its 
parts—a profound, introspective meditation on the passage of time that does justice to the 
contingent, capricious features of experience as it comes. By weaving these different 
beginnings in time together, Malick inscribes a type of propulsive, even spectral nostalgia 
in the film’s main story, a drama rooted in his own past(s). That same sense of haunting, 
animating bittersweetness radiates off nearly every carefully composed image, images 
that in aggregate, highlight, and re-mark upon a form of nostalgic desire both intrinsic to 
and illustrative of the exigencies of temporal experience at its most human. 
 In a certain sense, none of this is all that new. Ever since Johannes Hofer first 
coined the word in 1688, nostalgia has evinced a movement problem, the occlusion of 
movement or, simply, the inability to move in the desired direction, i.e., back home, back 
to the beginning, the origin, the point of provenance, belonging, and identity. This 
problem persists despite nostalgia’s “semantic drift,”529 its shift from the spatial to the 
temporal first identified by Kant at the dawn of modernity. The transition from “lost 
place” to “lost time” only changed the valence, the desire to re-turn remains. What is 
original and fresh about Malick’s approach is his remarkable and unrivaled ability to 
frame such a return in a way that encourages rather than impedes propulsive movement 
into the future, an effort that ultimately renders nostalgia’s generative, animating, and 
 
529 Cf. Krystine Irene Batcho, “Nostalgia: The Bittersweet History of a Psychological Concept,” 
History of Psychology 16, no. 3 (August 2013): 165–76. See also Immanuel Kant, Kant: Anthropology from 





propulsive effects more legible. Like Heidegger, Malick understands the significance of 
human restlessness in the search for some access to authentic Being within the world—
but he does not stop there. Like Derrida, he does not take full presence to be indicative of 
our longed-for connections with ourselves, the world, and one another; he knows the type 
of desire at work in that longing contains traces of the past that were never fully present 
yet continue to haunt nonetheless—but he does not stop there either. He creates, 
assembles, and sets to animating rhythm exceedingly arresting and transportive images 
that enact and re-mark upon these ideas in compelling ways that leave conventional, 
speculative abstraction wanting. Heidegger and Derrida offer very different approaches to 
speculative thought, but they both share a common desire to arrive at new forms of 
articulation more adequate to temporal experience than the traditional philosophical 
lexicon. Malick began his career in that same discursive space only to forsake it due to 
personal and intellectual frustrations. Whatever else those reasons and frustrations may 
have involved, the ensuing abandonment allowed him to accomplish, through film, what 
philosophy has sought to do for so very long—to formulate a mode of creative expression 
commensurate to the experiences that demand such expression in the first place. He 
seizes upon cinema’s unique capacities for temporal representation and for a full 139 
minutes delivers back to us, without closure or finality, that to which every nostalgic 
experience lays claim: passed and passing time. 
 The parting shot at the end of The Tree of Life drives these points home as 
emphatically as any of its images. Notably, it does not feature Jack O’Brien. It instead 




address might lead. We see an image of the Verrazzano-Narrows Bridge connecting 
Brooklyn and Staten Island. In a contemplative, almost prayerful fashion, the camera 
lingers upon the maritime ‘gateway’ to New York, a city of eminent movement and 
ceaseless propulsion, surrounded by waters equal to its energy, a flowing river and the 
open sea. Malick has often suggested that he would like his films to move like water, a 
that flow is, time after time, compared to the passage of time itself. The Tree of Life 
certainly does just that and here, finally, Malick gives us one final figure of crossing, a 
lasting image of movement and traversal that connects the shores of time, past and future, 
beginning and end, origin and destination. The suspension bridge. The riverbanks. The 
faint sound of seagulls in the distance as the Hudson empties into the vast Atlantic. What 
will become of this threshold and the bittersweetness implies? Can its address be heard 
and re-turned? Toward what does it call? “I muse on this and that,” says the narrator of 
Eduard Mörike’s Im Fruhling. “I yearn and yet for what I cannot say: it is half pleasure, 
half mourning. Tell me, ‘O heart, what memories do you weave in the twilight of the 
golden green branches? Old time that I dare not talk about.”530  
 
 
530 Quoted in S. Werman, “Normal and Pathological Nostalgia,” Journal of the American 








Nostalgia is probably inevitable—and it’s a nostalgia that I like, and that also makes me write: you work on 
nostalgia, you work at it and it can make you work.531 
- Jacques Derrida 
 
I muse on this, I muse on that, 
I yearn, and yet for what I cannot say: 
It is half pleasure, half mourning; 
Tell me, ‘O heart, 
What memories do you weave 
In the twilight of the golden green branches? 
Old time that I dare not talk about.532 
 
-  Eduard Mörike 
 
Nothing distinguishes memories from ordinary moments. Only afterwards do they claim remembrance, on 
account of their scars.533 
- Chris Marker  
 
 
 Ich sehne mich und weiss nicht recht nach was: Halb ist es Lust, halb ist es 
Klage: “I yearn and yet for what I cannot say: it is half pleasure, half mourning.” Half 
pleasure, half mourning, what does he mean? Is it that he is unable to distinguish between 
the two—pleasure in mourning, mourning in pleasure—or is it that, together, the two 
signal something that is somehow both? That is to say, both, simultaneously, not in order 
of sequence or rank but felt together, at once, a formal expression of irreducible 
coincidence that broaches the nostalgic condition. Mörike withholds the proper name 
 
531 Jacques Derrida, Paper Machine, trans. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press, 
2005), 63. 
532 Quoted in S. Werman, “Normal and Pathological Nostalgia,” Journal of the American 
Psychoanalytic Association 25 (1977), 393. Translation modified. For a fuller version of the entire poem 
see Eduard Mörike Im Frühling (1828), https://www.oxfordlieder.co.uk/song/1566 (accessed August 16, 
2020. 
533 This is taken from Marker’s 1962 science fiction short La Jetée and is quoted in one of the many 
epigraphs contained in Brian Dillon’s moving meditation on bereavement In the Dark Room. See Brian 




here but pinpoints the experience nonetheless. The most productively ambivalent and 
fruitfully ambiguous of all emotions, nostalgia evinces a feeling that thrives upon its own 
failure, its own structural impossibility, its ongoing, kinetic insatiability. Is it any wonder, 
given these contrarieties and antagonisms, that nostalgia is almost always divided against 
itself—half pleasure, half mourning—and commonly associated with the bittersweet, a 
word that admits no real synonym? Half pleasure, half mourning: a feeling in search of 
representation, a sensation fumbling for expression. What does it feel like to taste the 
bittersweet? And to taste it without the placating chaser one might hope would follow? 
Bittersweet nostalgia: an abiding attentiveness to the mutable variations of temporization, 
attunement accomplished through dis-attunement, more time for (passing) time, the 
animating, propulsive experience of experience from the inside. The chaser, we find, is 
an apparition, a phantom. Its panacea is as mercurial as the bittersweetness itself. The 
desire cannot be sated, yet it still moves and is moving, offering re-marks as propulsive 
and animating as they are unsettled and unsettling.  
 “I yearn, and yet for what I cannot say.” This hybrid, compound feeling, half 
pleasure, half mourning, gives rise to a form of desire that still, after all this, remains 
errant, unsure of its own ends but moves and is moving nonetheless. Nostalgia’s hazy 
valences and murky, dissonant tonalities belie neat distinctions between pleasure and 
displeasure, joy and grief, mourning and morning. In Mörike’s Im Frühling (“In Spring”) 
these bittersweet feelings facilitate an increased sense of awareness, attention, and 
receptivity. The title itself conjures the daybreak of vernal tide and time, the dawn of a 




that bittersweetness to remain as unresolved as the experiences that gave rise to it—
enables his narrator to turn to back the world and its changing rhythms with a newfound 
sense of openness. It propels him to more fully notice and engage the thicket of things, 
the minute details and tiny particulars that have come into sharper focus for Malick’s 
Jack O’Brien by the time we leave him at the end of The Tree of Life.  
 Was webst du für Erinnerung?: What memories do you weave? Erinnerung and 
webst (or tissu)—memory-trace and weave or web—are both operative terms in the 
deconstructive and psychoanalytic lexicon as we have seen and act as watchwords of 
nostalgic experience as I have characterized it via film. In “In Spring” Mörike’s “new 
spring” mobilizes this weave to offer a propulsive re-mark upon the traces of previous 
seasons, perhaps a little worse for wear but no less potent and necessary. The new season 
weaves these traces together to form a tapestry that becomes legible through a composite 
feeling, half pleasure, half mourning, pleasure-mourning, another name for the form of 
desire nostalgia engenders—mixed, mingled, and interfused. As I have maintained 
throughout, the experience of nostalgia retains multiple valences such as these, but many 
of them do not show up as such due to nostalgia’s history and transmission as a form of 
pathology. Those vectors time and time again register as errant or spurious under a 
diagnostic frame of reference but can, when made more legible, offer new, unturned and 
animating possibilities for movement in time.  
 This project has argued in favor of those more propulsive and animating features 
of nostalgic experience. It has sought to make them readable in new ways that position 




memory and complicate what we expect the experience of time to yield for us. Although 
buried alive in the history of nostalgia’s construction and reception, these features remain 
both potent and operative. The texts I have closely unfolded go a long way toward 
decentering nostalgia’s pathological residue and clarifying its conceptual contours, but its 
uses and demands come into much sharper focus in cinema. In its most rudimentary form, 
cinema is the art of recording, inscribing, or writing movement—etching on the celluloid 
surface, for example. This movement occurs in and across time, and cinema furnishes a 
means of inscribing time by ‘re-presenting’ or ‘re-animating’ the structure of temporized 
experience, offering it back up for further reflection and re-marking. The formal qualities 
specific to film catch life in the act, constructing moving images that move much in the 
same manner that time and experience move. These moving images do not cast the 
particularities of the transient objects they re-present in stable, fixed amber—they are 
moving, after all—but they do attend to the gaps and intervals left behind by passing time 
in a manner commensurate with experience as it unfolds. Nostalgia often emerges when 
those lacunae are especially noticeable and while film often mobilizes feelings like 
nostalgia by focusing attention on the weave of individual and collective traces that shape 
us, the parallel runs much deeper than that. Johannes Hofer was the first to point out, in 
1688, that nostalgia also relies upon images and re-presentation to excite desire and 
galvanize movement. He may have taken both the desire and the form of movement it 
impels to be problematic, but he was right to draw a connection between longing, 




further by showing how cinema is in an especially unique position to ‘screen’ nostalgia’s 
more propulsive and animating effects.  
 One of the main claims, advanced throughout and discussed at length in chapters 
three and five, is that nostalgia operates according to a belated, retroactive temporality, 
what Freud first called Nachträglichkeit and his Francophone heirs après-coup. While not 
categorically opposed to linear time—how could it be, after all—this theory of timing de-
centers it by drawing attention to the ways in which memory forces time, at times, back 
on itself, like an ouroboros constantly in motion.534 When dislodged from its initial 
diagnostic frame, this sense of timing helps clarify how nostalgic desire generates 
animating, propulsive movement by continually subjecting passed time and past 
experience to further re-working, what I have called re-marking throughout with 
reference to Derrida. Malick’s work illustrates this dynamic better than most cinematic 
offerings and achieves new, compelling significance in The Tree of Life. He depicts a 
scene of grief and loss re-marked by a form nostalgic desire that facilitates the work of 
mourning in time and, by the film’s end, places its protagonist, Jack O’Brien, in a better 
position to attend to his own experience, to turn more openly toward the world and 
respond more fully to its exigence. In the space that remains I want to highlight a similar 
scene as a means of supplementing the foregoing and tracing where future work on 
 
534 Søren Kierkegaard is often credited with having said “life is lived forward and understood 
backward.” The precise quote, which orbits the same terrain this project has sought to re-mark, reads as 
follows: “It is quite true what philosophy says, that life must be understood backward. But then one forgets 
the other principle, that it must be lived forward. Which principle, the more one thinks it through, ends 
exactly with temporal life never being able to be properly understood, precisely because I can at no instant 
find complete rest to adopt the position: backward.” See Søren Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard’s Journals and 




nostalgia and temporality might cast its horizons. This final scene is offered by Saint 
Augustine, whose notion of distentio animi—the stretching out of the soul by time—
opened this project and advances a means of putting the aporias and paradoxes of life to 
generative, animating use. Like Malick’s Jack O’Brien and the narrator in Im Frühling, 
Augustine’s reflections on temporal experience are motivated by nostalgic recollection 
and serve to enhance our ability to remain open and receptive to the world as it is given.  
 Mörike begins to set the stage through the image winter cold turning to new 
spring and the dynamics of movement that turning entails. The new season contains a 
weave of memory traces, a tapestry of past days so secret and so intimate that they cannot 
be confronted directly, only re-marked upon at a remove, with temporal distance. Mörike 
writes beautifully of a yearning (sehnend) and an expanding, stretching, or distending 
(sich dehnend) that are together emblematic of the form of movement characteristic of 
nostalgic experience—a desire that cannot be stilled and continues to animate. Like 
Johannes Hofer, Nietzsche, of all people, felt that this sentiment actually prohibited 
movement, at least the form of movement so often associated with speculative thought. 
He has “no thoughts at all” because he is “haunted in mind,” Nietzsche writes of Mörike 
in 1875.535 Mörike’s haunting of the mind is only legible to Nietzsche because it reads as 
a weakness or malaise, an obstacle to movement rather than its catalyst. This is the same 
sort of diagnostic posture that informs Hofer’s initial construction of nostalgia as an 
affliction of the imagination (imaginations laesae), one that engenders errant forms of 
 
535 Friedrich Nietzsche, Digital critical edition of the complete works and letters, ed. Paolo D’Iorio 
(New York, N.Y.: de Gruyter 1967) edited by Paolo D’Iorio. 




desire by impelling spurious forms of movement, upending the normal course of thought 
and memory. 
 Nietzsche had similar, even more contemptuous things to say of Augustine who 
he takes to be the harbinger of a “vulgarized Platonism,” unnecessarily torn asunder by 
conflicting thoughts and desires.536 Augustine, like Mörike, feels and gives voice to the 
restless, affective reverberations of stretched-out, temporized experience, engendering 
sensations—like pleasure-mourning, bittersweetness, and nostalgia itself—that often 
seem at fundamental odds with one another. Nietzsche adopts a position similar to other 
incredulous critics discussed throughout this project and takes issue with both the 
sentimentality expressed as well as its exigence. To his credit, this move makes sense on 
a certain level. It is consistent with his larger interest in overturning supposed weak-
minded slavishness in favor of the more noble will to power typified by the Übermensch 
(a posture that stems, I think, from the same underlying attitude as the distrust of feeling, 
the suspicion of images, and the valorization of authenticity discussed in chapters two 
and four). In the case of Augustine, Nietzsche’s remarks are part and parcel of his well-
known critique of religion and Christian morality. Nevertheless, it is curious how quickly 
the eminent thinker of eternal return and the Dionysian affirmation of life dismisses the 
persistence of life at play here. Mörike and Augustine not only intimate the antagonistic, 
seemingly contradictory mode of feeling often associated with nostalgia—
bittersweetness—they both attend to the temporal structure of restive life lived at speed, 
 
536 Cf. Nietzsche’s letter to Franz Overbeck, a friend and Augustine expert, dated March 31, 1885 in 
Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, trans. Christopher Middleton (Indianapolis, I.N.: Hackett 
Publishing, 1969), 238-239. For more context on this see Thomas H. Brobjer, Nietzsche’s Philosophical 




in time, ceaseless and interminable. When Mörike couples distention (dehnend) with 
yearning (sehnend) in “In Spring” he calls to mind Augustine’s own name for temporized 
experience: distentio animi, the distention of the soul by time, the stretching out of life’s 
animating force in opposite directions. In the case of both Mörike and Augustine, this 
coupling—yearning and distending, distending and yearning—works to turn the subject 
from interior introspection back out toward the world with a broader sense of attunement 
and a greater ability to notice, interact, and engage. For Mörike, tarrying with nostalgic 
experience and giving it full range of expression, mourning and pleasure in equal 
measure, enables him to receive the dawn of a new season signaled in his title with 
increased attention and receptivity. Likewise, with Augustine. His detour into the inner 
workings of memory and the distinctions between time and eternity in Books X-XI of the 
Confessions set the stage for, and perhaps even prompt, the broader reflections on 
creation, matter, and change contained in Books XII-XIII.  
 As I mentioned in the preface above, Augustine’s distentio animi designation 
marks one of the first attempts to formally thematize not only temporized experience, but 
how that experience is felt, how it affects one’s attention, memory, and motivations. He 
raises a perennial question—‘What, then, is time? Provided no one asks me, I know; if I 
want to explain it, I do not know.’—and instead of offering a definitive answer he 
chooses instead to frame this line of inquiry from a radically different vantage point. He 
offers a phenomenological account of temporal experience, a reflection on what time 
feels like, what it induces, and how we respond to it. He focuses on how what time does 




how it issues from this or that metaphysical system. It would be easy to cast Augustine as 
a subjective constructivist or even a proto-solipsist here, construing his consideration so it 
anticipates Kant’s famous definition of time as an element of the transcendental aesthetic, 
a form of pure sensibility and inner sense, a type of a priori that constitute the conditions 
of possibility for sense and experience in general.537 But this familiar move occludes the 
texture of Augustine’s inscription, brushing to the side its form, context, and internal 
logic. In this respect, Books X-XI (on memory and time) signal an abrupt change in 
direction, a digression or detour that interrupts the itinerary of autobiographical reminisce 
that governs the text. As the preface that set off this project indicated, these elements—
 
537 Bertrand Russell famously critiques Augustine on precisely these grounds. “St. Augustine, whose 
absorption in the sense of sin led him to excessive subjectivity, was content to substitute subjective time for 
the rest of history and physics. Memory, perception, and expectation, according to him, made up all that 
there is of time. But obviously this won’t do. All his memories and all his expectation occurred at about the 
time of the fall of Rome, whereas mine occur at about the time of the fall of industrial civilization, which 
formed no part of the Bishop of Hippo’s expectations. Subjective time might suffice for a solipsist moment, 
but not for a man who believes in a real past and future, even if only his own. My momentary experience 
contains a space of perception, which is not the space of physics, and a time of perception and recollection, 
which is not the time of physics and history. My past, as it occurred, cannot be identified with my 
recollections of it, and my objective history, which was in objective time, differs from the subjective 
history of my present recollections, which, objectively, is all now.” See his Human Knowledge: Its Scope 
and Limits (New York, N.Y.: Taylor & Francis, 2009), 187-188. As others have pointed out, this critique 
presumes that Augustine sets out to solve the problem of time rather than make its tension more intelligible, 
that he attempts to offer a define of what time is rather than provide a phenomenological account of what 
time does when we interact with it. But, as we saw in the preface above with the help of figures like Paul 
Ricoeur, this is precisely not what Augustine sets out to accomplish. He is interested in how we respond to 
time and how it affects us in light of present circumstances that mobilize traces of our past and orient us 
toward future horizon. For more on this dispute with Russell, see Robert Jordan, “Time and Contingency in 
St. Augustine,” The Review of Metaphysics 8, no. 3 (1955): 394–417; James Wetzel, “Time after 
Augustine,” Religious Studies 31, no. 3 (1995): 341–57; Roland J. Teske, Paradoxes of Time in Saint 
Augustine (Milwaukee, W.I.: Marquette University Press, 1996); and Thomas L. Humphries Jr., “Distentio 
Animi: Praesens Temporis, Imago Aeternitatis,” Augustinian Studies 40, no. 1 (2009): 75–101. For more on 
Augustine’s consideration of temporality and its implications generally see Mark Freeman, Rewriting the 
Self: History, Memory, Narrative (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 1993); Michael Mendelson, “Venter 
Animi/Distentio Animi: Memory and Temporality in Augustine’s Confessions,” Augustinian Studies 31, no. 
2 (2000): 137–63; M. Burcht Pranger, “Time and Narrative in Augustine’s" Confessions",” The Journal of 
Religion 81, no. 3 (2001): 377–93; and Virginia Burrus, Mark D. Jordan, and Karmen MacKendrick, 





memory refracted through time and vice versa—constitute an a nearly intractable aporia 
for Augustine. He raises a seemingly impossible question (what, then, is time?), notes 
that the answer may seem easy or even immediately given until that givenness and the 
problems it conceals are approached directly, at which point the question itself seems to 
dissipate and fall apart. Instead of definitely answering the question Augustine offers a 
strategy for coping with it that internalizes its tension rather than alleviating it—distentio 
animi: the constitutive tensity and animating stretchedness of life by time. To paraphrase 
Paul Ricoeur’s language once again, Augustine confronts this aporia, takes it in, and 
makes it work by putting the kinetic energy it generates to productive use. That positing 
is no doubt impelled by the narrative of autobiographical reminisce and nostalgic 
recollection the comes before in the first nine books of his Confessions.  
 Like many ancient and medieval texts of the same type, St. Anselm’s Proslogion, 
for example, Augustine’s meditations in the Confessions are structured as an extended, 
contemplative invocation. The primary direction of his address is not to his readers, but to 
his God. As biographer Peter Brown puts it, “Augustine’s back is turned to us throughout 
the Confessions. His attention is elsewhere.” The reader has “stumbled, unawares on the 
most intimate of all scenes,” a prayerful incantation meant to elicit and sustain a certain 
type of propulsive, mystical experience. This is why the pronoun tu (“You,” “Thou”) 
appears in 381 of the 453 paragraphs of the text.538 Augustine is in the midst of an 
incredibly vulnerable and revealing address that he has taken great care and deliberation 
 
538 St. Augustine and Peter Brown, Confessions (Second Edition), ed. Michael P. Foley, trans. F. J. 




to inscribe (“And now I confess to you, O Lord, in writing [in litteris]”).539 The 
meditation enacts the Neoplatonic dynamics of exitus-reditus, a scattering, sending out, 
or emanation that culminates in return, gathering, and repose within the One (“You stir 
man to take pleasure in praising you, because you have made us for yourself, and our 
heart is restless until it rests in you.”).540 This dynamic begins, in Book I, with 
Augustine’s ruminations on his inaccessible infancy and the miseries of his boyhood. 
Book II goes on to discuss the stirrings of sexual desire and defiance that accompanied 
his adolescence, including an infamous recounting of petty pear larceny which he forever 
regretted. Books III-V outline his years as a student, his dabbling with Manicheanism, 
and his travels to Rome and Milan, while Books VI-VII discuss his exploration of 
Neoplatonism. The work reaches a full-fledged climax in Book VIII, which details 
Augustine’s experience of temptation and his eventual conversion—the seeds of which 
were planted long before by his mother—following a mystical experience in a garden in 
Milan (“Pick up and read, pick up and read”).541   
 This climax, however, is interrupted by Book IX. The euphoria of his conversion 
experience is overshadowed by the increasing ailment of Augustine’s mother, Monica, 
and is immediately followed by the somber occasion of her untimely death. Augustine is 
careful to mark this event in time with precise detail: “On the ninth day of her illness, 
when she was aged 56, and I was 33, this religious and devout soul was released from the 
 
539 St. Augustine, The Confessions of Saint Augustine, trans. John K. Ryan, (Garden City, NY: Image 
Books, 1960), IX.12.33. 
540 Ibid., I.1.1. 




body.”542 The specificity of these date markers indicate the extent to which the event itself 
continues to mark Augustine’s experience, constituting a void or piercing blackhole 
around which the remainder of his re-marks orbit. “An overwhelming grief welled up in 
my heart,”543 Augustine tells us, “my soul was wounded, and my life as it were torn to 
pieces.”544 He struggles, in agony, to reconcile this torrent of sadness with the assurance 
afforded by his faith, a faith that Monica’s soul is finally free. Why, given this assurance, 
“did I suffer sharp pains of inward grief?” he asks.545 No answer. Instead, he bathes, a 
sacred, cleansing, and incredibly cathartic ritual for anyone seeking to privately shed the 
uncontrollable tears that often constitute the work of mourning and the labor of grief. He 
spends the remainder of the book eulogizing Monica and offering prayers for her 
memory, while also wondering why his God seems to have failed him: “I asked you…to 
heal my pain. You did not do so.”546 
 This is the re-marked scene of sorrow and lamentation that immediately precedes 
the discussion of memory and time in Books X-XI. The more philosophical examinations 
that follow are thus situated within a larger context of mourning, longing, and thoughtful 
remembrance, forming an affective crux that closely orbits the same propulsive, 
animating features of nostalgic experience this project has mapped out. Book X, the 
longest of the text by far, deals with memory. It contains some of the best known and 
most quoted lines of the entire work (e.g., “What do I love when I love my God?”547 and 
 
542 Ibid., IX.6.28. 
543 Ibid., IX.7.29. 
544 Ibid., IX.7.30. 
545 Ibid., IX.7.30. 
546 Ibid., IX.7.32. 




“Late have I loved you, beauty so old and so new: late have I loved you.”),548 but it opens 
simply and succinctly: “May I know you, who know me.”549 This address is as 
indeterminate and multidirectional as the one that guides Jack O’Brien in Malick’s The 
Tree of Life. And, like that film, Augustine’s experience and textual practice are marked 
by a series of turns—to himself, his God, and his losses—turns that snake back upon 
themselves and fold in on one another, ultimately propelling him back out into the world. 
“May I know you, who know me,” a petition immediately preceded by an obituary. To 
whom is Augustine’s supplication addressed? His (absent) God? His (dead) mother? His 
(unsettled) self? In this context grief and mourning initiate the stirrings of memory, the 
propulsive possibility of a new mourning in the wake of loss and discontinuity. Like 
Mörike’s hybrid feeling—half pleasure, half grief—Augustine’s tears are those mourning 
and morning. They are drawn from the wellspring of nostalgic desire, a desire for return, 
and a desire to assimilate a loss in the face of which nearly all available means of 
assimilation appear inoperative.  
 Augustine is affected by the loss of his mother and this affectedness impels his 
examination of memory, time, and temporization. He wants to know or discover how, 
exactly, he may continue to know or maintain a relation with what haunts him, with what 
is no longer immediately present yet still active in the weave of available memory-traces. 
This, I think, is the governing motif of the Confessions and the impetus for Augustine’s 
famous formulation of distentio animi, a notion that Mörike gestures toward for similar 
 
548 Ibid., X.27.38. 




reasons in Im Frühling, a yearning (sehnend) that is also a distending (dehnend). For 
Augustine, distentio animi refers to the spasm, open tension, and endless distention of the 
temporized self stretched out in opposite directions, the elongated extension of the 
animating force that is the soul within and across the time. Augustine finds himself 
situated in the thickness of the present, propelled toward the imminent horizon of the 
future, and ceaselessly haunted by traces of the past that remain opaque but not illegible. 
To the extent that his text is a written, meditative confession it stands as a patient and 
focused effort to make those traces more legible by mobilizing the propulsive effects of 
nostalgic experience, an experience that is also the experience of time’s limits and 
fecundity.  
 When Augustine famously observes that he knows time on an intuitive, everyday 
level but fails adequately explicate it, it is because he rightly senses that temporality is 
lived and felt before it can be subject to the determinations of abstraction and speculative 
thinking. He feels the flow of time and is deeply affected by its flux. In the wake of a 
profound loss, he contends with the fleeting, ephemeral character of experience as the 
nested structure of his text indicates. Books X-XI, on time and memory, take place inside 
a narrative of grief and mourning that itself takes place inside a larger work of 
remembrance and autobiographical introspection—an attempt, in other words, to re-mark 
upon the traces and specters that constitute a stretched-out self, running both ahead and 




Wittmann calls “the feeling of life as time,”550 and what I might call the feeling of time as 
nostalgia, an anticipatory and spectral type of nostalgia that takes the protracted feeling 
of temporization as irreducible. As both St. Augustine and Malick’s Jack O’Brien 
demonstrate, this form of nostalgia acts as a necessary resource for both the bounded 
conditions and the yet-to-be-determined capaciousness of human existence—an open and 
ongoing receptivity, both precarious and propulsive.  
 Distentio animi—the distended soul, life’s animating force stretched out in 
variance, anchored in the moving present. Time moves on, full steam ahead, without 
hesitation or delay. Our capacities for remembrance, feeling, and temporal awareness do 
not, however. They run ahead, sometimes lag behind, and are, at times, forced sideways, 
always moving in multiple directions. They capture a great deal but fail to secure 
anything with permanence or stability. The mind remembers, then forgets, then forgets it 
ever forgot. People, things, and our former selves pass away. They are missed and longed 
for, except when they are not. C’est la vie. That is life—or, better, that is what life will 
have been. For now, time stages a ceaseless war between memory and forgetfulness. 
Sometimes, if the conditions are right, nostalgia appears between skirmishes, rushing on 
the scene to triage and assess the losses. And, sometimes, if the conditions are especially 
right, that bittersweet feeling—half pleasure, half mourning—may generate animating, 
propulsive returns. But those returns cannot always assure contentment or even pure 
painlessness. They are too late, after all. They best they can do is to muster a belated re-
 
550 Marc Wittmann, Felt Time: The Psychology of How We Perceive Time, trans. Erik Butler 




mark. That re-mark may open old wounds in order to dress the new ones, bringing back a 
familiar ache but with a new, unturned sense of how that ache might move us. The new 
dressing forms a new scar, a new mark from which to read the outworking of our 
accretive experience, a reminder of our finitude and fragility, a temporal index of our 
movement in the world. Maybe, then, Chris Marker is right in the epigraph quoted above, 
that there is nothing to distinguish ordinary moments from memories except the belated 
presence of marks and scars. If he is, then perhaps there is nothing to distinguish the 
marks of memory from the work of nostalgia—except the abundances of life. And time. 
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